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1 Executive Summary (EN) 
This report provides input for the evaluation of the State aid rules related to environmental 
protection and energy, with a particular focus on the EU Guidelines on State aid for 
environmental protection and energy (EEAG) applicable in 2014-2020 and on the 
provisions applicable to aid for environmental protection and energy (Section 7) of 
Commission Regulation (EU) 651/2014 (GBER). The overall objective of the report is to 
provide background information for the review of these provisions. The topics covered in 
the report are related to the effectiveness, efficiency and relevance of the State aid rules. 
Effectiveness 
Bidding processes for renewable energy sources (RES) - EEAG and General Block 
Exemption Regulation (GBER) exemptions. Partly as a result of the new rules in place 
since 2014, renewable energy sources are often contracted via bidding processes such as 
auctions and tenders, rather than by the direct award of contracts. The sample of bidding 
processes in this study covers all bidding processes held in the period 2014-November 
2019 under aid schemes (identified by the EC project team) approved under the EEAG or 
GBER in a selection of Member States jointly accounting for over 80% of installed 
renewables generation capacity in the EU in 2018. The sample thus excludes schemes from 
these Member States that ran during this period but which were based on schemes still 
approved under the guidelines previously applicable. The Member States selected 
accounted for 81% of installed renewables generation capacity in the EU in 2018. Within 
the sample, the largest number of bidding processes occurred in 2018 (71), while the 
highest volume awarded was in 2017 (25.6 GW). Within the sampled schemes, the 
weighted average price of wind capacity fell by 62% between 2015 and 2019, while the 
weighted average price of solar capacity fell by 51% between 2014 and 2019. Averaging 
across the sampled schemes, a consistent picture does not emerge as to whether average 
prices are lower in multi-technology than single-technology auctions. However, price 
comparisons are hampered by Member States’ specific factors such as local climate 
conditions (e.g. sun and wind patterns), the size (in KW) of the installations admitted in 
the auctions or the length of support provided (in years). Nevertheless, within each major 
category of technology average prices were lower when the bidding volume exceeded the 
volume requested than when the reverse was true. Direct comparisons of prices between 
competitively awarded and administratively set support are hard to identify and should be 
treated with caution, although, out of 9 case study comparisons on 6 occasions the 
competitively set price was lower than the comparative administratively set prices. Many 
RES-related schemes have benefitted from exemptions under the EU rules. To understand 
the specific type of exemptions granted, information on 61 schemes involving an 
exemption were collected and examined: 39 of them relate to the EEAG and 28 to the 
GBER. Among the 61 schemes, 29 can be linked to point 125 EEAG, 19 to point 127 EEAG, 
and 21 to Article 43 GBER. 
Support for high efficiency Combined Heat and Power (CHP) technologies. CHP 
regimes capture and use heat generated as a by-product of the electricity generation 
process or employ industrial heat processes to generate electricity as a by-product. This 
can reduce carbon emissions. Such schemes are common in some EU countries with 
substantial heat demands. Calculations of the lifetime aid levels per unit of installed 
capacity for hypothetical case study plants have been performed for Belgium, the Czech 
Republic, France, Germany, the Netherlands and Poland, schemes which all involve 
operating aid. These can be compared to the lifetime aid levels for actual plants built in 
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Denmark and Lithuania. For larger plants, competitive award processes have occurred in 
Germany since 2017 and Poland held a bidding process in 2019. The main finding is the 
scale of differences in the level of aid awarded across different plant types and plant sizes. 
These differences likely reflect the wide variety of CHP installations used, differences in the 
size of the installations and the context in which they are used. In Belgium (before 2018) 
the Czech Republic, France and Germany, the highest levels of aid were granted to the 
smallest plants and for technologies associated with small plants. Averaging across the 
hypothetical case study plants in Germany and the Czech Republic the lifetime aid per KW 
of electrical capacity for plants below 100 KW in size was around double the average for 
hypothetical case study plants in the 100 KW to 1 MW size range.   
Capacity mechanisms – auction outcomes and scheme designs. To assess the 
performance of capacity mechanisms, various auctions outcomes and scheme designs were 
compared over the reference period. A sample of 11 schemes in 7 Member States was 
examined, based on a selection by the Commission. In Greece and Germany the capacity 
awarded is either predominantly or all demand side responsive. Greece, Poland and Ireland 
generally had higher capacity prices than France or the UK. In Germany, fast interruptible 
load auctions almost always cleared at their price caps in 2017 and 2018. In 2019, prices 
fell below price caps, though by no more than 4%. This is likely associated with limited 
competition, in terms of the volume participating, prior to 2019. In Greece, the auctions 
for the two types of demand-side capacity response have drifted towards their respective 
price caps. However, it is not obvious that this pricing trend in Greece can be associated 
with a reduction in competition. Overall, across the sampled schemes 65.5% of capacity 
was awarded on the basis of one-year contracts, more than three times as much as for the 
next most awarded contract length of 15 years. 
Negative pricing in electricity generation. A phenomenon of electricity markets is that, 
to balance supply and demand, the price paid to producers of electricity can sometimes be 
negative, in order to discourage the delivery of excess electricity into the system. Such 
demand-supply imbalances can arise when suppliers have low costs of production and 
receive guaranteed payments for production. In Germany, between 2014 and 2019, 720 
hours of negative day ahead prices occurred, with hundreds of negative day ahead price 
hours also occurring in Denmark’s two energy markets. However, in Great Britain there 
were no negative day ahead price hours observed (unlike in Ireland) and in the Netherlands 
there were only two hours. Following the introduction of the EEAG, measures were put in 
place to reduce generators’ incentives to produce during periods of negative prices, for 
example in Germany, by stopping support after six consecutive hours of negative pricing. 
Nevertheless, total RES generation has increased during negative day ahead price periods 
in Germany, France and Denmark. Also, the overall trend has been for the number of 
negative price hours to increase between 2014 and 2019. In Germany, for example, the 
number of negative price hours increased from under 70 in 2014 to more than 140 in the 
first eight months of 2019. However, data limitations restrict the ability to understand the 
precise behaviour of RES installations receiving aid subject to negative pricing rules. 
Levies for energy from renewable sources (RES levies). The EU has established 
targets for the percentage of primary energy consumption to be supplied from RES in each 
Member State for 2020. Four Member States (Hungary, Italy, Spain and Sweden) have set 
targets for RES production for 2020 that exceed their binding EU targets. These more 
ambitious targets were all set prior to 2014. 12 Member States had reached their EU 2020 
targets by 2018, with exceeding their target by more than one percentage point. One of 
the various mechanisms to finance RES support schemes is to charge levies on consumers. 
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RES levies as a percentage of electricity charges are examined for different types of 
example households, example non-energy intensive commercial users and example energy 
intensive users in 15 Member States. Averaging across the example users, RES levies 
account for less than 25% of the electricity bill in all Member States in all examined years, 
with the exception of non-energy intensive commercial users in Germany and Italy, where 
the percentage has increased from under 15% in 2009 to more than 40% in 2018. 
Waste management. The review of the national State aid schemes officially 
communicated to the Commission by the Member States between 2014 and mid-2019 as 
falling under Article 47 GBER showed that 71 out of 129 schemes (55%) explicitly mention 
or quote this provision, while 13 (10%) mention waste management without referring 
explicitly to this provision. A third category contains 45 schemes (35%) not covering nor 
mentioning waste management at all. These schemes are of a more general nature, 
providing for basic rules and regulations to be complied with by beneficiaries in order to be 
eligible for State aid covering measures of a different and/or sometimes unspecified kind. 
In 73 of the 84 schemes (87%) explicitly covering measures falling under Article 47 GBER, 
the aid was limited to support for waste recycling and preparation for re-use. Four of the 
84 schemes (5%) also included other kinds of projects, while seven (8%) did not address 
recycling or preparation for re-use projects. Among the 84 schemes, 71 (85%) do not 
contain eligible activities targeting specific types of waste, while the other 13 (15%) have 
such a focus. A survey conducted with all 32 relevant granting authorities from eight 
selected Member States, covering 56 schemes, led to 36 replies concerning 43 schemes in 
all eight selected Member States. The replies showed that nine authorities in five Member 
States actually granted aid for waste management and/or preparation for re-use projects 
in the reference period, sometimes under various schemes. These nine authorities 
indicated that they granted aid to a total of 975 individual projects (951 located in France) 
for a total of approx. EUR 133 million (approx. EUR 93 million in France). The authorities 
that did not grant aid at all or only in certain years indicated that the main reasons were 
the lack of applications, the narrow scope of Article 47 GBER, and the strict conditions and 
formalities to be fulfilled in order to qualify for such aid. 
Efficiency 
RES and CHP levy reductions to Energy Intensive Users (EIU). To assess whether 
the introduction of levy rebates for EIU led to increases of levies for other users, the 
development of levy rates over time for different user groups was analysed. The data allow 
identifying three broad groups of countries with different types of levies development. First, 
there are three countries with levy pattern consistent with a lasting redistribution effect: 
Germany (RES), Greece (RES), and Slovenia. In these countries, the RES levy reductions 
to EIUs were accompanied by the increase of levies on non-EIUs permanently. Second, 
there are countries with a pattern consistent with a short-lived redistribution effect that 
vanishes over time: Greece (CHP) and Poland (RES). Third, there are countries where no 
effect on rates for non-rebated customers could be observed: Denmark, France, Germany 
(CHP), Italy (introduction of rebates in 2014), Latvia, Poland (CHP), Romania, and the UK. 
The reductions in these countries were typically financed by the State and thus did not give 
scope for redistribution effects. In addition, the relevance of the grandfathering rule was 
assessed by measuring the proportion of sales by the grandfathered undertakings in their 
economy sector and country in 2017. Sectors not covered by the EEAG in Germany, Italy 
and Poland were considered. For Germany, there are four sectors (out of 30) with shares 
between 5% and 10%, while all other sectors have shares below 5%. For Poland, there 
are at most three sectors (out of 15+) with sales shares exceeding 5%, two of them being 
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very high, between 20% and 35%. For Italy, there are 19 sectors (out of 83) with sales 
shares exceeding 5%, and in three of them the sales share exceeds 30%. 
Financial instruments for energy efficiency in buildings. The review of all State aid 
schemes officially communicated to the Commission by the Member States as falling under 
Article 39 GBER between 2014 and mid-2019 showed that 47 out of 71 schemes (66%) 
contained explicit references to this provision or referred to energy efficiency in buildings 
in general terms. The 24 schemes which do not cover nor mention energy efficiency 
projects in buildings (34%) are of a more general nature, providing for basic rules and 
regulations to be complied with by beneficiaries in order to be eligible for State aid covering 
measures of a different and/or sometimes unspecified kind. Among the 47 relevant 
schemes, three categories can be identified: 19 reproduce entirely or almost completely 
the wording of Article 39 GBER (40%) and 14 mention that support shall be granted in 
accordance with this provision, but without giving further details (36%). For those two 
categories, the national provisions do not indicate how granting authorities verify the 
conditions of Article 39 GBER. A third category contains 11 schemes (24%) related to the 
support of energy efficiency in buildings without quoting Article 39 GBER and without 
referring to financial instruments. The stakeholder consultation into the relevant schemes 
comprised a sample of 21 granting authorities in eight selected Member States, covering 
29 State aid schemes. Among these, 17 authorities from eight Member States participated 
by replying to the survey, which revealed that many granting authorities consider Article 
39 GBER as lengthy and complex. Only one authority (in Greece) indicated that it provided 
loans for energy efficiency projects in buildings under Article 39 GBER. The same authority 
explained that it considered Article 39 of the GBER clear and not difficult to apply but 
regretted –like some other authorities - that the wording does not specify whether this 
provision can be combined with the de minimis Regulation. Other authorities stated that 
they prefer to rely on other, clearer provisions (e.g. Article 38 GBER). The contacted 
authorities were not aware of instances in which ESCOs or energy suppliers made energy 
supply contracts subject to the provision of energy-efficiency services or vice versa. 
Although there is evidence that ESCOs may provide both energy supply contracts and 
energy-efficiency services, the desk review of publicly available information did not suggest 
that they made the provision of the one conditional to the other. 
Relevance 
Zero subsidy bids. Based on publicly available information collected by 31 August 2019, 
the total volume of announced subsidy-free renewable energy projects currently in Europe 
is approx. 18 GW. Though the majority of this capacity results from zero-subsidy bids made 
in renewable energy auctions, the number of projects put forward outside of auction 
systems is rapidly increasing. Overall, one third of the 60 GW that Aurora (2018) has 
announced as the potential for subsidy-free renewables in North-West Europe by 2030, is 
in the pipeline. In light of this, the ability of markets to deliver zero-carbon electricity 
without public support seems promising. However, a significant part of the 18 GW volume 
comes from projects that are only at the planning stage, and it is not guaranteed that they 
will actually be built. Companies may have secured only enough finance to get a project 
through the planning process, rather than to build it. In the subsidy-free environment, 
lenders may be cautious about investing when the earning potential of the project is 
dependent on the wholesale electricity market. At the very least, subsidy-free deployment 
means financiers are likely to demand higher expected returns for their renewable energy 
stocks to match that risk. Moreover, the subsidy-free offshore wind projects in Germany 
and the Netherlands were not fully subsidy-free, given the guaranteed connection to the 
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grid. As to the auctions in Spain, though the guaranteed price floors are so low that they 
are unlikely ever to materialize, they still help to reduce the risk faced by the projects and 
can therefore be viewed as an implicit subsidy. These observations combined support the 
view presented in Evans (2018), that in spite of the promising outlook, government 
contracts may still be needed to support the renewable expansion. 
Alternative fuel infrastructure. The review of the schemes approved by the Commission 
for support of publicly accessible or dedicated alternative fuel infrastructure in the transport 
sector showed that all schemes (except one) were carried out by way of a bidding 
procedure or a call for applications. One scheme was addressed to only one beneficiary (a 
public authority in charge of general safety and water pollution control), and thus no tender 
was carried out. The projects concern the purchase of electric and/or natural gas buses 
and/or related charging/re-fuelling infrastructure. The technology referred to in these 
projects is related to standard or fast charging installations, alternative energy supply for 
cruise ships, as well as liquefied or compressed natural gas and hydrogen filling stations. 
The recharging infrastructure for buses is dedicated or semi-dedicated to public transport 
operators, whereas the infrastructure for electric cars and cruise ships is publicly 
accessible. The geographical coverage depends on the project: infrastructure of electric 
and/or natural gas buses only covers urban areas, whereas publicly accessible charging or 
refuelling infrastructure projects generally have a wider scope. The related charges for the 
use of the charging/re-fuelling infrastructure depend also on the type of project. There are 
no related charges applicable when the projects relate to the infrastructure of electric 
and/or natural gas buses. When the projects however concern electric vehicle charging 
infrastructure, the fees for the use of the funded charging facilities vary and depend usually 
on the tariff of the respective provider, on the duration of the charging session as well as 
on the charging power. The direct public funding with regard to the approved schemes for 
infrastructure for electric cars was in average ca. 34% in comparison to the total costs. 
The direct public financing for the bus schemes range from 32% for the Portuguese scheme 
to 69% for the German scheme, the high number for the German scheme resulting from 
the fact that majority of the funds were used to support the acquisition of buses and not 
for the installation of the infrastructure.  
For the selected electric charging station projects in six selected Member States, the review 
of ten projects showed that nine of them were supported by public financing, either by the 
EU, via the CEF/Horizon 2020 program, and/or by the Member States. One project was 
financed entirely from private funds. It related to one electric charging station established 
in a shopping mall in Tallinn by the operator of the Mall, which was willing to achieve the 
highest energy performance standard for the Mall. The implementation period of the 
projects lasted from less than one to four years. With respect to the technology, eight 
projects are fully or partially based on fast charging technology, while two are exclusively 
providing standard charging technology. Nine projects are always accessible (24/7), while 
one project has limited access due to regulated opening hours. Users have to pay for the 
usage of eight of the electric charging station projects. The fees vary and depend on the 
charging time, charging location and charging technology. Some project operators offer 
packages with a monthly basic fee, with reduced prices charged per KWh. The financing 
for the selected electric charging station projects ranges from no direct public financing to 
100% direct public financing. 
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2 Sommaire analytique (FR) 
Ce rapport fournit des éléments d'information pour l'évaluation des règles relatives aux 
aides d'État liées à la protection de l'environnement et à l'énergie, en mettant 
particulièrement l'accent sur les lignes directrices concernant les aides d'État à la protection 
de l'environnement et l'énergie pour la période 2014–2020 (EEAG) et sur les dispositions 
applicables aux aides pour la protection de l'environnement et l'énergie (section 7) du 
règlement (UE) 651/2014 de la Commission (RGEC). L'objectif général du rapport est de 
fournir des informations contextuelles pour le réexamen de ces dispositions. Les thèmes 
abordés dans le rapport concernent l'efficacité, l'efficience et la pertinence des règles 
relatives aux aides d'État. 
Efficacité 
Procédures d'appel d'offres pour les sources d'énergie renouvelables (SER) - 
Exemptions en vertu des EEAG et du règlement général d'exemption par catégorie 
(RGEC). En partie à cause des nouvelles règles en vigueur depuis 2014, les sources 
d'énergie renouvelables sont souvent contractées par voie d’enchères et d’appels d'offres, 
plutôt que par l'attribution directe de contrats. L'échantillon de procédures d'appel d'offres 
dans cette étude couvre toutes les procédures d'appel d'offres organisées entre 2014 et 
novembre 2019 dans le cadre de régimes d'aide (identifiés par l'équipe de projet de la 
Commission européenne) approuvés en vertu des EEAG ou du RGEC dans une sélection 
d'États membres représentant conjointement plus de 80 % de la capacité de production 
d'énergie renouvelable installée dans l'UE en 2018. L'échantillon exclut donc les régimes 
de ces États membres qui étaient en vigueur durant cette période mais qui étaient fondés 
sur des régimes encore approuvés par les lignes directrices précédemment applicables. Les 
États membres sélectionnés représentaient 81 % de la capacité de production d'énergie 
renouvelable installée dans l'UE en 2018. Au sein de l'échantillon, le plus grand nombre de 
procédures d'appel d'offres a eu lieu en 2018 (71), tandis que le volume le plus élevé a été 
attribué en 2017 (25,6 GW). Au sein des régimes échantillonnés, le prix moyen pondéré 
de la capacité éolienne a baissé de 62 % entre 2015 et 2019, tandis que le prix moyen 
pondéré de la capacité solaire a baissé de 51 % entre 2014 et 2019. Au vu de la moyenne 
des systèmes de l'échantillon, il n'est pas possible de déterminer de manière cohérente si 
les prix moyens sont plus bas dans les enchères multi-technologies que dans les enchères 
mono-technologies. Toutefois, les comparaisons de prix sont entravées par des facteurs 
spécifiques aux États membres, tels que les conditions climatiques locales (par exemple, 
l'ensoleillement et la configuration des vents), la taille (en KW) des installations admises 
aux enchères ou la durée de l'aide fournie (en années). Néanmoins, dans chaque grande 
catégorie de technologie, les prix moyens étaient inférieurs lorsque le volume des offres 
dépassait le volume demandé par rapport à l'inverse. Les comparaisons directes des prix 
entre les aides attribuées par voie concurrentielle et celles fixées par voie administrative 
sont difficiles à identifier et doivent être traitées avec prudence, bien que, sur 9 
comparaisons d'études de cas, à 6 reprises, le prix fixé par voie concurrentielle était 
inférieur aux prix comparatifs fixés par voie administrative. De nombreux régimes liés aux 
SER ont bénéficié d'exemptions en vertu des règles de l'UE. Pour comprendre le type 
spécifique d'exemptions accordées, des informations sur 61 régimes comportant une 
exemption ont été recueillies et examinées : 39 concernent les EEAG et 28 le RGEC. Parmi 
les 61 régimes, 29 peuvent être liés au point 125 EEAG, 19 au point 127 EEAG et 21 à 
l'article 43 RGEC. 
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Soutien aux technologies de production combinée de chaleur et d'électricité 
(PCCE) à haut rendement. Les régimes de cogénération capturent et utilisent la chaleur 
générée comme sous-produit du processus de production d'électricité ou emploient des 
processus industriels de production de chaleur pour produire de l'électricité comme sous-
produit. Cela peut réduire les émissions de carbone. De tels systèmes sont courants dans 
certains pays de l'UE où la demande de chaleur est importante. Des calculs de niveaux 
d'aide sur la durée de vie par unité de capacité installée pour des usines hypothétiques ont 
été effectués pour la Belgique, la République Tchèque, la France, l'Allemagne, les Pays-Bas 
et la Pologne, où les régimes comportent tous des aides au fonctionnement. Ceux-ci 
peuvent être comparés aux niveaux d'aide à vie pour les centrales réelles construites au 
Danemark et en Lituanie. Pour les grandes centrales, des procédures d'adjudication 
concurrentielles ont eu lieu en Allemagne depuis 2017 et la Pologne a organisé une 
procédure d'appel d'offres en 2019. La principale conclusion est l'ampleur des différences 
dans le niveau d'aide accordé selon les différents types et tailles d'installations. Ces 
différences reflètent probablement la grande variété des installations de cogénération 
utilisées, les différences de taille des installations et le contexte dans lequel elles sont 
utilisées. En Allemagne, Belgique (avant 2018), France et en République Tchèque, les 
niveaux d'aide les plus élevés étaient accordés aux plus petites installations et aux 
technologies associées aux petites installations. En moyenne, pour les centrales d’étude 
de cas hypothétiques en Allemagne et en République Tchèque, l'aide à vie par KW de 
capacité électrique pour les centrales d'une taille inférieure à 100 KW était environ le 
double de la moyenne des centrales d’étude de cas hypothétiques dans la fourchette de 
100 KW à 1 MW. 
Mécanismes de capacité - résultats des enchères et conception des systèmes. Pour 
évaluer la performance des mécanismes de capacité, les résultats des différentes enchères 
et les modèles de systèmes ont été comparés pendant la période de référence. Un 
échantillon de 11 systèmes dans 7 États membres a été examiné, sur la base d'une 
sélection effectuée par la Commission. En Grèce et en Allemagne, la capacité est 
principalement ou entièrement attribuée en réponse à la demande. En Grèce, en Pologne 
et en Irlande, les prix des capacités étaient généralement plus élevés qu'en France ou au 
Royaume-Uni. En Allemagne, les enchères à charge interruptible rapide ont presque 
toujours été autorisées à leur prix plafond en 2017 et 2018. En 2019, les prix sont tombés 
en dessous des plafonds de prix, mais pas de plus de 4%. Cela est probablement lié à une 
concurrence limitée, en termes de volume de participation, avant 2019. En Grèce, les 
enchères pour les deux types de réponse de capacité côté demande ont dérivé vers leurs 
plafonds de prix respectifs. Toutefois, il n'est pas évident que cette tendance des prix en 
Grèce puisse être associée à une réduction de la concurrence. Globalement, dans 
l'ensemble des régimes de l'échantillon, 65,5 % des capacités ont été attribuées sur la 
base de contrats d'un an, soit plus de trois fois plus que pour la deuxième durée de contrat 
la plus adjugée, à savoir 15 ans. 
Prix négatifs dans la production d'électricité. Dans le but d’équilibrer l’offre et la 
demande sur les marchés de l’électricité, le prix payé aux producteurs d’électricité peut 
parfois être négatif afin de décourager la livraison d'électricité excédentaire dans le 
système. De tels déséquilibres entre l'offre et la demande peuvent survenir lorsque les 
fournisseurs ont des coûts de production peu élevés et reçoivent des paiements garantis 
pour la production. En Allemagne, entre 2014 et 2019, 720 heures de prix à l’avance 
négatifs ont été enregistrées, et des centaines d'heures de prix à l’avance négatifs se sont 
produites sur les deux marchés de l'énergie du Danemark. Cependant, en Grande-
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Bretagne, aucune heure de prix négatif n'a été observée (contrairement à l'Irlande) et aux 
Pays-Bas il n'y a eu que deux heures de ce type. Suite à l'introduction de l'EEAG, des 
mesures ont été mises en place pour réduire les incitations des producteurs à produire 
pendant les périodes de prix négatifs, par exemple en Allemagne, en mettant fin au soutien 
après six heures consécutives de prix négatifs. Néanmoins, la production totale de SER en 
Allemagne, en France et au Danemark a augmenté pendant les périodes de prix à l’avance 
négatifs. De plus, la tendance générale est à l'augmentation du nombre d'heures à prix 
négatifs entre 2014 et 2019. En Allemagne, par exemple, le nombre d'heures à prix 
négatifs est passé de moins de 70 en 2014 à plus de 140 au cours des huit premiers mois 
de 2019. Toutefois, les limites des données restreignent la capacité à comprendre le 
comportement précis des installations SER bénéficiant d'une aide soumise à des règles de 
tarification négatives.   
Prélèvements pour l'énergie produite à partir de sources renouvelables 
(prélèvements sur les SER). L'UE a fixé des objectifs concernant le pourcentage de la 
consommation d'énergie primaire à fournir à partir de SER dans chaque État membre pour 
2020. Quatre États membres (Hongrie, Italie, Espagne et Suède) ont fixé des objectifs de 
production de SER pour 2020 qui dépassent les objectifs contraignants de l'UE. Ces 
objectifs, plus ambitieux, ont tous été fixés avant 2014. Douze États membres avaient 
atteint leurs objectifs UE 2020 en 2018, avec un dépassement de plus d'un point de 
pourcentage. L'un des divers mécanismes de financement du régime d’aide aux SER 
consiste à prélever des taxes auprès des consommateurs. Les prélèvements sur les SER 
en pourcentage des redevances d'électricité sont examinés pour différents types de 
ménages types, par exemple les utilisateurs commerciaux non intensifs en énergie et les 
utilisateurs intensifs en énergie dans 15 États membres. En moyenne, les redevances SER 
représentent moins de 25% de la facture d'électricité dans tous les États membres pour 
toutes les années examinées, à l'exception des utilisateurs commerciaux à faible 
consommation d'énergie en Allemagne et en Italie, où le pourcentage est passé de moins 
de 15% en 2009 à plus de 40% en 2018. 
La gestion des déchets. L'examen des régimes d'aides d'État nationaux officiellement 
communiqués à la Commission par les États membres entre 2014 et la mi-2019 comme 
relevant de l'article 47 RGEC a montré que 71 des 129 régimes (55%) mentionnent ou 
citent explicitement cette disposition, tandis que 13 (10%) mentionnent la gestion des 
déchets sans référence explicite à cette disposition. Une troisième catégorie comprend 45 
régimes (35%) qui ne couvrent ni ne mentionnent la gestion des déchets. Ces régimes 
sont de nature plus générale et prévoient des règles et dispositions que les bénéficiaires 
doivent respecter pour pouvoir bénéficier d'une aide d'État couvrant des mesures de nature 
différente et/ou parfois non spécifiée. Dans 73 des 84 régimes (87%) couvrant 
explicitement des mesures relevant de l'article 47 RGEC, l'aide était limitée au soutien du 
recyclage des déchets et de la préparation en vue de leur réutilisation. Quatre des 84 
régimes (5%) incluaient également d'autres types de projets, tandis que sept (8%) ne 
concernaient pas des projets de recyclage ou de préparation en vue de la réutilisation. 
Parmi les 84 régimes, 71 (85%) ne contiennent pas d'activités éligibles ciblant des types 
de déchets spécifiques, tandis que les 13 autres (15%) disposent d’ une telle orientation. 
Une enquête menée auprès des 32 autorités compétentes, couvrant 56 régimes d’aides 
dans les huit États membres sélectionnés, a donné lieu à 36 réponses concernant 43 
régimes dans les huit États membres sélectionnés. Les réponses ont montré que neuf 
autorités dans cinq États membres ont effectivement accordé des aides à des projets de 
gestion des déchets et/ou de préparation à la réutilisation au cours de la période de 
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référence, parfois dans le cadre de différents régimes. Ces neuf autorités ont indiqué 
qu'elles avaient accordé des aides à un total de 975 projets individuels (951 situés en 
France) pour un total d'environ 133 millions d'euros (environ 93 millions d'euros en 
France). Les autorités n'ayant pas accordé d'aides ou seulement lors de certaines années 
ont indiqué que les principales raisons étaient l’absence de demandes, le champ 
d'application étroit de l'article 47 RGEC et les conditions et formalités strictes à remplir 
pour pouvoir bénéficier de ces aides. 
Efficience 
Les SER et la cogénération permettent de réduire les taxes pour les utilisateurs 
intensifs d'énergie (UIE). Afin d'évaluer si l'introduction de réductions de taxes pour les 
UIE a conduit à des augmentations de taxes pour d'autres utilisateurs, l'évolution des taux 
de taxes au fil du temps pour différents groupes d'utilisateurs a été analysée. Les données 
permettent d'identifier trois grands groupes de pays avec différents types de 
développement des prélèvements. Tout d'abord, dans trois pays le modèle de 
prélèvements est compatible avec un effet de redistribution durable: Allemagne (SER), 
Grèce (SER) et Slovénie. Dans ces pays, la réduction des prélèvements RES sur les UIE 
s'est accompagnée d'une augmentation permanente des prélèvements sur les non-UIE. 
Deuxièmement, plusieurs pays ont un schéma cohérent avec un effet de redistribution de 
courte durée qui disparaît avec le temps: Grèce (PCCE) et Pologne (SER). Troisièmement, 
dans certains pays, aucun effet sur les tarifs pour les clients non remboursés n'a pu être 
observé : Danemark, France, Allemagne (PCCE), Italie (introduction de rabais en 2014), 
Lettonie, Pologne (PCCE), Roumanie et Royaume-Uni. Les réductions dans ces pays étaient 
généralement financées par l'État et ne permettaient donc pas d'observer des effets de 
redistribution. En outre, la pertinence de la règle des droits acquis a été évaluée en 
mesurant la proportion des ventes des entreprises bénéficiant de ces droits dans leur 
secteur économique et leur pays en 2017. Les secteurs non couverts par l'EEAG en 
Allemagne, en Italie et en Pologne ont été pris en compte. Pour l'Allemagne, il y a quatre 
secteurs (sur 30) dont les parts se situent entre 5 et 10%, tandis que tous les autres 
secteurs ont des parts inférieures à 5 %. Pour la Pologne, il y a au plus trois secteurs (sur 
15+) avec des parts de ventes supérieures à 5%, deux d'entre eux très élevés, entre 20% 
et 35%. Pour l'Italie, 19 secteurs (sur 83) ont une part de ventes supérieure à 5%, et dans 
trois d'entre eux, la part de ventes dépasse 30%. 
Instruments financiers pour l'efficacité énergétique dans les bâtiments. L’analyse 
de tous les régimes d'aides d'État officiellement communiqués à la Commission par les 
États membres comme relevant de l'article 39 RGEC entre 2014 et mi-2019 a montré que 
47 des 71 régimes (66%) contenaient des références explicites à cette disposition ou 
faisaient référence à l'efficacité énergétique dans les bâtiments en termes généraux. Les 
24 régimes qui ne couvrent ni mentionnent les projets d'efficacité énergétique dans les 
bâtiments (34%) sont de nature plus générale, prévoyant des règles et dispositions que 
les bénéficiaires doivent respecter pour pouvoir bénéficier d'aides d'État, couvrant des 
mesures de nature différente et/ou parfois non spécifiées. Parmi les 47 régimes concernés, 
trois catégories peuvent être  identifiées : 19 reproduisent entièrement ou presque 
entièrement le libellé de l'article 39 RGEC (40%) et 14 mentionnent que l’aide est accordée 
conformément à cette disposition sans toutefois donner plus de détails (36%). Pour ces 
deux catégories, les dispositions nationales n'indiquent pas comment les autorités 
chargées de l'octroi des aides vérifient le respect des conditions de l'article 39 RGEC. Une 
troisième catégorie contient 11 régimes (24%) liés au soutien de l'efficacité énergétique 
dans les bâtiments  sans citer l'article 39 RGEC et sans faire référence aux instruments 
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financiers. La consultation des parties concernées sur les régimes concernés a porté sur 
un échantillon de 21 autorités chargées de l'octroi des aides dans huit États membres 
sélectionnés, couvrant 29 régimes d'aides d'État. Parmi ceux-ci, 17 autorités dans huit 
États membres ont participé en répondant à l'enquête, qui a révélé que de nombreuses 
autorités considèrent l'article 39 RGEC comme étant long et complexe. Une seule autorité 
(en Grèce) a indiqué qu'elle accordait des prêts pour des projets d'efficacité énergétique 
dans les bâtiments au titre de l'article 39 RGEC. La même autorité a expliqué qu'elle 
considérait l'article 39 RGEC comme clair et non difficile à appliquer mais a regretté - 
comme certaines autres autorités - que la formulation ne précise pas si cette disposition 
peut être combinée avec le règlement de minimis. D'autres autorités ont déclaré qu'elles 
préfèrent s'appuyer sur d'autres dispositions plus claires (p.ex. l'article 38 RGEC). Les 
autorités contactées n'avaient pas connaissance de cas dans lesquels les fournisseurs de 
services énergétiques et les fournisseurs d'énergie conditionnaient les contrats de 
fourniture d'énergie à la fourniture de services d'efficacité énergétique, ou inversement. 
Bien qu'il y soit établi que les fournisseurs de services peuvent offrir à la fois de l'énergie 
et des services d'efficacité énergétique, l'examen des informations accessibles au public 
n'a pas suggéré qu'elles avaient conditionné la fourniture de l'un à l'autre. 
Pertinence 
Offres de subvention zéro. Sur la base des informations publiquement disponibles 
recueillies au 31 août 2019, le volume total des projets d'énergie renouvelable sans 
subventions annoncés actuellement en Europe est d'environ 18 GW. Bien que la majorité 
de cette capacité résulte d'offres à subvention zéro faites lors d'enchères sur les énergies 
renouvelables, le nombre de projets proposés en dehors des systèmes d'enchères 
augmente rapidement. Dans l'ensemble, un tiers des 60 GW qu'Aurora (2018) a annoncé 
comme le potentiel d'énergies renouvelables sans subventions dans le nord-ouest de 
l'Europe d'ici 2030, est déjà en cours de réalisation. Dans ce contexte, la capacité des 
marchés à fournir de l'électricité « zéro carbone », sans l’aide de soutiens publics, semble 
prometteuse. Toutefois, une partie importante des 18 GW provient de projets qui sont 
seulement au stade de la planification. Il n’est donc pas garanti que ces derniers seront 
effectivement réalisés. Il est possible que les entreprises aient obtenu un financement qui 
est suffisant pour planifier le projet mais qui ne l’est toutefois pas pour construire et réaliser 
celui-ci. Dans un environnement sans subventions, les prêteurs peuvent se montrer 
prudents dans leurs investissements lorsque le potentiel de gains du projet dépend du 
marché de gros de l'électricité. Au minimum, un déploiement sans subvention signifie que 
les financiers sont susceptibles d'exiger des rendements attendus plus élevés pour leurs 
stocks d'énergie renouvelable afin de compenser ce risque. En outre, les projets d'éoliennes 
en mer sans subventions en Allemagne et aux Pays-Bas n'étaient pas totalement exempts 
de subventions, étant donné la connexion garantie au réseau. Quant aux enchères en 
Espagne, bien que les prix planchers garantis soient si bas qu'il est peu probable qu'ils se 
concrétisent un jour, ils contribuent néanmoins à réduire le risque pour les projets et 
peuvent donc être considérés comme une subvention implicite. Ces observations 
combinées soutiennent l'opinion présentée dans Evans (2018), selon laquelle, malgré les 
perspectives prometteuses, des contrats gouvernementaux pourraient encore être 
nécessaires pour soutenir l'expansion des énergies renouvelables. 
Infrastructure de carburant alternatif. L'examen des régimes approuvés par la 
Commission pour le soutien aux infrastructures accessibles au public ou réservées aux 
carburants de substitution dans le secteur des transports a montré que tous les régimes 
(sauf un) ont été mis en œuvre par le biais d'une procédure d'appel d'offres ou d'appel à 
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candidatures. L'un des régimes ne s'adressait qu'à un seul bénéficiaire (une autorité 
publique chargée de la sécurité générale et de la lutte contre la pollution de l'eau), et aucun 
appel d'offres n'a donc été lancé. Les projets concernent l'achat d'autobus électriques et/ou 
au gaz naturel et/ou d'infrastructures de recharge/rechargement correspondantes. La 
technologie utilisée dans ces projets est liée aux installations de recharge standard ou 
rapide, à l'approvisionnement en énergie alternative pour les navires de croisière, ainsi 
qu'aux stations de remplissage de gaz naturel et d’hydrogène liquéfié ou comprimé. 
L'infrastructure de recharge pour les bus est dédiée ou semi-dédiée aux opérateurs de 
transport public, tandis que l'infrastructure pour les voitures électriques et les bateaux de 
croisière est accessible au public. La couverture géographique dépend du projet : 
l'infrastructure des bus électriques et/ou au gaz naturel ne couvre que les zones urbaines, 
alors que les projets d'infrastructure de recharge ou d’approvisionnement accessibles au 
public ont généralement une portée plus large. Les frais liés à l'utilisation de l'infrastructure 
de chargement ou d’approvisionnement en carburant dépendent également du type de 
projet. Il n'y a pas de frais connexes applicables lorsque les projets concernent 
l'infrastructure des bus électriques et/ou à gaz naturel. En revanche, lorsque les projets 
concernent l'infrastructure de recharge des véhicules électriques, les frais d'utilisation des 
installations de chargement financées varient et dépendent généralement du tarif du 
fournisseur respectif, de la durée de la séance de chargement ainsi que de la puissance de 
chargement. Le financement public direct en ce qui concerne les régimes approuvés pour 
les infrastructures pour les voitures électriques a été en moyenne environ 34% du coût 
total. Le financement public direct pour les régimes d'aide aux autobus varie entre 32% 
pour le régime portugais et 69% pour le régime allemand ; le chiffre élevé pour le régime 
allemand résultant du fait que la majorité des fonds ont été utilisés pour soutenir 
l'acquisition d'autobus et non pour l'installation de l'infrastructure.  
Pour les projets de stations de recharge électrique dans six États membres sélectionnés, 
l’analyse de dix projets a montré que neuf d'entre eux étaient soutenus par un financement 
public, soit par l'UE, via le programme CEF/Horizon 2020, et/ou par les États membres. Un 
projet a été entièrement financé par des fonds privés. Il concernait une station de recharge 
électrique installée dans un centre commercial de Tallinn par l'exploitant du centre, qui 
souhaitait atteindre la performance énergétique la plus élevée pour ce centre. La période 
de mise en œuvre des projets était de moins d'un an à quatre ans. En ce qui concerne la 
technologie, huit projets sont entièrement ou partiellement basés sur la technologie de 
chargement rapide, tandis que deux projets fournissent exclusivement une technologie de 
chargement standard. Neuf projets sont toujours accessibles (24 heures sur 24, 7 jours 
sur 7), tandis qu'un projet a un accès limité en raison d'heures d'ouverture réglementées. 
Les utilisateurs doivent payer pour l'utilisation de huit projets de stations de recharge 
électrique. Les frais varient et dépendent du temps de chargement, du lieu de chargement 
et de la technologie de chargement. Certains opérateurs de projets proposent des forfaits 
avec une redevance mensuelle de base, avec des prix réduits facturés par KWh. Le 
financement des projets de stations de recharge électrique sélectionnés varie entre 
l'absence de financement public direct et un financement public direct à 100 %. 
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3 Zusammenfassung (DE) 
Dieser Bericht enthält einen Beitrag zur Bewertung der Vorschriften für staatliche Beihilfen 
im Bereich Umweltschutz und Energie mit besonderem Schwerpunkt auf den zwischen 
2014 und 2020 geltenden EU-Leitlinien für staatliche Umweltschutz- und Energiebeihilfen 
(EEAG) und auf den Bestimmungen für Beihilfen im Bereich Umweltschutz und Energie 
(Abschnitt 7) der Verordnung (EU) 651/2014 der Kommission (AGVO). Das allgemeine Ziel 
des Berichts ist es, Hintergrundinformationen für die Überprüfung dieser Bestimmungen 
zu liefern. Die in dem Bericht behandelten Themen beziehen sich auf die Wirksamkeit, 
Effizienz und Relevanz der Vorschriften für staatliche Beihilfen. 
Wirksamkeit 
Ausschreibungsverfahren für erneuerbare Energiequellen (EE) - Freistellungen 
nach EEAG und Allgemeiner Gruppenfreistellungsverordnung (AGVO). Erneuerbare 
Energiequellen werden, teilweise aufgrund der seit 2014 geltenden Regeln, häufig über 
Bieterverfahren wie Auktionen und Ausschreibungen, und nicht durch direkte Vergabe von 
Aufträgen vermarktet. Die Stichprobe der Bieterverfahren in dieser Studie umfasst alle 
Bieterverfahren, die von 2014 bis November 2019 im Rahmen von Beihilferegelungen (vom 
EU-Projektteam ermittelt) anhand der EEAG oder der AGVO in ausgewählten 
Mitgliedstaaten genehmigt wurden, welche zusammen über 80% der 2018 in der EU 
installierten EE-Erzeugungskapazität ausmachen. Die Stichprobe schließt daher 
Regelungen aus den Mitgliedstaaten aus, die in diesem Zeitraum liefen, aber auf 
Regelungen basierten, die noch nach den zuvor geltenden Leitlinien genehmigt worden 
waren. Auf die ausgewählten Mitgliedstaaten entfielen 2018 81% der installierten 
Erzeugungskapazität für erneuerbare Energien in der EU. In der Stichprobe fand die größte 
Anzahl von Ausschreibungen 2018 statt (71), während das höchste Volumen 2017 
vergeben wurde (25,6 GW). In den ausgewählten Beihilferegelungen fiel der gewichtete 
Durchschnittspreis der Windkapazität zwischen 2015 und 2019 um 62%, während der 
gewichtete Durchschnittspreis der Solarkapazität zwischen 2014 und 2019 um 51% fiel. 
Bei der Durchschnittsbildung über die untersuchten Beihilferegelungen ergibt sich nicht 
eindeutig, ob die Durchschnittspreise bei Auktionen mit mehreren Technologien niedriger 
sind als bei Auktionen mit nur einer Technologie. Preisvergleiche werden jedoch durch 
spezifische Faktoren der Mitgliedstaaten erschwert, wie z.B. lokale Klimabedingungen (z.B. 
Sonnen- und Windverhältnisse), die Größe (in KW) der in den Auktionen zugelassenen 
Anlagen oder die Dauer der Förderung (in Jahren). Dennoch waren die Durchschnittspreise 
innerhalb jeder wesentlichen Technologiekategorie niedriger, wenn das Angebotsvolumen 
das beantragte Volumen überstieg, als im gegenteiligen Fall. Direkte Vergleiche der Preise 
zwischen der im Wettbewerb vergebenen und der administrativ festgelegten Förderung 
sind schwer zu ziehen und sollten mit Vorsicht angestellt werden, obwohl bei 9 
Fallstudienvergleichen in 6 Fällen der im Wettbewerb festgelegte Preis niedriger war als 
die vergleichbaren administrativ festgelegten Preise. Viele EE-bezogene Beihilferegelungen 
haben von Freistellungen nach den EU-Vorschriften profitiert. Um die spezifische Art der 
gewährten Freistellungen zu verstehen, wurden Informationen über 61 freigestellte 
Regelungen gesammelt und untersucht: 39 betreffen die EEAG und 28 die AGVO. Von den 
61 Regelungen fallen 29 unter Punkt 125 EEAG, 19 unter Punkt 127 EEAG und 21 unter 
Artikel 43 AGVO. 
Unterstützung für hocheffiziente Technologien der Kraft-Wärme-Kopplung 
(KWK). KWK-Systeme erfassen und nutzen die als Nebenprodukt des 
Stromerzeugungsprozesses erzeugte Wärme oder setzen industrielle Wärmeprozesse zur 
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Stromerzeugung als Nebenprodukt ein. Dadurch können Kohlenstoffemissionen reduziert 
werden. Solche Beihilferegelungen sind in einigen EU-Ländern mit einem erheblichen 
Wärmebedarf üblich. Für Beihilferegelungen in Belgien, Deutschland, Frankreich, den 
Niederlanden, Polen und der Tschechischen Republik, die alle Betriebsbeihilfen beinhalten, 
wurden Berechnungen der Gesamt-Beihilfehöhen pro Einheit installierter Kapazität für 
hypothetische Fallstudien-Anlagen durchgeführt. Diese können mit den Gesamt-
Beihilfehöhen für tatsächlich in Dänemark und Litauen gebaute Anlagen verglichen werden. 
Für größere Anlagen finden in Deutschland seit 2017 wettbewerbsorientierte 
Vergabeverfahren statt und in Polen wurde 2019 ein Bieterverfahren durchgeführt. Das 
wichtigste Ergebnis ist das Ausmaß der Unterschiede in der Höhe der gewährten Beihilfen 
für die verschiedenen Anlagentypen und -größen. Diese Unterschiede spiegeln 
wahrscheinlich die große Vielfalt der verwendeten KWK-Anlagen, die unterschiedliche 
Größe der Anlagen und den Kontext ihrer Nutzung wieder. In Frankreich, der Tschechischen 
Republik, Deutschland, und Belgien (vor 2018) wurden die höchsten Beihilfesätze für die 
kleinsten Anlagen und für Technologien i.V.m. kleinen Anlagen gewährt. Im Durchschnitt 
der hypothetischen Fallstudien-Anlagen in Deutschland und der Tschechischen Republik 
war die Gesamt-Beihilfe pro KW elektrischer Kapazität für Anlagen mit einer Größe von 
unter 100 KW etwa doppelt so hoch wie der Durchschnitt für hypothetische Fallstudien-
Anlagen von 100 KW bis 1 MW. 
Kapazitätsmechanismen - Auktionsergebnisse und Ausgestaltung der 
Beihilferegelungen. Um die Leistung der Kapazitätsmechanismen zu bewerten, wurden 
verschiedene Auktionsergebnisse und Ausgestaltungen der Beihilferegelungen im 
Referenzzeitraum verglichen. Aufgrund einer Auswahl der Kommission wurde eine 
Stichprobe von 11 Beihilferegelungen in 7 Mitgliedstaaten untersucht. In Griechenland und 
Deutschland werden die Kapazitäten überwiegend oder ausschließlich an 
Nachfragesteuerung vergeben. In Griechenland, Polen und Irland waren die 
Kapazitätspreise generell höher als in Frankreich oder im Vereinigten Königreich. In 
Deutschland erfolgte bei Auktionen für schnell unterbrechbare Last 2017 und 2018 der 
Zuschlag fast immer zu den Preisobergrenzen. Im Jahr 2019 fielen die Preise unter die 
Preisobergrenzen, aber nicht um mehr als 4%. Dies ist wahrscheinlich auf begrenzten 
Wettbewerb für die relevanten Volumen vor 2019 zurück zu führen. In Griechenland 
bewegten sich die Auktionen für beide Arten der Nachfragereaktion auf ihre jeweiligen 
Preisobergrenzen zu. Jedoch kann dieser Preistrend in Griechenland nicht eindeutig auf 
eine Verringerung des Wettbewerbs zurückgeführt werden. Insgesamt wurden in den 
untersuchten Beihilfeprogrammen 65,5% der Kapazität auf Grundlage von 
Einjahresverträgen vergeben, d.h. mehr als dreimal so viel wie bei der nächsthäufig 
verwendeten Vertragsdauer von 15 Jahren. 
Negative Preisgestaltung bei der Stromerzeugung. Ein Phänomen der Strommärkte 
ist, dass zum Ausgleich von Angebot und Nachfrage der Preis, der an die Stromerzeuger 
gezahlt wird, manchmal negativ sein kann, um die Lieferung von überschüssigem Strom 
in das System zu verhindern. Solche Ungleichgewichte zwischen Angebot und Nachfrage 
können entstehen, wenn die Lieferanten niedrige Produktionskosten haben und garantierte 
Zahlungen für die Produktion erhalten. In Deutschland kam es 2014-2019 zu 720 Stunden 
negativer Day-Ahead-Preise und auf den beiden dänischen Energiemärkten gab es 
ebenfalls Hunderte von Stunden mit negativen Day-Ahead-Preisen. In Großbritannien 
wurden, anders als in Irland, keine Stunden mit negativen Day-Ahead-Preisen beobachtet 
und in den Niederlanden war dies nur bei zwei Stunden der Fall. Nach Einführung der EEAG 
wurden Maßnahmen ergriffen, um Anreize für Erzeuger, in Zeiten negativer Preise Strom 
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zu produzieren, zu verringern, z.B. wurde in Deutschland die Förderung nach sechs 
aufeinanderfolgenden Stunden mit negativen Preisen eingestellt. Dennoch nahm die EE-
Gesamterzeugung in Zeiten negativer Tagespreise in Deutschland, Frankreich und 
Dänemark zu. Außerdem ging der Trend dahin, dass die Anzahl der Stunden mit negativen 
Preisen zwischen 2014 und 2019 zunahm. In Deutschland stieg z.B. die Zahl der negativen 
Preisstunden von unter 70 im Jahr 2014 auf über 140 in den ersten acht Monaten 2019. 
Allerdings reduzieren Datenbeschränkungen die Möglichkeit, das genaue Verhalten von EE-
Anlagen zu verstehen, die Beihilfen nach den Regeln für negative Preise erhalten.  
Umlagen für Energie aus erneuerbaren Quellen (EEG-Umlagen). Die EU hat 
Zielvorgaben für den prozentualen Anteil des EE-Primärenergieverbrauchs in jedem 
Mitgliedstaat für 2020 festgelegt. Vier Mitgliedstaaten (Ungarn, Italien, Spanien und 
Schweden) haben dafür Ziele festgelegt, die über die verbindlichen EU-Ziele hinausgehen. 
Diese ehrgeizigeren Zielvorgaben wurden alle vor 2014 festgelegt. Zwölf Mitgliedstaaten 
haben ihre EU-Ziele für 2020 schon 2018 erreicht und um mehr als einen Prozentpunkt 
übertroffen. Ein Mechanismus zur Finanzierung des EE-Fördersystems ist die Erhebung von 
Verbraucherumlagen. EEG-Umlagen als Prozentsatz der Stromabgaben wurden für 
verschiedene Arten von Beispielshaushalten, für beispielhafte nicht energieintensive 
gewerbliche Nutzer und für beispielhafte energieintensive Nutzer in 15 Mitgliedstaaten 
untersucht. Im Durchschnitt aller Beispielsnutzer machen die EEG-Umlagen in allen 
Mitgliedstaaten in den untersuchten Jahren weniger als 25% der Stromrechnung aus, mit 
Ausnahme der nicht energieintensiven gewerblichen Nutzer in Deutschland und Italien, wo 
der Anteil von unter 15% im Jahr 2009 auf über 40% im Jahr 2018 stieg. 
Abfallwirtschaft. Die Überprüfung der nationalen Beihilferegelungen, die der Kommission 
zwischen 2014 und Mitte 2019 offiziell von den Mitgliedstaaten als unter Artikel 47 AGVO 
fallend mitgeteilt wurden, ergab, dass 71 von 129 Regelungen (55%) diese Bestimmung 
ausdrücklich erwähnen oder zitieren, während 13 (10%) die Abfallwirtschaft erwähnen 
ohne ausdrücklich auf diese Bestimmung zu verweisen. Bei einer dritten Kategorie mit 45 
Regelungen (35%) wird die Abfallwirtschaft gar nicht abgedeckt oder erwähnt. Diese 
Regelungen sind allgemeiner Natur und enthalten grundlegende Kriterien und Vorgaben, 
die von den Begünstigten einzuhalten sind, um Beihilfen anderer und/oder nicht näher 
bezeichneter Art zu erhalten. In 73 der 84 Regelungen (87%), die ausdrücklich 
Maßnahmen gem. Artikel 47 AGVO erfassen, beschränkten sich die Beihilfen auf die 
Förderung des Abfallrecyclings und der Vorbereitung zur Abfall-Wiederverwendung. Vier 
der 84 Regelungen (5%) umfassten auch andere Projektarten, während sieben (8%) nicht 
auf Recycling oder Vorbereitung zur Wiederverwendung ausgerichtet waren. Von den 84 
Regelungen enthielten 71 (85%) keine förderfähigen Aktivitäten, die auf bestimmte 
Abfallarten abzielen, während die anderen 13 (15%) einen solchen Schwerpunkt hatten. 
Eine bei allen 32 relevanten Bewilligungsbehörden aus acht ausgewählten Mitgliedstaaten 
durchgeführte Umfrage, die 56 Beihilferegelungen betraf, führte zu 36 Antworten im 
Hinblick auf 43 Beihilferegelungen in allen ausgewählten Mitgliedstaaten. Aus den 
Antworten ging hervor, dass neun Behörden in fünf Mitgliedstaaten im maßgeblichen 
Zeitraum Beihilfen für die Abfallbewirtschaftung und/oder Vorbereitung zur 
Wiederverwendung gewährt haben, teilweise im Rahmen verschiedener Regelungen. Diese 
neun Behörden gaben an, dass sie für insgesamt 975 Einzelprojekte (davon 951 in 
Frankreich) Beihilfen von insgesamt ca. 133 Mio. EUR (davon ca. 93 Mio. EUR in Frankreich) 
gewährt haben. Die Behörden, die gar keine oder nur in bestimmten Jahren Beihilfen 
gewährten, nannten als Hauptgründe das Fehlen von Anträgen, den engen 
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Anwendungsbereich von Artikel 47 AGVO und die strengen Bedingungen und Formalitäten, 
die erfüllt werden müssen, um solche Beihilfen zu erhalten. 
Effizienz 
Begrenzung der EEG- und KWK-Umlagen für energieintensive Nutzer. Um zu 
beurteilen, ob die Einführung einer Begrenzung der Umlagen für energieintensive Nutzer 
zu einer Erhöhung der Umlagen für andere Nutzer führte, wurde die Entwicklung der 
Umlagen-Sätze im Laufe der Zeit für verschiedene Nutzergruppen analysiert. Die Daten 
ermöglichen die Identifizierung von drei Ländergruppen mit unterschiedlichen Arten der 
Umlagen-Entwicklung. Erstens gibt es drei Länder mit einem Abgabemuster, das zu einem 
dauerhaften Umverteilungseffekt führt: Deutschland (EE), Griechenland (EE) und 
Slowenien.   
In diesen Ländern erfolgten Ermäßigungen der EEG-Umlagen an energieintensive Nutzer 
zusammen mit einer dauerhaften Erhöhung der Umlagen an nicht energieintensive Nutzer. 
Zweitens gibt es Länder mit einem Abgabemuster, das zu einem kurzlebigen 
Umverteilungseffekt führt, der mit der Zeit verschwindet: Griechenland (KWK) und Polen 
(EE). Drittens gibt es Länder, in denen keine Auswirkungen auf die Tarife für Kunden ohne 
Ermäßigungen beobachtet werden konnten: Dänemark, Frankreich, Deutschland (KWK), 
Italien (Einführung von Rabatten 2014), Lettland, Polen (KWK), Rumänien und das 
Vereinigte Königreich. Die Ermäßigungen in diesen Ländern wurden in der Regel vom Staat 
finanziert und boten daher keinen Spielraum für Umverteilungseffekte. Darüber hinaus 
wurde die Relevanz der Besitzstandsregel durch Messung des Anteils der Verkäufe der 
Unternehmen mit Besitzstandsregel in ihrem Wirtschaftssektor und Land im Jahr 2017 
bewertet. Dabei wurden die nicht von den EEAG erfassten Sektoren in Deutschland, Italien 
und Polen berücksichtigt. Für Deutschland gibt es vier Sektoren (von 30) mit Anteilen 
zwischen 5% und 10%, während alle anderen Sektoren Anteile unter 5% haben. Für Polen 
gibt es höchstens drei Sektoren (von über 15) mit Umsatzanteilen von über 5%, wobei 
zwei davon mit 20-35% sehr hoch sind. In Italien gibt es 19 Sektoren (von 83) mit 
Umsatzanteilen von über 5% und in drei davon liegt der Umsatzanteil über 30%. 
Finanzinstrumente für Energieeffizienz in Gebäuden. Die Überprüfung aller 
Beihilferegelungen, die der Kommission zwischen 2014 und Mitte 2019 offiziell von den 
Mitgliedstaaten als unter Artikel 39 AGVO fallend mitgeteilt wurden, ergab, dass 47 von 71 
Regelungen (66%) ausdrückliche Hinweise auf diese Bestimmung enthielten oder sich 
allgemein auf die Energieeffizienz in Gebäuden bezogen. Die 24 Regelungen, die 
Energieeffizienzprojekte in Gebäuden weder abdecken noch erwähnen (34%), sind 
allgemeinerer Natur und sehen grundlegende Kriterien und Vorgaben vor, die von den 
Begünstigten einzuhalten sind, um Beihilfen anderer und/oder nicht spezifizierter Art zu 
erhalten. Die 47 relevanten Regelungen können in drei Kategorien unterteilt werden: 19 
geben ganz oder fast vollständig den Wortlaut von Artikel 39 AGVO wieder (40%) und 14 
erwähnen, dass Beihilfen nach dieser Bestimmung gewährt werden, jedoch ohne weitere 
Einzelheiten zu nennen (36%). Für diese beiden Kategorien geben die nationalen 
Bestimmungen nicht an, wie die gewährenden Behörden die Bedingungen von Artikel 39 
AGVO überprüfen. Eine dritte Kategorie enthält 11 Regelungen (24%), die sich auf die 
Förderung der Energieeffizienz in Gebäuden beziehen, ohne Artikel 39 AGVO zu zitieren 
oder sich auf Finanzinstrumente zu beziehen. Die Konsultation der Interessenvertreter zu 
den relevanten Regelungen umfasste eine Stichprobe von 21 Bewilligungsbehörden in acht 
ausgewählten Mitgliedstaaten, die 29 Beihilferegelungen abdeckten. Davon nahmen 17 
Behörden aus acht Mitgliedstaaten teil, indem sie auf die Umfrage antworteten, die ergab, 
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dass viele Bewilligungsbehörden Artikel 39 AGVO als lang und komplex ansehen. Nur eine 
Behörde (in Griechenland) gab an, dass sie Darlehen für Energieeffizienzprojekte in 
Gebäuden im Rahmen von Artikel 39 AGVO gewährt. Dieselbe Behörde betrachtete Artikel 
39 AGVO als klar und nicht schwer anwendbar, bedauerte jedoch, wie einige andere 
Behörden auch, dass der Wortlaut nicht klarstellt, ob diese Bestimmung mit der De-
minimis-Verordnung kombiniert werden kann. Andere Behörden erklärten, dass sie sich 
eher auf klarere Bestimmungen berufen (z.B. Artikel 38 AGVO). Den befragten Behörden 
waren keine Fälle bekannt, in denen Energiedienstleistungsunternehmen (ESCOs) oder -
lieferanten Energielieferverträge an den Bezug von Energieeffizienzdiensten knüpften oder 
umgekehrt. Obwohl es Hinweise darauf gibt, dass ESCOs sowohl Energielieferverträge als 
auch Energieeffizienzdienstleistungen anbieten können, ergab die Auswertung der 
öffentlich zugänglichen Informationen keinen Hinweis darauf, dass sie die Bereitstellung 
der einen von der Abnahme der anderen abhängig gemacht haben. 
Relevanz 
Null-Subventionsangebote. Anhand öffentlich zugänglicher Informationen, die bis zum 
31. August 2019 gesammelt wurden, beträgt das Gesamtvolumen der angekündigten 
subventionsfreien EE-Projekte in Europa derzeit ca. 18 GW. Obwohl der Großteil dieser 
Kapazität aus Null-Subventionsangeboten bei EE-Auktionen stammt, steigt die Zahl der 
Projekte, die außerhalb von Auktionssystemen entwickelt werden, rasch an. Insgesamt ist 
ein Drittel der 60 GW, die Aurora (2018) als Potenzial für subventionsfreie erneuerbare 
Energien in Nordwesteuropa bis 2030 angekündigt hat, in Entwicklung. Vor diesem 
Hintergrund kann die Fähigkeit der Märkte, kohlenstofffreien Strom ohne öffentliche 
Unterstützung zu liefern, als vielversprechend eingeschätzt werden. Allerdings stammt ein 
erheblicher Teil der 18 GW aus Projekten, die sich erst in der Planungsphase befinden, und 
es steht nicht fest, ob sie tatsächlich gebaut werden. Die Unternehmen haben sich u.U. 
lediglich genügende Finanzierung gesichert, um ein Projekt durch den Planungsprozess zu 
bringen, anstatt um es zu bauen. In einem subventionsfreien Umfeld könnten Kreditgeber 
bei Investitionen zurückhaltend sein, wenn das Ertragspotenzial des Projekts vom 
Stromgroßhandelsmarkt abhängt. Zumindest bedeutet der subventionsfreie Einsatz, dass 
die Finanzierer wahrscheinlich höhere erwartete Renditen für ihre Bestände an 
erneuerbaren Energien verlangen werden, um diesem Risiko gerecht zu werden. Darüber 
hinaus waren die subventionsfreien Offshore-Windprojekte in Deutschland und den 
Niederlanden angesichts des garantierten Netzanschlusses nicht vollständig 
subventionsfrei. Was die Auktionen in Spanien betrifft, sind die garantierten 
Preisuntergrenzen zwar so niedrig, dass sie wahrscheinlich nie eintreten werden, aber sie 
tragen dennoch dazu bei, das Risiko der Projekte zu verringern und können daher als 
implizite Subvention angesehen werden. Diese Beobachtungen stützen die Ansicht von 
Evans (2018), dass trotz vielversprechender Aussichten zur Expansion der erneuerbaren 
Energien immer noch staatliche Förderung erforderlich sein könnte. 
Infrastruktur für alternative Kraftstoffe. Die Überprüfung der von der Kommission 
genehmigten Beihilferegelungen zur Förderung öffentlich zugänglicher oder gewidmeter 
alternativer Kraftstoffinfrastruktur im Verkehrssektor zeigte, dass alle Regelungen (mit 
einer Ausnahme) im Wege eines Ausschreibungsverfahrens oder einer Aufforderung zur 
Einreichung von Bewerbungen durchgeführt wurden. Eine Regelung war nur an einen 
einzigen Begünstigten gerichtet (Behörde für allgemeine Sicherheit und Gewässerschutz), 
so dass keine Ausschreibung durchgeführt wurde. Die Projekte betrafen den Kauf von 
Elektro- und/oder Erdgasbussen und/oder entsprechende Lade- und 
Betankungsinfrastruktur. Die bei diesen Projekten verwendete Technologie bezieht sich auf 
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Standard- oder Schnellladeanlagen, alternative Energieversorgung für Kreuzfahrtschiffe 
sowie Flüssig- oder Druckgas- und Wasserstofftankstellen. Die Infrastruktur zum Aufladen 
von Bussen ist (quasi)gewidmet für öffentliche Verkehrsbetriebe vorgesehen, während die 
Infrastruktur für Elektroautos und Kreuzfahrtschiffe öffentlich zugänglich ist. Die 
geografische Abdeckung hängt vom Projekt ab: Infrastruktur für Elektro- und/oder 
Erdgasbusse deckt nur städtische Gebiete ab, während öffentlich zugängliche Lade- oder 
Betankungsinfrastruktur-Projekte generell einen größeren Anwendungsbereich haben. Die 
Gebühren für die Nutzung der Lade- und Betankungsinfrastruktur hängen auch von der Art 
des Projekts ab. Bei Infrastrukturprojekten für Elektro- und/oder Erdgasbusse fallen keine 
solchen Gebühren an. Bei Projekten für die Ladeinfrastruktur von Elektrofahrzeugen 
hängen die Gebühren für die Nutzung der finanzierten Ladeeinrichtungen in der Regel vom 
Tarif des jeweiligen Anbieters, von der Dauer des Ladevorgangs sowie von der Ladeleistung 
ab. Die direkte öffentliche Finanzierung der genehmigten Förderprogramme für 
Elektroauto-Infrastruktur betrug im Durchschnitt ca. 34% der Gesamtkosten. Die direkte 
öffentliche Finanzierung der Busprojekte schwankte von 32% für das portugiesische 
Projekt bis 69% für das deutsche Projekt, wobei der hohe Wert für Deutschland darauf 
zurückzuführen ist, dass der Großteil der Mittel für die Anschaffung von Bussen und nicht 
für die Installation der Infrastruktur verwendet wurde. 
Bei den ausgewählten Stromtankstellen-Projekten in sechs ausgewählten Mitgliedstaaten 
ergab die Überprüfung, dass neun von zehn Projekten mit öffentlichen Mitteln unterstützt 
wurden, und zwar entweder von der EU über das CEF/Horizon 2020-Programm und/oder 
von den Mitgliedstaaten. Ein Projekt wurde vollständig aus privaten Mitteln finanziert. Es 
betrifft eine Stromtankstelle in einem Einkaufszentrum in Tallinn, die von dessen Betreiber 
eingerichtet wurde, um den höchsten Energieleistungsstandard zu erreichen. Der 
Durchführungszeitraum der Projekte betrug unter ein Jahr bis vier Jahre. Hinsichtlich der 
Technologie basieren acht Projekte ganz oder teilweise auf Schnell-Ladetechnik, während 
zwei Projekte ausschließlich Standard-Ladetechnik anbieten. Neun Projekte sind jederzeit 
(rund um die Uhr) zugänglich, wogegen eins aufgrund geregelter Öffnungszeiten nur 
begrenzt zugänglich ist. Die Nutzer müssen bei acht Projekten für die Nutzung der 
Stromtankstellen bezahlen. Die Gebühren variieren und hängen von Ladezeit, -ort und -
technologie ab. Einige Projektbetreiber bieten Pakete mit einer monatlichen Grundgebühr 
an, bei denen pro KWh reduzierte Preise berechnet werden. Die Finanzierung der 
ausgewählten Stromtankstellen-Projekte reicht von keiner direkten öffentlichen 
Finanzierung bis zur 100%igen direkten öffentlichen Finanzierung. 
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4 Introduction 
4.1 General objective of the evaluation support study 
As part of the evaluation process of the current State aid rules, the European Commission 
(“Commission”) awarded to the consortium led, for this specific project, by Sheppard Mullin 
Richter & Hampton LLP, in cooperation with E.CA Economics GmbH and Centre for 
Competition Policy, University of East Anglia (“consortium”), a contract to carry out a 
retrospective evaluation support study on the EU Guidelines on State aid for environmental 
protection and energy applicable in 2014-2020 (“EEAG”) and the provisions applicable to 
aid for environmental protection and energy (Section 7) of the Commission Regulation (EU) 
651/2014 declaring certain categories of aid compatible with the internal market in 
application of Articles 107 and 108 of the Treaty (“GBER”). 
The objective of the retrospective evaluation support study (“Study”) is to support the 
Commission with an evidence-based review of the implementation of the EEAG, applicable 
since 1 July 2014, and Section 7 of the GBER. The Study provides input to the Commission 
for assessing whether the EEAG and the relevant GBER provisions are fit for purpose taking 
into account the general State aid modernisation objectives, the European Green Deal 
objectives, the specific objectives of the legal framework and the current and future 
challenges, including the Clean Energy package, the long-term climate and energy 
strategy, the circular economy strategy and the evolution of the technology and of market 
conditions. The Study does not contain any such assessment in itself (with the sole 
exception of question 8), but provides and summarizes factual input for such an 
assessment by the Commission. 
The Study generally covers the 27 EU Member States and the United Kingdom, ensuring 
sufficient granularity of the data per EU Member State. For some of the questions included 
in the Study, only specific Member States or a representative sample of Member States 
have been analysed, as indicated below, where applicable. 
The Study has been prepared from an inter-disciplinary perspective, i.e. a State aid 
economic perspective, a State aid law perspective and an ex-post evaluation perspective, 
in accordance with the Tender Specifications of the Framework Contract (“FWC”). It is 
limited to providing input and data for answering the eleven specific study questions. 
4.2 Description of the study questions 
This section describes the study questions and the methodology adopted to perform the 
relevant tasks and to answer the study questions in line with the standards set out in the 
Commission’s Better Regulation Guidelines and in the Better Regulation Toolbox. 
For a number of questions, the relevant data was collected either from publicly available 
sources or provided by the Commission. The exact method for each specific data collection 
varies depending on the number of Member States covered by the respective questions. 
To the extent relevant for the data collection, the methodological requirements for 
retrospective evaluation support studies was followed as laid down in section 2.2.1 of 
Annex I (Tender Specifications) of the FWC. The methodology consisted in seeking data 
from the sources listed in the technical specifications, as well as other sources as needed, 
including but not limited to publicly available information published on the websites of 
Transmission System Operators (“TSO”), national regulatory authorities and national 
ministries. Careful attention was paid to ensuring comparability across Member States and 
documenting limits on comparability. 
 31 
 
The responses contained in the report are the result of desk research to collate publicly 
available data and of targeted surveys with questionnaires and interviews. This task solely 
involved the collecting of data and background information, rather than the analysis of this 
data. The different sections below describe the samples, methodology and quality of the 
resulting data for each question. The actual data is provided in the respective Annexes. 
Significant efforts to identify the required data included Internet searches and relevant 
information obtained from Commission decisions. The precise data collected is a function 
of the availability and nature of data that has emerged. Major decisions regarding the 
specific data to collect have been taken in consultation with the Commission. 
Throughout the data collection process an emphasis has been placed on traceability so that 
the data can be independently verified, if required. This was done by a system of folders 
containing copies of the sources of information. The web links of the most important data 
sources are included in the Annexes. 
Question 1 – Effectiveness of RES schemes: This question seeks to understand the 
extent to which the EEAG and the GBER provisions been effective in allowing aid for RES 
deployment at lower costs or with less aid. This includes understanding the effectiveness 
of bidding processes and the impact, or not, of bidding processes being open to multiple 
technologies. The data gathered is the result of desk research to collate publicly available 
data. Where suitable data was not found, the general procedure has been to contact 
relevant national authorities by email and follow up with a second email if no response was 
received. Some preliminary data collected on RES bidding process outcomes from the 
AURES II project is provided. Data on administratively set support within the sampled 
schemes has also been collected; data on repowering has been collected to the extent 
available. The vast majority of the data has been collected by the project team following a 
‘maximum disaggregation’ approach where ‘pots’ within auctions are counted as separate 
bidding processes. 
Question 2 – RES schemes covered by GBER/EEAG exemptions: This question 
focuses on whether the absence of tendering requirements for certain categories of RES 
has been a barrier to achieving cost reductions, and whether the existence or size of 
exemptions to market integration have been a barrier to achieving market integration. The 
data gathered is the result of desk research to collate publicly available data. Where 
suitable data was not found, the general procedure has been to contact relevant national 
authorities directly. Initial data on RES volumes and aid levels covered by exemptions to 
the GBER and EEAG are provided. Identifying data relevant to this question, beyond that 
available in Commission documents, has proven particularly difficult, due to the challenge 
of identifying the subset of aid in larger schemes subject to a relevant exemption. 
Question 3 – High efficiency cogeneration and district heating: This question 
focuses on the extent to which the EEAG ensured that support for high energy efficient 
cogeneration and district heating was effective. The data gathered is the result of desk 
research to collate publicly available data on schemes and then apply to hypothetical case 
study plants. It was found that the majority of the sampled schemes involve operating aid 
rather than investment aid. To allow comparisons across schemes, a methodology was 
developed to estimate the support that would be awarded to example CHP plants over their 
lifetime under each scheme. 
Question 4 – Capacity mechanisms: This question seeks information related to whether 
the EEAG ensured that capacity mechanisms were cost-effective in providing security of 
supply and least-distortive to competition. Information is provided for auction/allocation 
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processes under each of the eleven approved capacity mechanisms identified by the 
Commission, including the volume awarded split by technology. The data gathered is the 
result of desk research to collate publicly available data. Where suitable data was not 
found, the general procedure has been to contact relevant national authorities directly.  
Question 5 – Negative prices in electricity generation: The question covers the extent 
to which the EEAG and the corresponding GBER provisions (and their application) facilitated 
the integration of RES into the electricity market. The question particularly focuses on 
instances of negative pricing for electricity for five Member States. The data gathered is 
the result of desk research to collate publicly available data. Where suitable data was not 
found, the general procedure has been to contact relevant national authorities directly. The 
available data on negative prices and RES generation during hours of negative prices is 
being provided. Generally, it was not possible to identify the subset of RES generation that 
has received State aid and is subject to negative pricing rules. 
Question 6 – RES levies: This questions covers information on whether Member States 
have introduced a renewable energy policy in 2014-2020, going beyond their binding 2020 
RES targets, and on the level of RES charges over the total electricity bill, where possible, 
per category of electricity consumers. The data gathered is the result of desk research to 
collate publicly available data. Where suitable data was not found, the general procedure 
has been to contact relevant national authorities directly. For Question 6.ii, 15 Member 
States are sampled. Due to the absence of aggregate data identifying the proportion of 
electricity bills devoted to RES charges for most of the time period, a specific methodology 
was developed, using the details contained in national legislation and Commission decision 
documents to calculate the RES charges for a series of example residential consumers, 
example commercial consumers and example energy intensive users. 
Question 7 – Waste management: Question 7.a is related to all national State aid 
schemes which Member States had officially communicated to the Commission between 
2014 and mid-2019 as containing measures falling under Article 47 GBER. These schemes 
were reviewed in light of whether they contain such measures, and if so, which are their 
specific features. The data collection exercise included desk research into publicly available 
sources as well as a targeted stakeholder consultation with a combination of surveys and 
interviews. The desk research covered 129 national State aid schemes in 20 Member 
States, which were reviewed under specific links shown in the Commission list, as well as 
with Internet research. Questions 7.b and c cover the practical implementation of the State 
aid schemes by the relevant granting authorities within a representative sample of eight 
Member States. The objective was to identify how much State aid was granted to what 
kind of projects in which years, as well as the reasons for not granting more State aid to 
more projects within the reference period. To collect this information, a survey was 
conducted with specific questionnaires being sent to all relevant granting authorities of the 
sample, followed by clarification questions and telephone interviews.  
Question 8 – Reductions to energy intensive users: This question concerns the impact 
of the reductions in the RES levies and levies per analogy for energy intensive users (“EIU”) 
on the levies paid by different consumer groups, as well as the relevance of the 
grandfathering rule. To show the development of levies paid by different users after the 
introduction of the reductions, development over time of RES and related levy rates for 
different user groups was presented, some of which benefited from the reduction while 
others did not. In addition, the total annual expenses for a period of equal length before 
to after the introduction of reductions were compared. For all consumer groups, the 
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development of RES and other levy expenses were quantified in Euro/year and as a share 
of the total electricity bill. The relevance of the grandfathering rule was assessed according 
to the proportion of sales by the grandfathered undertakings in their industry sector in 
2017. Grandfathered undertakings were identified as beneficiaries in sectors not listed in 
Annexes 3 and 5 to the EEAG nor in the two decisions in which the Commission approved 
exemptions under point 186 EEAG. Lists of beneficiaries were provided by the authorities 
regulating the energy markets in Germany, Italy and Poland. Grandfathered undertakings 
shares in sales were extracted from the professional firm-level data base Orbis by Bureau 
van Dijk. Sector-wide sales were provided by Eurostat. 
Question 9 – Financial instruments for energy efficiency in buildings: Under 
Question 9.a, the data collection into schemes officially communicated to the Commission 
by Member States as containing provisions on State aid for energy efficiency measures in 
buildings falling under Article 39 GBER included desk research into publicly available 
sources and a targeted stakeholder consultation, using a combination of surveys and 
interviews. The desk research covered 71 national State aid schemes in 18 Member States, 
which were examined by using specific links provided in the Commission list, and with 
Internet research, to better understand how Member States had in practice structured 
schemes providing aid for energy efficiency in buildings through financial instruments. 
Question 9.b covers the practical implementation of the relevant State aid schemes by the 
relevant granting authorities within a representative sample of eight Member States. The 
objective was to better understand how much aid (if any) was granted to what kind of 
projects in which years, as well as the reasons for not granting aid under this provision 
within the reference period. To collect this information, a survey was conducted with 
specific questionnaires being sent to all relevant granting authorities, followed by 
clarification questions and telephone interviews. 
Question 10 – Zero subsidy bids: Subsidy-free renewable energy projects in the EEA 
were defined as those where the project receives zero public funding, irrespective of any 
movements in energy market prices. Latest developments on subsidy-free renewable 
energy projects were collected in an extensive desk research covering publications by 
energy regulators, industry associations and academics. The information collection covered 
twelve European countries with the highest announced cumulative subsidy-free project 
volumes. The countries analysed are Spain, Germany, Netherlands, Norway, Italy, Finland, 
Sweden, UK, Finland, Portugal, Ireland and Denmark. 
Question 11 – Alternative fuel infrastructure: The data collection included a targeted 
stakeholder consultation using a combination of surveys and interviews. Two different 
questionnaires were sent out as a basis for the survey, which covered a representative 
sample of relevant granting authorities and beneficiaries. These questionnaires contained 
questions indicating how the projects were implemented, e.g. companies involved, tender 
criteria used for the selection, costs, technology, access of users to the infrastructure, and 
related charges. A third questionnaire was sent to stakeholders of 20 selected projects in 
Austria, Belgium, Estonia, France, Spain and Sweden, which contained details on actors 
involved and geographical coverage, total costs, public financial sources and share of total 
costs, access to infrastructure and related charges for users, technology concerned, for 
projects constructed on the public domain, competitive conditions under which the 
concession was awarded, if public finance was provided, whether this was based on a 
tender, as well as budget and selection criteria, conditions imposed on the beneficiary of 
public finance, and the legal basis used to ensure State aid compliance. Based on projects 
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identified and selected, the financing of the different selected alternative fuel infrastructure 
projects was compared, indicating the geographical coverage of the project concerned. 
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5 Effectiveness 
5.1 Bidding processes providing support to RES schemes and schemes covered 
by EEAG and GBER tendering exemptions 
Question 1: To what extent have the EEAG and corresponding GBER provisions 
been effective in allowing aid for Renewable Energy Sources ("RES") deployment 
at lower costs or with less aid?  
Question 2: Has the absence of requiring a tender for certain categories of RES 
been a barrier to achieving cost reduction? Have the existence or size of 
exemptions to market integration been a barrier to achieving market integration? 
(see Annex 0 for a list of all questions). 
5.1.1 Introduction 
The first objective of this question is to obtain information on a large sample of bidding 
processes1 awarding operating aid for renewable energy source (RES) electricity production 
to identify whether they are helping to lower the costs of RES for Member States. The 
second objective is to identify information relevant to assessing whether the absence of 
tendering requirements has been a barrier to cost reductions and/or market integration 
17 Member States2 have been sampled. In 2018 these Member States accounted for 100% 
of the installed renewable generation capacity in the subset of Member States that had 
schemes providing operating aid granted via a bidding process, and accounted for 81% of 
installed renewables generation capacity in the EU as a whole.3 Within these Member 
States the data covers those schemes covered by measured approved under EEAG and 
GBER, as agreed with the Commission, and listed in Table A6.5.1 in Annex 6.5. Where a 
scheme had a relevant decision and the scheme commenced prior to the decision, data 
has been collected back to 2014. Additionally, where the sampled decision documents 
directly mentioned other bidding processes, data was also collected for these processes, 
with the earliest data featured in Annex 1.1 beginning in 2012. Figure 1 to Figure 12 cover 
the period 2014-20194.   
Even for the period 2014-2019 it is necessary to be cautious when interpreting time trends. 
The sample of bidding processes analysed does not claim to contain all processes 
conducted in this period, for example, there are likely to be additional bidding processes 
held as part of schemes approved under previously existing guidelines. Tendering became 
a full obligation under the EEAG 2014 only after 1 January 2017 (in 2015 and 2016 only 
pilot tenders needed to be organised which were to amount to at least 5% of new RES 
capacity, see point 126 of the EEAG). Also, when considering averages for particular years, 
it is important to note that 14 out of 17 Member States had sampled bidding processes 
                                                            
1 The term ‘bidding process’ is used to cover both auctions and tenders (including tenders involving multiple 
criteria). The project team notes that the terms auction and tender are used interchangeably in documents and 
the distinction between the two may vary between documents. The term ‘bidding process’ should not be viewed 
as signifying that all the processes identified satisfy the legal definition of “competitive bidding processes”. 
2 The sampled Member States are: Denmark, Estonia, Finland, France, Germany, Greece, Hungary, Italy, 
Lithuania, Luxembourg, Malta, the Netherlands, Poland, Portugal, Slovenia, Spain and the UK. Only 14 Member 
States are featured in Annex 1.1 as Estonia, Hungary and Portugal had not completed applicable bidding processes 
by November 2019. 
3 These percentages are based on figures from the International Renewable Energy Agency, 
https://www.irena.org/Statistics/View-Data-by-Topic/Capacity-and-Generation/Query-Tool  
4 Specifically, up to and including November 2019. 
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only in a subset of the years between 2014 and 20195, hence, the Member States 
composing annual averages are likely to change between years. Furthermore, the data 
behind Figure 1 to Figure 12 is often partial, with data for particular schemes in particular 
years not being available or expressed in non-equivalent units (e.g. Megawatt-peak or 
Megawatt-hours instead of Megawatts). 
The data on bidding process outcomes incorporates some preliminary data from the AURES 
II Horizon 2020 project6, however, most of the data has been independently collated by 
the project team. The full collated dataset on bidding process outcomes is provided in 
Annex 1.1. 
As of November 2019, among the sampled Member States, bidding processes had not yet 
been completed in Estonia, Hungary or Portugal. In addition to data on competitively set 
support, information has also been collated on administratively set support where relevant 
and available. In sections 3.1 to 3.5 all monetary amounts are expressed in nominal terms 
unless stated otherwise. 
Regarding RES schemes covered by “administrative support” exemptions to the EEAG and 
the GBER, 61 decisions/schemes were investigated7 (33 under the EEAG and 28 under the 
GBER). Overall, limited data was identified that can be definitively and wholly attributed to 
an exemption. The challenge was that available data generally relates to schemes as a 
whole rather than to the parts of schemes covered by a specific exemption. Also, the 
information provided on aid in the GBER notification sheets is limited compared to those in 
EEAG decisions. Of the schemes that could be linked to a specific exemption, 29 of the 61 
decisions/schemes involve the exemption from point 125 EEAG.8 The data that has been 
identified regarding exemptions is reported in Annex 2. 
5.1.2 Methodology 
The choice of sampled Member States has been driven by the need to identify RES schemes 
involving operating aid that has been awarded via a (competitive) bidding process. The 
definition of what constitutes a distinct bidding process is less clear than it first appears. 
Events labelled in national documents as constituting ‘an auction’ may involve several ‘pots’ 
or ‘groups’ which are for specific technologies or plant capacities (in MW or KW). When one 
of these pots/groups has: (i) a separate target/budget volume to be achieved, and (ii) has 
separate price results, it is counted in the present analysis as a distinct bidding process. 
Thus a maximum disaggregation approach is followed, where the aim is to classify each 
major price-setting process separately. Bidding processes are allocated to the year when 
the process was conducted, specifically the deadline for bids, which can differ from the 
year used to label auctions/tenders in administrative documents. As a result, the number 
of bidding processes reported in the dataset may differ from other data sources, such as 
AURES II. 
Publicly available information on repowering was sought, however, the amount of 
information found was limited. Also, the preliminary AURES II data on volumes built is 
                                                            
5 The exceptions with bidding processes in every year 2014 to 2019 are France, Germany and the Netherlands. 
6 This data from the AURES II project is available online in the AURES II Auction Database, see 
http://www.aures2project.eu/auction-database/. 
7 Initially 67 decisions were deemed relevant, however, on further investigation, 6 were found not to involve an 
exemption (SA.40348, SA.43995, SA.41528, SA.48066, SA.48238, SA.46552). 
8 For 6 GBER schemes (SA.51530, SA.46069, SA.51525, SA.40279, SA.52567, SA.43057) it was not possible to 
identify the specific exemption covered. 
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inherently partial as the time period allowed for construction for many schemes has not 
yet ended. 
Price comparisons have been undertaken but are hampered by specific factors such as local 
climate conditions (e.g. sun and wind patterns), the size (in KW) of the installations 
admitted in the auctions or the length of support provided (in years). 
To assess EEAG and GBER schemes involving administratively set operating aid, the same 
set of Member States where competitively set operating aid had been identified was 
considered. Following discussions with the Commission, schemes relating to demonstration 
projects and/or where the operating aid solely constituted working capital loans were not 
considered. Relevant EEAG schemes were identified from a long list of EEAG schemes 
provided by the Commission. The relevant GBER schemes were identified using the 
Commission’s case search tool.9 As per the Commission’s request schemes included in the 
final list involved at least one of the following exemption grounds: (i) point 125 EEAG, (ii) 
point 126(a) EEAG, (iii) point 126(b) EEAG, (iv) point 126(c) EEAG, (v) point 127 EEAG, 
(vi) Article 42.8 GBER, (vii) Article 42.9 GBER and (viii) Article 43 GBER. These exemption 
grounds allow plants, generally below certain size thresholds, to receive aid without a 
competitive bidding process or stop plants from having to meet market integration rules. 
A final list of the schemes where data has been sought is provided in Table A6.5.2 in Annex 
6.5. The precise form of an exemption is not explicit in all cases and so, in some instances, 
the project team has used its judgement to assign a scheme to a particular category of 
exemption. 
5.1.3 Results overview 
Figure 1 through Figure 12 cover all bidding processes for the agreed schemes listed in 
Table A6.5.1. As noted above, the figures do not necessarily cover all the bidding processes 
that occurred in the sampled Member States between 2014 and 2019.  
Figure 1 shows that the highest number of bidding processes within the sampled schemes 
occurred in France, with a total of 84, followed by Germany where 38 occurred.  In contrast, 
Spain and the UK each conducted only 4 bidding processes. However, these numbers are 
difficult to interpret directly as each bidding process differed in size and scope, for example, 
some relate a specific sub-category of a technology (e.g. solar on building roofs, 500 KW 
to 8 MW) while others cover multiple high-level technologies (e.g. solar, wind onshore, 
wind offshore, hydro and biomass etc.).   
                                                            
9 See http://ec.europa.eu/competition/elojade/isef/. 
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Figure 1: Number of bidding processes in sampled schemes by Member State, 
2014-2019 
 
Source: Material collated by Centre for Competition Policy, University of East Anglia from national authority 
websites, national authority documents and preliminary data from the AURES II project. 
Figure 2: Number of bidding processes in sampled schemes by year, 2014-2019 
 
Source: Material collated by Centre for Competition Policy, University of East Anglia from national authority 
websites, national authority documents and preliminary data from the AURES II project. 
Figure 2 records that within the sample a higher number of bidding processes occur from 
2016 onwards. As noted above, this trend likely results from the sampling method, with it 
taking some time for schemes under the revised 2014 EEAG to be introduced. Between 
2016 and 2019 the lowest number of bidding processes per annum in the sampled schemes 
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is 3810. The peak in the number of processes in 2018 is influenced by France holding 27 
bidding processes in this year.  
While France had the highest number of bidding processes, over the period considered 
amongst the sampled schemes, Figure 3 shows it awarded only the fifth highest volume of 
support at 5,681 MW.11 In contrast, the Netherlands’ sampled schemes involved only 12 
separate bidding processes, but awarded 22,780 MW in capacity. However, it should be 
noted that the Netherlands SDE+ scheme has a distinctive structure.  
The SDE+ scheme involves an extensive system of pre-set maximum tariff levels and the 
volume awarded at support levels below these tariff rates was not identified.12 Table 1 
reports those volumes awarded that in source documents were expressed in terms of MWh 
and MWp and are not shown in Figure 3. To allow an assessment of the representativeness 
of the current sample Figure 3 and Table 1 include totals taken from the public version of 
the AURES II database of auctions.13 
                                                            
10 The 2019 figure only covers the period up to the end of November 2019. 
11 This figure does not include 2,949 MWp (megawatt-peak). If this MWp volume is added, France had the fourth 
highest volume of support.  
12 The SDE+ scheme is treated as a large bidding process since before aid is awarded at the administratively set 
maximum tariff rates there is a system of ‘free’ bids from any category which have first rights to the available 
budget. Also, the system of maximum tariff rates is itself set up to encourage a degree of competition: multiple 
rounds are held throughout the year and earlier rounds, frequently with the maximum tariff rate between rounds, 
have first call on the available budget. 
13 The AURES II database is downloadable from: aures2project.eu/auction-database/. The values are those 
downloaded on 3 February 2020. The low volume recorded for the Netherlands and for the UK in the AURES II 
data is due to the AURES II database not recording the relevant awarded volumes in MW, but only in their financial 
value (EUR). Even though the AURES II data gives a lower volume for France, within this volume value it appears 
an auction for 799.5MW ‘Feed-in Tariff for installations over 250kW peak (Art. L311-12)’ occurring in March 2015 
may have been recorded twice. Similarly, within the volume for the Netherlands it appears an auction for 376MW 
appears to have been recorded twice.  
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Figure 3: Total volume awarded (MW) through bidding processes in sampled 
schemes by Member State, 2014-201914 
 
Source: Material collated by Centre for Competition Policy, University of East Anglia from national authority 
websites, national authority documents and data from the AURES II project. 
Table 1: Total volume awarded (MWh and MWp) through bidding processes in 
sampled schemes by Member State, 2014-201915 
Member State Volume awarded (MWh) Volume awarded (MWp) 
Finland 1,360,000 
(1,370,000) 
- 
France - 2,949 
(-) 
Poland 64,003,610 
(63,277,038) 
- 
The Netherlands 124,328,000 
(-) 
- 
Note: The values in brackets are those taken from the AURES II database on 3 February 2020. The AURES II 
database does not appear to distinguish between MW and MWp, hence, the absence of AURES II data for France. 
                                                            
14 See footnote 13 for a discussion of differences between the current sample and the AURES II data. 
15 The volumes in Table 1 are in addition to the volumes in Figure 3. 
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Source: Material collated by Centre for Competition Policy, University of East Anglia from national authority 
websites, national authority documents and data from the AURES II project. 
Figure 4 shows that while the highest number of bidding processes in the sampled schemes 
occurred in 2017, the greatest volume was competitively awarded in 2014, 25.65GW. 
However, 2017 appears to be an outlier with the volumes in 2018 and 2019 being 13.36GW 
and 14.18GW respectively. Also, Table 2 shows that in 2017 a relatively low volume of 
support in terms of MWh occurred, while the only awards in MWp occurred in 2018 and 
2019. Again, in Figure 4 and Table 2 data from the AURES II project is provided as a 
comparison, the volumes are noticeably lower in the AURES II data as they appear to 
record certain volumes for the Netherlands and the UK in monetary amounts. 
Figure 4: Total volume awarded (MW) through bidding processes in sampled 
schemes by year, 2014-201916 
 
Source: Material collated by Centre for Competition Policy, University of East Anglia from national authority 
websites, national authority documents and data from the AURES II project. 
Table 2: Total volume awarded (MWh and MWp) through bidding processes in 
sampled schemes by year, 2014-201917 
Year Volume awarded (MWh) Volume awarded (MWp) 
2014 54,149,000 
(0) 
0 
(-) 
2015 70,179,000 
(0) 
0 
(-) 
2016 2,808,471 0 
                                                            
16 See footnote 13 for a discussion of differences between the current sample and the AURES II data. In the 
AURES II data a French auction involving 240.6MW has a year marked 2015-2016, in Figure 4 it has been included 
in the 2015 AURES II value. 
17 The volumes in Table 2 are in addition to those in Figure 4. 
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(2,081,900) (-) 
2017 5,033,403 
(5,033,403) 
0 
(-) 
2018 57,521,735 
(57,531,735) 
2,090 
(-) 
2019 0 
(0) 
859 
(-) 
Note: The values in brackets are those taken from the AURES II database on 3 February 2020. The AURES II 
database does not appear to distinguish between MW and MWp. The 0 MWh values for the AURES II data in 2014 
and 2015 are due to the AURES II data appearing to record volumes only in monetary terms for the Netherlands.  
Source: Material collated by Centre for Competition Policy, University of East Anglia from national authority 
websites, national authority documents and data from the AURES II project. 
Linking the data on the number of bidding processes and volumes awarded together, Figure 
5 shows that in particular years the sampled Dutch, Spanish and UK schemes involved 
bidding processes with an average volume awarded per bidding process exceeding 2 GW. 
In contrast, in each year in the sampled French bidding processes the average awarded 
volume was below 200MW18. There is a contrast in process structure between those 
Member States running a small number of large processes and those running a large 
number of small processes. 
                                                            
18 Or 300MWp as shown in Table 3. 
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Figure 5: Mean volume awarded (MW) per bidding process for sampled schemes 
by Member State over time, 2014-2019 
 
Source: Material collated by Centre for Competition Policy, University of East Anglia from national authority 
websites, national authority documents and preliminary data from the AURES II project. 
Table 3: Mean volume awarded (MWh and MWp) per bidding process for 
sampled schemes by Member State over time, 2014-201919 
Member State 2014 2015 2016 2017 2018 2019 
Finland (MWh) - - - - 1,360,000 - 
Poland (MWh) - - 936,157 4,720,962 9,360,289 - 
Netherlands (MWh) 54,149,000 70,179,000 - - - - 
France (MWp) - - - - 232 286 
Source: Material collated by Centre for Competition Policy, University of East Anglia from national authority 
websites, national authority documents and preliminary data from the AURES II project. 
Turning to indicators of supply and the potential competitiveness of the processes held, 
across the period considered, in Poland 9 auctions were cancelled due to a lack of bidders.  
Figure A1.2.6 in Annex 1.2 shows that 8 single technology bidding processes were 
cancelled compared to 4 multi-technology bidding processes. In France, 17 bidding 
processes were concluded where the volume participating was below the volume requested 
and the same occurred in Germany in 11 bidding processes, in Italy in 5 bidding processes 
and in Malta in 1 process. However, for 10 Member States, the ability to make this 
comparison, at least in some bidding processes, is limited by a lack of data on either the 
volume requested or the volume participating. 
Looking across Member States and time, Figure A1.2.7 shows that on 30 occasions single 
technology bidding processes involved a volume participating below the volume requested, 
                                                            
19 The values in Table 3 are for bidding processes separate to those in Figure 5. 
 44 
 
while this occurred on 4 occasions for processes open to 4 or more technologies and on no 
occasions for processes open to 2 or 3 technologies. However, single technology processes 
with the required data are far more frequent than multi-technology processes; as a 
percentage of the observed processes with the required data, 26.5% of single technology 
processes were undersubscribed compared to 26.7% of processes open to 2 or more 
technologies.20 
Another way to consider the relative competitiveness of each process is to compare the 
volume participating to the volume awarded. The results of this exercise are presented in 
Figure 6, for those Member States where the necessary data was available. This chart 
shows that, for the sampled schemes with sufficient data, Poland had the highest average 
volume participating relative to volume awarded ratio of 3.7, while Luxembourg21 had the 
lowest ratio of 1.0. Other Member States with an average ratio below 2 are Malta, Greece 
and France (in its solar processes where volumes were expressed as MWp). Overall, Figures 
A1.2.3 and A1.2.8 in Annex 1.2 do not show clear evidence of higher ratios (higher 
competitiveness) being associated with lower prices.  
 Splitting the data by technology in Figure A1.2.3, possibly shows some weak evidence 
of such a relationship within processes providing awards to biomass/biogas and wind, 
however, this is based on a small number of observations.  
 Also, Figure A1.2.5 shows that the trend is for the unweighted mean value of the 
volume participating over volume awarded ratio to decline over time.  
 Figure A1.2.4 appears to show a negative correlation between the log of the volume 
awarded in a bidding process and the average price, however, this result may be 
influenced by larger processes tending to occur in more recent years. 
                                                            
20 6 bidding processes open to 2 or 3 technologies had the required data and none were undersubscribed. 9 
bidding processes open to 4 or more technologies had the required data and 4 were undersubscribed, hence, 
44.4% of bidding processes open to 4 or more technologies were undersubscribed. In total 113 single technology 
bidding processes with the required data were identified. 
21 The ratio for Luxembourg is based on a single bidding process with preliminary data from the AURES II project. 
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Figure 6: Mean of the volume participating over volume awarded ratio for bidding 
processes in sampled schemes by Member State, 2014-201922 
 
Source: Material collated by Centre for Competition Policy, University of East Anglia from national authority 
websites, national authority documents and preliminary data from the AURES II project.  
Figure 7 shows that Member States take different approaches to the structuring of bidding 
processes with respect to their openness to multiple technologies. The high-level 
technological categories used in this analysis being: solar, hydro, onshore wind, offshore 
wind23, bioenergy (biomass/biogas) and other24. In Italy, Luxembourg and Malta all volume 
was awarded via bidding processes involving a single technology. Similarly, more than 
90% of volumes in France and Germany were awarded in single-technology processes. In 
contrast, all the volume awarded in the UK occurred through bidding processes involving 
two or more technologies, while at least 80% of the volume awarded in Finland, Spain, 
Slovenia and the Netherlands occurred in bidding processes where at least four 
technologies could participate. Figures A1.2.1 and A1.2.2 in Annex 1.2 provide charts 
equivalent to Figure 7 and Figure 8, but in absolute (MW) rather than percentage terms. 
Figure 8 indicates that among the sampled schemes from 2016 to 2019 at least 45% of 
the volume awarded occurred in bidding processes open to 4 or more technologies. 
                                                            
22 Includes bidding processes with required data only. Slovenia, the Netherlands and the United Kingdom are 
omitted due to a lack of volume participating data. For each bidding process the volume participating over volume 
awarded ratio was calculated and an unweighted mean of these ratios was taken. Figure 6 includes data for 
undersubscribed bidding processes (where volume participating is below volume requested). In these cases the 
ratio of volume participated over volume awarded is still generally above 1. This is because some bids are usually 
excluded due to a failure to meet qualifying criteria and these bids are included in the volume participating figures. 
23 Due to the specific type of wind capacity in some Member States being unspecified in Figure 10 to Figure 12 
onshore wind and offshore wind are combined into the single category ‘wind’. 
24 Other is used to cover CHP, geothermal and combustion technologies with an unspecified fuel. 
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Figure 7: Percentage of total volume awarded (2014-2019) by bidding processes 
in sampled schemes open to different numbers of technologies, by Member 
State25 
 
Source: Material collated by Centre for Competition Policy, University of East Anglia from national authority 
websites, national authority documents and preliminary data from the AURES II project.  
                                                            
25 French auctions involving MWp and Dutch auctions in MWh are excluded. A multi-technology auction in Poland 
was counted as a one technology auction as, although, it was open to all technologies the detailed requirements 
meant Hydro was the sole eligible technology. In Lithuania and Spain data for ‘Wind’ is taken to include both wind 
onshore and wind offshore. These points also apply to Figure 8. 
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Figure 8: Percentage of volume awarded (MW) through bidding processes in 
sampled schemes open to different numbers of technologies, 2014-2019 
 
Source: Material collated by Centre for Competition Policy, University of East Anglia from national authority 
websites, national authority documents and preliminary data from the AURES II project. 
Figure 9 to Figure 12 provide data on prices awarded per KWh in the sampled bidding 
processes. The prices are weighted means, where the weight is the volume awarded. Some 
caution is warranted with the results the averages pool all available pricing data.26 Different 
types of prices were observed as the bidding object in bidding process. The most common 
type of price in the sampled schemes, observed in 8 Member States27, was a guaranteed 
minimum price or variable premium, while in 4 Member States28 guaranteed prices or two-
way contract for differences were observed and in 3 Member States29 feed-in tariffs for 
plants of a certain capacities (KW) were observed. In Denmark and France fixed prema 
over the market electricity price were observed, while Finland has a fixed premium that 
tapers to zero once the market electricity price is sufficiently high and in Spain bidding 
processes can involve bidding on the percentage reduction to a standardised investment 
value for a type of plant30. Additionally, the length of support varies across schemes and 
technologies, for example, co-firing with biomass in the Netherlands receives support for 
8 years, while in Italy support can be awarded for up to 30 years. 
From an economic perspective, the length of support and the differing risk characteristics 
of these various price types means that a firm with a specific type of plant will vary the 
price it bids (is willing to accept) according to the price type of each bidding process. As 
                                                            
26 Prices are clearing prices in pay as clear auctions and weighted average prices for pay as bid auctions. 
27 Denmark, Germany, Italy, Lithuania, Malta, Slovenia, Spain and the Netherlands. 
28 France, Greece, Poland and the UK. 
29 France, Italy, Poland and Slovenia. 
30 The winning bids are then converted into an equivalent unit price. 
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such, the prices observed are not strictly comparable across the various bidding processes. 
Nevertheless, to provide initial insights the data is pooled. Also, the outcome prices of the 
bidding processes have been treated to ensure all constitute ‘whole prices’ rather than 
simply the premium above the wholesale market electricity price.31 
Below the main trends in Figure 9 to Figure 12 are described. As previously noted, time 
trends may be influenced by the sample not including all the bidding processes taking place 
in Member States, particularly in 2014 and 2015. Also, it is important to remember that 
trends may be influenced by correlations between factors, such as between single 
technology bidding processes and RES technologies/plant sizes with particular cost 
structures. Another potential factor that may influence the comparisons is that while 
particular Member States employ particular bidding process structures, their climate 
conditions, in terms of sunlight and wind patterns, are also likely to have particular 
characteristics, which impact upon the prices obtained.  
In Figure 9, for the sampled schemes prior to 2018, on average, bidding processes 
involving a single technology achieved the lowest average award price, while in 2018 and 
2019 bidding processes involving 2-3 technologies achieved the lowest average price. In 
2019, for the sampled schemes, the weighted average award price in single technology 
bidding processes was 5.3 cents (EUR) per KWh compared to 4.1 cents (EUR) per KWh for 
bidding processes involving 2-3 technologies and 6.4 cents (EUR) per KWh for bidding 
processes involving 4 or more technologies. Thus, in 2019, bidding processes involving 4 
or more technologies had the highest average award price, 55% above the average award 
price in sampled bidding processes involving 2-3 technologies.  
Pooling all data from 2014 to 2019 across all technologies the average price in the sampled 
bidding processes involving 1 technology was 5.8 cents (EUR) per KWh, while for those 
involving 2-3 technologies it was 8.0 cents (EUR) per KWh and for those involving 4 or 
more technologies it was 7.0 cents (EUR) per KWh. In Annex 1.2 Figure A1.2.12 to Figure 
A1.2.14 repeat Figure 9 but separately for the three main technological categories: (i) 
solar, (ii) wind and (iii) biomass/biogas, respectively. The main insight that can be gained 
from these additional figures is that among bidding processes including biomass/biogas in 
all years the average price is lower in bidding processes open to 4 or more technologies 
than in single technology bidding processes. In 2019, the average price awarded to 
biomass/biogas in single technology bidding processes was 12.4 cents (EUR) per KWh 
compared to 6.9 cents (EUR) per KWh in bidding processes open to 4 or more technologies. 
Figure A1.2.15 shows that, for the sampled schemes within each Member States with 
sufficient data, the variance of awarded prices was higher across single technology bidding 
processes than across the sub-categories of technology in multi-technology auctions. 
                                                            
31 Competition around guaranteed minimum prices and guaranteed prices involves ‘strike prices’ that are 
automatically whole prices. For schemes involving fixed premiums, the annual average wholesale day ahead 
market electricity price (based on data from the entso-e transparency platform) was added to each of the 
premiums resulting from the bidding processes. Additionally, while bidding in the Dutch SDE+ scheme involved 
a strike price, the form of available data also required wholesale day ahead market electricity prices to be added. 
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Figure 9: Volume weighted mean price per KWh in sampled schemes split by 
number of technologies that could compete in bidding processes, 2014-201932 
 
Source: Material collated by Centre for Competition Policy, University of East Anglia from national authority 
websites, national authority documents and preliminary data from the AURES II project.   
Figure 10 shows that the weighted average award price for wind fell by 62% between 2015 
and 2019, with most of this drop occurring between 2015 and 2017. The volume weighted 
mean price of wind in the sampled schemes dropped from 12.7 cents (EUR) per KWh in 
2015 to 4.8 cents (EUR) per KWh in 2019. Also, the weighted average award price of solar 
in the sampled schemes fell by 51% between 2014 and 2019, with most of this fall 
occurring between 2014 and 2015. Since 2017, the average prices of all technologies in 
the sampled schemes have been below 9.5 cents (EUR) per KWh. Also, since 2017 wind 
has been the cheapest technology. In 2019 the average price for solar in the sampled 
schemes was 8.0 cents (EUR) per KWh, 67% above the average price of wind. In 2019 the 
weighted mean price for bioenergy plants was 8.2 cents (EUR) per KWh and for hydro it 
was 8.5 cents (EUR) per KWh. 
                                                            
32 This chart pools all available pricing data for bidding processes where volumes awarded were expressed in MW. 
No pricing data was available for Spain in 2016 or Italy or Luxembourg. 
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Figure 10: Volume weighted mean price per KWh in sampled schemes split by 
high-level technology category, 2014-201933 
 
Source: Material collated by Centre for Competition Policy, University of East Anglia from national authority 
websites, national authority documents and preliminary data from the AURES II project. 
In Figure 11 the mean price for each technology (pooling data across 2014-2019) is given 
in each Member State. Both the cheapest and most expensive technologies vary across 
Member States. For example, in France, Germany, Poland and Slovenia bioenergy was the 
most expensive technology, while in the Netherlands and Greece it was solar and in 
Denmark it was wind.  
Figure 11 again highlights wind as a cheaper technology with it being, on average, the 
cheapest technology in the sampled schemes in 5 Member States34, although, solar was 
on average cheaper in Denmark, Slovenia and Spain. Bioenergy appears particularly 
expensive relative to other technologies in Germany and Slovenia with it being, 
respectively, 128% and 112% above the weighted average price of the next most 
expensive technologies in each of these Member States.  
In Figure A1.2.9 to Figure A1.2.11 in Annex 1.2 the evolution of average prices over time 
within Member States for solar, wind and biomass/biogas are provided. 
                                                            
33 This chart pools all available pricing data for bidding processes where volumes awarded were expressed in MW. 
No pricing data was available for Spain in 2016 or Italy or Luxembourg. 
34 France, Germany, Greece, Lithuania and the United Kingdom. Finland is not included in this figure as wind was 
the only technology receiving support. 
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Figure 11: Volume weighted mean price per KWh in sampled schemes split by 
technology and Member State, 2014-2019 pooled35 
 
Source: Material collated by Centre for Competition Policy, University of East Anglia from national authority 
websites, national authority documents and preliminary data from the AURES II project. 
Figure 12 compares the volume weighted average award prices in oversubscribed bidding 
processes (volume participating>volume requested) to undersubscribed (volume 
participating≤volume requested) bidding processes. With the exception of solar in 201636, 
in all instances where a comparison is possible the average prices in the sampled 
oversubscribed processes were lower than the average prices in the sampled 
undersubscribed processes. The one note of caution with this finding is that many of the 
sampled schemes did not have the required data, in particular, none of the schemes in 
Slovenia, the Netherlands and the UK had the required data.  
In Figure 12 the price gap between under -and over- subscribed bidding processes is larger 
for solar than for wind. In 2018 the average prices for under -and over- subscribed 
processes involving wind were 5.99 cents (EUR) and 5.43 cents (EUR) per KWh 
respectively, compared to 8.85 cents (EUR) and 5.81 cents (EUR) per KWh for solar. 
                                                            
35 The chart pools available pricing data for bidding processes. For France only bidding processes with volumes 
awarded expressed in MW are included. No pricing data was available for Spain in 2016, Italy or Luxembourg. 
36 Although this exception rests on a single data point for the 2016 undersubscribed solar value. 
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Figure 12: Volume weighted mean price per KWh in sampled schemes (with 
required data)37 for undersubscribed and oversubscribed bidding processes split 
by technology, 2014-2019 
 
Source: Material collated by Centre for Competition Policy, University of East Anglia from national authority 
websites, national authority documents and preliminary data from the AURES II project. 
Comparing the prices in administratively set support schemes and bidding processes faces 
the inherent challenge that Member States are unlikely to award aid to identical plants 
through both routes at the same time. There are two main ways to compare prices between 
bidding processes and administrative schemes. One is to compare aid awarded in different 
years where one type of scheme precedes another and a second is to compare the support 
provided to different sized plants, as small plants can be exempt from EEAG and GBER 
tendering requirements. Both types of comparison should be treated with caution. If the 
costs of renewables fall over time and bidding processes replace administratively set 
support, there is the risk of a ‘false positive’ that bidding processes appear to be associated 
with lower prices. There is a similar risk of a ‘false positive’ if smaller plants have higher 
costs than larger plants and there is a legitimate reason for smaller plants to be built. 
Table A1.2.1 in Annex 1.2 provides 9 case studies where a competitively set price can be 
compared with an administratively set price for the same technology within a Member 
State. In Table A1.2.1 full details on the precise definition of the prices being compared is 
provided. 8 of the case studies compare plants of differing sizes/sub-types and 1 compares 
adjacent years. The case studies occur in the following Member States: Denmark (2 case 
studies), Finland, France, Germany (3 case studies), Greece and Malta.  
                                                            
37 This figure required data be available for volume participating, volume requested, volume awarded and award 
price. It also only considers bidding processes where the volumes were expressed in MW. These data requirements 
mean that for some technology-year combinations data is very limited, in some instances being only a single data 
point. One Spanish bidding process in 2017 is excluded from the figure where the volume participating exceeded 
the volume requested, but the auction authorities awarded support to all the volume that participated. 
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In the case studies in Denmark, Finland, Greece and Malta, together with the German case 
for offshore wind, the competitively set price is lower than all the possible equivalent 
administratively set prices. In the French solar case study from 2014, the challenge is the 
number of prices to compare (7 competitively set and 4 administratively set). In the French 
case study all the competitively set prices are higher than the lowest administratively set 
price38 and 6 of the competitively set prices are higher than the 3 lowest administratively 
set prices. However, all the competitively set prices are lower than the highest 
administratively set price.39 In the German case for onshore wind in 2017 the competitively 
set price is lower than 4 out of 6 administratively set prices.40 Last, in the case study of 
German biomass support in 2017 the competitively awarded price is higher than all the 
administratively set prices. In a September 2017 bidding process aid was awarded to 
biomass installations of 150KW to 20MW at 14.3 cents (EUR) per KWh as a variable 
premium, in comparison an administratively set variable premium for installations under 
100KW was 13.32 (EUR) per KWh. This German case study is the one case study where it 
is known that volume participating was below the volume requested.41 
Figure 13 shows that the highest number of sampled schemes with EEAG and GBER 
exemptions, as detailed in Table A6.5.2, come under point 125 EEAG (29 schemes), 
followed by Article 43 GBER (21 schemes) and point 127 EEAG (19 schemes). However, 
the number of exemptions does not necessarily reflect the volume of aid granted under an 
exemption. Also, when considering Figure 13, it is worth noting that some schemes fall 
under multiple exemption categories. Point 125 EEAG exempts installations below 500 KW 
in capacity42 or demonstration plants from market integration rules including that aid is 
provided as a feed-in premium that does not incentivise production when the electricity 
price is negative and that plants meet standard system balancing responsibilities. Point 
127 EEAG exempts aid from a competitive bidding process for plants below 1 MW of 
capacity43 or demonstration projects, while Article 43 GBER allows operating aid for RES 
installations below 500 KW in capacity,44 subject to rules ensuring that the aid is not 
excessive. 
                                                            
38 This lowest administratively set price is a catch-all price for installations below 12MW which do not fall into the 
specific sub-categories of solar technology for which bidding processes occur. 
39 This highest administratively set price is for solar units below 9KW built into the frame of buildings. 
40 The two lower administratively set rates are calculated as mechanical discounts from another of the 
administratively set rates and one is only available in exceptional circumstances. 
41 The volume requested in this bidding process was 122.5MW, the volume participating was 40.9MW and the 
volume awarded was 27.6MW. 
42 3 MW or 3 generation units for wind energy. 
43 Below 6 MW or 6 generation units for wind energy. 
44 Below 3 MW or 3 generation units for wind energy; and capacity of less than 50,000 tonne per year for biofuels. 
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Figure 13: Number of sampled schemes/decisions per type of exemption  
 
Source: Material collated by Centre for Competition Policy, University of East Anglia from national authority 
websites, national authority documents and European Commission decision documents. 
The volume of aid awarded under exemptions and the volume of capacity receiving  exempt 
aid, by year and by Member State, were considered but not reported as it is uncertain 
whether the small quantity of available data is representative. Even for Member States 
where some relevant data is available, it covers a subset of schemes. The identified data 
is reported in Annex 2. However, it is possible to state that 11 schemes are covered in 
their entirety by an exemption; 4 of these are in France45, 2 in Estonia46 and one each in 
Hungary, Germany, Denmark, Malta and the Netherlands.47 It is also possible to state that 
of the aid awarded in 2016 for the sampled Italian scheme, 32% of the capacity in MW 
built by the end of 2018 received administratively set support, while the other 68% 
received support awarded through a bidding process.48 
5.1.4 Conclusions 
The following main observations arise for the sampled schemes, subject to the caveats 
detailed above: 
 The highest number of bidding processes occurred in 2018 with 71, while the highest 
volume awarded was 25.6GW in 2017. In 2016-2019, at least 45% of the volume 
awarded in each year was in bidding processes involving 4 or more technologies. 
However, it is unclear whether multi-technology auctions are associated with lower 
average award prices. Price comparisons are hampered by Member State specific 
                                                            
45 SA.46898 (2016-2017), SA.47623 (2017), SA.43485 (2016) and SA.47957 (2017). The year in brackets is 
when aid was awarded. 
46 SA.36023 and SA.47354 (2014-2017) and SA.49198 (2018). 
47 Hungary: SA.44076 (2017); Germany: SA.48327 (2017-2019); Denmark: SA.51530 (2019); Malta: SA.42970 
and SA.51961 (2015-2019); and the Netherlands: SA.53567 (2018). 
48 See SA.43756. The competitively set support includes counting the Italian ‘Registry’ system as a bidding 
process, with it being a multi-criteria tender. The percentages are based on capacity built by 31.12.2018 as listed 
in Table 2 of ‘Activity Report 2018 – New Energy for the Future’, Gestore Servizi Energetici (GSE), available at: 
https://www.gse.it/documenti_site/Documenti%20GSE/Rapporti%20delle%20attivit%c3%a0/GSE_RA2018.pdf 
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factors such as local climate conditions (e.g. sun and wind patterns), the size (in KW) 
of the installations admitted in the auctions or the length of support provided (in years). 
 Between 2017 and 2019 wind had the lowest average award price. In 2019 the 
weighted average award price for wind was 4.8 cents (EUR) per KWh compared to 8.0 
cents (EUR) per KWh for solar. The weighted average price of wind capacity fell by 62% 
between 2015 and 2019, while the weighted average price of solar capacity fell by 51% 
between 2014 and 2019. 
 A greater number of single technology processes than multi-technology processes (30 
against 4) had occasions where one might be concerned about competitiveness (in 
terms of the bid volume being below the requested volume). However, overall more 
single technology bidding processes took place, so that 26.5% of single technology 
bidding processes had a bid volume below the requested volume compared to 26.7% 
of bidding processes open to 2 or more technologies. 
 Within the main technology categories undersubscribed bidding processes are found to 
have higher average award prices than oversubscribed bidding processes for the 
sampled schemes with the required data. 
 Comparisons of prices between competitively awarded and administratively set support 
equally need to be treated with caution due to the lack of fully equivalent comparisons. 
Nevertheless, in 6 out of 9 case study comparisons, the competitively set price was 
lower than the administratively set prices. The clearest case where the administratively 
set price was lower involved a bidding process where the process was undersubscribed.  
 Most exemptions fall under point 125 EEAG (29 schemes), Article 43 GBER (21 
schemes) and point 127 EEAG (19 schemes).  
 Data on value (EUR) and volume (MW) of aid awarded under exemptions is available 
for a minority of sampled schemes. Relevant data is hard to identify as exemptions 
cover only a small element of some schemes. 
 Less data is available for schemes covered by GBER exemptions compared to EEAG 
exemptions due to the brevity of GBER notification sheets compared to EEAG decision 
documents. 
5.2 Support for high efficiency Combined Heat and Power (CHP) technologies 
Question 3: To what extent have the EEAG ensured that support for high energy 
efficient cogeneration and district heating was effective? (see Annex 0 for a list of 
all questions). 
5.2.1 Introduction 
The objective is to understand how support for high efficiency Combined Heat and Power 
(CHP) plants varies across technologies, plant sizes, time and Member States, as well as 
how the level of aid varies by the main features of the support schemes. The definition of 
high efficiency cogeneration is provided in Directive 2012/27/EU.49 For plants with an 
electrical capacity of 1 MW or above, high efficiency is defined as a primary energy saving 
of at least 10% relative to the separate production of heat and electricity by reference 
                                                            
49 See https://eur-lex.europa.eu/LexUriServ/LexUriServ.do?uri=OJ:L:2012:315:0001:0056:en:PDF. 
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plants. For plants with an electrical capacity below 1MW, high efficiency is defined as a 
primary energy saving which is positive.50 
Of the sampled State Aid cases, two, in Denmark (SA.44922) and Lithuania (SA.41539), 
involve investment aid and relate to specific named plants. The other cases involve 
operating aid. To allow a comparison of aid levels across both types of scheme, where 
operating aid is provided a discounted lifetime aid amount is calculated. Due to a lack of 
data on the actual aid distributed to specific plants by year in Member States beyond 
Denmark and Lithuania, for the other Member States aid levels are calculated for 
hypothetical ‘case study’ CHP plants that vary according to their technology and size. 
One finding is that different schemes target support at different types of CHP. For example, 
Denmark and Lithuania provide support to plants over 15 MW of electrical capacity fired 
by biomass, whereas the sampled French scheme is specifically for natural gas plants with 
a capacity below 1 MW. Also, the Dutch SDE+ scheme provides support to biomass CHP 
plants as a form of renewable heat rather than due to them providing high efficiency 
cogeneration. There are differences in the level of aid awarded across different 
technologies, plant sizes and Member States.  
These results reflect the fact that potential CHP installations vary in their characteristics. 
Initially, the chosen case study plants ranged from a fuel cell unit with a net electrical 
capacity of 0.7 KW to a gas turbine plant with a net electrical capacity of 44.5 MW. 
However, after calculating the primary energy saving for the case study plants, it was 
found that all the example gas turbine and steam turbine plants, when fuelled by natural 
gas, did not meet the required primary energy savings to be classified as high efficiency 
cogeneration. Calculations are performed for new build plants fuelled by natural gas, 
except for the Netherlands where calculations assume a solid biomass fuel to reflect the 
SDE+ scheme’s support for CHP plants being focussed on bioenergy fuelled plants.51 
5.2.2 Methodology 
Data was gathered for the 10 combined heat and power (CHP) schemes detailed in Table 
A6.5.3 in Annex 6.5. These schemes were sampled on the direction of the Commission. 
Among schemes involving operating aid, Belgium (Flanders) and Poland (before 2019) 
involve certificate schemes. France, the Czech Republic and Germany (prior to 2019) 
involve calculations based on administratively set tariff rates. The SDE+ scheme in the 
Netherlands involves a bidding process and the calculations use the weighted average level 
of support implied by aggregate auction outcome data.52 The German calculations for 2019 
are based on the average weighted surcharge from the December 2017 tender.53 An 
auction relating to CHP support was run in Poland in late December 2019, however, this 
                                                            
50 See Annex II, Methodology for Determining the Efficiency for the Cogeneration Process, Directive 2012/12/EU, 
https://eur-lex.europa.eu/LexUriServ/LexUriServ.do?uri=OJ:L:2012:315:0001:0056:en:PDF. 
51 E.g., see plant types listed in: 
https://english.rvo.nl/sites/default/files/2019/10/Brochure%20SDE%20plus%20ENG%20Autumn%202019.pdf. 
52 The available pricing data aggregates across different types and sizes of biomass plant, including plants that 
do not explicitly refer to CHP. 
53 The year refers to the date of plant commissioning. In Germany it is assumed that plants commissioned in 
2017/2018 made the necessary application before 31.12.2016 to receive an administratively set rate of support. 
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auction appears to provide support beginning in 2021, with aid for plants constructed in 
2019 being administratively determined.54 
A methodology was established to estimate the value of the operating aid received for a 
series of example ‘case study’ plants over their lifetime of operation. Not all technologies 
involve plants of equivalent sizes. Some technologies, such as microturbines, are small 
scale, the largest case study microturbine plant being 950KW. To calculate aid levels, plant 
characteristics beyond their electrical output were required, such as their heat and 
electrical efficiency, to estimate their primary energy savings. To estimate the aid received, 
it is therefore necessary to specify a large number of parameter values for each plant. To 
ensure plants involve plausible sets of characteristics (from an engineering perspective), 
the example CHP plants are those whose characteristics are listed in the US Environmental 
Protection Agency’s ‘Catalog of CHP Technologies’.55 At times, additional parameters to 
those detailed in the catalogue have had to be specified or calculated. When specifying the 
combination of parameters for the example CHP plants the project team does not claim 
engineering expertise. Also, the relative frequency of these different case study plants in 
Member States is not known. 
The full characteristics of the case study plants are provided in the ‘EPA’ tab of Annex 3.1. 
In Table A6.5.4 in Annex 6.5 a summary is provided of the electricity and thermal outputs 
of the case study plants split by technology. In total, 24 types of case study CHP plant 
were considered: internal combustion engines (100 KW to 9.3 MW); gas turbines (3.3 to 
44.5 MW); steam turbines (0.5 to 15 MW); microturbines (28 to 950 KW); and fuel cells 
(0.7 KW to 1.4 MW). However, 10 of these case study plants were not classified as high 
efficiency when fuelled by natural gas, while 14 did meet the high efficiency definition (5 
internal combustion engine plants, 4 microturbine plants and 5 fuel cell plants).56 Based 
on the plant characteristics detailed in Annex 3.1, the value of aid received on an annual 
basis has been calculated. These calculations are based on the project team’s best 
interpretation of the support schemes’ rules, which are generally complex. These annual 
figures (over the period of time given for the receipt of aid specified in national 
legislation/regulations) are then discounted to provide a lifetime figure for the aid provided. 
A common discount rate, the ECB’s HICP Eurozone inflation rate, is used for all Member 
States.57 To allow comparison across schemes two lifetime aid amounts per unit of installed 
capacity are provided, one where the denominator is a plant’s electrical output and one 
where the denominator is a plant’s thermal output.58 The resulting lifetime aid amounts 
are provided in the ‘Summary’ tab of Annex 3.1.  
                                                            
54 Details of the 2019/2020 administratively set support in Dz.U. 2019 poz.1671, available at: 
http://prawo.sejm.gov.pl/isap.nsf/download.xsp/WDU20190001671/O/D20191671.pdf; details of auction held in 
Dec. 2019 in ‘Information from the President of the Energy Regulatory Office No. 103/2019 regarding the results 
of cogeneration premium auction No. ACHP/1/2019’, available at: https://www.ure.gov.pl/pl/efektywnosc-
kogenerac/energia-z-kogeneracji/aukcje-chp/8405,Ogloszenia-i-wyniki-aukcji.html 
55 U.S. Environmental Protection Agency Combined Heat and Power Partnership, ‘Catalog of CHP Technologies’, 
Sep. 2017, https://www.epa.gov/sites/production/files/2015-07/documents/catalog_of_chp_technologies.pdf. 
56 The primary energy saving calculations for plants with identical characteristics can vary slightly across Member 
States, and between years before and after 2016, due to variations in the reference efficiency values used for 
separate heat and electric plants. In borderline cases this can affect whether a plant is judged to be high efficiency. 
57 For years that have already occurred the actual inflation rate is used, while for future years the ECB’s most 
recent projections are used. 
58 How operating aid is spread over time and the discount rate applied will influence comparisons between 
schemes involving operating aid and those comprising upfront investment aid. 
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5.2.3 Results overview 
The results below are based on the lifetime aid per unit of electrical capacity. Additional 
results, including those based on lifetime aid per unit of heat capacity are provided in 
Annex 3.2. As the balance between electricity and heat outputs can vary by technology, 
the results may differ between these two units of assessment. In particular, for the SDE+ 
scheme in the Netherlands in 2018 and 2019, the aid amounts per unit of electrical capacity 
are very high, because aid is awarded for heat and electrical output. For this reason, the 
Netherlands is discussed in the text rather than presented in Figure 15 to Figure 17. All 
lifetime investment aid amounts referred to below are expressed in 2019 prices as EUR per 
KW. The averages presented in Figure 14 to Figure 17 and in Annex 3.2 are simple 
arithmetic averages taken over those case study plants in a given Member State that would 
have received a positive amount of aid in a given year.59 As such, these averages do not 
claim to represent the actual distribution of different plant types observed in Member 
States. In Denmark, a 22.5 MW woodchip fired steam turbine plant received lifetime aid of 
EUR 2,588 per KW, whereas in Lithuania two steam turbine plants (one waste fuelled and 
one woodchip fuelled) totalling 88 MW received lifetime aid of EUR 1,782 per KW. The aid 
per KW was therefore 45% higher in the Danish case. 
In all years for which lifetime aid amounts were calculated in France, Germany, the Czech 
Republic and Poland (plus Belgium prior to 2018) case study plants with a capacity below 
100 KW on average received a higher level of lifetime aid per unit of electrical capacity 
than those with a capacity between 100 KW and 1 MW. In Poland the average aid for case 
study plants below 100 KW in size was 1-2% above those in the 100 KW to 1 MW range. 
In the Czech Republic average aid levels for the smaller plant category were 1.8 to 2.1 
times higher than for the larger plant category, while in Germany it was around 2.5.60 
Figure 14 shows that in each year the lifetime aid per KW for case study plants below 100 
KW in Germany was above EUR 3,100 per KW of electrical capacity, while for case study 
plants in the 100 KW to 1 MW size range, support never exceeded EUR 1,400 per KW.  
Figure 14: Average lifetime aid for case study CHP plants (EUR per KW of 
electrical capacity), split by size of plant in Germany, 2016-2019 
 
                                                            
59 The number of case study plants forming each average can therefore vary between Member States and years. 
60 The figures for Poland and Czechia cover 2014 to 2019, while those for Germany cover 2016 to 2019. 
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Source: Calculations by Centre for Competition Policy, University of East Anglia utilizing information from national 
authority websites, national authority documents and European Commission decision documents. 
In Germany, the higher level of aid for the smallest case study power plants is a mechanical 
result of the scheme’s design. In general, the maximum number of operating hours for 
which CHP plants in Germany can receive aid is 30,000 hours. However, plants with an 
output below 50 KW can claim aid for 60,000 hours. The difference in aid levels by plant 
size in the Czech Republic is also a direct result of differences in the unit rates of support. 
In 2019 the Czech Republic’s Green Premium for plants of 0-200 KW capacity is CZK 864 
per MWh, for those of 200 KW to 1 MW capacity is CZK 549 per MWh and for those of 1-
5MW capacity is CZK 318 per MWh.61 The specifics of the changes to the top up tariffs are 
detailed in the ‘Czech Republic’ tab of Annex 3.1. In Belgium the average level of aid for 
the case study plants below 100KW fell between 2017 and 2018, with this change being 
driven by plants with an electrical capacity below 10 KW no longer being eligible for CHP 
certificates. 
Figure 15 reports the average lifetime aid level per KW of electrical capacity for the case 
study plants with a capacity below 100 KW. It shows variations across Member States, 
from EUR 351 per KW in Belgium to EUR 3,124 per KW in Germany in 2019. While Belgium 
also provides the lowest level of support for the case study plants in the 100 KW to 1 MW 
range, Figure 16 shows that France provides a higher level of aid than Germany in this size 
range. In France, estimated lifetime aid was EUR 2,158 per KW of electrical capacity in 
2019 compared to EUR 1,293 per KW in Germany.  
One factor influencing the comparatively high value of lifetime aid for French plants in the 
100KW to 1MW range is that in France aid is provided for 15 years, whereas in Germany 
plants in this size range would be subject to 30,000 hour limit which for the case study 
plants meant aid lasts for less than 8 years. In the French scheme there is also a much 
smaller reduction in aid by size of plant. French plants below 300KW can receive a set 
purchase price, while those above 300KW receive a top-up premium. The value of aid for 
plants above 300KW is slightly lower as there is a deduction linked to the cost of capacity 
certificates.62 
A feature of Figure 15 to Figure 17 is the increase in support in Poland between 2018 and 
2019. In 2019, the Polish CHP certificate scheme was replaced by a new system involving 
both administrative support and a plan for competitively awarded support. However, the 
competitive auction process was only held for the first time in late December 2019 The 
lifetime aid levels for plants constructed before 2019 are held down because under the new 
scheme ‘existing plants’ are given a per unit level of support lower than the market value 
of the certificates that had previously been in place.  
For example, in 2018 the market value of a ‘yellow’ certificate was PLN 108.76 per MWh, 
but existing plants below 1MW in size were due to receive only PLN 69.17 per MWh in 
2019. In contrast, a new plant of equivalent size constructed in 2019 was scheduled to 
receive PLN 141.19 per MWh. The upward jump in support shown for Poland in 2019 is 
                                                            
61 These unit rates are those for a plant not operating for more than 4,400 hours per annum. For plants operating 
no more than 3,000 hours per annum the equivalent rates are CZK 1,283, CZK 915 and CZK 626 per MWh. 
62 For both sizes of a plant the value of aid is set by a formula which is linked to the monthly average gas price 
and also includes an element directly linked to the size of the primary energy saving achieved by a plant. The 
formulae are provided in paragraphs 25 and 26 of the State Aid decision document SA.43719. 
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sensitive to the level of aid that plants built in 2019 will continue to receive in future 
years.63 
Figure 15:  Average lifetime aid for case study plants below 100KW (EUR per KW 
of electrical capacity, 2019 prices) by Member State, 2014-2019 
 
Source: Calculations by Centre for Competition Policy, University of East Anglia utilizing information from national 
authority websites, national authority documents and European Commission decision documents. 
In Annex 3.2 graphs are provided reporting lifetime aid amounts per unit of heat capacity. 
In Figure A3.2.5, which reports lifetime aid per unit of heat capacity for case study plants 
between 1 MW and 10 MW, the Netherlands is included. 
                                                            
63 The calculations are based on the assumption that support for a 2019 plant remains constant at the level stated 
for ‘new’ plants in 2020. 
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Figure 16:  Average lifetime aid for case study plants 100 KW to 1 MW (EUR per 
KW of electrical capacity, 2019 prices) by Member State, 2014-2019 
 
Source: Calculations by Centre for Competition Policy, University of East Anglia utilizing information from national 
authority websites, national authority documents and European Commission decision documents. 
In Figure 17 the average lifetime aid levels are shown for case study internal combustion 
engine plants. Compared to the average levels of aid by size of plant reported in Figure 15 
and Figure 16, Figure 17 shows that the average support level provided in Poland for the 
case study internal combustion engine plants is higher than in the Czech Republic. 
 62 
 
Figure 17:  Average lifetime aid for case study internal combustion engine plants 
(EUR/KW electrical capacity, 2019 prices) by Member State, 2014-2019 
 
Source: Calculations by Centre for Competition Policy, University of East Anglia utilizing information from national 
authority websites, national authority documents and European Commission decision documents. 
In Table A3.2.1 in Annex 3.2 the precise details of the two available case studies providing 
comparisons of the level of aid awarded to high efficiency cogeneration plants between 
bidding processes and administratively set support are provided. As with the case study 
comparisons discussed in section 5.1.3, these comparisons need to be treated with some 
caution. The first comparison is between a 2019 Polish tender awarding support from 2021 
onwards with the administratively set premium in 2019. The competitively set fixed 
premium is 1.97 cents (EUR) per KWh, compared to an administratively set fixed premium 
of 3.29 cents (EUR) per KWh. The second comparison is between administratively set 
support in Germany in 2016 and the support awarded in a December 2017 tender. The 
tender awarded a fixed premium of 4.05 cents (EUR) per KWh to plants with a capacity of 
1-50MW. This is above the below fixed premium in the 2016 administratively set support 
scheme of 4.4 cents (EUR) per KWh for plants between 250KW and 2MW of capacity, but 
above the rate of 3.1 cents (EUR) per KWh for plants with capacity above 2MW. A factor 
that may influence the value of aid in the 2017 tender is that the volume awarded was 
below the volume requested (82MW against 100MW).  
Figure 18 shows that Germany in 2017 had high-efficiency cogeneration plants with the 
highest electrical capacity of sampled Member States at 29.7GW, with the next highest 
capacities being 8.9GW in Poland and 8.8 GW in the Netherlands. In terms of changes in 
capacity between 2016 and 2017, Figure A3.2.8 shows that the largest percentage increase 
occurred in Belgium with high-efficiency cogeneration electrical capacity increasing by 
27.4%. In three Member States (the Czech Republic, Denmark and Lithuania) high-
efficiency cogeneration electrical capacity fell between 2016 and 2017, with the largest 
percentage drop being in the Czech Republic at 7.3%. 
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Figure 18:  Total electrical capacity (GW) of high-efficiency cogeneration plants 
for sampled Member States, 2016 and 2017 
 
Source: Eurostat 
As for total CHP capacity, Figure 19 shows that Germany has the greatest total capacity in 
2017 at 39.6GW, while all other sampled Member States had total CHP capacity below 
10GW. The increase in German CHP capacity between 2013 and 2014 is due to a change 
in the data reported to Eurostat; prior to 2014 the data only related to power units that 
were entirely dedicated to CHP. Aside from this, the largest increase in total CHP electrical 
capacity in absolute terms was for the Czech Republic between 2015 and 2016 when CHP 
electrical capacity increased by 4.4GW. In 2017 the sampled Member State with the lowest 
CHP electrical capacity was Lithuania with a capacity of 0.6GW. In Figure A3.2.9 in Annex 
3.2 CHP electrical capacity per capita is reported. Figure A3.2.9 shows that relative to the 
size of its population Denmark had the highest level of CHP capacity, with 1.0 KW per 
capita in 2017, while France had the lowest level of CHP capacity, with 0.1 KW per capita. 
Figure 20 provides an index of total CHP capacity in each sampled Member State. This 
indicates the variation in the growth rates of CHP electrical capacity. In Belgium and 
Lithuania, total CHP electrical capacity was lower in 2017 than in 2011. In Lithuania total 
CHP electrical capacity fell by approximately 50% over the period.  
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Figure 19: CHP electrical capacity (GW) by sampled Member State, 2011-2017 
 
Source: Eurostat 
Figure 20:  Index of total CHP electrical capacity by sampled Member State 
schemes, 2011-2017 (2011 = 1) 
 
Note: The increase in recorded CHP capacity between 2013 and 2014 in Germany is the result of a change in the 
definition of the CHP plants reported to Eurostat. 
Source: Calculations by Centre for Competition Policy, University of East Anglia using Eurostat data. 
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5.2.4 Conclusions 
The following main observations arise, subject to the caveats detailed above: 
 The average lifetime aid for the case study CHP plants varies across Member States. 
For example, for case study plants below 100 KW in capacity, lifetime aid per KW of 
electrical capacity in 2019 ranges from below EUR 500 in Belgium to more than EUR 
3,000 in Germany. These differences likely reflect the wide variety of CHP installations 
used, differences in the size of the installations and the context in which they are used. 
 The average lifetime aid is generally higher for case study CHP plants with smaller 
capacities. For example, in Germany, case study plants under 100 KW of capacity are 
calculated as receiving more than EUR 3,000 per KW of electrical capacity over their 
lifetime, while those of 100 KW to 1 MW are calculated as receiving between EUR 1,000 
and 1,500 per KW of electrical capacity. 
 There is variety in the growth rates of high efficiency CHP and total CHP capacity across 
Member States.  
 The comparison of lifetime aid amounts for the case study plants is influenced by the 
modelling assumptions used, in particular, that levels of aid do not change significantly 
after 2019.  
5.3 Capacity mechanisms – auction outcomes and scheme designs 
Question 4: To what extent have the EEAG ensured that capacity mechanisms 
were cost-effective in providing security of supply and least-distortive to 
competition? (see Annex 0 for a list of all questions). 
5.3.1 Introduction 
To assess the performance of capacity mechanisms, while taking into consideration the 
design of schemes, a sample of 11 schemes across 7 Member States is considered (see 
Table A6.5.4 in Annex 6.5). For the sampled schemes, data was collected (and is reported 
below) from 2014 or the start of scheme, rather than from the date when a decision led to 
the capacity mechanism being adopted under the EEAG. The longer time series of data is 
provided for illustrative purposes.  
The schemes vary in their design features, as shown in Table 4 below. The largest French 
scheme is a decentralised certificate scheme where energy suppliers must hold a certain 
number of certificates proportional to the quantity of energy supplied. Greece runs 
schemes on a quarterly rather than annual basis and Ireland has derating factors that vary 
by plant size as well as technology. Germany runs weekly capacity auctions where prices 
are set both for the quantity of capacity provided and for the level of electricity production. 
The German scheme also frequently clears at or near its price cap. 
Table 4: Description of sampled capacity mechanisms by Member State 
Member 
State 
No. of 
schemes  
No. of 
Rounds 
Contract 
Length 
Comments 
Belgium 1 4 1 and 3 
years 
Data for 2014-15 and 2015-16 indicates a T1 scheme 
involving gas, CHP and Demand Side Response (DSR) 
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France 3 5 1 and 20 
years 
Scheme 1: Main scheme run in 2017 and 2018 is a 
certificates scheme where energy providers must each hold a 
certain amount of capacity to cover peak demand. Scheme 2: 
'Erasure' scheme is T-1 involving DSR. Scheme 3: Additional 
capacity for Brittany with 20 year contracts. 
Greece 2 32 Quarterly Scheme 1: Main scheme involves DSR. It is split into two 
components one for DSR lasting up to 1 hour and one for 
DSR lasting up to 48 hours. Scheme 2: In 2018 and 2019 a 
transitory multi-technology mechanism was introduced where 
95% of the capacity awarded was to hydro and gas plants 
Ireland 1 3 - Covers Republic of Ireland and Northern Ireland. Two T-1 
rounds and one T-4 round. Contract length data unavailable 
Poland 1 3 1, 5, 7, 
15 and 17 
years 
T-5 scheme, includes both generation and DSR. 
UK 2 9 1, 3, 4, 
10, 12, 
14, 15 
years 
Excludes Northern Ireland. Main scheme involves T-1 and T-4 
auctions. Second scheme covers supplementary capacity 
auction in 2017. Schemes involve both generation and DSR. 
Germany 1 273 Weekly Provides DSR with rounds split into two types according to 
speed of response. Payment comprises two elements: one 
linked to capacity and one linked to energy production. The 
auctions always end at or close to the price caps for each 
element. 
Source: Material collated by Centre for Competition Policy, University of East Anglia from national authority 
websites, national authority documents and European Commission decision documents. 
5.3.2 Methodology 
For each scheme, the aim was to collect data on derating factors, the nature of the scheme 
(T-1, T-4/5 or certificates), the capacity price, the price cap and amount of capacity 
awarded by technology/energy source. The information obtained is reported in Annex 4.1. 
The number of de-rating factors for the Republic of Ireland mean they are provided 
separately in Annex 4.2. In Annex 4.3 obligations placed on those providing capacity for 
the delivery of capacity and testing for its presence are provided. In Poland and the UK the 
figures on capacity awarded are split between existing, refurbished and new capacity64, 
but this split by different types of capacity (existing, refurbished, new) is not available for 
individual technologies. 
5.3.3 Results overview 
Figure 21 shows that when awarded capacity is expressed in megawatt-years65, 65.5% of 
capacity has been awarded via one year contracts, almost three times as much as for the 
next most awarded contract length of 15 years. 
                                                            
64 This split has also been identified for the Britanny Additional Capacity scheme in France in 2011, and for the 
Irish Capacity Mechanism in 2017. 
65 One megawatt-year represents a megawatt of capacity being provided for one calendar year. 
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Figure 21: Volume awarded by contract length in sampled capacity mechanisms 
 
Source: Material collated by Centre for Competition Policy, University of East Anglia from national authority 
websites, national authority documents and European Commission decision documents. 
One question is the extent to which capacity mechanisms provide support to technologies 
using fossil fuels. Figure 22 shows the percentage of capacity that could be using fossil 
fuels over the period 2014-2019 for sampled schemes. Due to data limitations these 
percentages are not be weighted by the length of contracts awarded to different types of 
plants/capacity and so are based on MWs rather than MW-years.66  
Also, as the data on awarded capacity is split by technology rather than fuel type, Figure 
22 only provides an upper bound on the proportion of capacity that could be using fossil 
fuels.67 That 100% of the capacity in Germany is non-fossil fuel results from its sampled 
scheme being DSR, which is also the reason for Greek capacity being 87% non-fossil fuel. 
That 76% of capacity in the sampled French schemes is non-fossil fuel is the result of 
around 60% of awarded capacity involving nuclear plants. In contrast, in Poland and 
Ireland over 90% of awarded capacity is potentially fossil fuelled.  
                                                            
66 Ireland, Poland and the UK do not report the length of contracts awarded to different technologies.  
67 In particular, capacity taking the form of interconnectors, storage and energy from waste were included in the 
category ‘potentially fossil fuel’. 
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Figure 22:  Percentage of capacity (MW) receiving support that may use fossil 
fuels in sampled capacity mechanisms by Member State, 2014-2019 
 
Source: Calculations performed by Centre for Competition Policy, University of East Anglia based on material 
collated from national authority websites, national authority documents and European Commission decision 
documents. 
Figure 22 shows that for the sampled capacity mechanisms in 5 out of 6 years the capacity 
awarded (in MW) potentially fuelled by fossil fuels was higher than the non-fossil fuel 
capacity awarded. In 4 years at least 80% of the capacity awarded was potentially fossil 
fuelled. 
Figure 23: Capacity awarded (MW) in sampled capacity mechanisms split by 
potential fuel type, 2014-2019 
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Source: Material collated by Centre for Competition Policy, University of East Anglia from national authority 
websites, national authority documents and European Commission decision documents. 
The volumes awarded in the capacity mechanisms vary by Member State. Figure 24 shows 
that Poland, France and the UK in certain years each purchased more than 80,000 MW-
years of capacity. Germany, Belgium, Greece and Ireland never purchased more than 
12,000 MW-years of capacity in a given year. Figure 24 also shows drops in the capacity 
awarded in Poland (from 126,968 MW-years to 22,567 MW-years between 2018 and 2019) 
and in the UK (from 90,210 MW-years in 2016 to 5,798 MW-years in 2018). The drop in 
Poland may be related to the number of multi-year contracts being awarded in 2018. 
Figure 24: Volume awarded (MW-years) in sampled capacity mechanisms, 2011-
2019 
 
Source: Material collated by Centre for Competition Policy, University of East Anglia from national authority 
websites, national authority documents and European Commission decision documents. 
Turning to the average capacity prices over time, the UK and Poland have lower prices per 
MW-year in 2018 and 2019 when they were purchasing a lower quantity of capacity. The 
mechanisms in Greece, the Republic of Ireland and Poland have higher capacity prices than 
those in France68 and the UK. Germany is not featured in Figure 25 due to the two-part 
pricing structure of its capacity mechanism. Belgian data is reported for 2014 and 2015 
only, as no auction was held in 2016 and data for the 2017 auction was unavailable. In 
Figure 24 and Figure 25, the UK Supplementary Capacity Auction and the French Additional 
Capacity Mechanism (Brittany) are represented by single points, in 2017 and 2011 
respectively, as the mechanisms only operated for single years. 
In Annex 4.4 additional charts are provided that chart price against a range of possible 
design features for capacity mechanisms, specifically: (i) maximum awarded contract 
length, (ii) the percentage of volume awarded that was demand side response, (iii) the 
percentage of volume awarded that was new generation capacity, (iv) the lead time to the 
                                                            
68 Excluding the additional capacity mechanism for Brittany. 
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delivery of capacity, (v) maximum penalty as a proportion of annual capacity mechanism 
revenues. It is difficult to identify clear patterns from this exercise although this may be 
influenced by the limited number of data points for the different design variations. 
Figure 25:  Average capacity price (EUR per MW per year) by sampled mechanism, 
2011-2019 
 
Source: Material collated by the Centre for Competition Policy, University of East Anglia from national authority 
websites, national authority documents and European Commission decision documents. 
In Annex 4.4 additional charts are provided that chart price against a range of possible 
design features for capacity mechanisms, specifically: (i) maximum awarded contract 
length, (ii) the percentage of volume awarded that was demand side response, (iii) the 
percentage of volume awarded that was new generation capacity, (iv) the lead time to the 
delivery of capacity, and (v) the maximum penalty as a proportion of annual capacity 
mechanism revenues. It is difficult to identify clear patterns from this exercise although 
this may be influenced by the limited number of data points for the different design 
variations. The high frequency of the capacity mechanism rounds in Greece and Germany 
allows a more detailed analysis of the price trend over time and the position of awarded 
prices relative to the capacity mechanisms’ price caps. The Greek interruptibility scheme 
involves quarterly auctions for two types of demand side response (DSR): ‘ST’ and ‘LT’. LT 
refers to an auction seeking to procure 1GW of DSR to remain available for 48 hours 
following the announcement of an event, while ST refers to an auction seeking 600MW of 
DSR that would remain available for 1 hour following the announcement of an event.  
A feature of Figure 26, which shows the prices and price caps for these auctions, is the 
drop in the price caps before the Q1 2018 auction. Since the auction for Q2 2017 the 
clearing prices have risen towards the price caps, in particular for the ST DSR. For the LT 
DSR, the clearing price increased from EUR 50,000 per MW per year to EUR 62,000 per 
MW per year by the auction for Q4 2019. Correlating with the reduction in the ST price cap 
to EUR 50,000 per MW per year, the ST clearing price drops below its longer term level, 
never being above EUR 44,000 per MW per year in the Q1 2018, Q2 2018 and Q3 2018 
auctions. However, from the auction for Q4 2018 onwards the ST clearing price is always 
above EUR 49,000 per MW per year, reaching EUR 49,900 per MW per year in the Q1 2019 
and Q2 2019 auctions. 
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These changes in price do not appear to have a straightforward relationship with the 
‘competitiveness’ of the auctions. In all the sampled ST and LT auctions the volume 
participating exceeded the volume awarded. Also, it is difficult to see a relationship in 
Figure A4.4.6 in Annex 4.4 which charts auction clearing prices against volume 
participating over volume awarded.69 
Figure 26: Capacity price and price caps for the Greek interruptibility scheme, 
2016-201970 
 
Source: Material collated by Centre for Competition Policy, University of East Anglia, from the Greek Independent 
Power Transmission Operator (IPTO) 
The German DSR scheme is split into two categories: (i) 750 MW of ‘Immediately 
Interruptible Load’ to provide DSR at 350 msec notice, and (ii) 750 MW of ‘Fast 
Interruptible Load’ to provide DSR at 15 min notice. Weekly auctions for both types of DSR 
have been held since 27 March 2017 and involve one price linked to capacity and a unit 
price linked to the quantity of DSR actually employed. Throughout the period the capacity 
price cap has been EUR 500 per MW per week and the unit output price cap has been EUR 
400 per MWh. The Immediately Interruptible Load auction has never met the target 
capacity of 750 MW and so, with one exception71, has always cleared at the two price caps.  
Figure 27 illustrates that while initially the Fast Interruptible Load auction cleared at the 
price caps, in 2019 the auctions have started to clear below each of the price caps. This 
corresponds to a time period when the capacity volume awarded increased; in 2019 the 
capacity volume awarded in the Fast Interruptible Load auction exceeded 750 MW on 17 
occasions72. 
                                                            
69 If there is a pattern in Figure A4.4.6, it would seem to be a weak positive correlation between the 
competitiveness indicator and clearing prices, the opposite of the expected relationship. 
70 Data was unavailable for 2016 Q2, 2016 Q3, 2017 Q3 and 2017 Q4. 
71 The auction for 1 April to 7 April 2019 had a capacity clearing price of EUR 499.88 per MW per week. 
72 Up to and including the week beginning 4 November 2019. 
 72 
 
Figure 27: Capacity and unit clearing prices, plus price caps, for the German 
ABLAV ‘Fast Interruptible Load’ mechanism, 2017-201973 
 
Source: Material collated by Centre for Competition Policy, University of East Anglia from Regelleistung.net 
5.3.4 Conclusions 
The following main observations arise, subject to the caveats detailed above: 
 65.5% of capacity in MW-years was awarded via one-year contracts. 
 Greece, Poland and Ireland generally had higher capacity prices than France or the UK.  
 Germany and Greece have frequent awards, allowing for more detailed study. 
o In Germany, fast interruptible load auctions almost always cleared at price caps in 
2017 and 2018. In 2019, prices fell below the price caps, though by no more than 
4%. This is likely associated with limited competition, in terms of the volume 
participating, prior to 2019. 
o In Greece, the auctions for the two types of demand-side response have drifted 
towards their respective price caps.  Since Q4 2018 onwards, the clearing price in 
the ST auction has been between EUR 49,000 per MW per year and EUR 49,900 per 
MW per year, compared to the EUR 50,000 price cap. However, it is not obvious 
that this pricing trend can be associated with a reduction in competition. 
5.4 Negative pricing 
Question 5: To what extent have the EEAG and the corresponding GBER provisions 
and their application facilitated the integration of RES into the electricity market? 
(see Annex 0 for a list of all questions.) 
5.4.1 Introduction 
The objective is to understand the extent of negative electricity pricing in Denmark, France, 
Germany, the Netherlands and the UK, and whether rules restricting the aid received by 
RES installations during hours of negative prices have been effective in limiting the number 
                                                            
73 Covering the weeks from that beginning 27 March 2017 to that beginning 4 November 2019. 
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of negative price hours. This question arises because, due to demand and supply conditions 
and the need for balance in the electricity system, electricity prices are sometimes negative 
in many EU Member States. 
The observed schemes differ in the rules limiting support during hours of negative prices. 
In Germany, the UK and the Netherlands support is not paid when there are more than six 
consecutive hours of negative prices. In France and Denmark support is not paid during 
any hours of negative prices, although, in France, schemes can include a ‘compensation 
mechanism’ for suppliers if a large number of negatively priced hours occur within a given 
calendar year. Another variation between schemes is whether or not aid is awarded when 
the price is exactly zero. 
It was not possible to isolate the aggregate level of RES generation occurring during 
negative price hours receiving aid approved under the EEAG. Using data for all RES 
generation (receiving aid or not) indicates that in Germany and Denmark considerable RES 
generation continues during hours of negative prices in the first eight months of 2019. 
5.4.2 Methodology 
Table A6.5.6 in Annex 6.5 provides a summary of the total number of negative price hours 
observed on the relevant day ahead electricity market over the period 1 January 2014 to 
4 September 2019. The data on the occurrence of negative day ahead prices was taken 
from the entso-e74 transparency platform with additional data from the relevant electricity 
exchanges as required. The data on the occurrence of negative day ahead prices is collated 
in Annexes 5.1 to 5.7.75 In Annex 5.8, for all the hours of negative day ahead prices 
identified, the total electricity generated by RES and the split of generation by different 
types of RES, is provided utilising entso-e data. For Denmark, Germany and France, five 
RES plants have been sampled where their generating output on five days when a 
particularly large number of hours of negative day ahead prices76 were observed has been 
collected. This sampling approach faced challenges such that it was limited to the plant 
data available on entso-e.  
Annex 5.9 provides generation data for the sampled RES plants77 for the sample days 
identified in Annexes 5.1 to 5.4. The plant level data on entso-e is inherently partial for 
RES, as Regulation (EU) 543/201378 only requires TSOs to report production for 
generation units with a capacity of 100 MW or above. No solar generation units were 
observed on entso-e for the sampled days and the majority of RES plants identified were 
hydro-electric plants. Table A6.5.7 in Annex 6.5 details the sampled plants and days. For 
the sampled days in Denmark the ‘last’ intraday electricity price for each time period has 
                                                            
74 See https://transparency.entsoe.eu/. 
75 The Summary tab in these annexes splits the negative day ahead price hours by day and hour; also it details 
the days sampled for the collection of individual plant case studies. The days sampled for case studies were 
focused on 2018 and 2019 to maximise the likelihood of including RES plants subject to negative pricing rules. 
76 In Denmark Market 1 the min. number of negative price hours was 6 (except extra sample days for Horns Rev 
C), in Denmark Market 2 the min. was 5 hours, in France 3 hours and in Germany 8 hours. The variation between 
Member States reflects the variation in the frequency of negative day ahead prices in the different Member States. 
77 entso-e generation data is provided for fossil fuel and hydro plants by individual generating unit, i.e. individual 
turbine. Where a plant had multiple generating units we provide data for one randomly selected generating unit. 
78 See Article 16, https://eur-lex.europa.eu/LexUriServ/LexUriServ.do?uri=OJ:L:2013:163:0001:0012:EN:PDF. 
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also been obtained and when the value of this price is negative it has been marked on 
Figure 34, Figure 35 and Figures A5.12.1 to A.5.12.10 in Annex 5.12. 
Two plants that definitely received aid involving negative pricing rules and had usable data 
were Horns Rev C and Anholt in Denmark. The generation behaviour of these plants relative 
to periods of negative electricity prices are provided in Figure 34 and Figure 35 below. The 
German plants Rheinkraftwerk Iffezheim and Wikinger Prod received State aid, the latter 
probably being subject to negative pricing rules due to its production beginning in 
December 2017.79 However, no usable data for Wikinger Prod was found on entso-e for 
the sampled days and a similar situation also applies to the sole Northern Irish RES plant 
identified on entso-e, Lisahally, and the sole Dutch RES plant on entso-e, Westereems 2 
Tennet.80 The limitations of the data available on entso-e are already known.81 No plants 
in Great Britain were sampled as no hours of negative day ahead prices occurred.  
When selecting the plants on entso-e to sample, outside sources were used to identify their 
date of construction/start of operation. In practice, all the hydro plants identified for the 
sampled Member States began operation before the 1990s (apart from PSW Goldisthal PSS 
A in Germany) and so appear to be unlikely recipients of aid. Nevertheless, data is provided 
for these plants so that the behaviour of RES plants not receiving aid during negative day 
ahead price events can be understood, in particular, for pumped-storage hydro-electric 
plants which might increase their consumption during hours of negative prices.82 
5.4.3 Results overview 
The total number of negative day ahead price hours varies across Member States. Over 
the period considered, Figure 28 shows Germany experienced the highest number of 
negative day ahead price hours (720), while in Denmark Market 1 there were 414 hours. 
By contrast, the Netherlands experienced two hours of negative day ahead prices and in 
Great Britain there were none, although, in Northern Ireland there were 59 hours of 
negative day ahead prices. In this sub-section, references to 2019 mean the period up to 
and including 4 September 2019. 
                                                            
79 The other German RES plants available on the entso-e platform did not receive aid from the EEG scheme. 
80 The missing data issue was not possible to solve by changing the sampled days. 
81 ‘A review of the ENTSO-E Transparency Platform’, Output 1 of the “Study on the quality of electricity market 
data” commissioned by the European Commission, 2017, 
https://ec.europa.eu/energy/sites/ener/files/documents/review_of_the_entso_e_plattform.pdf. 
82 However, the data is not designed to be conclusive on this point as one generating unit (rather than all) from 
the multiple units that pumped storage plants tend to possess is sampled and the precise rules on the 
remuneration of these plants during negative day ahead price hours have not been investigated. 
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Figure 28: Total hours of negative day ahead electricity prices in sampled Member 
States, 2014-2019 
 
Source: Underlying data from the entso-e transparency platform, plus additional data from the Elspot market 
(Denmark), the EPEX Spot83 market (France and Germany). 
Figure 29 highlights that in Germany, Denmark and Northern Ireland the greatest number 
of negative day ahead price hours occurred in 2019. In Germany and Denmark the trend 
is for the number of negative day ahead price hours to rise over time. For example, in 
Denmark Market 2 there were no negative day ahead price hours in 2014, while 81 
occurred in the first 8 months of 2019. In Denmark Market 1 the number negative day 
ahead price hours in the first 8 months of 2019 was 2.3 times the number in 2014. In 
Germany the number of negative day ahead price hours rose 2.4 times (from 64 hours to 
153 hours). In France the number of negative day ahead price hours was lower in 2019 
than in 2014. When considering the time trend for Germany, it is worth noting that the 
rules limiting support during hours of negative electricity prices apply to plants 
commissioned from 1 January 2016. Hence, for plants constructed before this date, one 
would not necessarily expect the rule change to alter their production decisions. 
                                                            
83 Epexspot is the name of the exchange it does not refer specifically to the on the day spot price. Similarly, there 
is a day ahead Elspot price. 
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Figure 29: Number of negative day ahead price hours by year for sampled Member 
States, 2014-19 
 
Source: Underlying data from the entso-e transparency platform, plus additional data from the Elspot market 
(Denmark), the epexspot market (France and Germany). 
Beyond the number of negative day ahead price hours, one can consider the average length 
of negative day ahead price events. Figure 30 shows that in addition to Germany having 
more negative day ahead price hours occurring, on average each negative price event also 
lasted for a greater number of hours than in France or Denmark (with the exception of 
2019). While Germany saw a greater number of negative day ahead price hours in 2019 
than 2014, the average length of these episodes was similar at just under four hours. 
Figure 30: Average length of negative day ahead price episodes by sampled 
Member State, 2014-2019 
 
Source: Underlying data from the entso-e transparency platform, plus additional data from the Elspot market 
(Denmark), the epexspot market (France and Germany). 
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Figure 31: Number of hours of negative day ahead prices by time of day for 
Germany, 2014-2019 pooled  
 
Source: Underlying data from the entso-e transparency platform, plus additional data from the epexspot market. 
Figure 31 shows that in Germany over the period 2014-2019 the greatest number of 
negative day ahead price hours occurred between 12am and 7am with a second peak 
between 1pm and 4pm.  
The quantity of RES generation occurring during the periods of negative day ahead prices 
is now considered. Figure 32 shows that the quantity of RES generation in Germany during 
hours of negative day ahead prices exceeds that in all other Member States combined. On 
average, during hours of negative day ahead prices in 2019 German RES generation totaled 
45 GW, while in the Member State with the next highest RES generation per hour, France, 
it totaled 14.3 GW. While each of the Danish markets had a higher number of negative day 
ahead price hours than France, they had lower average hourly quantities of RES generation 
during negative day ahead price events in 2019 of 2.9 GW and 1.1 GW respectively. 
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Figure 32: Average RES generation per hour during negative day ahead price 
episodes by sampled Member State, 2015-2019 
 
Source: Underlying data from the entso-e transparency platform. 
Although Figure 32 shows an upward trend in RES generation per hour in Germany over 
time, in other Member States the percentage increase between 2016 and 2019 was higher. 
Between 2016 and 2019, the average volume of RES generation during negative day ahead 
price hours in Germany rose by 17.8% compared to 28.0% in France, 34.4% in Denmark 
Market 1 and 60.7% in Denmark Market 2. 
Figure 33: Percentage of negative day ahead price hours accounted for by 
negative price events of different durations in Germany, 2014-15 vs 2016-19 
 
Source: Underlying data from the entso-e transparency platform, plus additional data from the epexspot market. 
Given the large number of negative day ahead price hours and the high level of RES 
generation in Germany, the potential impact of the change to the German rules on support 
during hours of negative prices that took effect in 2016 are considered in more detail. 
Figure 33 compares the percentage of all negative day ahead price hours by duration of 
negative day ahead price event in the years before and after the rule change. Comparing 
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the data for 2014-2015 and 2016-2019 shows that the percentage of hours in events 
lasting 7 hours fell from 11.1% to 4.0%, and the percentage of hours in events lasting 6 
and 8 hours also fell. However, over the period 2016-2019 the percentage of hours 
accounted for by negative day ahead price events lasting 9 hours or more rose compared 
to 2014-2015, from 12.6% to 33.6%. 
As explained in section 5.4.2, the generation of ‘case study’ RES plants was investigated 
on a sample of days with frequent hours of negative pricing. The best data available relates 
to plants in Denmark, specifically three offshore windfarms (Anholt, Horns Rev B and Horns 
Rev C) and two biomass plants (Skaerbaekvaerket 3 and Studstrupvaerket 3) in Denmark 
Market 1.84 In general, it was not possible to identify which of the plants where generation 
data is available received State aid, nor the precise State aid rules applicable during periods 
of negative prices. Without this information only tentative conclusions about the impact of 
negative price rules on plant behaviour can be drawn from the case studies. However, for 
Horns Rev C (Horns Rev 3), the Commission decision states "For hours in which the day 
ahead auction price is negative, no premium will be paid."85 Also, the tender documents 
for the Anholt windfarm state that no surcharge will be granted for hours when the spot 
price is not positive, although this applies for max. 300 hours annually.86 While the specific 
rules applicable to Horns Rev B (start of operation in Sept. 2009) are unclear, the tender 
document does not contain a clause equivalent to that in the Anholt tender documents.87 
The rules applicable to the Studstrupvaerket 3 and Skaerbaekvaerket 3 biomass CHP plants 
are unclear, although, it is known that the former was converted to biomass in Oct. 2016 
and the latter was converted to co-firing with biomass in Oct. 2017. 
Figure 34: Hourly generation output (MW) of the case study Denmark Market 1 
RES plants on 10 August 2019 
 
                                                            
84 For additional data for Denmark Market 1 and four RES plants in Denmark Market 2, see Annex 5.12. 
85 SA.40305, paragraph 15. 
86 See point 2, ‘Economic conditions’, pg 43, ‘Conditions for public tender – Anholt offshore wind farm, April 30, 
2009’, https://ens.dk/sites/ens.dk/files/Vindenergi/udbudsbetingelser_anholt_30_april09_endelig.pdf 
87 See ‘Conditions for tender after negotiation on offshore wind turbine concession at Horns Rev (October, 2004)’, 
https://ens.dk/sites/ens.dk/files/Vindenergi/udbudsbetingelser_anholt_30_april09_endelig.pdf 
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Note: Negative day ahead price periods (inclusive of prices of zero) are illustrated by the shaded box. No negative 
price periods (inclusive of prices of zero) were observed on the intraday market.88 
Source: Day ahead prices/generation data from entso-e transparency platform, intraday prices from Nord Pool. 
In Figure 34 one of the offshore wind installations, Anholt, reduces its output during the 
negative day ahead price period. Both Horns Rev B and Horns Rev C maintain stable 
production during the negative day ahead price period. Indeed, the output of Horns Rev B 
and Horns Rev C is rising in the hours leading up to the negative day ahead price event. 
The pattern of Horns Rev B and Horns Rev C maintaining production during hours of 
negative prices on the day ahead market, while Anholt sharply reduces production, is 
representative of the patterns observed on the other sampled days.89 On 10 August 2019, 
covered in Figure 34, the two biomass plants, Skaerbaekvaerket 3 and Studstrupvaerket 
3, did not generate any electricity. Figure 35 covers a day when both of them were 
operating, but no data was available for Horns Rev C. It is representative of 
Studstrupvaerket 3 on three sampled days that during hours of negative day ahead prices 
its output is reduced but does not fall to zero. During the negative day ahead price event 
in Figure 35 both Anholt and Skaerbaekvaerket 3 produced zero output. 
Figure 35: Hourly generation output (MW) of case study Denmark Market 1 RES 
plants on 2 January 2019 
 
Note: Negative day ahead price periods (inclusive of prices of zero) are illustrated by the shaded box. Negative 
price periods (inclusive of prices of zero) on the intraday market are illustrated by the thick green line. 
Source: Day ahead prices/generation data from entso-e transparency platform, intraday prices from Nord Pool.  
In Annex 5.12 additional charts are provided covering the other sampled days in Denmark 
Market 1 and Denmark Market 2 for the case study plants. 
                                                            
88 The intraday prices used are the ‘last’ prices for the relevant time period. Intraday pricing data was missing 
for: 00:00-02:00, 21:00-22:00 and 23:00-00:00. 
89 The sampled days are 1 January, 2 January, 17 March, 23 April and 10 August 2019. As Horns Rev C has 
missing data on a number of these days, its output was also assessed on 30 June and 11 August 2019.  
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5.4.4 Conclusions 
The following main observations arise, subject to the caveats detailed above: 
 The total number of hours of negative day ahead prices have increased across the 
sampled Member States in recent years, from 118 in 2014 to 416 in the first 8 months 
of 2019. 
 Looking at Denmark where plant specific data is available, two wind farms, Anholt and 
Horns Rev C, behave differently during negative day ahead price periods. Anholt 
substantially reduces production, while Horns Rev C maintains production. 
 To draw firm conclusions about the impact of negative price rules on individual RES 
installations it is necessary to know the exact negative price rules that the installations 
face and have access to the matching form of pricing data (day ahead, intraday or 
imbalance settlement price). Horns Rev C and Anholt are the two plants where the 
necessary combination of data is available. 
 In Germany negative price rules do not appear associated with reduced total RES 
generation at times of negative prices on the day ahead market. Comparing data from 
2014-2015 to 2016-2019, while a lower proportion of negative day ahead price hours 
occurred during negative price events lasting 7 or 8 hours, the proportion of negative 
day ahead price hours occurring in negative price episodes lasting over 10 hours has 
increased since 2016. The percentage of negative day ahead price hours occurring in 
episodes lasting over 6 hours increased from 35% in 2014 and 2015 to 42% in 2016 
to 2019. 
 Plant level generation data was available for a limited number of RES plants on the 
entso-e transparency platform. General availability of plant-by-plant data for plants 
receiving State aid would be valuable for evaluating support schemes.  
5.5 Proportion of electricity bills accounted for by RES charges 
Question 6: The contractor shall prepare the following tables: (i) Table 1: should 
indicate, for each Member State, whether they have introduced a renewable 
energy policy in the period 2014-2020 going beyond their binding 2020 RES 
targets; (ii) Table 2: should list the level of RES charges over the total electricity 
bill for a sample of a minimum of 15 Member States in the period 2014-2020. For 
those Member States having implemented an approved scheme under section 
3.7.2. of the EEAG, Table 2 should also indicate the level of the reductions on RES 
levies and the level of the reductions to other charges approved by the 
Commission by analogy, if applicable. (see Annex 0 for a list of all questions.) 
5.5.1 Introduction 
The key objectives of this section are to examine: (i) the RES targets pursued by Member 
States, (ii) the proportion of electricity bills accounted for by RES charges, and (iii) the 
proportion of electricity bills accounted for by other charges approved by analogy. Looking 
across all Member States, four (Hungary, Italy, Spain and Sweden) have set RES targets 
for 2020 that exceed their binding EU targets. These targets were all set prior to 2014. For 
the analysis of the proportion of electricity bills accounted for by RES charges, 15 Member 
States have been sampled.  
As the data on these proportions was not readily available for all years and Member States, 
a methodology was created where the proportions were calculated for example households, 
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example non-energy intensive commercial users and example energy intensive commercial 
users (EIU). The main results of this exercise are presented in section 6.1, which looks in 
detail at the changes over time within individual Member States to assess the possible 
relationship between the reductions in RES charges for EIUs and changes to the RES 
charges for other consumers. 
In the analysis the definition of what constitutes an example EIU varies across Member 
States. Energy price data for Eurostat consumption bands IC-IF are used as the basis for 
the calculations for both EIU and non-EIU90 commercial consumers. To calculate the RES 
charges for an example EIU in a particular Member State we assume that, compared to a 
non-EIU with an identical consumption level, our example EIU has the necessary 
characteristics to meet the Member State-specific definition of an EIU required to receive 
a reduction in their RES charge. If the reduction in a RES charge is linked to the electro-
intensity of a business, we assume an electro-intensity of 20%. 
The formal definition of undertakings that can receive reductions to RES charges, which all 
national definitions must comply with, is provided in Section 3.7.2 EEAG.91 Reductions to 
RES charges can be provided to undertakings in the sectors listed in Annex 3 of the EEAG 
which have a high electro-intensity and high exposure to international trade. Additionally, 
undertakings not listed in Annex 3 of the EEAG can receive support if they have an electro-
intensity of at least 20% and operate in a sector with a trade intensity of at least 4% at 
the EU level.  
In terms of the extent of support that can be provided, the Commission considers aid to 
be proportionate if beneficiaries pay at least 15% of the RES charges that non-EIUs face. 
Alternatively, Member States can apply a threshold that undertakings do not pay more 
than 4% of their gross value added for RES charges, or 0.5% of their gross value added 
for undertakings with an electro-intensity of at least 20%. 
5.5.2 Methodology 
Detail on whether Member States have introduced policies going beyond their binding 2020 
RES targets is provided in Annex 6.1. The data primarily comes from national renewable 
energy action plans92 and the Grantham Institute’s database of climate related 
legislation.93 To ensure that policy changes during the period 2014-2019 were not missed 
relevant national authorities were contacted twice in all Member States. National targets 
with deadlines after 2020 were not included in the data collection exercise. Data has been 
collected for 12 of the 13 Member States94 where the Commission has approved ‘reductions 
to EIU charges’, plus three additional Member States. The sampled Member States are: 
Denmark, France, Germany, Greece, Italy, Latvia, Lithuania, Poland, Romania, Slovakia, 
Slovenia and the United Kingdom) plus Austria, Croatia and Estonia.  
For the proportion of the total electricity bill accounted for by RES charges, the possibility 
of using DG Energy data was explored, but most of the required data was unavailable. As 
a result, DG Energy data has been used to inform the data verification process rather than 
as the primary source of data. Eurostat identifies the proportion of electricity prices 
attributable to ‘Renewable taxes’ in 2017 and 2018 and, even in these years, data for some 
                                                            
90 Additionally, for non-EIUs, calculations are performed for consumption bands IA and IB. 
91 See https://eur-lex.europa.eu/legal-content/EN/TXT/PDF/?uri=CELEX:52014XC0628(01)&from=EN. 
92 See https://ec.europa.eu/energy/en/topics/renewable-energy/national-renewable-energy-action-plans-2020. 
93 See www.lse.ac.uk/GranthamInstitute/countries/. 
94 No data was found for Bulgaria. 
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Member States (e.g. France, Germany, Italy and Spain) is missing. Hence, a procedure 
was adopted to construct the requested data in all required years. 
The present dataset was built up from analysing the legislation in each Member State and 
then applying the project team’s best understanding of the legislation to a range of 
example consumers. The proportion of electricity bills accounted for by RES charges has 
been calculated for 15 example consumer types (5 household types, 6 types of non-energy 
intensive commercial users and 4 types95 of energy intensive commercial users).  
The consumer types match the consumption bandings used by Eurostat (DA to DF for 
households and IA to IF for commercial users) to provide the electricity price data on which 
the calculations were based.96 The calculated RES charges were compared to DG Energy’s 
figures for 2017. The largest differences were found for Croatia, Italy, Latvia and Slovenia. 
One possible explanation for these is that the project team has calculated charges for 
specific example consumer types, while the DG energy figures are likely to average across 
different consumers. 
The structure of levies are diverse across Member States, as are the technical definitions 
used in policies. In addition to levy bands being determined by consumption volume, in 
some instances, other factors are involved such as electricity voltage.97 Another complexity 
is that in some cases not all a levy’s revenues are used to support RES, requiring the 
proportion going to RES to be identified. In addition to the general complexity of the RES 
levies, a number of Member States (Italy, Poland, Romania and the United Kingdom) use 
or have used certificate schemes.98  
In these cases, RES charges were calculated based on the market (or minimum) price of 
the certificates, the number of certificates that have to be held for a particular level of 
electricity generation/consumption, and the rules used to pass through the cost of 
certificates to particular consumers. Annex 6.2 provides detailed information on the 
structure of the reductions to RES and other charges. The estimates of the proportion of 
electricity bills devoted to RES charges are presented in the ‘Summary’ tab of Annex 6.3.  
Reductions for EIUs related to ‘other charges approved by the Commission by analogy’ and 
the proportion of electricity bills accounted for by these other charges were estimated. The 
sampled charges/State Aid cases listed in Table A6.5.9 in Annex 6.5 relate to France, 
Germany, Greece, Italy, Poland and Slovakia.  
The proportion of the electricity bill represented by these other charges is provided for 
these Member States in the ‘Summary’ tab of Annex 6.4. The methodology for calculating 
these proportions, and their presentation in Annex 6.4, is the same as for the proportion 
of electricity bills represented by RES charges. In terms of the extent to which the results 
in Annex 6.4 may be driven by assumptions, the ‘other charge’ rates for Germany, Italy 
and Slovakia were taken directly from legislation, the rates for France required some 
                                                            
95 In France and in Italy prior to 2018 the definition of EIUs means calculations are performed for only 3 types of 
energy intensive commercial users. 
96http://appsso.eurostat.ec.europa.eu/nui/show.do?dataset=nrg_pc_204&lang=enand 
http://appsso.eurostat.ec.europa.eu/nui/show.do?dataset=nrg_pc_205&lang=en. 
97 Electricity voltage is a factor determining the RES charge in Austria, Greece, Italy and Slovenia. 
98 In Italy the green certificates scheme’s last year of effective operation was 2014, in Poland the certificates 
scheme’s last year of operation was 2018, while in Romania and the UK the green certificate schemes continues 
to operate. 
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manipulation, while the rates for Poland and Greece involved the project team’s own 
estimates or assumptions. 
5.5.3 Results overview 
Four Member States (Hungary, Italy, Spain and Sweden) have 2020 RES targets exceeding 
their binding EU commitments. Table 2 shows that Italy has a target exceeding its 
commitments by the largest margin, with its target being 19-20% instead of 17%.  
Table 5: Member States with 2020 RES targets exceeding EU commitments  
Member 
State 
Year Policy 
Introduced 
Policy Title 
Binding EU 
2020 Target 
(% of energy 
consumption 
from RES) 
Alternative 
higher 
target 
Increase in Target 
Hungary 2010 
National Action Plan 
2010 
13.00% 14.65% 1.65 %age pts 
Italy 2013 National Energy Strategy 17.00% 19-20% 2.00-3.00 %age pts 
Spain 2011 
Plan for Renewable 
Energy PER 2011-2020 
20.00% 20.80% 0.80 %age pts 
Sweden 2009 
Government Bills 
2009/09:162 and 163 
49.00% 50.00% 1.00 %age pts 
Source: Grantham Institute database of climate related legislation and national renewable energy action plans. 
Table 6 shows that by 2018, 12 Member States99 were exceeding their 2020 targets with 
Croatia doing so by the largest margin of 8.0 percentage points. Denmark and Sweden 
also exceeded their targets by more than 5.5 percentage points in 2018. In contrast, the 
Netherlands was 6.6 percentage points below its 2020 target as of 2018.100 However, the 
nature of the available Eurostat tracking statistics needs to be recognised. The binding EU 
2020 targets were constructed on the basis of a statistical object ‘s2005’, the share of 
energy consumption from RES as calculated in 2005.  
However, the Eurostat time series of RES shares in energy consumption incorporates 
methodological changes to make the time series as accurate as possible. This inconsistency 
between the time series and the origins of the 2020 targets has the greatest impact for 
Croatia: Eurostat now estimates the RES share in Croatia in 2005 as 23.7%, a figure 11.1 
percentage points above the value of ‘s2005’ used to calculate Croatia’s 2020 target.101 
The Eurostat time series also increases the RES share relative to ‘s2005’ for Hungary by 
2.6 percentage points, Italy by 2.3 percentage points and Sweden by 0.9 percentage 
points, 3 of the Member States featured in Table 5. 
                                                            
99 Greece’s RES share in 2018 exceeded its 2020 target by 0.002 percentage points. 
100 These values are taken from the Eurostat spreadsheet ‘SHARES summary results 2018’ downloaded from 
https://ec.europa.eu/eurostat/web/energy/data/shares on 21 January 2020. 
101 The discrepancy for Croatia is discussed in section 15.2 ‘Comparability – over time’ of the Eurostat metadata 
for ‘Share of energy from renewable sources (nrg_ind_ren)’, available at: 
https://ec.europa.eu/eurostat/cache/metadata/en/nrg_ind_ren_esms.htm . Eurostat explains the Croatia 
discrepancy as resulting from more detailed survey data becoming available regarding the use of biomass fuel 
sources by households leading to an upwards revision of the share of energy consumption from renewable 
sources. 
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Table 6: Progress towards binding EU 2020 renewables target by Member State, 
2018 position 
Member 
State 
(1) Value of 
‘s2005’ (% 
of energy 
consumptio
n from RES) 
(2) Current 
Eurostat 
timeseries value 
for 2005 (% of 
energy 
consumption 
from RES) 
Value 
of (2) 
less 
(1), 
%pts 
(3) Binding 
EU 2020 
Target (% of 
energy 
consumption 
from RES) 
(4) % of 
energy 
consumptio
n from RES 
in 2018 
2018 RES 
share less 
2020 
target 
(value of 
4 less 3), 
%pts 
Croatia 12.6 23.7 11.1 20.0 28.0 8.0 
Denmark 17.0 16.0 -1.0 30.0 36.1 6.1 
Sweden 39.8 40.7 0.9 49.0 54.6 5.6 
Estonia 18.0 17.4 -0.6 25.0 30.0 5.0 
Bulgaria 9.4 9.2 -0.2 16.0 20.5 4.5 
Finland 28.5 28.8 0.3 38.0 41.2 3.2 
Czechia  6.1 7.1 1.0 13.0 15.1 2.1 
Lithuania 15.0 16.8 1.8 23.0 24.4 1.4 
Cyprus 2.9 3.1 0.2 13.0 13.9 0.9 
Italy 5.2 7.5 2.3 17.0 17.8 0.8 
Latvia 32.6 32.3 -0.3 40.0 40.3 0.3 
Greece 6.9 7.3 0.4 18.0 18.0 0.0 
Romania 17.8 17.6 -0.2 24.0 23.9 -0.1 
Hungary 4.3 6.9 2.6 13.0 12.5 -0.5 
Austria 23.3 24.4 1.1 34.0 33.4 -0.6 
Portugal 20.5 19.5 -1.0 31.0 30.3 -0.7 
Germany 5.8 7.2 1.4 18.0 16.5 -1.5 
Luxembg 0.9 1.4 0.5 11.0 9.1 -1.9 
Malta 0.0 0.1 0.1 10.0 8.0 -2.0 
Slovakia 6.7 6.4 -0.3 25.0 11.9 -2.1 
Spain 8.7 8.4 -0.3 20.0 17.4 -2.6 
Belgium 2.2 2.3 0.1 13.0 9.4 -3.6 
Poland 7.2 6.9 -0.3 15.0 11.3 -3.7 
Slovenia 16.0 16.0 0.0 14.0 21.1 -3.9 
UK 1.3 1.1 -0.2 15.0 11.0 -4.0 
Ireland 3.1 2.8 -0.3 16.0 11.1 -4.9 
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France 10.3 9.6 -0.7 23.0 16.6 -6.4 
Netherlds 2.4 2.5 0.1 14.0 7.4 -6.6 
Together, Figure A6.6.16 and Figure A6.6.17 in Annex 6.6 report each Member State’s 
progress against their individual binding EU target for the percentage of total energy 
consumption to come from renewable energy sources. Over the period 2010-2018, 
Denmark recorded the largest improvement in the proportion of energy consumption from 
RES, with it increasing by 14.0 percentage points, while the lowest change was in Hungary 
which saw a decrease of 0.3 percentage points. 
Figure 36 to Figure 41 show differences between Member States in the average proportions 
of electricity bills devoted to RES charges, and in the evolution of these proportions over 
time. Here the focus is on discussing cross-country comparisons as the detail on comparing 
RES charges over time within individual Member States is provided in section 6.1. In Figure 
36 and Figure 37 the reported values are the simple arithmetic average of the values for 
the 5 example household types, while in Figure 38 and Figure 39 the average is taken 
across 4 of the example non-energy intensive commercial users102 and in Figure 40 and 
Figure 41 the average is taken across the 4 example energy intensive commercial users.103 
Germany and Italy are characterised by the largest increases in the proportion of electricity 
bills represented by RES charges for households and non-EIU commercial users over the 
period considered. For example, between 2008 and 2018 the average percentage of the 
electricity bill represented by RES charges in Germany for household consumers rose by 
16.4 percentage points, while for non-EIU commercial consumers the increase was 37.1 
percentage points. This contrasts with the case of Slovenia where between 2011 and 2018 
the average proportion for households rose by 1.9 percentage points and for non-EIU 
commercial consumers by 6.5 percentage points. 
While the proportion of the electricity bill accounted for by RES charges in Germany is the 
highest (or second highest) for all three classes of consumers among the sampled Member 
States in 2018, the difference to other Member States varies across the classes. It is 
highest for the example non-EIU commercial consumers. For both Germany and Italy, the 
average proportion of the electricity bill accounted for by RES charges for the example 
non-EIU commercial consumers was over 45% (see Figure 38). In contrast, in no other 
sampled Member State the proportion for the example non-EIU commercial consumers 
exceeded 21%. For the example EIUs, the average proportion of the electricity bill 
represented by RES charges in Germany (see Figure 40) is closer to the other sampled 
Member States with 19.4% in 2018, compared to 13.1% in Slovakia, which has the second 
highest average proportion for the example EIUs. For the example EIUs, Italy had the fifth 
highest average proportion of the electricity bill devoted to RES charges. In 2018 the lowest 
average proportion for non-EIU commercial consumers was in Poland (2.2%, see Figure 
39), while for EIUs it was in Latvia (0.6%, see Figure 41). 
                                                            
102 Consumption bands IC to IF. The averages do not include the example IA and IB users to ensure the averages 
for non-EIUs are directly comparable to those for EIUs. 
103 3 example energy intensive commercial users in the case of France and Italy (prior to 2018). 
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Figure 36: Average example RES charge over electricity bill by sampled Member 
State (first eight), household consumers (consumption bands DA to DF) 
 
Source: Calculations by Centre for Competition Policy, University of East Anglia utilizing information from national 
authority websites, national authority documents and European Commission decision documents. 
Figure 37: Average example RES charge over electricity bill by sampled Member 
State (second seven), household consumers (consumption bands DA to DF) 
 
Source: Calculations by Centre for Competition Policy, University of East Anglia utilizing information from national 
authority websites, national authority documents and European Commission decision documents. 
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Figure 38: Average example RES charge over electricity bill by sampled Member 
State (first eight), non-energy intensive commercial consumers   (consumption 
bands IC to IF) 
 
Source: Calculations by Centre for Competition Policy, University of East Anglia utilizing information from national 
authority websites, national authority documents and European Commission decision documents. 
Figure 39: Average example RES charge over electricity bill by sampled Member 
State (second seven), non-energy intensive commercial consumers 
(consumption bands IC to IF) 
 
Source: Calculations by Centre for Competition Policy, University of East Anglia utilizing information from national 
authority websites, national authority documents and European Commission decision documents. 
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Figure 40: Average example RES charge over electricity bill by sampled Member 
State (first eight), energy intensive commercial users (consumption bands IC to 
IF) 
 
Source: Calculations by Centre for Competition Policy, University of East Anglia utilizing information from national 
authority websites, national authority documents and European Commission decision documents. 
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Figure 41: Average example RES charge over electricity bill by sampled Member 
State (second seven), energy intensive commercial users (consumption bands IC 
to IF) 
 
Source: Calculations by Centre for Competition Policy, University of East Anglia utilizing information from national 
authority websites, national authority documents and European Commission decision documents. 
In Annex 6.6 additional charts are provided for: (i) the proportion of electricity bills 
accounted for by other charges approved by analogy, (ii) electricity prices in EUR per MWh 
for the three categories of consumer, and (iii) detail on the proportion of electricity bills 
accounted for by RES charges for each individual consumption band in Italy and Germany. 
5.5.4 Conclusions 
The following main observations arise, subject to the caveats detailed above: 
 Four Member States (Hungary, Italy, Spain and Sweden) have 2020 RES targets 
exceeding their binding EU commitments.  
 In 2018 12 Member States had a RES share in total energy consumption exceeding 
their binding 2020 target according to Eurostat data. 
 Of these 12 Member States, Bulgaria, the Czech Republic, Denmark, Estonia, Croatia, 
Lithuania, Finland and Sweden exceeded their respective binding RES targets by at 
least one percentage point.  
 In 2018 the RES charge as a percentage of household electricity bills varied from under 
5% to just over 20% across the EU. The RES charge as a percentage of the bill for non-
energy intensive commercial customers varied from under 5% in Poland to more than 
40% in Germany and Italy. 
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In 2018 the RES charge as a percentage of the bill for energy intensive commercial 
customers was under 10% for all Member States examined except in Germany, Lithuania 
and Slovakia. 
5.6 Waste management 
Question 7: Waste management is an important element in achieving resource 
efficiency. To what extent has Article 47 GBER, which sets out the compatibility 
criteria for aid for waste recycling and re-utilisation, been effective in allowing 
aid to foster sustainable and smart growth in re-use and recycling of waste while 
avoiding disproportionate distortions of competition? (see Annex 0 for a list of all 
questions.) 
5.6.1 Review of waste management schemes  
Question 7.a: Do the schemes containing provisions on waste management limit 
eligible activities to recycling of waste and preparation for re-use? Do they target 
specific types of waste, and if so, which ones? Do they also cover waste-to-energy 
projects? 
To provide input for assessing the effectiveness of State aid measures in the field of waste 
management, the review started with desk research into 129 national State aid schemes, 
based on a list provided by the Commission, containing all national schemes that Member 
States had until mid-2019 officially communicated to the Commission as falling under 
Article 47 GBER. The list covered schemes stemming from 20 Member States. All 129 
schemes were assessed and reviewed individually, either by using a specific link provided 
in the Commission list, or by carrying out Internet research based on the scheme number 
and/or title. 
The outcome of this research is presented in a comprehensive excel table (Annex 7.1), 
indicating, for each of the 84 schemes containing provisions on State aid for waste 
management (including recycling and preparation for re-use, but excluding wastewater 
treatment), whether: 
 eligible activities are limited to recycling of waste and preparation of waste for re-use, 
 eligible activities target specific types of waste, and 
 eligible activities can also be related to waste-to-energy projects. 
The scope and nature of the schemes vary considerably. While 71 of 129 schemes (55%) 
explicitly mention or quote Article 47 GBER,104 13 others (10%) cover waste management 
measures in general terms without referring to Article 47 GBER.105 Eight of these 13 
schemes however contain a general reference to the GBER and/or State aid rules. A third 
category of 45 schemes (35%) do not cover nor mention waste management at all.106 The 
schemes are of a more general nature, providing for basic rules and regulations to be 
complied with by beneficiaries to be eligible for State aid, covering measures of a different 
and/or sometimes unspecified kind. One scheme in the third category covers only 
wastewater treatment (SA.40647 for France107). 
                                                            
104 These schemes are marked in green in Annex 7.1. 
105 These schemes are marked in grey in Annex 7.1 
106 These schemes are left in white in Annex 7.1. and the three above mentioned specific questions are marked 
as “N.A.” in the respective columns. 
107 This scheme is marked in red in Annex 7.1. 
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All the 84 schemes actually covering waste management were systematically screened 
with regard to the three issues listed above. In 73 of these 84 schemes, the granting of 
aid is limited to support for waste recycling and preparation for re-use. Four of the 84 
schemes also contain other measures, in addition to waste management: 
 SA.40714 - Germany: Under this scheme, aid may also be granted for (1) air pollution 
control, noise and vibration protection, (2) circular economy and resource conservation 
as well as climate protection. 
 SA.45005 - Germany: Under this scheme, aid may also be granted for (1) market 
information, company profiles and support services, especially with regard to 
innovative capacity of SMEs; (2) feasibility studies abroad as proof of suitability and 
purposeful applicability of technologies abroad; (3) country studies (including demand-
side legislation) under environmental cost-benefit analysis and registration of priority 
regions; (4) development of advisory, demonstration and training services related to 
environmental infrastructure and innovation abroad; (5) technical assistance for 
environmental infrastructure and innovation projects in tenders abroad; (6) pilot and 
model projects of German companies abroad focusing on environmental infrastructure 
measures and environmental relevance for exports; (7) international networking with 
involvement of public and municipal actors, exchange of knowledge and experience 
(cooperation with selected partner countries). 
 SA.45686 - Finland: Under this scheme, aid may also be granted for (1) research and 
development on nutrient recycling for biomass; (2) innovation in biomass nutrient 
recycling and processes and organization in biomass nutrient recycling; (3) investments 
promoting recycling of nutrients from biomass, new and untested compared to the state 
of the art, and which do not optimize or extend existing technology; as well as (4) 
renewable energy production measures closely linked to and carried out as part of 
activities referred to in (1). 
 SA.40795 – Italy: Under this scheme, aid may also be granted for (1) the prevention 
and reduction of gaseous emissions, (2) waste water, (3) other pollution factors. 
Of all 84 schemes explicitly covering measures falling under Article 47 GBER, 71 (85%) do 
not contain eligible activities targeting specific types of waste and 13 (15%) focus on 
specific types of waste. These are the following: 
 SA.41223 – Austria: This scheme has a focus on biomass, biogenic waste and 
hazardous waste. 
 SA.41622 – Estonia: This scheme has a focus on separately collected construction 
and demolition waste, separately collected glass waste, separately collected plastic 
waste (including agricultural plastic waste), large waste separately collected, separately 
collected biodegradable waste, separately collected textile waste, separately collected 
packaging waste, tires collected separately; separately collected batteries and 
accumulators. 
 SA.45686 – Finland: This scheme has a focus on nutrients from biomass. 
 SA.53395 – Germany: This scheme has a focus on garden, green and biowaste, 
reduction of greenhouse gas emissions in abandoned municipal waste landfills. 
 SA.49641, SA.50107, SA.52476 - Netherlands: These schemes have a focus on 
manure minerals. 
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 SA.53946 – Netherlands : This scheme has a focus on organic waste, plastics, 
textiles, furniture and mattresses. 
 SA.48088, SA.51745 – Spain: These schemes have a focus on industrial waste. 
 SA.51394 – Spain: This scheme has a focus on investments into (1) identification and 
separation of brominated plastics in waste streams, (2) computer systems for 
management of reusable parts at the end of their life-cycle (CTVFU) in authorised 
Waste Electrical and Electronic Equipment (WEEE) treatment centres, (3) 
devices/machinery for rapid and efficient decontamination of different wastes from end-
of-life vehicles (ELVs), including heavy industrial vehicles, such as airbag neutralisation 
equipment, liquid suction equipment (e.g. for shock absorber oil), advanced fluorinated 
gas recovery equipment, and cutting-edge electro-hydraulic catalysts (excl. fuel 
recovery equipment), (4) devices/machinery and organisation systems to prevent 
mixing of construction and demolition waste and enable separation of mixtures of 
construction and demolition waste that allow for subsequent recovery of resulting 
fractions, (5) promoting reuse of construction elements through facilitating 
methodologies/technologies for dismantling of construction elements, and procedures 
that ensure custody of quality of articles/materials to be reused. 
 SA.39221 – United Kingdom: This scheme has a focus on recycling, reprocessing 
and reuse of waste in Scotland, including but not limited to, treated/contaminated 
wood, glass, plastics, metals, aggregates, quarry mineral wastes organics/compost, 
WEE, textiles batteries, tyres, plasterboard and gypsum. 
 SA.39528 – Czechia: This scheme has a focus on hazardous wastes, biologically 
degradable wastes, take-back products, municipal waste. 
Among the 84 schemes, 78 (93%) explicitly covering measures under Article 47 GBER do 
not contain eligible activities related to waste-to-energy projects. It should be noted that 
waste-to-energy is a broad term and encompasses various waste treatment processes 
generating energy (e.g. in the form of electricity and/or heat to produce waste-derived 
fuel), each of which has different environmental impacts and circular economy potential.108 
Three schemes contain eligible activities (also) related to waste-to-energy projects. These 
are the following: 
 SA.41223 – Austria: This scheme explicitly covers investments for (i) the production 
of energy from renewable energy sources for the purpose of avoiding or reducing 
environmental pollution caused by climate-relevant gases; and (ii) the generation of 
energy from biogenic waste or waste containing relevant biogenic waste. 
 SA.42719 – Czechia: This scheme explicitly covers investments for the construction 
and modernization of facilities for energy recovery and related waste infrastructure. It 
aims at promoting waste management and technologies for reuse, recycling and waste 
recovery, including its energy recovery. 
 SA.46496 – Greece: This scheme explicitly covers investments for energy production 
from waste or biogas. The investments eligible for State aid can be related to recycling, 
                                                            
108 Communication from the Commission to the European Parliament, the Council, the European Economic and 
Social Committee and the Committee of the Regions — The role of waste-to-energy in the circular economy, 
COM(2017) 34 final, OJ 2017 C 345/102. 
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waste reuse, standardization of final waste recovery products, and energy production 
from waste or biogas. 
5.6.2 Stakeholder consultation  
Question 7.b: For schemes containing provisions of waste management, how 
many waste recycling and preparation for re-use projects have obtained aid 
under these schemes, in which Member States, and what budget has been 
allocated to these schemes?  
Question 7.c: If no aid was granted under the schemes based on Article 47 GBER, 
what were the reasons? 
To collect the relevant data for these two questions, a targeted stakeholder consultation 
was conducted, using a combination of surveys and interviews. For that purpose, a web-
based survey was designed specifically for State aid measures for waste management 
falling under Article 47 GBER and transmitted to the addressees, together with an 
accompanying letter from the Commission. Telephone interviews were conducted with the 
granting authorities when this was considered more effective than the mere questionnaire, 
in particular when there was insufficient feedback, or when the replies were not clear 
enough. Certain interviews were conducted on the recipients’ request. Given that more 
than eight Member States adopted relevant support schemes based on Article 47 GBER, 
the review was limited to a representative sample of eight Member States as set out in 
Table 7. 
Table 7: Member State sample 
Member State Geographic 
location 
Country size Recycling rate Schemes with 
expenditures 
Croatia South/East Small 20% No 
Czechia Central/East Medium 32% Yes 
Estonia North/East Small 28% Yes 
France West Large 40% Yes 
Germany Central/West Large 65% Yes 
Hungary Central/East Medium 32% No 
Netherlands West Medium 52% Yes 
Sweden North Medium 48% Yes 
The sample was chosen to include large and small Member States as well as “new” and 
“old” Member States, located in the South/North/East/West of the EU, and includes all 
reported spenders of public support under Article 47 GBER (apart from the UK). The sample 
also reflects a diverse selection of the recycling rates of Member States. 
The questionnaire covered the following questions: 
 Among the schemes communicated to the Commission as containing aid for recycling 
of waste and preparation for re-use, (i) how many beneficiaries obtained aid?, (ii) which 
were these?, and (iii) which total/individual budget was allocated to (each of) these 
projects? 
 For schemes under which no aid has been granted at all, or not in a particular year 
within the reference period, what were the main reasons? 
The questionnaires were sent to all granting authorities having adopted measures for which 
the Commission was informed about actual expenditure in the relevant period, as well as 
certain additional granting authorities for which the existence of actual expenditure was 
not reported to the Commission, so that it had to be verified why no (additional) aid was 
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granted. On this basis, the survey included 32 identified granting authorities, in charge of 
56 schemes in total. Among these 56 schemes, 14 (25%) did not contain provisions on 
waste management nor explicit references to Article 47 GBER. However, these 14 schemes 
contained general references to compliance with State aid rules and the GBER.  
5.6.2.1 Details on aid granted under Article 47 GBER 
From the 56 identified addressees, 36 replies were received, concerning 43 schemes, all 
of which are reproduced in a separate column in Annex 7.2. and provided in Annex 7.3. 
Among these 43 schemes, 11 do not contain provisions in accordance with Article 47 GBER, 
and the stakeholders declared that no aid was granted on the basis of these schemes. 
Among the responding authorities, nine actually granted aid for waste 
management/preparation for re-use projects in the reference period, sometimes under 
various schemes. Under the following schemes, aid was granted in the following manner: 
(1) SA.40264/SA.40266 – Agence de l’Environnement et de la Maîtrise de 
l’Energie - ADEME (FR): These schemes are managed by the ADEME and came into effect 
on January 1, 2015. The mobilization of de minimis aid is also used by ADEME for these 
aid schemes. 
 Under scheme SA.40264 (renewed as SA.49422 in 2017 and again as SA.55400 in 
2019), aid was granted to 611 projects related to waste recycling and to 313 to projects 
related to the preparation for re-use. The names of the projects and respective amounts 
of aid granted are shown in Annex 7.4. The costs differ from one project to another, 
depending on the aim of the project. In case of waste recycling, the minimum costs 
were related to sorting and preparation centers, and the maximum costs were related 
to the recycling of materials (including construction waste) or organic recovery 
(including anaerobic digestion). The projects were implemented in 18 different French 
regions, and the amount of aid actually granted ranges between EUR 770 and EUR 
443,828. Regarding the preparation for re-use, the minimum costs were faced by 
projects related to the prevention of food waste (EUR 271). The most expensive project 
was related to the creation of an innovative wet-delaminated talc milling unit for the 
eco-design of polymer parts for the automotive industry (EUR 840,000). The minimum 
amount of aid effectively received by the beneficiaries to implement the re-use projects 
was EUR 380 and the maximum amount of aid received was EUR 840,000. 
 Under scheme SA.40266, aid was granted to 27 projects related to waste recycling and 
preparation for re-use, all benefiting from aid under the program “Investissement 
d’avenir”. The names of the projects and respective amounts of aid granted to these 
projects are shown in Annex 7.4. The estimated average budget per project is around 
EUR 1.2 million (ranging from EUR 51,204 to EUR 12 million). The total cost is around 
EUR 51.4 million and the total amount of aid effectively granted is around EUR 26.2 
million (ranging from EUR 12,000 to EUR 8.3 million per project). The project for which 
EUR 12 million where estimated effectively obtained EUR 8.3 million. 
 The total amount of aid reserved under both schemes was EUR 190.4 million, of which 
EUR 93 million were effectively paid out to the 951 beneficiaries. A waste fund was put 
in place and aid was granted and paid out each year since the schemes entered in 
force.  
(2) SA.40624 – Kreditanstalt für Wiederaufbau - KfW (DE) allocated aid to seven 
waste recycling/preparation for re-use projects in Germany for a total amount of approx. 
EUR 9 million, of which approx. EUR 6.8 million were paid to five beneficiaries. More details 
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on these projects are provided in Annex 7.5. The total budget allocated to the scheme 
(Umweltinnovationsprogramm-UIP) is EUR 40.6 million. 
 In 2015, an amount of approx. EUR 1.5 million was approved, but the project was not 
implemented by the beneficiary, and so the aid was not paid out. 
 In 2016, an amount of EUR 136,000 for investments and an additional amount of 
approx. EUR 11,000 for a measuring program were approved and fully paid out to the 
beneficiary following the completion of the project. 
 Still in 2016, an amount of approx. EUR 550,000 was approved, but so far only approx. 
EUR 450,000 were paid out to the beneficiary, given that the project has not yet been 
fully completed. 
 In 2017, an amount of approx. EUR 670,000 was approved, but the aid was not paid 
out, due to technical reasons, because the project is being implemented in a different 
manner compared to the original plan, so that the conditions for the financing under 
the scheme were not fulfilled anymore. 
 Still in 2017, an amount of approx. EUR 2.9 million was approved and fully paid out to 
the beneficiary following the completion of the project. 
 Still in 2017, an amount of approx. EUR 2.7 million was approved. The project has been 
fully completed and the final payment to the beneficiary was made at the end of 2019. 
 In 2018, an amount of approx. EUR 510,000 was approved and fully paid out to the 
beneficiary following the completion of the project.  
(3) SA.41622 – Keskkonnaininvesteeringute Keskus (EE) granted aid for three 
specific waste recycling projects for a total amount of about EUR 10.7 million, while no aid 
was granted for any waste preparation for re-use projects. 
 The aid granted in 2018 to one beneficiary aims at the establishment of a separate 
waste bio-waste management plant (EUR 2.42 million). The project started on 30 
October 2018 and will be implemented by 30 June 2021. 
 The aid granted in 2018 to one beneficiary aims to provide a solution for the sustainable 
management of sewage sludge and separately collected biowaste in regional anaerobic 
digestion centers (EUR 4.53 million). The pilot project will establish a waste 
management center in Pärnu, which will solve the city’s sewage sludge problem by 
circulating all waste inputs and outputs (fermentation residue and biomethane). The 
project started on 1 October 2018 and will be implemented by 1 March 2021. 
 The aid granted in 2018 to one beneficiary aims at the construction of a glass foam 
chipping plant, which will be established in the Järvakandi industrial area, in order to 
solve the problems related to Estonian glass waste (EUR 3.77 million). The project 
started on 1 October 2018 and will be implemented by 31 December 2020. 
(4) SA.42457 – Caisse des Dépots et Consignations (FR) granted aid in 2019 for one 
specific waste recycling and preparation for a waste re-use project linked to the partial 
demolition and re-construction of a large building located in Paris under the budget «Ville 
de Demain». The aid of EUR 60,000 was granted to support engineering works (“Assistance 
à Maîtrise d’Ouvrage”: AMO) to be provided by a large enterprise. The total amount for the 
AMO is EUR 120,000, and so the aid granted covers 50% of that amount. The AMO shall 
support the optimization of the treatment of waste generated specifically by the (partial) 
demolition and reconstruction of the building/site. The treatment options include recycling, 
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re-use outside of the specific site and re-use on the specific site. For that purpose, the AMO 
shall contribute to the following activities: 
 Identification of re-usable materials on the site 
 Analysis of legal and financial feasibility of their re-use on the site  
 Guidance on the organization and waste management plan (“SOGED”) to be 
implemented by demolition and construction companies 
 Management of storage space and coordination of re-use in the re-construction phase 
(5) SA.45168 – Landesamt für Natur, Umwelt und Verbraucherschutz (LANUV) 
Nordrhein-Westfalen (DE) granted aid to six waste recycling and preparation for re-use 
projects, in a series of five calls for proposals organized under the EFRE program, starting 
in April 2017, following the official publication of the State aid scheme in April 2016. Initially 
three calls for proposals had been arranged, each with a total budget of EUR 5 million. 
After their successful implementation, two additional calls for proposals we set up, the last 
one in June 2019. All five calls were given a total budget of EUR 35 million form the EFRE 
budget, with some flexibility among them. All calls for proposals were limited to SMEs 
under the EU definition for innovative projects of various kinds, including but not limited 
to waste management. For each of the calls, all proposals received were competing with 
each other. The total amount of aid granted to the six following beneficiaries, after careful 
review by LANUV NRW and Effizienz-Agentur NRW, and separate decisions of a dedicated 
jury, was approx. EUR 9 million: 
 One beneficiary received EUR 1.3 million (45% of total eligible cost) for a waste sorting 
plant with innovative technology to increase the level of reusability of light weight 
packaging material. 
 One beneficiary received EUR 250,000 (50% of total eligible cost) for the set up and 
operation of serial production of pallets from plastic waste.  
 One beneficiary received approx. EUR 390,000 (50% of total eligible cost) for the 
resource efficient and low-emission production of FRT thermofiber cellulose insulation 
material.  
 One beneficiary received approx. EUR 360,000 (50% of total eligible cost) for 
innovative recycling of waste containing keratin.  
 One beneficiary received approx. EUR 3.4 million (50% of total eligible cost) for the 
innovative and resource efficient production of recycling materials from waste 
containing minerals. 
 One beneficiary submitted an application for approx. EUR 3.6 million (45% of total 
eligible cost) for an innovative plant for the recycling of textile residuals and their 
integration into construction panels. This application for State aid is still under review 
by the relevant authorities. 
(6) SA.47601 – Riigi Tuigteenuste Keskus (EE) Aid of approx. EUR 600,000 was 
approved in June 2018 for one specific waste recycling project for the application of eco-
friendly underground solutions for solid waste management at municipal institutions. 
However, the grant contract has not been signed yet and the project is subject to 
amendments. Its overall objective is to decrease environmental risks in the cross-border 
region by improving solid waste management systems, ensuring effective waste 
separation, and constructing at municipal institutions modern waste collection points with 
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sealed underground containers. Specific objectives are (i) the construction of waste 
collection points; (ii) the education and popularisation of the need for the separation of 
solid waste, and (iii) the creation of favorable conditions for cost-effective recycling of 
waste materials. As a result, 25 waste collection points will be installed in Kohtla-Järve 
town. 
(7) SA.49641 - Provincie Gelderland (NL) granted aid to one waste preparation for re-
use project (“Groene Mineralen Centrale GZV - Hygiënisatie project”). The amount granted 
was EUR 250,000 for a total budget of approx. EUR 800,000. Based on this aid, the 
beneficiary invested in the following components: (i) installation for hygienization and post-
drying, (ii) bunker for buffering the hygienized thick fraction, (iii) installation for 
transportation of the hygienized thick, and (iv) utilities. With these installations, the 
beneficiary seeks to recover minerals from manure, of which there is a surplus in the 
Achterhoek region. This project aims to develop a refining method to enhance the value of 
manure and expand the possibilities of further refinement of manure/thick fraction. 
(8) SA.50809 – Management autoriteit West Nederland (NL) granted aid in 2017 to 
one specific waste recycling project for the processing of concrete to recycle cement 
products. The project is implemented by an undertaking that developed and successfully 
tested an innovative concrete dryer. By using this concrete dryer, cement dust is recovered 
from concrete rubble, resulting in high-quality recycling of 100% concrete rubble. The 
impact of the project is a significant reduction in CO2 emissions, given that less cement 
and sand is required for new concrete. The total cost was approx. EUR 2.8 million, of which 
approx. one third was contributed by the Dutch authority. The project started on 25 July 
2017 and is set to last until 31 March 2021. 
(9) SA.42456, SA.49001, SA.50267 – Naturvårdsverket (SE) granted aid in 2015, 
2017 and 2018  for four waste recycling projects and for two re-use projects under scheme 
SA.42456, renewed as SA.49001 in 2017 and as SA.50267 in 2018. The total budget 
allocated was EUR 15.8 million and the total budget actually used for the following projects 
was EUR 11.6 million. 
 KKL-02186-2017: the beneficiary implementeda waste management project with a 
budget of EUR 12.8 million. The objective is to build a sorting plant to develop a waste 
treatment service in Stockholm County, to coordinate waste management in one place 
and to increase the proportion of recycled materials. In addition to allowing a drastic 
increase in the recycling of plastic packaging from households, the facility permits to 
sort metal, plastic and paper packaging. The project is planned to be completed by the 
end of 2020 and is implemented by AB Fortum Heat.  
 KKL-04307-2018: the beneficiary implemented a waste management project with a 
budget of ca. EUR 2 million. The project targets the collection, disposal and recycling 
of used plastic and mainly covers a specific type of waste (silage plastic). Mainly, it 
consists of processing the farmers' used silage plastic into recycled plastic raw material. 
The recycled plastic raw material is returned to the Swedish plastic industry where the 
it is used instead of new raw material, thus saving carbon dioxide emissions. The 
project will be completed by 31 December 2019 and is implemented in the Jönköping 
County. 
 KKL-05251-2018: the beneficiary will implement a waste management project with a 
budget of EUR 38,518. The project aims to ensure an efficient way of waste 
management and is intended to increase the capacity of sorting machines as more than 
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35,000 tons of mixed waste are transported into the sorting plant. The machine is able 
to sort a variety of materials in different shapes and sizes after scanning the waste 
flow. The project will be implemented by 31 December 2020 in the Skåne County. 
 KKL-02613-2017: the beneficiary implemented  a waste management project with a 
budget of EUR 368,482. The project aims at increasing the mix of recycled asphalt in 
manufacturing new asphalt. The project was planned to be implemented from 1 January 
2018 until 1 April 2018 in the Västra Götaland County, however it was cancelled. 
 KKL-02864-2017: the beneficiary implemented a re-use project, with a budget of EUR 
167,510. The aim of the project is to develop waste re-use in Linköping Recycling 
centers (located in the Linköping municipality). The project was completed on 1 
September 2019. 
 NV-06312-15: the beneficiary implemented a preparation for re-use project with a 
budget of EUR 321,601. The project aims at increasing the capacity of the recycling 
park for reusable products in Uppsala Municipality in order to be able to offer a better 
collection for reusable products. The project was implemented by 31 May 2019. 
5.6.2.2 Reasons for not granting aid under Article 47 GBER 
The nine authorities having granted aid in the reference period reported that they did not 
do so in each year. The 17 authorities (in charge of 27 schemes) that did not grant State 
aid for waste management projects in the reference period at all, as well as the nine 
stakeholders that granted aid, received follow-up questions to identify the reasons for not 
granting aid at all or for granting aid only in certain years.  
The main reasons reported by the authorities that did not grant aid, are related to the lack 
of applications for relevant projects  and to the scope of Article 47 GBER and the specific 
conditions and formalities to be fulfilled in order to qualify for such aid. This granting 
authorities were asked, when replying to the online survey, to indicate the relevant 
reasons, which were presented as multiple choices questions. The following choices were 
proposed, and respondents could select one or several reasons: 
 Lack of applications for relevant projects (mentioned by 12 granting authorities) 
 Difficulty to apply the “state of the art” criterion under Article 47 GBER (mentioned by 
no granting authority)  
 Difficulty to satisfy the “treatment of waste from others” criterion under Article 47 GBER 
(mentioned by 5 granting authorities) 
 Low aid intensities (mentioned by 2 granting authorities)  
 Other reasons (mentioned by 7 granting authorities) 
The authorities had the opportunity to indicate what “other reasons” would be for not 
granting aid. Those other reasons mentioned more specifically by the granting authorities 
were the following: 
 Not covering all relevant costs (mentioned by 2 granting authorities)  
 Focus on extra investment cost with difficult calculation method, leading to certain 
grants being based on Article 17 GBER instead (mentioned by 1 granting authority) 
 Other provisions better suited, e.g. Article 20, 25 GBER (mentioned by 1 granting 
authority) 
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 Not suited for projects involving transfer of know-how and application for 
environmental and climate technologies to countries in need (mentioned by 1 granting 
authority) 
 Supported projects do not fall under Article 47 GBER (mentioned by 3 granting 
authorities) 
 Complexity of Article 47 GBER (mentioned by 2 granting authorities)  
The following reasons behind the decision to not grant aid in certain years within the 
reference period were given by the granting authorities in the context of follow-up 
interviews: 
 Lack of applications for relevant projects (mentioned by 2 granting authorities) 
 Difficulty to apply the “state of the art” criterion under Article 47 (mentioned by 3 
granting authorities) 
 Difficulty to satisfy the “treatment of waste from others” criterion under Article 47 GBER 
(mentioned by 2 granting authorities) 
 Complexity of Article 47 GBER (mentioned by 2 granting authorities) 
 Other provisions better suited (mentioned by 1 granting authority) 
In cases where incomplete answers were provided, i.e. in the absence of specific replies to 
one or several questions, or (for complete replies) to get more background information 
about the reasons for not granting any (or more) aid under the respective schemes, a 
series of telephone interviews was conducted with the granting authorities concerned.  
 With regard to schemes SA.39140 and SA.39143, a representative of the BMWi stated 
that there have not been any cases with regard to waste management. They were not 
aware of any request of aid in this field. Moreover, even if aid would have been granted 
for waste management, this would not have been explicitly recorded under the current 
schemes as those schemes provide federal guarantees. 
 With regard to schemes SA.40264 and SA.40266, a representative of ADEME stated 
that difficulties may arise because of the cumulation of aid with other public financing 
tools that are subject to different rules. Certain candidates, notably SMEs, have revoked 
their requests in light of such difficulties.  
o For instance, in case of coordinated calls for proposals involving several regional 
actors and financing authorities, it is not possible to maintain confidentiality for 
projects aiming at new market entry. ADEME has accepted confidentiality, limited 
in time and scope, in duly motivated situations and in full respect of transparency 
and publicity rules, by including such a clause in the contract awarding the aid, but 
other organisation have not done this.  
o It has also been essential to provide guidance to candidate at an early stage which 
requires significant human resources for ADEME. For SMEs, the GBER does not 
define precisely the type of eligible candidates, so that many of them were not able 
to request aid given the administrative hurdles. This leads to a distortion of 
competition to the benefit of larger companies having a better knowledge of the 
State aid rules and procedures. ADEME has therefore launched a review of its 
processes to put in place a simplified procedure. 
o Requests have been rejected for the following reasons: projects were commercially 
viable without State aid or had a too high ROI, projects were carried out by actors 
not in line with the ADEME regulations (e.g. collectives or temporary groupings of 
SMEs, when the liabilities are not clearly shared or allocated), non-priority projects 
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or projects not falling under ADEME’s competences, difficulties to present all 
relevant documents (CERFA form required above EUR 23,000 aid), too long duration 
for the analysis and award of the requested aid. 
o The ‘State of the Art’ criterion has been sometimes difficult to apply. The EU 
nomenclature does not always match the broad range of requests received, in terms 
of actors, technical nature of the proposed solution, relevant documentation, 
regulatory or technical constraints applicable. However, ADEME accepts a wide 
range of projects including, for the re-use of waste, investments for the prevention 
and upfront reduction (as well as food spoiling), pre-collection, preparation for 
upcycling, valuation of materials and substitution. This heterogeneity makes the 
review and award process longer and more complex.  
o The ‘waste generated by others’ criterion has also been difficult to apply in practice. 
Innovative solutions should therefore be adopted in order to support environment-
friendly projects outside of Article 47 GBER, e.g. under Articles 36, 37 or 29 GBER, 
carried out by innovative SMEs rather than by less innovative dominant operators. 
 With regard to scheme SA.40624, a representative of KfW stated that Article 47 GBER 
is too complex for many beneficiaries, in particular smaller ones, to be used more widely 
in practice. In case of doubt on the fulfilment of all relevant criteria, companies often 
prefer to match their funding requests under the de minimis rules, even if the amounts 
of aid become lower than under the GBER. The UIP-scheme has not led to many 
requests for public funding of waste management, while energy related projects are 
more frequent. According to a rough estimate, more than 50% of all funding requests 
were rejected, both in the field of waste management and in other areas. This is 
because they do not fulfil the relevant criteria under Article 47 GBER, which are difficult 
to understand and implement for requestors, in particular if they are small or medium-
size companies. KfW explained that it was difficult for several companies to fulfil the 
‘state of the art’ criterion. Moreover, among all criteria, the one which has been 
particularly problematic is the calculation of the investment cost surplus based on 
reference cost which is difficult to define for many requestors. The principles governing 
this calculation are being regarded as too rigid and a more flexible 
interpretation/application would have led to more (successful) requests for public 
funding. 
 With regard to scheme SA.43249, a representative of the Fond za zaštitu okoliša i 
energetsku učinkovitost of Croatia explained that the decision to not grant aid under 
Article 47 GBER was due to the complexity of the article and especially its wording. In 
practical terms it is difficult to satisfy the treatment of waste from others criterion under 
Article 47 GBER. 
 The Ministerium für Umwelt, Energie, Ernährung und Forsten Rheinland-Pfalz (MUEEF, 
DE) manages a budget of approx. EUR 15 million for the promotion of new technological 
developments to reduce C02 emissions and to save resources through model and 
demonstration projects. These projects may also be relevant for waste recycling and 
preparation for re-use, e.g. scheme SA.45476 focused on energy efficiency measures, 
but may include aid for waste management projects as well. However, this scheme 
does not cover any projects specifically geared towards waste management, and so 
there was little demand for such kind of aid. As a result, no aid has been granted at all 
under Article 47 GBER in the reference period. One project having received aid, and 
showing a link to waste management, concerns the construction of an innovative 
sewage sludge incineration plant by Thermische Verwertung Mainz GmbH (TVM) in 
2018. The aid granted to TVM under the administrative ordinance ‘Verringerung der 
CO2-Emissionen und Ressourcenschutz durch regenerative und effiziente 
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Energienutzung’ amounted to EUR 5 million (for further details see Annex 7.2). This aid 
was however based on Article 38 rather than Article 47 GBER. 
 With regard to the schemes SA.42456, SA.49001, SA.50267, a representative of the 
Naturvårdsverket (SE) explained that the Agency is facing several difficulties while 
implementing Article 47 GBER. In general, it could be due to the Swedish translation 
of the title of Article 47 GBER, but re-utilisation (“återanvändning”) is not possible when 
something has been classified as waste (avfall). 
o Article 47.3: The simple case is when waste would otherwise be incinerated. In 
other cases, it can be quite difficult to assess whether alternative management 
means a "less environmentally friendly way" of handling the waste. 
o Article 47.4: An example is that the aid must not relieve the applicant from producer 
responsibility. But it is difficult to assess what is included in the producer 
responsibility in the individual cases. 
o Article 47.5: This is also difficult to judge. It is also odd to consider in terms of 
increased demand for waste. 
o Article 47.6: Probably the most difficult to assess, especially the meaning of 
"improvement over the latest technology".  
o Article 47.7: It is not always easy to get the applicant to explain what the alternative 
is and thus the point becomes difficult to assess. 
5.6.3 Conclusions 
The review of the State aid schemes officially communicated to the Commission by the 
Member States between 2014 and mid-2019 as falling under Article 47 GBER showed that 
71 of 129 schemes (55%) explicitly mention or quote this provision, while 13 (10%) 
mention waste management without explicit reference. A third category of 45 schemes 
(35%) do not cover nor mention waste management at all. These schemes are of a more 
general nature, providing for basic rules and regulations to be complied with by 
beneficiaries in order to be eligible for State aid covering measures of a different and/or 
sometimes unspecified kind.  
For 71 out of 84 schemes (84%) covering waste management measures with explicit 
reference to Article 47 GBER, Member States limited themselves to either quote or 
reproduce this provision without any specific amendments or adaptations. In 73 out of 84 
schemes (87%) explicitly covering measures falling under Article 47 GBER, the granting of 
aid was limited to support for waste recycling and preparation for re-use, while four of 
them (5%) also included other kinds of projects and the other seven (8%) do not address 
recycling or preparation for re-use projects. Among all the 84 schemes covering measures 
under Article 47 GBER, 71 (85%) do not contain eligible activities targeting specific types 
of waste, while 13 (15%) do have such a focus.  
The survey conducted with the 32 relevant granting authorities in charge of 56 schemes in 
the selected eight Member States showed that, among the 26 granting authorities (from 8 
Member States) that replied to the survey with regard to 43 State aid schemes, nine 
granted aid for waste management and/or preparation for re-use projects in the reference 
period, sometimes under various schemes, but eight of them granted aid only in certain 
years. Those authorities indicated that they granted aid to a total of 975 individual projects 
(951 located in France) for a total of approx. EUR 133 million (approx. EUR 93 million in 
France). The main reasons for them not granting more aid in the reference period are the 
lack of applications for relevant projects, the narrow scope of Article 47 GBER, the strict 
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conditions and formalities to be fulfilled in order to qualify for such aid, as well as the 
difficulty to satisfy the “treatment of waste from others” criteria. 
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6 Efficiency 
6.1 Reductions to energy intensive users  
Question 8.a: As regards the Member States which have granted reductions to 
energy intensive users, the contractor shall identify and assess what impact have 
those reductions had - cumulated with reductions to CHP charges approved by 
the Commission by analogy – on RES and CHP levies paid by energy intensive 
industrial consumers, non-energy intensive industrial consumers and households 
in terms of EUR/year? (see Annex 0 for a list of all questions.) 
In the spirit of the EEAG, energy intensive users (“EIU”) are undertakings with a high ratio 
between electricity cost and gross value added (electro-intensity in %, see Annex 4 EEAG). 
The precise definition of EIU depends on the country. In some cases, it is clarified based 
on official documents and in others it is based on assumptions. In many cases, it depends 
(amongst others) on the Eurostat’s electricity consumption band of a given undertaking.109 
For Denmark, firms with an electro-intensity of 20% or more and belonging to bands IC 
through IF are assumed to be EIU. In France, an undertaking must exceed 7 GWh of annual 
electricity consumption to be defined as an EIU. In Germany, an undertaking must exceed 
1 GWh of annual electricity consumption to be defined as an EIU. In Greece, the Medium 
Voltage group (bands IC, ID and IE) was split by consumption level to reduce the ETMEAR 
rate for medium voltage users, which consumed more than 13 GWh of electricity. This split 
is comparable to a reduction of levy for bands IC, ID and IE. In Italy, an undertaking must 
exceed 2.4 GWh of annual electricity consumption to be defined as an EIU. Furthermore, 
they must be connected to least in one point in medium, high or very high voltage. For 
Poland and Romania, it was assumed that EIU only fall into the bands IC-IF if they have 
an electro-intensity of 20% or more. In Slovenia, an undertaking must exceed 1 GWh of 
annual electricity consumption to be defined as an EIU. For the UK, it was assumed that 
undertakings with an electro-intensity of 20% or more are EIU. 
Section 3.7.2. EEAG authorizes reductions of RES-related surcharges for Energy Intensive 
Users (“EIU”) under five conditions:  
i) support is limited to the additional cost resulting from RES (point 184 EEAG), 
ii) reductions are limited to companies from energy-intensive sectors exposed to 
international trade listed in Annex 3 EEAG (point 185 EEAG),  
iii) or to undertaking from another sector with trade intensity of at least 4% at EU level 
and electro-intensity of at least 20% (point 186 EEAG) as listed in Annex 5 EEAG, 
iv) eligibility criteria are objective, transparent and not discriminatory (point 187 EEAG),  
v) at least 15% of additional cost is paid without reduction (proportionality, point 188 
EEAG), with possibilities to further reduce this share (point 189 EEAG). 
Section 3.7.3 EEAG allows for a transitional period with two identified milestones for 
Member States to adapt their existing reduction schemes. Member States had until June 
2015 to notify the Commission of an adjustment plan to put their existing scheme in line 
with the EEAG. Such plans had to be implemented by 1 January 2019 to ensure that as of 
that date, any aid granted to compensate costs of RES financing would be in line with the 
EEAG. In addition, the EEAG recognizes (in point 197) that some Member States have 
                                                            
109 The definitions of consumption bands are given in Table 10 in Appendix 8.1. 
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introduced reductions or exemptions from RES surcharges before the EEAG came into force 
based on different eligibility criteria. The EEAG determines that such aid is compatible 
“provided that the adjustment plan foresees a minimum own contribution of 20 % of the 
additional costs of the surcharge without reduction, to be established progressively and at 
the latest by 1 January 2019.”110 This is referred to as the grandfathering rule. 
6.1.1 Relevant decisions 
From 2014 until August 2019, the Commission approved reductions to EIU in twelve 
Member States: Bulgaria (SA.45861), Denmark (SA.42424), France (SA.36511), Germany 
(SA.33995, SA.38632, SA.44679), Greece (SA.52413), Italy (SA.38635), Latvia 
(SA.42854), Lithuania (SA.50484), Poland (SA.37345, SA.43697), Romania (SA.39042), 
Slovenia (SA.41998), and the United Kingdom (SA.43657, SA.45155, SA.52615).  
Bulgaria and Lithuania were excluded from the descriptive analysis, because no data is 
available for Bulgaria and there were no reductions to EIU in Lithuania. Furthermore, in 
two decisions the Commission accepted reductions to EIU in sectors other than those listed 
in Annex 3+5 EEAG, in line with point 186 EEAG: Denmark (SA.44863) and Germany 
(SA.41381). 
Six decisions concern reductions to CHP levies approved by the Commission by analogy 
since 2017: France (SA.36511), Germany (SA.42393), Greece (SA.52413), Italy 
(SA.38635), and Poland (SA.52530). In addition, the Commission approved by analogy 
reductions to levies financing nuclear decommissioning in Slovakia (SA.50877) and 
financing social tariffs and equivalent electricity price levels between continental France 
and Outermost regions (SA.36511).  
References to the grandfathering clause is included in five RES schemes: Germany 
(SA.33995)111, Greece (SA.52413)112, France (SA.36511)113, Italy (SA.38635)114, and 
Poland (SA.37345).115 These references are interpreted such that the grandfathered 
undertakings can belong to three categories: 
                                                            
110 Point 197 EEAG. 
111 Point 200-201 EEAG: “Germany has indicated that only a number of the beneficiaries of the BesAR in 2013 
and 2014 were eligible for State aid in the form of reductions in the funding of support for electricity from 
renewable sources in accordance with section 3.7.2. Germany has therefore submitted an adjustment plan which 
is examined in section 7.3.5 for those beneficiaries that were not eligible. […]”. 
112 Point 26, 104-114 EEAG: “The adjustment plan is based on the following minimum ETMEAR contributions in 
line with the EEAG: […] c) 20% of ETMEAR contribution for undertakings which benefitted from reductions before 
1 July 2014 but operating in sectors other than those listed in Annex 3 or 5 of the EEAG or operating in a sector 
included in Annex 5 of the EEAG and having an electro-intensity below 20% (EEAG point 197). 
113 Point 268-275 EEAG: “The information provided by France, for certain years only for which it has statistics, 
has shown that for these years a significant number of beneficiaries have obtained reductions higher than the 
reduction levels authorised by the 2014 Guidelines. For example, in 2004, 124 beneficiaries of the CSPE cap at 
0.5% of value added paid a CSPE below 15 cent and 202 paid a CSPE below 20 percent of its maximum level. In 
addition, 27 beneficiaries of the per-site cap paid less than 15 percent of the CSPE, 39 less than 20 percent of 
CSPE. In addition, the Commission notes that the 934 beneficiaries of the CSPE ceiling of 0.5% of value added 
belong to 135 different sectors of activity (131 NACE codes), a broader base than that authorised by Annexes 3 
(68 NACE codes) to the 2014 Guidelines.” 
114 Point 116-132 EEAG: 35 companies were identified as having potentially not paid the minimum required RES 
levies. These 35 companies would all be electro-intensive within the meaning of point 185-186 EEAG. 
115 Point 253 EEAG: “In Poland, energy-intensive consumers generating energy for their own use bear at least 
15% of the costs of the RES support system, while other consumers generating energy for their own use bear at 
least 20% of these costs. On the basis of this information, the Commission concludes that the firms which 
benefited from these reductions before the entry into force of the EEAG on 1 July 2014 can be considered as 
undertakings that can maintain their contribution to the financing of the RES-E support scheme at a level of at 
least 20%, in accordance with the provisions of point 197 EEAG.” 
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 Undertakings benefiting from RES levy reductions before 1 July 2014 from sectors other 
than those listed in Annex 3 or Annex 5 EEAG or in the two decisions on approved 
exemptions under point 186 EEAG (Germany, Greece, France) 
 Undertakings benefiting from RES levy reductions before 1 July 2014 from sectors listed 
in Annex 5 EEAG, but with energy intensity lower than 20% (Greece) 
 Undertakings benefiting from RES levy reductions before 1 July 2014 from sectors 
covered by the EEAG, but paying less than 20% of the RES levies (France, Italy, 
Poland). 
6.1.2 Data sources 
The following types of data were used and reviewed: 
 RES and CHP yearly levies paid on top of the electricity price for groups of consumers 
with different levels of energy consumption until 2019 in all 13 Member States in which 
reductions have been granted. This data collection was done for question 6ii. 
 Beneficiaries of reductions in RES and CHP levies, including those affected by the 
grandfathering rule in point 197 EEAG, and their NACE code. This information was 
collected from energy regulators in three Member States using the grandfathering rule, 
Germany, Italy and Poland. For France and Greece, the information was not available.  
 Sector- and country-level sales data for 2017: Data on sales was collected per sector 
per Member State in 2017 to calculate the proportion of grandfathered undertakings. 
This data is (partially) available at Eurostat. 
 Sales data in 2017 for the grandfathered undertakings: This data was collected from 
the professional firm-level database Orbis provided by Bureau van Dijk. 
6.1.3 Impact of reductions on the level of levies 
This section evaluates the impact of reductions to rebates on RES and related levies as 
approved by the Commission. This evaluation is done both for consumers that benefitted 
from the reduction (i.e. EIU) and for consumers who did not (i.e. non-EIU and 
households).116 It is based on a comparison of levy rates over time and a comparison of 
total expenses in EUR/year between periods of equal length before to after the introduction 
of the rebate.117  
The review covers all countries that introduced a reduction on RES or CHP levies over the 
period of observation: Denmark, France, Germany, Greece, Italy, Latvia, Poland, Romania, 
Slovenia and the UK.118 The discussion below focuses on main developments and general 
patterns illustrated by examples. Discussions and descriptive evidence for each country 
                                                            
116 Electricity prices, RES levies and reductions to the latter generally depend on the consumption intensity. 
Table 1 in Annex 8.1 provides an overview of consumption bands and the consumption range. 
117 Levy rates come from different sources as outlined in the answer to Question 6ii. These sources are: (1) 
Legislation: Rates were given in legal documents directly. (2) Calculation: Rates were calculated if the legal 
background provided a functional relationship (e.g. a rate but a maximal cap) rather than fixed values. (3) 
Adjusted: Rates were adjusted based on estimations (e.g. regarding the level of cost-pass-through, combining 
the levy and green certificate price or the valuation of the costs of a scheme). 
118 For some countries, data on RES levies or reductions to RES levies have been collected and presented in the 
answer to Question 6 but these data are cannot be used here. Austria introduced an exemption for households 
in 2012 because but data are only available from 2012 onwards, so it was disregarded. Estonia, Lithuania and 
Slovakia were disregarded for there were no reductions applied to EIU during the period covered by the study. 
For Bulgaria, there is no data available. 
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individually including Euro-values of the total burden per year for each consumption band 
are presented in Annex 8.1. 
The analysis is based on an assessment of the development of RES and related levies over 
time. It identifies whether this development is consistent with a redistribution effect, i.e. 
whether a decrease of levy rates for EIU is observed at the same time as an increase of 
levy rates for other consumption groups. This assessment only allows identifying patterns 
of redistribution (i.e. levy rates of some groups increasing because rates for EIU decreased) 
and cannot be interpreted as evidence or causality for such an effect, because the 
development of levies is influenced by multiple factors.  
Those factors can either be unobserved political decisions, or, insofar as levy rates are 
linked to the price of electricity, unobserved market factors. As a result, even if one rate 
(e.g. for EIU) decreases and another rate (e.g. for households) increases, this does not 
prove that one caused the other. The analyses, based on the data at hand, allows depicting 
developments and identifying patterns but it does not allow making conclusions on 
causality. 
6.1.3.1 Heterogeneous Development 
The development of the levies for both rebated and non-rebated consumers is very 
heterogeneous across countries and consumer groups. Some countries show clear 
increases in levy rates (and burden) for non-rebated customer groups, i.e. households and 
non-EIU when rates for EIU decline. In other countries, rates are rather flat over time or 
show a hump-shaped pattern (increasing first and then decreasing).  
6.1.3.2 Main groups regarding potential impact 
Whether or not a development is consistent with a redistribution effect depends not only 
on the country but also on the kind of levy (RES or related) because these might develop 
differently over time. In some cases, the effects are even heterogeneous across 
consumption bands, i.e., levy rates increase for some non-rebated customer groups (which 
is consistent with redistribution) but not for others.  
 Pattern not consistent with redistribution effect (no effect): Levy rates for non-
rebated customer groups appear unaffected by the introduction of rebates for EIU. 
While the introduction of rebates for EIU necessarily led to a drop in levy rates for 
these, the rates for all other consumption bands might be largely unaffected. Figure 42 
below depicts the development of RES and CHP levy rates for Italy. In 2014, levies for 
EIU (plotted in grey) were reduced and thus declined. However, rates for all other 
consumption bands appear unaffected. 
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Figure 42: RES+CHP levy rates per consumption band in Italy 
 
Source: E.CA Economics based on data collected as answer to Question 6. CfD Levy rates are adjusted, green 
certificate and FiT rates are calculated by the University of East Anglia. Note: Reductions are available for 
EIU as of January 2016. 
 Pattern consistent with lasting redistribution effect: Levy rates of non-rebated 
customer groups increase after rebates for EIU were introduced. In some cases, levy 
rates for non-rebated customer groups increased around the time when reductions for 
EIU were introduced. Such a development can be observed for Italy around the increase 
of reductions in 2018 (see above) or for RES levies in Germany (see Figure 43 below).  
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Figure 43: RES levy rate per consumption band in Germany 
 
Source: E.CA Economics based on data collected for Question 6. Levy rates are taken from legislation. 
Reductions applied as of 2014. There is no data for consumption band IF for 2017 and 2018. 
For Germany, the interpretation of a redistribution effect is supported by an additional 
source: the total budget spend on RES-support in Germany (i.e. money collected via 
levies across different customer groups) has increased between 2008 and 2015.119 The 
combination of no reduction in the total budget with a significant reduction in RES levies 
for EIU implies that the money needs to be collected from other customer groups. 
 Pattern consistent with short-lived redistribution effect: Levy rates diverge but 
then re-converge. Some cases show a pattern consistent with redistribution but this is 
only short-lived. Figure 44 below shows the development of RES levy rates for Poland 
as an example: With the reduction for EIU in 2014, rates for non-rebated customer 
bands increased in 2014 and 2015. However, these then decreased to almost the same 
level as the rate for EIU in 2016 and remained largely similar for the following years. 
                                                            
119 As reported by the BMWi (“EEG in Zahlen: Vergütungen, Differenzkosten und EEG-Umlage 2000 bis 2019, 15 
October 2018”), the total budget spent was 9.02 (2008), 10.78 (2009), 13.18 (2010), 16.76 (2011), 21.01 
(2012), 21.91 (2013), 23.95 (2014), 27.50 (2015), 27.47 (2016), 30.41 (2017), and 32.02 (2018). 
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Figure 44: RES levy rate per consumption band in Poland 
 
Source: E.CA Economics based on data collected for Question 6. Levy rates taken from legislation. Green 
certificate rate calculated by the University of East Anglia. Reductions available for EIU as of Jan 2014. 
 
Table 8 below shows a classification of the different countries and levy rates around the 
introduction of rebates for EIU. If developments are identical, different levies (RES and 
CHP) are grouped. For details and discussions per country, see Annex 8.1. 
Table 8: Overview of patterns of development of levy rates 
Country (levy) Pattern consistent 
with 
Discussion 
Denmark (RES) No effect Decision SA.42424 explains that levies are financed 
directly from the State budget (point 23), suggesting 
limited scope for redistribution effects. 
France (RES) No effect The advantages from reductions were financed by the 
State (opening decision SA.36511 of 27.03.14,point 79-
82), suggesting limited scope for redistribution effects. 
France (CHP) No effect According to decision SA.36511 (349, 350), the costs of 
the policies exceeded the revenues collected and this 
deficit was covered by the state budget, suggesting 
limited scope for redistribution effects. 
Germany (RES) Lasting redistribution RES levy rates before the introduction show an upwards 
trend; total budget spent increases continuously between 
2008 and 2018 
Germany (CHP) No effect Levies for some consumption bands adapted upwards 
Greece (RES) Lasting redistribution Reduction introduced in 2014; slight re-convergence from 
2015 onwards 
Greece (HECHP) Short-lived redistribution Reduction introduced in 2014 leads to severe divergence 
but rates re-converge from 2015 onwards 
Italy (RES and 
other) 
2014: no effect 
2018: redistribution 
2014: Reductions for EIU were financed by the State, 
thus little scope for redistribution (SA.38635) 
2018: not clear if lasting or not, due to data limitations 
Latvia No effect Decision SA.42854 explains that levies are financed 
directly from the State budget (point 28), suggesting 
limited scope for redistribution effects.  
Poland (RES) Short-lived redistribution Decision SA.37345 in para 175 notes that the reductions 
for EIUs in relation to certificates of origin were to be 
financed by end-consumers. 
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Country (levy) Pattern consistent 
with 
Discussion 
Poland (CHP) No effect Reduction introduced in 2019, thus no effect because still 
too early to assess. In principle, redistribution effects 
likely because the CHP scheme will be financed just by 
the levies (SA.52530, point 74). 
Romania (RES) No effect Decision SA.39042 does not provide explanations for the 
absence of an effect consistent with redistribution. 
Slovenia (RES + 
CHP) 
Heterogeneous but 
lasting redistribution 
Strong increase for consumption band IF of non-EIU 
Moderate but lasting increase for other groups 
UK (RES) No effect The reductions for the Renewable Obligation scheme and 
Feed-In-Tariffs scheme are financed from state budget, 
thus there is no scope for redistribution. (SA.43657, point 
47 and 48)  
In the third Contract for Difference (CfD) scheme, there is 
scope for redistribution, because energy suppliers pass on 
their additional RES costs on consumers and may 
compensate the reductions for EIU by higher charges in 
other user groups. 
Source: E.CA Economics based on data collected as answer to Question 6. Note: HECHP is the Greek name and 
implementation of CHP. 
6.1.4 Conclusions 
To assess whether the introduction of RES levy rebates for EIU led to increases of levies 
for other consumers, the development of levy rates over time for different consumer 
groups was analysed. The data allow identifying three broad groups. First, there are three 
countries with a pattern consistent with a lasting redistribution effect: Germany (RES), 
Greece (RES), and Slovenia. Second, there are countries with a pattern consistent with a 
short-lived redistribution effect that vanishes over time: Greece (CHP) and Poland (RES). 
Third, there are countries where no effect on rates for non-rebated customers could be 
observed: Denmark, France, Germany (CHP), introduction of rebates in Italy in 2014, 
Latvia, Poland (CHP), Romania, and the UK. The reductions in these countries were 
typically financed by the State and thus did not give scope for redistribution effects.  
6.2 Relevance of grandfathering rule 
Question 8.b: As regards the Member States which have granted reductions to 
energy intensive users the contractor shall identify and assess to what extent has 
the grandfathering rule foreseen in point 197 of the EEAG been relevant in 
different sectors in terms of proportion of grandfathered undertakings? (see Annex 
0 for a list of all questions.) 
The assessment covers the countries using the grandfathering rule and publishing lists of 
RES levy reduction beneficiaries: Germany, Italy and Poland.120 
6.2.1 Identification of the grandfathered undertakings and sales data collection 
The grandfathered undertakings were identified as beneficiaries in sectors not listed in 
Annexes 3 and 5 of the EEAG nor in the two decisions, in which the Commission approved 
exemptions under point 186 of the EEAG (Denmark - SA.44863 and Germany – SA.41381) 
in the following way:  
                                                            
120 For the remaining countries using the grandfathering rule, France and Greece, information on beneficiaries 
was not available. 
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 Poland: The lists of beneficiaries were collected from the Polish energy regulator Urząd 
Regulacji Energetyki (URE). This included the names and tax identifying number (NIP) 
of beneficiaries of the RES levy reductions in 2016 to 2019, as well as beneficiaries of 
the CHP levy reductions in 2013 to 2019. The corresponding NACE code of each 
undertaking were identified by matching the NIP to the Orbis database of Van Dijk and 
extracting the primary NACE code for all matched companies. Consequently, the 
grandfathered undertakings were identified by filtering out the beneficiaries active in 
NACE codes covered by the EEAG Annex 3 and 5.  
 Germany: The lists of beneficiaries were collected from the German Ministry of 
Economy (Bundesamt für Wirtschaft und Ausfuhrkontrolle; BAFA). This included the 
names and NACE codes of the beneficiaries of RES levy reductions in 2006 to 2018. 
Consequently, the grandfathered undertakings were identified by filtering out the 
beneficiaries active in NACE codes covered by the EEAG Annex 3 and 5 as well as the 
two additional NACE sectors exempted in Germany. 
 Italy: The lists of beneficiaries were collected from the L’Autorita di Regolazione per 
Energia (ARERA). This included the names and tax identification numbers of the 
beneficiaries of RES levy reductions in 2017. The corresponding NACE code of each 
undertaking were identified by matching the tax id to the Orbis database of Van Dijk 
and extracting the primary NACE code for all matched companies. Consequently, the 
grandfathered undertakings were identified by filtering out the beneficiaries active in 
NACE codes covered by the EEAG Annex 3 and 5. 
To calculate the proportion of the grandfathered undertakings in their sector, the number 
of enterprises and the total yearly sales of the relevant undertakings and their entire sector 
in 2017 were collected. The year 2017 was selected, since this is likely to be the most 
recent year for which firm-level financial data is available in professional databases.  
 NACE sector yearly sales and number of enterprises in 2017 were collected from 
Eurostat:121 
o Poland: In regards to RES 2017 data, the grandfathered undertakings are active 
within 15 NACE sectors. Eurostat provides yearly sales data and the data on the 
number of enterprises for 12 out of 15 of the relevant NACE sectors. In result, the 
proportion of both yearly sales and the number of grandfathered undertakings were 
calculated compared to total sales or total number of active undertakings in the 
respective NACE sector in 2017. In respect to CHP 2017, all grandfathered 
undertakings have been also grandfathered from the RES levy. Therefore, the 
proportion of grandfathered undertakings, in respect to sales or number of 
undertakings, calculated for RES levies’ beneficiaries is valid also for the 
beneficiaries of the CHP levies. 
o Germany: In 2017, the grandfathered undertakings are active within 30 NACE 
sectors. Eurostat provides yearly sales data for 26 out of 30 of the relevant NACE 
                                                            
121 Source: Annual detailed enterprise statistics for industry (NACE Rev. 2, B-E) [sbs_na_ind_r2], 
https://ec.europa.eu/eurostat/web/products-datasets/-/SBS_NA_IND_R2 accessed on 17.10.2019; Annual 
detailed enterprise statistics for construction (NACE Rev. 2, F) [sbs_na_con_r2], 
https://ec.europa.eu/eurostat/web/products-datasets/-/sbs_na_con_r2 accessed on 23.10.2019; Annual 
detailed enterprise statistics for trade (NACE Rev. 2, G) [sbs_na_dt_r2], 
https://ec.europa.eu/eurostat/web/products-datasets/-/SBS_NA_DT_R2 accessed on 23.10.2019; Annual 
detailed enterprise statistics for services (NACE Rev. 2, H-N and S95) [sbs_na_1a_se_r29], 
https://ec.europa.eu/eurostat/web/products-datasets/-/SBS_NA_1A_SE_R2 accessed on 23.10.2019. 
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sectors. In two cases, the sales data were not available due to confidentiality. In 
one case, the NACE code was not available was not within of available code on 
Eurostat. In one case, the particular NACE code did not appear on Eurostat. 
Additionally, we retrieved the number of enterprises. Eurostat provides the number 
for 26 out of the relevant 30 NACE codes. In result, we calculated the proportion of 
both, yearly sales as well as the number of grandfathered undertakings, compared 
to total sales or total number of active undertakings in the respective NACE sector 
in 2017. 
o Italy: In 2017, the grandfathered undertakings are active within 83 NACE sectors. 
Eurostat provides yearly sales data for 74 out of 83 of the relevant NACE sectors. 
In seven cases, the NACE code was not within the range of available codes on 
Eurostat. In one case, sales data was not available due to confidentiality. In one 
case, the particular NACE code did not appear on Eurostat. Additionally, we 
retrieved the number of enterprises. Eurostat provides this number for 74 out of 
the relevant 83 NACE codes. In result, we calculated the proportion of both, yearly 
sales as well as the number of grandfathered undertakings, compared to total sales 
 Grandfathered undertakings’ sales in the respective Member States were collected 
from the firm-level database Orbis provided by Bureau van Dijk: 
o Poland: Overall, in regards to RES 2017 data, there were 388 beneficiaries on the 
list provided by the URE, out of which 17 were identified as grandfathered 
undertakings. For 15 of these undertakings, there were yearly sales data available 
for 2017 on the Orbis database. For one undertaking sales data of 2018 was used, 
as no other data was available. There was one undertaking which did not show any 
yearly sales data in the years 2014 to 2018. Based on the NIP, four out of the 388 
undertakings could not be found in the Orbis database; hence, they have been 
neglected. As all grandfathered undertakings in respect of CHP 2017 are also 
grandfathered in respect of RES 2017, the same ratios are applicable. 
o Germany: The list of beneficiaries, retrieved from the BAFA, contains 2092 
undertakings in 2017. Filtered by the NACE code, 179 were identified as 
grandfathered undertakings. The grandfathered undertakings active in NACE 
sectors 4910 and 4930122 were scrutinised with respect to their geographic 
distribution rather than their sales numbers, because these undertakings operate 
locally. These sectors combined encompass 80 grandfathered undertakings. The 
remaining 99 grandfathered undertakings were analysed in respect to their 
proportion of sales and number of firms compared to the entire NACE sector. For 
54 undertakings there was yearly sales data available for 2017 on the Orbis 
database. For 2 undertakings, sales data from years preceding 2017 were used. For 
the remaining undertakings, there was no sales data available on the Orbis 
database. 
o Italy: The list of beneficiaries in 2017, retrieved from the L’Autorita di Regolazione 
per Energia (ARERA), contains 2776 undertakings. There is an additional list 
containing 144 undertakings, yet their exemption has been under investigation and 
not finally determined. Hence, these additional undertakings were negleted and 
potentially lead to underestimation of the number of grandfathered undertakings. 
                                                            
122 NACE 4910 is passenger rail transport, NACE 4930 is other passenger land transport. 
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Based on the tax ID (Partita IVA and/or Fiscal Code), we found information for 2722 
out of 2776 undertakings on the Orbis database. For 2703 undertakings, Orbis 
shows a NACE code, which allowed us to identify the grandfathered undertakings. 
19 undertakings did not show a NACE code on Orbis, although other information 
was available. They could either be grandfathered or exempted. Within the available 
data, we found at least 809 grandfathered undertakings. In respect to the 
proportion of sales and the number of firms compared to the entire NACE sector, 
we found yearly sales data of 2017 for 784 grandfathered undertakings. For 7 
undertakings we used sales data from years preceding 2017. For 6 undertakings 
we used sales data from 2018. For 12 undertakings, there was no sales data 
available on the Orbis database. 
 Limitations: The methodology described above has several limitations. First, it does 
not identify all grandfathered undertakings. It does not allow identifying the 
grandfathered undertakings active in sectors listed in Annex 3 or 5 EEAG, but benefiting 
from reductions higher than those allowed by the EEAG or those with energy intensity 
lower than 20%. Also the 144 Italian undertakings under investigation remain not 
identified, although some of them may end up as grandfathered. Second, when NACE 
sectors are larger than true antitrust markets, the share of grandfathered undertakings’ 
sales in full NACE sector sales will underestimate the true relevance of the 
grandfathered undertakings in the market. Finally, in instances where the Orbis 
database does not assign the NACE code to the undertakings in an economically 
sensible way, the estimated share may be biased. This appears to be the case for coal 
mining in Poland (see next subsection).  
6.2.2 Relevance of grandfathered undertakings 
Two measures of the relevance of the grandfathered undertakings in their sector and 
country are provided in this section. For each relevant NACE code per country, the 
aggregated sales by grandfathered undertakings are compared to the total sales in that 
sector and Member State. This measure of the relevance of the grandfathered undertakings 
in their sector has a potentially useful interpretation.  
As long as the sector definitions roughly correspond to the relevant product market 
definitions, the share of aggregated sales by grandfathered undertakings signals the 
potential for competitive biases due to grandfathering. In addition, the number of 
grandfathered undertakings is compared to the total number of undertakings in the same 
NACE sector in the Member State. This section describes the results for Poland, Germany 
and Italy. 
 Poland: Table 13 in Annex 8.2 shows that in most of sectors the share of grandfathered 
undertakings in the total number of undertakings is below one percentage. The 
proportion of grandfathered undertakings is low also when measured in terms of sales, 
with three exceptions. In sectors 6810 (buying and selling of own real estate) and 4671 
(wholesale of solid, liquid and gaseous fuels and related products), the share of 
grandfathered undertakings sales out of the total sales are 32.8% and 8.26% 
respectively. However, when looking at the company names we note that the Orbis 
database allocated holding companies of coal mine producers under these sectors. If 
the holding entities of the coal producers are assessed against NACE 0510 (Mining of 
coal and lignite), the proportion of grandfathered undertakings in respect to sales is 
56.22% and 3.51% in respect to the number of undertakings. In the sector 4675 
(wholesale of chemical products) the sales share of the grandfathered undertaking is 
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21.1%. These sectors appear likely to be affected by competition distortions due to 
grandfathering. 
 Germany: Table 14 in Annex 8.2 shows that in each sector, the share of grandfathered 
undertakings from the total number of undertakings is below one percentage. The 
proportion of grandfathered undertakings is low also when measured in terms of sales, 
with four exceptions. In sectors 1052 (Manufacture of ice cream), 1812 (Other 
printing), 4312 (Site preparation), and 5222 (Service activities incidental to water 
transportation), the share of grandfathered undertakings sales out of the total sales 
are 9.25%, 9.32%, 14.41%, and 5.05% respectively. These sectors appear the most 
likely to be affected by competition distortions due to grandfathering in Germany. 
Additionally in Germany, there are also grandfathered undertakings active locally in 
passenger transport. This is the case for the NACE codes 4910 (Passenger rail 
transport, interurban) and 4930 (Other passenger land transport). In these sectors, 
the number of grandfathered undertakings varies strongly by region. The following two 
maps show the number of grandfathered undertakings per Federal State for each of 
the NACE codes. 
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Figure 45: Number of grandfathered undertakings per Federal State in passenger 
rail transport, interurban (NACE: 4910), in Germany 
 
Source: E.CA Economics. Note: Based on the Orbis database, three additional grandfathered undertaking are 
active in NACE 4910 and their activities cover all regions in Germany. These undertakings are neglected in the 
map as there is conflicting information on their NACE code between Orbis data and the list received from BAFA. 
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Figure 46: Number of grandfathered undertakings per Federal State in other 
passenger land transport (NACE: 4930) in Germany 
 
Source: E.CA Economics. 
For interurban passenger rail transport, the highest concentration of the grandfathered 
undertakings is in Baden-Württemberg and Hessen (13), followed by Nordrhein-
Westfalen, Bavaria and Sachsen (12). The lowest number of grandfathered 
undertakings were active in Mecklenburg-Vorpommern (6). In other passenger land 
transport, the largest number of grandfathered undertakings were active in Nordrhein-
Westfalen (20), followed by Bavaria (13) and in Baden-Württemberg (12). These were 
mainly regional providers of public transport, e.g. tram or metro services 
(“Verkehrsbetriebe”, “Stadtwerke” and “Straßenbahn” amongst others). 
 Italy: Table 15 in Annex 8.2 shows that in most of sectors (64 out of 83), the share of 
grandfathered undertakings sales in the total of the NACE code in 2017 is below five 
percentage points. There are 19 NACE sectors (out of 83), where the share exceeds 
5%: 0890 (mining and quarrying), 1052 (Manufacture of ice cream), 1330(Finishing of 
textiles), 1710 (Manufacture of pulp, paper and paperboard), 1811 (Printing of 
newspapers), 1812 (Other printing), 1814 (Binding and related services), 2010 
(Manufacture of basic chemicals, fertilisers and nitrogen compounds, plastics and 
synthetic rubber in primary forms), 2210 (Manufacture of rubber products), 2220 
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(Manufacture of plastics products), 2310 (Manufacture of glass and glass products), 
2340 (Manufacture of other porcelain and ceramic products), 2364 (Manufacture of 
mortars), 2450 (Casting of metals), 2550 (Manufacture of fabricated metal products, 
except machinery and equipment), 2561 (Treatment and coating of metals), 2562 
(Machining), 2610 (Manufacture of electronic components and boards), 3521 
(Manufacture of gas). In three of these sectors, the share is particularly high: 71.9% 
in manufacture of gas, 38% in manufacture of ice cream and 31% in manufacture of 
fabricated metal products, except machinery and equipment. These sectors appear the 
most likely to be affected by competition distortions due to grandfathering in Italy. 
6.2.3 Conclusions 
The relevance of the grandfathering rule was assessed according to the proportion of sales 
by the grandfathered undertakings in their economy sector and country in 2017. Sectors 
not covered by the EEAG in Germany, Italy and Poland were considered. For Germany, 
there are four sectors (out of 30) with shares between 5% and 10%, while all other sectors 
have shares below 5%. For Poland, there are at most three sectors (out of 15) with sales 
shares exceeding 5%, two of them being very high, between 20% and 35%. For Italy, 
there are 19 sectors (out of 83) with sales shares exceeding 5%, and in three of them the 
sales share exceeds 30%.  
6.3 Financial instruments for energy efficiency 
Question 9: Based on Member States' implementation of the requirements of 
Article 39 GBER in energy-efficiency schemes and on financial intermediary and 
energy service companies' ("ESCOs") market behaviour, to what extent has the 
administrative burden linked to Article 39 GBER been proportionate to the 
potential distortions on the financial intermediary markets and on the energy 
efficiency service market? (see Annex 0 for a list of all questions.) 
6.3.1 Review of energy efficiency schemes  
Question 9.a: For the schemes containing provisions on energy-efficiency 
projects in buildings: 
(i) How is the selection of financial intermediaries (or funds) organized?  
(ii) How the national legal basis purposes to verify that the independent private 
investment share reached 30% and that private investors obtained a fair 
rate of return? 
(iii) How does the national legal basis purposes to verify that financial 
intermediaries were passing-on full advantages to beneficiaries and were 
managed on a commercial basis? 
(iv) Whether the national legal basis allows that the subsidized loans be 
concluded between financial intermediaries (or funds) and ESCOs? 
(v) What types of expenditures and projects are eligible under the national legal 
basis? 
(vi) Whether subsidized loans or guarantees are limited to households or also 
available between financial intermediaries and SMEs or large undertakings? 
To provide input for assessing the effectiveness of State aid measures in the field of energy 
efficiency in buildings, the review started with desk research into 71 national State aid 
schemes, based on a list provided by the Commission, indicating all national schemes 
falling under Article 39 GBER which had been officially communicated to the Commission 
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by the Member States until mid-2019 as constituting schemes falling under Article 39 of 
the GBER. These 71 schemes stemmed from 18 Member States. The outcome of this 
research is presented in a comprehensive excel table (Annex 9.1), containing all above 
mentioned schemes, with a particular focus on provisions related to: 
 selection of funds/financial intermediaries; 
 independent private investment share of 30% and private investors’ fair rate of return; 
 financial intermediaries passing on full advantages to building owners or tenants and 
being managed on a commercial basis; 
 subsidized loans concluded between financial intermediaries (or funds) and ESCOs; 
 eligible expenditures and projects, notably building insulation, heating renovation, 
installation of RES production, or combinations of those; and 
 subsidized loans or guarantees being limited to households or also available between 
financial intermediaries and SMEs or large undertakings. 
Based on the list of 71 schemes provided by the Commission, 47 schemes (66%) were 
identified as directly referring to Article 39 GBER.123 Nine of the other 24 schemes (38%) 
refer to the provisions of the GBER more generally, or to Regulation (EU) No 1407/2013 
(“de minimis Regulation”) without quoting any specific article, while 15 of them (62%) do 
not contain any reference to State aid rules. Among these 24 schemes, 16 (66%) do not 
refer to energy efficiency projects in buildings specifically, but contain provisions on 
financial instruments for energy efficiency.  
Of the 47 schemes with explicit reference to Article 39 GBER, 7 (15%) reproduce its entire 
wording, 12 (26%) reproduce certain parts of it,124 17 (36%) simply mention that projects 
should be carried out in accordance with its conditions without explaining further the 
content of this provision, and 11 (23%) simply indicate that energy efficiency projects in 
buildings are covered.125  
On the selection of financial intermediaries or funds, schemes that refer to, or contain, the 
wording of Article 39(8) a.-f. GBER require an “an open, transparent and non-
discriminatory call in accordance with applicable Union and national laws”. As many 
granting authorities simply refer to, or copy, the wording of this GBER provision, it was not 
possible to indicate how it is verified if the investment by an independent private investor 
reaches 30%, and if the investors obtain a fair rate of return.126  
Among the 47 relevant schemes, 20 (43%) require explicitly that private investment should 
reach at least 30%, while the other 27 schemes (57%) do not. The national provisions 
implementing the schemes often do not address the management of financial 
intermediaries, including energy efficiency funds on a commercial basis. Six of the 47 
schemes (13%) indicate the identity of financial intermediaries and 23 (49%) refer to the 
requirements in Article 39(9) GBER, while 18 (38%) do not indicate anything on the 
management of the financial intermediaries involved or to be involved. The national 
provisions implementing the schemes often do not address the passing on of the full 
advantage to building owners or tenants either. Among the 47 schemes, 22 require that 
                                                            
123 Those schemes are highlighted in green in Annex 9.1. 
124 These schemes mainly reproduce the conditions set out in Article 39(8) and 39(9) GBER. 
125 This category contains the schemes: SA.39273, SA.43600 and SA.51442, for which the responsible granting 
authorities indicated that they were covering Article 39 GBER. 
126 For the Greek scheme (SA.48981) see further details below, section 4.3.2.1. 
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the full advantage is passed to the owners or tenants (47%), while 25 of them (53%) do 
not contain any indications as regard the pass-on advantage to building owners. 
Under the Greek scheme SA.48981, however, an invitation for expression of interest by 
financial intermediaries was published. It contains a general reference to Art. 39 of the 
GBER and a reference to paragraphs 8 and 9 of the same article on the conditions that 
apply for the selection of financial intermediaries. In addition, there is a reference to a 
maximum intensity of 70% of the financing needed for the eligible works. The remaining 
financing must be financed by the beneficiary. The invitation also refers to the Fund 
covering the costs of two energy audits and the remuneration of a “project advisor”. It also 
refers to the possibility for beneficiaries to contract a loan for the amount (maximum 30%) 
not covered by the Fund, with a “100% subsidization of the interest”. Finally, the Fund 
which is created for this scheme is to be financed at 1/3 by national/EU funds, and 2/3 by 
the financial intermediaries. The scheme does not contain any indication as to the identity 
of the selected financial intermediaries. The 1/3-2/3 ratio is also applied at project level, 
meaning that the maximum intensity would be lower than 70%. 
Among the 47 schemes directly referring to Article 39 GBER, three (SA.44392, SA.46156 
and SA.51024) indicate that the subsidized loans have to be concluded between the 
financial intermediary (or fund) and an ESCO. Still among the 47 schemes, 14 (30%) 
specify which energy efficiency projects related to buildings are covered, while 33 (70%) 
schemes do not specify this. Among these 33 schemes, 17 (52%) contain specific 
provisions on the definition of energy-efficiency measures, while 12 (36%) do not, and 4 
(12%) implicitly refer to the definition of energy-efficiency by mentioning that the terms 
in the national legislation have the same meaning as in the GBER. 
In six schemes (13%), it is specified what the projects cover, e.g. building insulation to 
reduce energy consumption by improving thermal performance of buildings (including new 
windows, double-glazing etc.), renovation of heating system or production of hot water 
from RES, and that a combination of those investments would be covered, while the 
remaining 41 schemes (87%) do not contain such provisions. 
In 16 schemes (34%) containing a reference to Article 39 GBER, the wording does not 
contain any indication as to the beneficiaries of energy efficiency investments in buildings 
in the form of loans or guarantees. 12 schemes (26%) indicate that the aid is limited to 
homeowners and tenants and four schemes specify that only homeowners should be 
eligible beneficiaries. 19 schemes (40%) extend the beneficiaries to public bodies, private 
companies, associations or institutions and nine refer to companies as being the sole 
beneficiaries of aid. The Lithuanian scheme (SA.51024) specifies that only municipal 
administrations are being considered as final beneficiaries. 
6.3.2 Stakeholder consultation on energy efficiency schemes 
Question 9.b: For schemes containing provisions on energy-efficiency projects in 
buildings, how many energy-efficiency projects in buildings have obtained aid 
under these schemes, how the selection process of financial intermediaries (or 
funds) was organized, and if granting authorities were aware of any instances in 
which ESCOs or energy suppliers have made energy supply contracts subject to 
the conclusion of energy-efficiency services or vice versa? 
To collect the relevant data, a targeted stakeholder consultation was conducted, using a 
combination of surveys and interviews. For that purpose, a web-based survey was 
transmitted to the addressees together with an accompanying letter from the Commission. 
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Telephone interviews were conducted with the granting authorities when this was 
considered more effective than the mere questionnaire, in particular when there was 
insufficient feedback from the addressees or when the replies were not clear enough. 
Certain interviews were conducted on the recipients’ request.  
Given that more than eight Member States adopted relevant support schemes based on 
Article 39 GBER, the review was limited to a representative sample of eight Member States. 
Table 9: Sample of Member States 
Member State Geographic 
location 
Country size Close/far from 
energy-efficiency 
target 
Schemes with 
expenditures for 
energy efficiency 
projects (Art. 39) 
Croatia South/East Small 2% No 
France West Large 12% Yes 
Germany Central/West Large 14% Yes 
Greece South/East Small 6% Yes 
Hungary Central/East Medium 9% No 
Poland Central/East Large 10% Yes 
Spain South/West Large 10% Yes 
Sweden North Medium 17% No 
Source: Sheppard Mullin  
The sample includes large and small, as well as “new” and “old” Member States, located in 
the South/North/East/West of the EU. It includes all reported spenders of public support 
under Article 39 GBER (apart from the UK).  
It also reflects a diverse selection of the progress made by Member States towards reaching 
energy efficiency targets. Table 9 shows the percentage of the target for 2015 that the 
Member States already reached.127 
The questionnaire covered the following questions: 
 Whether Member States provided loans or guarantees under the relevant schemes to 
funds or financial intermediaries and what budget was allocated to each scheme?  
 Whether Member States organized tenders or calls for application to select financial 
intermediaries or funds, and which types of institutions were selected to provide 
subsidized energy-efficiency loans? 
 Whether Member States were aware of any instances in which ESCOs or energy 
suppliers have made energy supply contracts subject to the conclusion of energy-
efficiency services or vice versa? (also based on Internet search) 
The questionnaires were sent to relevant granting authorities in the selected Member 
States, including all granting authorities having adopted measures for which the 
Commission was informed about actual expenditure in the relevant period, as well as 
additional authorities for which the existence of expenditure was not reported to the 
Commission, so that it had to be verified why no (additional) aid was granted. 
The survey, carried out with the questionnaire, followed by a series of interviews, 
comprised 21 granting authorities, in charge of 29 schemes, in the 8 selected Member 
                                                            
127 Report from the Commission to the European Parliament and the Council, 2017 assessment of the progress 
made by Member States towards the national energy efficiency targets for 2020 and the implementation of the 
Energy Efficiency Directive as required by Article 24(3) of Directive 2012/27/EU. 
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States. It revealed that among the 29 schemes, 5 do not contain explicit provisions on 
financial instruments for energy efficiency, nor a reference to Article 39 GBER. A total of 
17 stakeholders in charge of 22 State aid schemes and covering eight Member States 
replied to the survey, and their replies are outlined below and summarized in the last 
column of Annex 9.2. The full replies are provided as Annex 9.3. 
6.3.2.1 Details on aid granted under Article 39 GBER 
Of the 17 granting authorities that replied to the survey, only one (the Greek authority, 
SA.48981) indicated that it granted aid under Article 39 GBER. In a telephone interview, 
this authority stated that 18,134 loans were approved for a total of EUR 30 million to 
homeowners for energy saving interventions, such as replacement of windows, insulation 
etc. As per October 2019, 4,839 loans were disbursed for an average amount of EUR 6,700 
per homeowner. The same authority organised a public call for application to select 
established financial institutions operating in Greece to provide these subsidised energy-
efficiency loans. During an interview with the Special Service for State Aid of the Greek 
granting authority,128 it was stated that Article 39 GBER was considered clear and not 
difficult to apply. However, it was regretted that, unlike other GBER provisions, the wording 
does not specify whether this provision can be combined with the de minimis Regulation.129 
The remaining 16 granting authorities did not grant any loans or guarantees under Article 
39 GBER. However, some of them indicated that they granted aid under other provisions 
of the national scheme and listed those projects (SA.43254 and SA.42457). For instance, 
the French “Caisse des Dépôts et Consignations” indicated that aid was granted to 14 
projects with amounts varying between EUR 80,000 and EUR 2.5 million. None of the 
interviewees however indicated on which GBER provisions those subsidies where based. 
Interviews were conducted with seven granting authorities with regard to the reasons for 
the lack of application of Article 39 GBER, and all of them stated, among others, the 
complexity of the wording and the difficulties due to its practical implementation, because 
Article 39 GBER is long, complex and not user-friendly. This complexity further results in 
difficulties in the implementation, and interviewees tended to prefer other clearer and more 
practical provisions from the GBER. Interviewees regretted this, especially where the 
demand for energy efficiency projects tends to increase. On the wording of the provision, 
some authorities mentioned that it is too lengthy, and that it does not address its 
combination with de minimis rules.130 Other granting authorities stated that, besides the 
complexity of the wording of Article 39 GBER, the construction of the aid via a financial 
intermediary is very complex and difficult to apply in practice.131 
Some interviewees indicated that Article 39 GBER is often included in much broader 
national schemes about environmental protection aid, and that other types of GBER 
exemptions were more suitable for the objectives of the programs.132 Some interviewees 
stated that these difficulties have been addressed by applying Article 38 GBER instead.133 
                                                            
128 Interview with members of the Special Service for State Aid, Υπουργειο Αναπτυξης Και Επενδυσεων. 
129 See, for instance, Art. 21(18) GBER. 
130 Interviews with Referat EA6 – Beihilfenkontrollpolitik Bundesministerium für Wirtschaft und Energie, and with 
Befektetési menedzse. 
131 Interview with Handläggare, Klimatklivet, Naturvårdsverket Klimatklivsenheten, and with Referat EA6 – 
Beihilfenkontrollpolitik Bundesministerium für Wirtschaft und Energie. 
132 Interview with Head of the Renewable Energy and Resource Use Area, EVE. 
133 Interview with Handläggare, Klimatklivet, Naturvårdsverket Klimatklivsenheten. 
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6.3.2.2 Tying of energy supply contracts 
As regards publicly available evidence on the tying of energy supply contracts to energy 
efficiency services, or vice versa, all 17 authorities replying to the survey stated that they 
were not aware of potential instances in which such contracts were tied to energy efficiency 
services or vice versa. This result is consistent with the preliminary findings of the research 
carried out on several websites of national competition authorities, among others, in 
Belgium, France, Germany and Austria, in order to identify any competition enquiries those 
authorities might have conducted, without any such findings. 
Further research was conducted on so called energy performance contracting (“EPC”) and 
energy supply contracting (“ESC”) as defined by the Energy Efficiency Directive.134 An EPC 
is “a contractual arrangement between the beneficiary and the provider of an energy 
efficiency improvement measure, verified and monitored throughout the whole term of the 
contract, where investments (work, supply or service) in that measure are paid for in 
relation to a contractually agreed level of energy efficiency improvement or other agreed 
energy performance criteria, such as financial savings”.135 An ESC is a contractual 
arrangement for the efficient supply of energy.136 In other words, ESC focuses on efficient 
energy supply where ESCOs provide products such as heat, chilling, compressed air or 
electricity. EPC aims for energy savings such as HVAC, lighting, controls and building fabric 
improvements.137 EPC may include additional services related to efficient energy supply. 
Further, pursuant to Country Reports made for the QualitEE project, ESCOs may operate 
on both EPC and ESC markets.138 However, although EPC and ESC can be offered jointly 
by ESCOs, no evidence of cases was identified where providers would make the signature 
of the one conditional to the conclusion of the other contract.  
6.3.3 Conclusions 
The review of the 71 State aid schemes officially communicated to the Commission by the 
Member States as falling under Article 39 GBER between 2014 and mid-2019 showed that 
47 schemes (66%) contained explicit references to this provision or referred to energy 
efficiency in buildings in general terms. The 24 schemes (34%) which do not cover nor 
mention energy efficiency projects in buildings are of a more general nature, providing for 
basic rules and regulations to be complied with by beneficiaries in order to be eligible for 
State aid covering measures of a different and/or sometimes unspecified kind. 
Among the 47 schemes covering Article 39 GBER, three categories can be identified: 19 
(40%) reproduce (almost) entirely the wording, while 17 others (36%) simply mention 
that support shall be granted in accordance with this provision without further details. For 
those two categories, the wording of the national legal bases does not indicate how 
granting authorities verify that the conditions of Article 39 GBER are respected. A third 
category contains 11 schemes (24%) related to the support of energy efficiency in buildings 
without quoting Article 39 GBER. 
                                                            
134 Directive 2012/27/EU of 25 October 2012 on energy efficiency, amending Directives 2009/125/EC and 
2010/30/EU and repealing Directives 2004/8/EC and 2006/32/EC. 
135 Art. 2(27) of Directive 2012/27/EU. 
136 This definition is a simplified version of the IEA DSM Task Force 16 definition. 
137 See European Association of Energy Service Companies, Energy Contracting: Successful energy services 
business models, available at: 
https://www.euesco.org/cms/upload/downloads/brochures/101006_euesco_ContractingFlyer_A4_final_low.pdf 
138 See QualitEE Country Reports on the Energy Efficiency Services Market and Quality, available at: 
https://qualitee.eu/country-reports-on-the-energy-efficiency-services-market-and-quality/. 
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The stakeholder consultation into the relevant schemes included 21 granting authorities in 
the eight selected Member States, of which 17 replied to the questionnaire. It appeared 
that many granting authorities consider Article 39 GBER as rather lengthy and complex. 
Only one authority (in Greece) provided loans for energy efficiency projects in buildings, 
considering Article 39 GBER as clear and not difficult to apply. Four granting authorities 
explained that they prefer to rely on other, clearer provisions in the GBER. The autorithies 
in charge of implementing three State aid schemes, including the Greek authority having 
implemented a scheme under Article 39 of the GBER, were concerned that the drafting of 
Article 39 GBER does not allow to understand if the provision can be combined with the 
de-minimis exemptions. 
Finally, consistent with the answers given by the granting authorities to that aspect, the 
desk review of publicly available information does not suggest that either ESCOs or energy 
suppliers have made energy supply contracts subject to the conclusion of energy-efficiency 
services or vice versa. Although there is evidence that ESCOs may provide both energy 
supply contracts and energy-efficiency services, there is no indication that they had made 
the performance of the one conditional to the signature of the other. 
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7 Relevance 
7.1 Zero-subsidy bids 
Question 10: Do the EEAG and GBER still adequately address recent market 
developments such as zero subsidy bids? What are zero subsidy bids made under 
RES support schemes? What were auctioned technologies, auction dates, 
volumes, bids, as well as other advantages? Where contracts were awarded to 
projects that bid at zero, what were award criteria on the basis of which winning 
project (or projects) were selected? (see Annex 0 for a list of all questions.) 
7.1.1 Introduction 
This section focuses on ‘subsidy-free’ renewable energy projects in eleven Member States, 
i.e. Spain, Germany, Netherlands, Norway, Italy, Finland, Sweden, UK, Portugal, Ireland 
and Denmark, for which subsidy-free projects were found in publicly available information, 
collected by 31 August 2019.  
Subsidy-free projects were defined as those receiving zero public funding irrespective of 
movements in the energy market price. Thus, although no subsidy is received in relation 
to electricity generated, these projects may benefit from support in terms of e.g. subsidised 
grid connection costs, or access to land/seabed.  
Based on the collected data, the total announced subsidy-free renewable energy capacity 
currently in Europe is approx. 18 GW. The capacity of onshore wind outstrips solar, offshore 
wind and biomass, with 47% of total volume represented by onshore wind technology. 
Solar is second, with 34% capacity share. There is a split in technologies between northern-
European countries that have announced a greater volume of wind projects, and southern 
European countries with a higher concentration of solar.  
Countries leading the way in subsidy-free wind are Germany and the Netherlands. The 
largest subsidy-free projects by capacity tend to be wind in the north of Europe. Solar 
projects are typically more numerous but smaller in volume (ICIS, 2019). In spite of this, 
Spain currently leads the subsidy-free market with the highest number of projects and 
total capacity announced, accounting for almost 50% of all subsidy-free renewables 
announced in terms of volume.  
A subsidy-free project can be a result of a zero bid in renewable energy auction, or it may 
come about as project concluded outside of an auction system139. The majority of the 
cumulative subsidy-free announced project volume results from zero bids in renewable 
energy auctions.  
At the time when data was collected, seven renewable energy auctions with zero subsidy 
bids had taken place in three countries: Spain (3 auctions, 83 zero bids), Netherlands (2 
auctions, 2 zero bids) and Germany (2 auctions, 4 zero bids). The total volume of these 
auctions is approximately 11.8 GW or 66% of the total announced project volume. The 
auctioned volumes by country and technology are presented in Figure 47. 
                                                            
139 If the auction is based on a Contract for Difference (CfD) model, then zero bid corresponds  
to bidding at or below projected electricity market price.  
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Figure 47: Subsidy-free auctioned capacity by country and by technology 
 
Source: BOE 2016, 2017a, 2017b (ES), Müsgens and Riepin 2018 (DE) and s Enterprise Agency n.d. (NL). 
Renewable energy projects can also be approved outside of an auction format. In such 
cases, developers typically attempt to secure a long-term revenue stream for their projects 
by signing a power purchase agreement (PPA) with either a corporate or utility buyer (ICIS, 
2019). A PPA is a long-term electricity supply agreement between an installation operator 
(seller) and an electricity customer (buyer). The buyer can be an intermediary energy 
trader or energy supplier, or a major direct industrial consumer such as an IT company 
who needs renewable power for its data centres. (Nasner, 2019) 
The generator of the renewable energy receives a fixed price per megawatt hour, meaning 
that it can expect fixed returns on its investment and offer the bank the certainty it requires 
for the loans (Nasner, 2019). In the dataset collected for this review, all projects approved 
outside of an auction format are backed up by a PPA. Figure 48 summarises cumulative 
project volumes by country and technology that are approved outside of an auction format. 
For convenience, the plethora of references for subsidy-free projects approved outside of 
an auctions system are listed separately by project and can be found in Annex 10. 
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Figure 48: Subsidy-free capacity approved outside of an auction format by 
country and by technology140 
 
Source: See references listed in Annex 10. 
As can be seen from Figure 48, all projects approved outside of an auction format are 
either onshore wind or solar projects. 
7.1.2 Renewable energy auctions with zero subsidy bids 
Spain, Germany and the Netherlands are the three countries in Europe that have seen zero 
subsidy bids in their renewable energy auctions. Below the auctions in each of these three 
countries are discussed in turn, starting with the largest auctioned capacity. 
7.1.2.1 Spain 
The first renewable energy auction was held in January 2016, after being delayed from 
November 2015. The country also held two additional auctions in 2017 (Kruger et al. 2018). 
Unlike in other European countries, the auction participants in Spain are bidding for 
subsidies on installed rather than generated power (BOE 2016, 2017a, 2017b). In more 
detail, the Spanish scheme is essentially a standardised regulated asset-based system in 
which the government remunerates each plant to ensure a “reasonable rate of return” 
based on a recognised asset value. The reasonable rate is the government bond yield plus 
a spread. The bidders bid at a discount over the Regulated Asset Base – effectively ensuring 
that the government provides subsidies only if the market power prices are insufficient for 
the project to reach the reasonable rate of return. The winner of the auction is determined 
purely based on price and pricing is uniform, meaning that all winning projects get the 
same discount rate. (Del Río 2016, Losana 2017, Kruger et al. 2018) 
Though the awarded projects are guaranteed a minimum price for the generated power, 
the price floors are so low that effectively the awarded projects remain fully exposed to 
market prices (Kruger et al. 2018, ICIS 2018b). To this end, in this report, all projects that 
                                                            
140 For some of the solar projects, the capacities were announced in terms of direct current (DC) as the power is 
generated from the panel. However, solar power needs to be converted from DC to alternate current (AC) to be 
injected into the power grid. In this process, some of the power is lost. To this end, in cases where solar power 
capacities were announced in DC, a loss of 15% of a direct current was assumed in the transformation process. 
Subsequently, the capacities announced in DC were multiplied by 0.85 in order to unify the capacity measures 
across different technologies (Gipe, 2009). In addition, for some of the wind projects in Italy, capacities were 
announced in terms of megawatt hours. Since there was no information provided on the actual operating hours, 
the number of hours in a year was used to convert the volume to megawatts. 
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have bid zero investment subsidies in the Spanish auctions are interpreted as projects that 
are built without public funding. Table 10 summarises the design elements of the three 
renewable energy auctions in Spain.  
Table 10: Overview of renewable energy auction design in Spain. 
Design element Round 1 (Jan 2016) Round 2 (May 2017) Round 3 (Jul 2017) 
Volume requested 
per auction 
700 MW 3,000 MW 3,000 MW requested; 
5,037 MW awarded 
Technology 
requested 
Onshore wind, biomass Technology neutral Onshore wind, solar 
Prequalification 
requirements 
(e.g. to post 
collateral to help 
ensure winning 
projects are built) 
• Minimum volume of 
the bid: 1 KW 
• Bid bond of EUR 
20/KW 
• No previous 
experience required, 
no administrative 
permits (incl. land) 
required 
• Minimum volume of 
the bid: 1 KW 
• A bid bond of EUR 
60/KW and a building 
permit required 
• No previous 
experience required 
• Minimum volume of 
the bid: 1 KW 
• A bid bond of EUR 
60/KW and a 
building permit 
required 
• No previous 
experience required 
Remuneration 
characteristics 
Investment-based support. The outcome of the auction is a discount on the standard 
value of the initial investment of the reference standard plant (RSP). 
Other advantages • Guaranteed floor price 
(value not known) 
• No guaranteed 
connection to the grid 
• Guaranteed floor price 
of EUR 40/MWh 
• No guaranteed grid 
connectio 
• Guaranteed floor 
price of EUR 32/MWh 
• No guaranteed 
connection to the 
grid. 
Selection criteria: 
price vs. other 
Price-only auction (discount on the initial investment). 
Auction format: 
single vs. multiple 
Multi-item. Bidders bid for a given capacity, not for a given project /plant. 
Auction type Static, sealed bid, price-only. 
Pricing rule: pay 
as bid vs. uniform 
Uniform pricing. All the winners receive the discount of the last bid being accepted, 
which will set such discount. 
Price ceilings • Bid on discount from 
initial remuneration 
for standard plants, 
thus auction has 
inherent price ceiling 
• No maximum discount 
rate 
• Bid on discount from 
initial remuneration 
for standard plants,  
thus, auction has 
inherent price ceiling 
• Max. discount 64.43% 
for onshore wind, 
51.22% for solar, and 
99.98% for biomass 
• Bid on discount from 
initial remuneration 
for standard plants, 
thus auction has 
inherent price ceiling  
• Max. discount 69.9% 
for onshore wind and 
87.1% for solar. 
Realisation 
periods 
Deadline to build the project is 48 months (counting from the publication of the 
Resolution in the official government journal BOE). 
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Penalties In event of non-compliance by agreed date (48 months), OMI-Polo Español SA 
(OMIE) – in charge of the management of the auction - enforces bid bonds. 
Sources: Altozano (2019), BOE (2016, 2017a, 2017b), Kruger et al. (2018), Losana (2017), Del Rio (2016). 
There are several institutions involved in Spain’s auction programme. The State Secretariat 
for Energy is the regulator setting the rules of the auctions and passes the relevant 
legislation. The Comisión Nacional de los Mercados y la Competencia is an independent 
organisation that supervises and manages the auction procedure and outcome, while the 
OMI-Polo Español S.A is in charge of the management of the auction (Del Río, 2016). In 
the first Spanish renewable energy auction, no maximum discount rate was set, resulting 
in all projects bidding at a 100% discount rate. This means that the projects are fully 
exposed to the spot market, with no subsidies from the government. In the second and 
third auctions, the government defined maximum discount rates (or minimum levels of 
investment support) for each technology, at which all developers again bid. Table 11 
summarises the outcomes of Spanish renewable energy auctions.  
Table 11: Overview of renewable energy auction outcomes in Spain. 
Outcome 
element 
Round 1 (Jan 2016) Round 2 (May 2017) Round 3 (Jul 2017) 
MW procured 700 MW (13 projects) 3,000 MW 5,037 MW  
Technology 
procured / 
installed 
• Onshore wind (500 
MW, 8 projects) 
• Biomass (200 MW, 
5 projects) 
• Onshore wind (2,780 MW, 
14 projects) 
• Solar (1,000 MW, 7 projects) 
• Biomass (19 MW, 9 projects) 
• Onshore wind (1,128 
MW, 10 projects) 
• Solar (3,909 MW, 30 
projects) 
Prices Everyone bid 100% 
discount 
• Onshore wind producers bid 
max. discount of 64.43% 
• Solar producers bid max. 
discount of 51.22%. 
• Biomass producers bid max. 
discount of 99.98%. 
• Onshore wind 
producers bid max. 
discount of 69.9% 
• Solar producers bid 
max. discount of 
87,1% 
Sources: Del Rio (2016), Kruger et al. (2018), BOE (2016, 2017a, 2017b). 
Table 11 indicates that there is over 8,700 MW subsidy-free renewable energy capacity 
currently in the pipeline in Spain. However, given the loose pre-qualification requirements 
in Spanish auctions, concerns on whether the awarded projects ever realize have been 
raised. (Kruger et al. 2018). To this end, research on the awarded projects was made in 
order to determine the share of projects that actually realize. The findings suggest that at 
least 7,108 MW (81%) of the awarded capacity is currently finished, under construction or 
has been able to secure the necessary project financing. With this capacity alone, Spain 
maintains its position as the clear leader of subsidy-free market in Europe. 
7.1.2.2 Germany 
The first renewable energy auctions in Germany that received zero subsidy bids were held 
in 2017 and 2018 (Harman, 2018). Both auctions allocated offshore wind projects, for 
which the system operator provided sites and grid connections (Kruger et al. 2018). In 
particular, winning the auction was the only way to become eligible for grid connection and 
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access the electricity market. Given the long realization periods, many of the bidders 
considered winning as an option for the future. Willingness to secure market share and 
opt-out option contributed to aggressive bidding at zero (Klessmann, 2017) Table 12 
summarises the design elements of the two offshore wind auctions held in Germany. 
Table 12: Overview of the offshore wind energy auction design in Germany 
Design element Round 1 (Apr 2016) Round 2 (Apr 2017) 
Volume requested  1,550 MW (4 sites) 1,610 MW (6 sites) 
Technology requested Offshore wind 
Prequalification 
requirements / 
obligations (e.g. 
requirement to post 
collateral to help 
ensure winning 
projects are built) 
• A guarantee of EUR 100,000/MW capacity 
that a participant is bidding for. 
• Participant has to be an owner of existing 
pre-developed projects (Existing projects 
are offshore wind farms that had already 
been approved or planned prior to 1 August 
2016 or for which at least one consultation 
date had been implemented.) 
• A guarantee of EUR 
100,000/MW capacity 
that a participant is 
bidding for. 
• Only existing projects 
not awarded during the 
first round were eligible 
to participate.  
Remuneration 
characteristics 
Over a 20-year period starting from the delivery year, the auction winners will 
receive a market premium that is a top-up payment equal to the difference 
between their individual strike price and the technology average market 
price realized by all German offshore wind farms each month141. The strike 
price is not indexed to inflation and the system is one-way: If the technology 
average price exceeds the strike price, the operator gets to keep its wholesale 
market revenues and does not have to pay back the difference. 
Other advantages The system operator provides sites and grid connections. After the 20-year 
subsidy period elapses, all operators can sell their output on the wholesale 
market for an additional five to 10 years before the license to use the site is 
transferred back to the state. 
Selection criteria: price 
vs. other 
Price. The bidder with the lowest “reference value”, i.e. the base amount for the 
guaranteed grid supply compensation, receives the auction award. If two or 
more bidders make this lowest reference value bid, the bidder with the smaller 
capacity bid will receive the award. 
In the 2018 auction, a minimum of 500 MW was allocated to projects in the 
Baltic Sea. 
Auction format: single 
vs. multiple 
Single. Bidders bid for given projects /sites. 
Auction type Static, sealed bid, price-only. 
Pricing rule: pay as bid 
vs. uniform 
Pay as bid. All the winners receive the own reference value bid. 
Price ceilings EUR 120/MWh EUR 100/MWh 
                                                            
141 If the strike price exceeds the technology average price, an operator whose wholesale market sales are  
exactly in line with the average offshore wind farm obtains the strike price exactly (because its revenues are  
equal to wholesale market revenues plus the calculated market premium), while an operator whose wholesale 
market revenues exceed or fall short of the technology average price earns more or less, respectively, than the  
strike price. 
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Realisation periods 2022-2025 
Penalties Cancellation of the award and a penalty that may be as low as 30% of the bid 
bond. The eventual interpretation of the penalties clause in the Offshore Wind 
Act is disputed in the legal community 
Sources: Huebler et al. (2017), Knight 2018, Müsgens and Riepin (2018), Offshore Wind (2018), Shumkov 
(2018), Volz and Waldmann (2019). 
The auction rules and procedures are determined by Germany’s ministry of Economic 
Affairs and Energy and the tendering procedures are carried out by the Federal Network 
Agency for Electricity, Gas, Telecommunications, Post and Railway (Bundesnetzagentur) 
(Norton Rose Fulbright, 2017). In the April 2017 offshore wind auction, three out of four 
winning projects made bids of EUR 0/MWh. The second April 2018 auction saw two out of 
six winning projects awarded with zero bids. In the two auctions combined, more than 
50% of winning capacity was bid at zero. (Müsgens and Riepin, 2018) A more detailed 
information on the auction outcomes is presented in Table 13. 
Table 13: Overview of the offshore wind energy auction outcomes in Germany 
Outcome element Round 1 (Apr 2017) Round 2 (Apr 2018) 
MW procured • With zero bids: 1,380 MW (3 sites) 
• Total: 1,490 MW (out of 1,550 
MW) 
• With zero bids: 420 MW (1 site) 
• Total: 1,610 MW (out of 1,610 
MW) 
Technology procured 
/ installed 
Offshore wind. 
Prices • EUR 0/MWh (1380 MW) 
• EUR 60/MWh (110 MW) 
Average: Euro 4.40/MWh  
• EUR 0/MWh (420 MW, of which 10 
MW for Wikinger Süd, Baltic Sea) 
• EUR 64/MWh (476 MW, all for 
Baltic Eagle park, Baltic Sea) 
• EUR 98.30/MWh (131.75 MW) 
• Prices for the remaining 582.25 
MW not known, but less than 
98.30/MWh. 
Average: EUR 46.60/MWh 
Sources: Deutsche Windguard (2018), Huebler et al. (2017), Müsgens and Riepin (2018), Shumkov (2018). 
The results from Table 13 show that though zero subsidy bids were submitted in both 
auctions, the average successful bid in the 2018 auction was over ten times higher than 
the average winning bid at the 2017 auction. There are at least two potential reasons for 
this. First, there was less competition in the second auction as only existing permitted or 
far-advanced projects that were unsuccessful in the 2017 auction were allowed to 
participate. Second, the 2018 auction allocated a minimum of 500 MW for projects in the 
Baltic Sea, where most bidders were not able to benefit from the same scale effects as in 
the North Sea. 
7.1.2.3 Netherlands 
The focus is on the two offshore wind auctions held in 2018 and 2019, which were the first 
renewable energy auctions in the Netherlands that received zero subsidy bids (ICIS, 
 132 
 
2018a). Like in Germany, also under the existing Dutch offshore wind regime, the 
Government develops each site and TSO (TenneT) provides the grid connection (Mardsen 
et al. 2018). A distinguishing feature in the two Dutch auctions was that they were based 
on procedures without subsidies to begin with. In particular, due to the zero bids in the 
German offshore wind auctions and low strike prices in UK renewable energy auctions, the 
Netherlands authorities altered the rules of their tendering processes.  
Under the new rules, zero subsidies were assumed right from the start and companies 
were assessed according to predetermined set of criteria: 1) the knowledge and experience 
of the parties involved; 2) the quality of the design of the wind farm; 3) the capacity of 
the wind farm; 4) the social costs (incl. grid connection costs); 5) the quality of the 
inventory and analysis of the risks; and 6) the quality of the measures to assure cost 
efficiency. Only in the event that none of the applications had satisfied the pre-qualification 
requirements, the tender had been extended to a subsidy-based second round of bidding. 
Table 14 summarises the design elements of these two offshore wind auctions. 
Table 14: Overview of offshore wind energy auction design in the Netherlands 
Design element Round 1 (Mar 2018) Round 2 (Jul 2019) 
Volume requested per 
auction 
700 MW (two sites) 700 MW (two sites) 
Technology requested Offshore wind 
Prequalification 
requirements / 
obligations (e.g. 
requirement to post 
collateral to help ensure 
winning projects are 
built) 
All applications must submit the following:  
• Project plan  
• Wind report  
• Operational calculation 
• Annual account(s) (The applicant must have at its disposal equity capital 
amounting to at least 20% of the total investment costs.) 
• Financing plan 
• Table of wind turbine details and locations and table of cabling plan details 
The winner of the tender must submit: 
• A bank guarantee for compliance with timely operation of the production 
installation or the payment of a 10 million Euro fine of an EU based bank 
laid down in a model bank guarantee within 4 weeks after the issue date 
of the subsidy award. 
• A bank guarantee for compliance of 35 million Euro within 12 months after 
the issue date of the subsidy award. If the bank guarantee is not issued 
the penalty is EUR 10 million. 
Remuneration 
characteristics 
The auctions were conducted on a non-subsidy basis where the bids were 
evaluated in a comparative assessment on a range of (non-price) criteria. Only 
in the event that there had been no successful bidders, the auctions would 
have proceeded to a subsidy stage. 
Other advantages Free usage of the sites and a 
guaranteed free connection to the 
grid: The auctioned sites are located 
outside the 12 miles zone of the 
Permission to use the sites and a 
guaranteed connection to the grid. 
However, since the auctioned sites are 
located within 12 miles zone of the 
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Dutch territories. As a result, the 
wind farm operator is not required to 
pay fees neither for using the sites 
nor for the infield cabling between 
the wind turbines and the TenneT 
grid platform. 
Dutch territories, the wind farm 
operator has to establish a) a seabed 
lease for the wind turbines and b) a 
rental agreement for the infield cabling 
between the wind turbines and the 
TenneT grid platform. 
Selection criteria: price 
vs. other 
Other. The applications were assessed based on the following criteria:  
• The knowledge and experience of the parties involved 
• The quality of the design of the wind farm 
• The capacity of the wind farm 
• The social costs (incl. grid connection costs) 
• The quality of the inventory and analysis of the risks 
• The quality of the measures to assure Cost Efficiency.  
The last two criteria had the highest weighting and were divided into three 
categories: 1) risk on electricity prices and value of Guarantees of Origin; 2) 
risks during construction; and 3) risks during operational period of wind farm. 
Single/multiple auction Single. Bidders bid for given projects /sites. 
Auction type Static. Sealed bid. 
Pricing rule: pay as bid 
vs. uniform 
N.A. 
Price ceilings N.A. 
Realisation periods The entire wind park must be realized within 5 years from the moment the 
results of the auction are published. 
Penalties In the event of non-compliance with these obligations, the Minister has the 
power to impose an administrative enforcement order or an order subject to a 
penalty and, if necessary, to withdraw the permit. In the event of an order 
subject to a penalty being applied, the Minister will determine an amount for 
the periodic penalty payment which is proportionate to the loss inflicted on the 
national government as a result of the non-compliance with the obligations. 
Sources: Clarke (2017), Kyberg/de Rijke (2016), Marsden et al. (2018), Netherlands Enterprise Agency (n.d.).  
The Netherlands Enterprise Agency executes the offshore wind energy subsidy and permit 
tenders on behalf of the Ministry of Economic Affairs and Climate Policy, coordinating 
potential subsidies, building permits, site data of the wind farms and a connection to the 
electricity network of TenneT. Table 15 summarises the outcomes of the two auctions.  
Table 15: Overview of offshore wind energy auction outcome in the Netherlands 
Outcome element Round 1 (Mar 2018) Round 2 (Jul 2019) 
MW procured 700 MW (two sites) 700 MW (two sites) 
Technology procured / installed Offshore wind 
Prices EUR 0/MWh 
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Source: Netherlands Enterprise Agency (n.d.) 
Swedish Vattenfall, who has promised to utilize economies of scale created by building all 
four sites, won both of the two auctions. Not only has Vattenfall promised to build the sites 
without government subsidies, but also in fact it has to pay around EUR 2 million per year 
in ground rent for the seabed area where two of the four offshore wind farms are being 
built. (Hill, 2019).  
7.1.3 Subsidy-free projects approved outside of an auction system 
Based on the research conducted for this report, funding for the projects awarded outside 
of an auction system is always secured via a power purchase agreement (PPA). In on-site 
PPA’s, the developer and operator of the wind or solar farm sells the electricity directly to 
a high-demand customer. In sleeved PPA’s the power plant is not located on the premises 
of the high-demand customer, but the electricity is supplied via the grid. The electricity is 
purchased and sold by a trader who usually offers other services, such as forecasts or 
optimisation of electricity generation. Finally, in synthetic or financial PPA’s the electricity 
supply is virtual rather than physical and the electricity is traded on the electricity 
exchange. In this type of agreement, the market risk is hedged and the electricity supply 
is covered by guarantees of origin (GO). (Nasner, 2019) 
PPA’s do not automatically mean that a project is not subsidised. Nor does it mean that 
the project has been approved outside of an auction system. In particular, a generator of 
renewable energy whose project has been approved within an auction system and who is 
receiving subsidies may also sign a PPA. However, this subsection focuses only on projects 
that a) have not received any public funding; and b) have been approved outside of an 
auction system. 
Figure 48 in subsection 7.1.1 depicts announced volumes of subsidy-free projects that 
have been approved outside of an auction system by country. Based on the figure, such 
projects are particularly prevalent in Norway, Italy, Finland and Sweden. In Norway, the 
entire 1500 megawatt capacity is due to one onshore wind project developed by Norsk 
Vind Energi AS. In Italy there are multiple subsidy-free projects completed or under 
construction with total volume more than 1400 megawatts. The largest ones are the 425 
megawatt project developed by Limes Renewables Italia and the 400 megawatt project of 
Horus Capital. In Finland, Google is the PPA partner in five out of the 20 subsidy-free 
projects (652.4 MW in terms of capacity) and IKEA is the PPA partner in four of the projects 
(110.2 MW in terms of capacity). In Sweden, majority of the 860 megawatt capacity is due 
to an onshore wind project called Markbygden ETT (650 MW) developed by Svevind. 
References to each of the project can be found from Annex 10. 
7.1.4 Conclusions 
The total volume of announced subsidy-free renewable energy projects currently in Europe 
is approximately 18 GW. Though majority of this capacity results from zero subsidy bids 
made in renewable energy auctions, the number of projects put forward outside of auction 
systems is rapidly increasing. In particular, there were no subsidy-free projects approved 
outside of an auction system until 2017, when the total annual capacity of such projects 
reached approximately 250 MW. This figure surged to approximately 3250 MW in 2018, 
and by the late August 2019, the capacity announced during that calendar year was already 
2180 MW. Overall, one third of the 60 GW that Aurora (2018), has announced as the 
potential for subsidy-free renewables in North-West Europe by 2030 is in the pipeline. In 
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light of this, the ability of markets to deliver zero-carbon electricity without policy support 
seems promising. 
However, as pointed out already earlier, a significant part of the 18 gigawatts volume 
comes from projects that are only at the planning stage and it is not guaranteed that they 
will actually be built. Companies may have secured only enough finance to get a project 
through the planning process, rather than to build it. In the subsidy-free environment, 
lenders may be scared of investing when the earning potential of the project is left to the 
wholesale electricity market. At the very least, the riskier world of subsidy-free deployment 
means financiers are likely to demand higher returns to match that risk.  
Moreover, the subsidy-free offshore wind projects in both Germany and the Netherlands 
were not fully subsidy-free given the guaranteed connection to the grid. Magnus Hall, the 
CEO of Vattenfall, which won both of the two Dutch offshore wind projects, has estimated 
that the value of free grid connection is up to EUR 10/MWh, which is more than 20% of 
the market electricity prices in the region of EUR 45/MWh (Evans, 2018), and Vattenfall 
paid EUR 2 million/year for the seabed sites. As to the auctions in Spain, though the 
guaranteed price floors are so low that they are unlikely ever to materialize, they still help 
to reduce the risk faced by the projects and can therefore be viewed as an implicit subsidy. 
These observations combined may support the view presented in Evans (2018), that in 
spite of the promising outlook, government contracts are may still be needed to support 
the largescale renewable expansion. However, given the speed with which renewable 
energy prices have decreased and the potential for successful projects to benefit from 
advantages beyond the subsidy linked to electricity generation, future competitive 
processes should be designed to ensure that no advantages (for example grid connections, 
seabed concessions) are transferred to beneficiaries without being fully accounted for. 
7.2 Alternative fuel infrastructure 
Question 11: To what extent are the process (assessment under the Treaty) and 
the compatibility rules developed by the Commission in its decision practice for 
alternative fuel infrastructure (publicly accessible or dedicated infrastructure) 
adapted to subsequent market developments and technological advances? (see 
Annex 0 for a list of all questions.) 
7.2.1 Assessment of implementation of schemes 
Question 11.a: For the schemes approved by the Commission, indicate how the 
projects have been implemented: companies involved in the projects, tender 
criteria used for the selection of companies (where applicable), costs of project, 
selected technology (when the scheme was open to several technologies), how 
access of the users to the infrastructure was organized (entirely open or not) and 
how much the user is charged for the access to and/or the use of the 
infrastructure. 
In order to provide input for assessing the relevance of State aid measures in the field of 
alternative fuel infrastructure, and in response to Question 11.a, the review started with 
an assessment of the nine schemes and two amendments for the support of publicly 
accessible or dedicated alternative fuel infrastructure, which were approved by the 
Commission. After an analysis of the publicly available information, the beneficiaries of the 
schemes were identified. In case of lack of publicly available information, the granting 
authorities were contacted with an inquiry regarding the disclosure of the beneficiaries. 
Based on the answers received, the relevant stakeholders were contacted by phone and e-
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mail in order to ensure the participation in the survey. Five granting authorities provided 
the main characteristics of the implementation of the State aid decisions. More detailed 
answers are provided in Annex 11.1. 
(1) Germany - Charging infrastructure for e-mobility (SA.46574)  
The measure under scheme SA.46574 aims to support the installation and upgrade of 
electric charging infrastructure across Germany. The total budget of the scheme is EUR 
300 million coming from federal funds (Energy and Climate Fund). The program runs for 
four years, starting in 2017. The beneficiaries of the schemes are natural and legal persons, 
without restrictions (both private investors and cities/municipalities). 
The aid is awarded in the form of grants by means of calls for applications. So far, the first 
three calls for funding have received more than 4,000 applications for funding. As of August 
2019, applications have been approved for a total of more than 17,000 charging points 
(equivalent to around EUR 80 million). On 19 August 2019 the fourth call for funding 
started, with a deadline for applications on 30 October 2019. Following the Commission 
decision, an eligibility criterion is that the electricity required for the charging process must 
come from renewable energy sources (RES) or from renewable electricity self-generated 
on site. According to the granting authority, 5,200 of the supported charging points are 
already in operation and more than 1,600 beneficiaries were involved in the project. As 
agreed with the Commission, information of 56 beneficiaries was gathered, based on a 
sample list with regard to the first three calls for applications. The total amount of aid 
granted to the selected beneficiaries, which have a total charging capacity of 404,568 KW, 
amounts to EUR 66,157,556.51. The following section provides an overview of the actual 
implementation of the scheme: 
Tender criteria: The first call for applications, which was launched on 15 February 2017, 
was based on the first-come, first-served principle. This means that aid was granted to a 
beneficiary according to the order of the reception of the complete application. With the 
first call the authority supported standard charging points up to EUR 10 million as well as 
2,500 fast charging points. Normal charging points were supported with up to 40% of the 
eligible costs with a maximum of EUR 3,000 per charging point. Fast charging points were 
supported with up to 40% of the eligible costs with a maximum of EUR 12,000 per charging 
point under 100 KW and EUR 30,000 per charging point from 100 KW onwards. The 
maximum number of fast charging points for each of the 16 Federal States has been 
indicated by the authority in the call (2,500 in total).  
With the second call for applications, which was launched on 14 September 2017, 12,100 
normal charging points and 1,001 fast charging points (with 150 KW) as well as 
modernisation measures were supported. Normal charging points were supported with a 
maximum of 40% of the eligible costs and a maximum of EUR 2,500 per charging point. 
Fast charging points were supported with a maximum of 40% of the eligible costs and a 
maximum of EUR 30,000 per charging point. The maximum number of both standard and 
fast charging points for each of the 16 Federal States has been indicated by the authority. 
Once the applications have reached the maximum number of charging points in a Federal 
State, the selection process was based on the principle of economic efficiency (best-value-
for-money), meaning that a contract was awarded to the tenderer offering the best quality-
price ratio in a Federal State. The authority therefore created a ranking with the most 
efficient applicants, which was based on the support per KW charging capacity. There were 
two rankings and selection processes for standard and fast charging points respectively. 
The granting authority awarded the aid to the applicants with the lowest grants requested 
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per KW of total charging capacity of the charging infrastructure to be set up. Grid 
connection costs were not considered as relevant in the selection process. 
The third call for applications was launched on 19 November 2018 with the aim to support 
ca. 10,000 standard charging and 3,000 fast charging points. For this call, in order to reach 
a regional coverage in the entire country, the authority established two charging maps, 
one for standard charging points and one for fast charging points. For both maps, the 
country was divided into 283 tiles with a size of 40 km x 40 km per tile. This should be an 
indicator for the needs for charging infrastructure and indicating a maximum number of 
charging points to be approved. Moreover, in the fast charging point map there are 
different colours used: blue colour indicates a higher and yellow a lower demand of 
charging points. Normal charging points were supported with a maximum of 40% of the 
eligible costs and a maximum of EUR 2,500 per charging point. Fast charging points (50-
100 KW) in the blue area were supported with a maximum of 50% of the eligible costs and 
a maximum of EUR 12,000 per charging point. Fast charging points with 100 KW and more 
were supported with a maximum of EUR 30,000. In the yellow areas, fast charging points 
(50-100 KW) were supported with a maximum of 30% of the eligible costs and a maximum 
of EUR 9,000. Fast charging points with 100 KW and more were supported with a maximum 
of EUR 23,000. In addition, the call aimed to provide support for the grid connection with 
a maximum of EUR 5,000 for the connection to the low voltage network and a maximum 
of EUR 50,000 to the medium voltage grid. Modernisation measures for the improvement 
or replacement of charging infrastructure was supported with a maximum of 40% of the 
eligible costs. As in the second call, the authority selected the beneficiaries based on 
aspects of economic efficiency of their applications, i.e. the granting of aid was based on 
the support per KW charging capacity.  
The fourth call for applications was launched on 19 August 2019 with the aim to support 
ca. 5,000 normal charging and 5,000 fast charging points. As in the third call for 
applications, the authority established one map for standard charging points and one map 
for fast charging points and therefore divided Germany into tiles (40km to 40km). 
Moreover, in the map for fast charging points different colours were used: blue colour 
indicates a higher and grey a lower demand of charging points. Normal charging points 
were supported with a maximum of 40% of the eligible costs and a maximum of EUR 2,500 
per charging point. Fast charging points (50-100 KW) in the blue area were supported with 
a maximum of 50% of the eligible costs and a maximum of EUR 12,000 per charging point. 
Fast charging points with 100 KW and more were supported with a maximum of EUR 
30,000. In the grey areas, fast charging points (50-100 KW) were supported with a 
maximum of 30% of the eligible costs and a maximum of EUR 9,000. Fast charging points 
with 100 KW and more were supported with a maximum of EUR 23,000. As in the third call 
for applications, also grid connection and modernisation measures were supported (same 
amount as in the third call for application). 
Costs and duration of construction of the project: The granting authority indicated that due 
to the large number of funded projects, the investment costs can vary between a thousand 
euros for smaller standard charging points and several million euros for large fast-charging 
projects. Therefore, based on the sample lists of beneficiaries, the minimum costs of one 
project is estimated around EUR 10,685 and the maximum costs are estimated around 
EUR 28.6 million. The amount of aid received varies as well from EUR 3,693 to EUR 10.99 
million. The duration of the construction of the electric infrastructure stations varies 
between half a year and three years. 
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Geographical scope: The approved projects have a broad scope, covering the whole 
country. As explained in the tender specifications, the granting authority established a 
regional distribution covering the needs of a certain area. Thus, the projects approved are 
implemented at national level, some of them covering the whole country, and some of 
them some specific regions.  
Technology: The infrastructure of the projects implemented relates to standard charging 
and/or fast charging stations. Therefore, the projects implemented by the beneficiaries 
cover either both types of charging, or just one of them. The majority of the projects cover 
standard charging. 
Access to infrastructure: In the first call for applications, the full financial support was only 
granted if the infrastructure is accessible 24 hours a day, 7 days a week, otherwise the 
funding rate will be cut by 50%. It is nevertheless necessary that the infrastructure is 
accessible during the week at least for 12 hours per day. In the second, third and fourth 
call for applications it is explicitly required that the charging points were accessible 24/7.  
Charges: The fees for the use of the funded charging facilities vary depending on the tariff 
of the respective provider. Some operators are also offering free usage of their charging 
infrastructure. The user charges range from EUR 0.29/KWh to EUR 8 per charging session. 
The costs mainly depend on the duration of the charging session as well as on the charging 
power. 
General comments: In follow-up interviews, the beneficiaries contacted indicated that the 
general difficulties faced were related to the practical implementation of the project, 
especially because of the large geographical scope of their project.142 Since the receipt of 
subsidies binds the beneficiary to certain procurement regulations, it is often difficult to 
plan the construction of charging infrastructure nationwide on a larger scale. Another 
difficulty mentioned was the gain of know-how for the installation of the projects, which 
could be either acquired by third parties or inhouse. 
(2) Germany - Acquisition of electric buses for urban public transport (SA.48190) 
The scheme aims to support the acquisition of plug-in hybrid buses and battery-based 
buses in public passenger transport, to replace diesel buses and to increase the number of 
electric buses in public transport in Germany. The scheme also supports recharging 
infrastructure in connection with the purchase of plug-in hybrid or battery-based buses. 
The total budget is EUR 70 million and the scheme will be in place until the end of 2021. 
EUR 35 million should be made available at federal level under the National Climate 
Initiative. The overall budget at federal level was increased, with the amendment of 28 
May 2018 (SA.50776 (2018/N)), to EUR 155 million. With the amendment of 4 February 
2019 (SA.52677 (2018/N)) the budget was increased to EUR 350 million. The beneficiaries 
are commercial undertakings and public entities providing public passenger transport 
services. The support is granted as investment aid to cover the additional costs of acquiring 
low emission electric buses compared to diesel buses as well as the respective recharging 
infrastructure. The granting procedure follows a transparent, non-discriminatory 
procedure. According to the granting authority, twelve bus companies have received State 
                                                            
142 Interview with EnBW Energie Baden-Württemberg AG conducted on 14 October 2019; interview with 
Lechwerke AG, conducted on 21 October 2019; interview with Pfalzwerke Aktiengesellschaft conducted on 21 
October 2019.  
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aid under the scheme. Additional information on the actual implementation of the project 
was collected via publicly available sources. The following section provides an overview: 
Tender criteria: Aid may only be granted for plug-in hybrid buses, electric buses, and 
electric charging infrastructure in connection with the purchase of such buses. The tender 
is organised in a two-stage process. After the call for applications, the interested parties 
first submit a meaningful project outline in which the conditions for a possible support have 
to be proven. Provided the prerequisites have been fulfilled and the project outline is 
selected, the second stage will take place by sending out to the relevant stakeholders an 
invitation to submit a formal application for funding. The tender criteria include: (i) project 
outline (40%), number of new battery or plug-in hybrid buses and integration in the fleet; 
power supply for auxiliary units; expected use of subsidized vehicles; (ii) reduction of 
greenhouse gas (CO2) emissions and ratio of greenhouse gas emissions avoided and 
support needs (25%); (iii) contribution to compliance with air quality limit values and 
requirements of the EU Environmental Noise Directive (25%); (iv) role model impact, 
transferability of results, visibility through public relations (10%). Therefore, eligible 
projects must aim at the purchase of plug-in hybrid and/or battery electric buses, and the 
project must meet different standard criteria (e.g. technical specification for purchase of 
new vehicles; more than five vehicles need to be procured; vehicles need to be used in 
public transport; use of renewable energy needs to be ensured; profitability calculation 
should be done). Other specifications include the reduction by at least 35% of the CO2 
emission compared to a bus without hybrid technology; the need for the bus to meet the 
Euro VI standards, and a limitation of noise emissions to 73 dB or 76 dB, depending on the 
engine power). 
Costs and duration of the construction of the project: The costs of the project vary for each 
beneficiary, depending on the type and scope of each project. The average costs of the 
projects is EUR 20.7 million, ranging from EUR 1.9 million up to EUR 64.96 million. The 
beneficiaries received aid between EUR 761,570 and EUR 44.8 million, whereas the 
majority of the costs and granted aid relates to the acquisition of buses (and less to the 
recharging infrastructure). The maximum aid intensity for plug-in hybrid buses and 
recharging infrastructure is 40% of the eligible investment costs. For battery buses, the 
maximum aid intensity amounts to 80% of the eligible investment costs. The duration of 
the project depends on whether the project is related to the purchase of battery 
buses/plug-in hybrid buses; or to the construction of recharging infrastructure, the average 
duration being three years. 
Geographical scope: The geographical scope of the projects is restricted to the respective 
cities in which the bus companies operate. 
Technology: The technology used for the projects is the standard charging as well as fast 
charging stations.  
Access of users to infrastructure: The infrastructure is dedicated to actual beneficiaries 
only (commercial undertakings and public entities providing public passenger transport 
services) who access their own charging infrastructure in the bus depots and in public areas 
at (last) stops of public transport. The beneficiaries indicated that buses are charged at 
last stop/turning point of routes and/or in the bus depots. The beneficiaries explained that 
this saves expensive investments (road space is limited, difficult to find suitable locations). 
Moreover, if the bus route changes, the charging station on the initial route cannot be 
approached anymore. Charging in bus depots allows more operational flexibility and is 
easier to monitor and control.  
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Charges: There are no charges for the use of the infrastructure. 
(3) Germany - Alternative power supply for cruise ships in the Hamburg City 
Port/Altona-HafenCity (SA.37322) 
The measure has an environmental objective and concerns two connection facilities: a 
static shore-side power supplying connection fed by the national electricity grid in the 
Altona cruise terminal and an infrastructure for the provision of electricity by liquefied 
natural gas (LNG)-powered ships at the HafenCity cruise terminal for cruise ships in the 
Hamburg City Port, to provide an alternative source of energy supply during a port call. 
Hamburg Port Authority (HPA) is in charge of the project. The following section provides 
an overview of the actual implementation of the scheme:  
Tender criteria: There was no tender carried out as HPA is the only beneficiary. HPA is also 
the owner of the new infrastructure. 
Costs and duration of construction of the project: Besides the support by national funds 
(ca. EUR 3.7 million), the project was also supported by EU funds amounting to ca. EUR 
3.5 million.143 The duration of the construction was 2.5 years (for further details see annex 
11.1). 
Geographical scope: The geographical area covered by the project is the Hamburg City 
Port (Altona-HafenCity). 
Technology: The electricity provided via the infrastructure is not used for recharging, but 
serves cruise ships as an alternative energy supply while they are lying down in the Port 
of Hamburg. The shore connection provides: voltage supply from the public grid (10kV), 
frequency converter (from 50 Hz to 60 Hz), mobile transfer station including cable 
management system. 
Access of users to infrastructure: Cruise ship companies are able to acquire electricity 
charging services directly and have non-discriminatory access to the infrastructure. The 
access is based mainly on the use of the cruise terminal. 
Charges: The usage fees are ca. EUR 2,800 (for handling the transfer trolley and switching 
the system on/off), plus the variable costs depending on the amount of electricity 
purchased. 
(4) Portugal – PO SEUR Programme for Clean Buses in urban areas (SA.45694) 
This scheme aims to support the purchase of new low carbon buses and the costs of the 
infrastructure necessary to operate these buses, with the objective to reduce polluting 
emission of public buses in Portugal. The public support of the measure comes from the 
Cohesion Fund to 85% of the eligible costs, while 15% are supported by the bus operators. 
The total budget is EUR 60 million and each beneficiary can benefit from a maximum 
funding of EUR 20 million. The scheme will last until 31 December 2020. With the 
amendment of 16 May 2018, the Portuguese authorities increased the budget by EUR 30 
million. The modification does not affect the duration of the scheme. Out of EUR 60 million 
ca. EUR 47 million were actually allocated to the beneficiaries. The maximum aid allocated 
to one beneficiary was EUR 14.72 million. The following section provides an overview of 
the actual implementation of the scheme: 
                                                            
143 Cf. https://ec.europa.eu/inea/en/ten-t/ten-t-projects/projects-by-country/germany/2012-de-92052-s). 
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Tender criteria: The scheme is based on a bidding process available to any operator with 
a public service remit that runs a bus service in urban areas in Portugal. The main criteria 
of the selection process were (i) contribution to the reduction of CO2 emissions (35%); (ii) 
contribution to the promotion of the use of renewable energy in transport (25%); (iii) 
evaluation of the economic rationale of the intervention (40%). Out of eleven applications, 
nine projects have been approved. They are related to the acquisition of vehicles for public 
urban passenger transport using cleaner energy sources (compressed natural gas, liquefied 
natural gas, electric power, hydrogen). Consequently, the scheme is open to (i) Euro VI 
compressed natural gas (CNG) or LNG buses; (ii) electric buses or electricity hybrid buses 
and (iii) hydrogen buses. Applicants could also receive aid for the installation of charging 
or re-filling stations and other actions like technical assistance or monitoring, which is 
however conditional to the acquisition of clean buses and limited to 20% of the total eligible 
costs of the application. 
Costs and duration of the construction of the project: The cost and duration differ from one 
project to another. The average costs of the project are around EUR 6.5 million, ranging 
from EUR 413,000 to EUR 51.8 million. The amount of aid varies from EUR 199,325 to EUR 
14.7 million. Regarding the duration of the project, a distinction should be made between 
the installation and the lifetime of the equipment. The duration of the construction lasts up 
to three years, whereas the period of exploitation is usually around 15 years. 
Geographical scope: The projects cover urban areas in Portugal. This is in line with the 
scheme, since the local authorities, private and public bus operators which benefited from 
State aid run their services in Portuguese cities, i.e. Lourosa, Bragança, Porto, Braga, 
Coimbra, Guimarães, Lisboa, Barreiro. 
Technology: Eligible technologies include new CNG, LNG, hydrogen, electricity or plug-in 
hybrids, with emissions at least 15% lower than the applicable ceilings set in the Euro VI 
Standard. The beneficiaries could also acquire the necessary infrastructure to operate the 
clean buses. For instance, the operation of an infrastructure might require the construction 
of CNG/LNG fuel pumps, electricity recharging stations, or re-filling stations for CNG/LNG. 
Out of the nine beneficiaries, one project exclusively referred to the acquisition of electric 
buses. Three projects were related to the acquisition of electric buses, the installation of 
electric charging points, the acquisition of natural gas buses, and the installation of LNG 
and/or CNG filling stations. Four projects referred to the acquisition of electric buses and 
the installation of charging points, whereas one project was exclusively dedicated to the 
acquisition of natural gas buses and the installation of a LNG filling station. 
Access of users to infrastructure: The infrastructure is a semi-dedicated infrastructure 
which is accessible both by the beneficiaries as well as by other public transport operators. 
Access also depends on the opening hours of the infrastructure. The infrastructure is not 
open to the general public.  
Charges: The use or access to the infrastructure is free of charge.  
(5) Netherlands - Green Deal for Publicly Accessible Charging Infrastructure 
(SA.38769) 
The scheme has the objective to support the use of environmentally friendly electric 
vehicles in the Netherlands by developing a nation-wide infrastructure of publicly accessible 
electric charging posts at local level. The scheme covers the period from 2015 until 2018 
(three years of committed installation), with a total budget of EUR 33.7 million for the 
installation of publicly accessible electric charging posts. The scheme is funded by the 
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Central Government of the Netherlands as well as by the budgets of local governments 
and private contributions. The following section provides an overview of the actual 
implementation of the scheme: 
Tender criteria: Tenders are organised at local level. The operator that wins the tender is 
allowed to build and operate the posts for a period specified in the tender. The applicant 
with the lowest bid (most favourable price per charging unit and quality) wins the tender 
to install and operate the charging posts within the specified territory for the duration set 
in the tender. The eligibility criteria for the tender are as follows: 
 Both public and private parties must each contribute an average of at least EUR 500 
per charging point; 
 The charging points must be publicly accessible 24/7; 
 Charging stations are only awarded in response to a specific request from an electric 
vehicle driver;  
 A publicly accessible charging station is made available to electric vehicle drivers only 
if they have demonstrated that they cannot charge on their own premises; 
 Electric vehicle drivers must not be excluded because of the car brand; 
 The operating period of a publicly accessible charging station shall not exceed 10 years; 
 Ownership of the charging station stays with the municipality at the end of the 
operating period. 
The publicly accessible charging infrastructure is rolled-out by means of (i) public contract, 
(ii) concessions and (iii) direct grants.  
Costs and duration of construction of project: The total budget is EUR 33.7 million. The 
Central Government has contributed ca. EUR 4.1 million, the private sector ca. EUR 2.8 
million (EUR 500/charging pole). All the charging poles are public and publicly accessible, 
as they do not belong to a specific electric vehicle driver. The private contribution of EUR 
500 per charging point was paid in almost all cases from electric vehicle drivers. In practice, 
the charging fee of the charging poles was higher during the first couple of years, in order 
to allow the achievement of EUR 500 per charging pole through the contribution of all 
electric vehicle drivers using the pole, and was subsequently reduced after. For instance, 
for one specific project, the charging fee was EUR 0.33/kWh during the first three years, 
and EUR 0.30/kWh after this period, meaning that the income of EUR 0.03/kWh 
accumulated during the three years made possible the financing of EUR 500. The exact 
calculations were realised for each projects as regards the charging fee to be applied and 
the period of time needed in order to obtain the contribution of EUR 500. In addition, local 
governments have contributed up to EUR 22 million. The total budget actually allocated by 
the Central Government is EUR 4.6 million, with a minimum contribution of EUR 300,000 
for one project (Provincie Noord-Holland) and a maximum of EUR 1.11 million for another 
one (Provincie Noord-Brabant/Limburg).  
Geographical scope: The scheme consists of a country wide program installing publicly 
accessible electric charging posts at local government levels throughout the Netherlands. 
Four beneficiaries cover urban areas as well as the country with their projects, while one 
of them focuses only on urban areas and another one only on rural areas. 
Technology: The scheme relates to publicly accessible electric charging posts and the 
technology used for all projects are standard chargers with a capacity of 11 KW. 
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Access of users to infrastructure: The charging posts for electric vehicles are publicly 
accessible 24/7 (e.g. public car park). 
Charges: The fees vary from EUR 0.25/KWh to EUR 0.35/KWh and depend on the charging 
hour. For instance, during the off-peak hours, from 8pm to 5am the following day, a 
maximum charging fee of EUR 0.32/KWh is applied. At the peak hour, the charging fee is 
fixed around EUR 0.07/KWh. 
7.2.2 List of electric charging station projects 
Question 11.b: For Austria, Belgium, Estonia, France, Spain and Sweden identify 
the list of existing projects of publicly accessible infrastructure (electric charging 
stations and hydrogen refuelling stations for road vehicles only, excluding 
bicycles, motorcycles and similar vehicles). 
The Connecting Europe Facility (“CEF”) website maintains a database of CEF Transport 
grants between 2014 and 2019 by country which contributed to the gathering of a list of 
existing CEF transport supported projects regarding Electric Recharging or Hydrogen 
Refueling Infrastructures.144 This list is attached as Annex 11.2. Based on the database 
maintained by European Alternative Fuels Observatory (“EAFO”)145, a list of up to ten 
operators per selected Member State with publicly accessible infrastructures for electric 
charging stations and hydrogen charging stations were identified as set out in Annex 11.3.  
7.2.3 Electric charging station projects 
Question 11.c: For each selected project, the contractor shall indicate i) which 
actors are involved and the geographical coverage of the project, ii) whether 
public financing was provided and the sources of the public financing as well as 
the share of the public financing in the total costs, iii) the total costs of the 
project, iv) how access to the infrastructure is organised, v) the technology 
concerned by the project, vi) if the project was constructed on public domain, vii) 
whether the public funding was granted in a tender, the budget of the tender and 
the tender criteria used for the selection of companies (if any), viii) the selected 
technology, ix) conditions imposed on the beneficiary of public financing, x) 
which legal basis was used by the Member State for the State aid compliance. 
To collect the relevant data, a targeted stakeholder consultation was conducted using a 
combination of surveys and interviews. A specific questionnaire was prepared and 
addressed to selected stakeholders in six Member States, which were provided by the 
Commission, i.e. Austria, Belgium, Estonia, France, Spain, and Sweden. The selection 
included, for each of the relevant Member States, the project with the broadest 
geographical coverage; if all projects are local ones, at least the one for the most populated 
city; for each Member State at least one project in a low population area; at least three 
projects for France and Spain. The selected projects are provided in the table below: 
Table 16: Selected electric charging station projects 
                                                            
144 https://ec.europa.eu/inea/connecting-europe-facility/cef-transport/projects-by-country. 
145 https://www.eafo.eu/. 
Member State 
Broadest 
geographical scope 
Most populated city or 
regional coverage  
Low population density 
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Source: Sheppard Mullin 
Ten responses to the survey were received from stakeholders of the following projects: 
SIRVE, CIRVE, ELMO, Ladestationen der Stadt Wien, BENEFIC, Flens Kommun, T1 Mall of 
Tallinn, SmartEnCity, Corri-Door, and Great. Seven of these projects involve more than 
one company providing specific input for the project in their field of expertise (e.g. 
financing, charging technology, specialisation in certain vehicles such as busses etc.). The 
cost of the projects may differ significantly and range from ca. EUR 90,000 (Flens Kommun) 
to EUR 37 million (BENEFIC Project).  
Nine of the projects were supported by public financing, either by the EU via the CEF 
program or by the Member States. Two projects (Ladestationen Wien and Flens Kommun) 
are driven by public authorities or public undertakings. Eight projects are based on fast 
charging technology, and two are additionally providing standard charging technology. Two 
projects are exclusively providing standard charging. Nine projects are accessible 24/7, 
whereas one has limited access due to the opening hours of a car park in a shopping mall. 
Users have to pay for the usage of the infrastructure in eight projects. The preliminary 
outcome of the desk research and survey with regard to those projects is presented in a 
comprehensive excel table, attached as Annex 11.4. 
(1) SIRVE  
The SIRVE Project (Sistemas Integrados para la Recarga de Vehículos Eléctricos) was 
selected based on the criterion of low population density in Spain. It was supposed to be 
deployed in Zaragoza with the main objective to provide solutions for the charging of 
electric vehicles. The SIRVE stations should have been composed of a quick and a moderate 
charger, three slow chargers, a battery pack, a regulator and solar power panels.146 
However, after the test phase of the project and the installation of two demonstrators in 
Zaragoza, the project was stopped due to the high costs involved. 
Companies involved and construction: Three companies were involved in this project: 
Fundacion cince centro de investigacion de recursos y consumos energeticos; Sistemas 
urbanos de energieas renovabiles; and Pronimetal. The geographical scope of the project 
                                                            
146 http://www.fcirce.es/smart-mobility-es/sirve?_sft_category=smart-mobility-es.  
Austria 
EVA+ Project 
(SMARTICS) 
Wien Energie Energie Steiermark 
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was urban (Zaragoza) and it would not have been constructed on public domain. The 
expected duration of the construction of the infrastructure was 3 years. 
Financing and costs: The expected total cost of the project was EUR 2.4 million, the share 
of the consortium member Sistemas urbanos being EUR 703,000 who also had to cover 
annual maintenance cost of EUR 1,500, mainly for insurance as the demonstrator was set 
up next to a petrol station. The Ministry of Science and Innovation was supposed to provide 
public financing amounting to EUR 1.6 million. Local authorities did not have a share in the 
project. The financing was provided in a tender with several conditions, e.g. to be an 
innovative company; to have a minimum share capital; to ensure the development of 
research and also to adhere to the “INNPACTO subprogram” as defined in Art. 15.3 of 
Order CIN/699/2011, to promote projects in cooperation between research organizations 
and companies for the joint realization of R&D&I projects that help to enhance innovative 
activities and improve the technological balance of the country.147 This subprogram is 
supported by the European Regional Development Fund.  
Access and technology: The technology used includes fast (higher than 22 KW) and 
standard (up to 22 KW) charging stations. The planned infrastructure was meant to be 
publicly accessible 24/7 (e.g. public car park). Because the project was not implemented, 
no fees were charged to users, and it is not possible to provide an exact charging price. 
However, it was indicated that users would have been charged for the usage of the 
infrastructure, and the price would have varied according to the charging time and the 
electricity price. 
(2) CIRVE  
The CIRVE Project (Iberian UE Corridors for EV Fast Charging Infrastructure) is operated 
in Spain and Portugal. The consortium members will deploy 58 multi-standard quick 
charging points (40 in Spain, 18 in Portugal) located along the Mediterranean and Atlantic 
area with special attention to cross-border areas between Portugal, Spain and France.  
All the information set out below concerns the “CIRVE Project” in Spain which consists of 
the installation of 25 new charging points and the adaptation of another 15 already 
installed. Its objective is to increase the use of electric vehicles in Spain under a fully 
interoperable cross-border framework that allows electric vehicle users to enter the Iberian 
Peninsula, ensuring a link between the southern and northern parts of the EU.148 
Companies involved and construction: There are six companies involved in the project: (i) 
IBIL, GESTOR DE CARGA DE VEHÍCULO ELÉCTRICO, S.A.; (ii) IBERDROLA CLIENTES SAU; 
(iii) ENDESA ENERGÍA S.A.; (iv) EDP COMERCIALIZADORA, S.A.U.; (v) GIC; (vi) RENAULT 
SAS. The project was constructed both on public and on private domain and the 
geographical scope is nation-wide and covers the whole of Spain.  
Financing and costs: The total costs of the entire project in Spain were EUR 3,523,232. 
The project is supported by the Connecting Europe Facility (CEF) with 50% of the costs 
(maximum EU contribution EUR 1,761,616), which each consortium member received.149 
The members of the consortium, which are all electric recharge operators supported the 
remaining costs. 
                                                            
147http://www.ciencia.gob.es/portal/site/MICINN/menuitem.dbc68b34d11ccbd5d52ffeb801432ea0/?vgnextoid=
c8e371e47ecfe210VgnVCM1000001d04140aRCRD. 
148 http://cirveproject.com/about-cirve/#project.  
149 https://ec.europa.eu/inea/en/connecting-europe-facility/cef-transport/2015-eu-tm-0409-s. 
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Access and technology: The technology consists of multi-standard quick charging points 
(50KW). Access is organized as an open access 24/7 (e.g. public car park). The responsible 
consortium member stated that for the private domain it was sometimes difficult to find 
areas which are accessible 24/7. Users are charged EUR 0.39/KWh. 
(3) ELMO  
ELMO (Estonian Electro-Mobility) is a nation-wide project with the broadest geographical 
scope in Estonia. It comprises 168 quick chargers, of which 102 are installed in towns and 
66 on roads. The purpose is to create an all-Estonian network of quick chargers.150 
Companies involved and construction: SA Kredex and ABB Eesti AS. The project was not 
constructed on public domain and the duration of the construction was ca. 3 years. 
Financing and costs: The project was 100% publicly financed (for further details see Annex 
11.4). The financing was based on a CO2 emission trade agreement between the Estonian 
government and Japan’s Mitsubishi Corporation.151  
Access and technology: The technology consists of quick charging points (up to 62.5 KW). 
Access is organized as an open access 24/7 (e.g. public car park). For the usage the users 
can choose between several packages, with and without a monthly basic fee (EUR 
10/month or EUR 30/month), with charges ranging from EUR 1.50 and EUR 4.50 per 
charging session.152 
(4) Ladestationen der Stadt Wien 
The project is set up in Vienna, the most populated city in Austria. The objective is to install 
500 electric charging stations for electric vehicles (two charging points per station with 11 
KW) by the end of 2020. In a first phase in 2018, the operator of the project Wien Energie 
GmbH (Wien Energie) has already installed, in each commune of Vienna, five electric 
charging stations with two charging points each (in total 230 stations with standard 
chargers of 11 KW). When choosing a location, specific criteria are taken into account such 
as the attractiveness of the location (transfer to public transport, shopping facilities, etc.), 
frequency and capacity utilization, connection options to the power grid and economic 
efficiency.153 
Companies involved and construction: Wien Energie is the only company involved in the 
project. The project covers the city of Vienna and was constructed on public domain. Wien 
Energy GmbH stated that the concession for the construction of the infrastructure was 
awarded via a public tender. 
Financing and costs: Wien Energie received public financing of ca. EUR 600,000, based on 
the GBER scheme “Bundesförderung – Umweltförderung im Inland”154 (for further details 
see Annex 11.4). More precisely, Wien Energie received EUR 1,000 per charging station 
plus EUR 200 per additional charging point per station. The granting authority imposed 
conditions on Wien Energie such as the requirement of public accessibility of the electric 
charging stations. Moreover, Wien Energie had to provide a mobility concept for the 
                                                            
150 http://elmo.ee/charging-network-2/. 
151 Mitsubishi Corporation has concluded an agreement with the Estonian Government to purchase 10 million tons 
of emissions rights. Under the terms of this contract, Mitsubishi Corporation will also be providing 507 electric 
vehicles as well as support with regard to quick charging technology. 
152 http://elmo.ee/pricing/.  
153 https://www.wienenergie.at/eportal3/ep/channelView.do/pageTypeId/67856/channelId/-51202. 
154 SA.29531 – Umweltförderung im Inland. 
 147 
 
operation of the charging points including the calculation of their environmental effects. 
For such calculation it was estimated how many conventional cars will be replaced by 
electric vehicles with the installation of these electric charging stations, which will lead to 
a CO2 reduction. Only those environmental effects had been taken into account which will 
be achieved by implementing the measure in Austria. Finally, there was a requirement to 
use 100% electricity from renewable energies. 
Access and technology: As regards technology, Wien Energie installed standard charging 
points and open access is organised 24/7 (e.g. public car park). The charges for the users 
depend on the tariff class and the day time. The user can subscribe to pay a monthly basic 
fee (EUR 9.90/month or EUR 34.90/month). The higher the monthly fee, the cheaper the 
tariffs. The tariffs range from EUR 0.60/hour to EUR 15/hour, depending on the day time, 
subscription and charging type. 
(5) BENEFIC  
The BENEFIC Project (BrussEls NEtherlands Flanders Implementation of Clean power for 
transport) is carried out, among others, in Brussels, the most populated city in Belgium, 
as well as in Flanders and in the Netherlands. It is a cross-border project for the 
development of charging and refueling infrastructure for alternative fuels for transport. The 
various partners aim to construct ca. 1,000 additional loading and refueling points for 
passenger cars, electric taxis, electric buses, freight transport and inland waterway vessels 
by September 2020.  
The project should provide recharging infrastructure for electric vehicles, electric taxis and 
electric buses, CNG and LNG infrastructure, hydrogen refueling infrastructure and onshore 
electricity supply facilities for inland navigation.155 BENEFIC obtained funds under the 
Connecting Europe Facility (CEF) funded by the Commission. The Flemish Department of 
the Environment is coordinating the project. 
Companies involved and construction: There are eleven companies involved: (i) Fastned; 
(ii) Allego; (iii) Pitpoint; (iv) Shell; (v) Q8; (vi) Blue Corner; (vii) Orange Gas; (viii) STIB-
MIVB (buses); (ix) De Lijn (buses); (x) EBS (buses); (xi) Brussels Airport (buses). The 
project covers Brussels, Flanders and the Netherlands, and focusses on urban and rural 
areas. The project is not constructed on public domain. The duration of the construction is 
expected to last from 2018 to 2020. 
Financing and costs: The total costs amount to EUR 37.15 million, of which EUR 7.3 million 
are financed by CEF.156 The maximum financial support amounts to 20% of the costs 
allocated for the infrastructure works. The remaining costs were covered by private parties 
that actually installed the charging infrastructure. The consortium has to comply with 
various criteria, defined in the call for projects, such as: public accessibility of the 
infrastructure; no other EU funding; interoperability and other technical conditions as 
imposed in Directive 2014/94/EU on the deployment of alternative fuels infrastructure.157 
Access and technology: The project comprises several technologies and infrastructure 
facilities: 832 fast and standard chargers for electric cars, electric taxis, and electric buses; 
(518 in Flanders, 11 in the Netherlands, 176 in Brussels-Capital Region, 107 in all 3 regions 
and 20 in the Netherlands and Flanders), 30 electric busses for passenger transport; (in 
                                                            
155 http://www.benefic.eu/en/home.  
156 https://ec.europa.eu/inea/en/connecting-europe-facility/cef-transport/2016-eu-tm-0277-s.  
157 OJ 2014 L 307/1. 
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Flanders), 4 hydrogen filling stations; (4 in the Netherlands), 39 shore power installations; 
(39 in Flanders) and 11 CNG stations (4 in Flanders, 3 in Brussels-Capital Region and 4 in 
the Netherlands). Access to the electric infrastructure charging stations is organized in an 
open access 24/7 (e.g. public car park). The stakeholder stated that there are no costs for 
the actual access, but there will be charges for the use of the infrastructure. 
(6) Flens Kommun 
The project was carried out in Sweden in the cities Flen and Malmköping which belong to 
the municipality of Flen in the region of Södermanland. The project comprises two electric 
charging stations with three charging points each. Flens Kommun is both the owner as well 
as the operator of the charging stations. 
Companies involved and construction: There are seven companies involved in the project: 
(i) ABB; (ii) Granlunds grävmaskiner AB; (iii) Flens Eltjänst; (iv) Team Tejbrant; (v) NCC; 
(vi) Vattenfall; (vii) Tekniska avdelningen, Flens kommun. The project covers a rural area 
in Sweden and was constructed on public domain. The construction time was less than one 
year.  
Financing and costs: 50% of the costs were covered by Flens Kommun, the remaining 50% 
by Klimatklivet, a public fund for local and regional actions that reduce emissions of carbon 
dioxide and other gases that affect the climate, administered by the Swedish environmental 
protection agency (Naturvårdsverket). The funds invested should provide the greatest 
possible emission reduction per invested money. Applications for the “Klimatklivet” are 
assessed and handled in accordance with the so-called “Klimatklivetförordningen” which is 
a GBER scheme. In order to benefit from this fund, Flens Kommun needed to provide the 
costs and bills paid of the project. The main difficulty for this project was to increase the 
power capacity on site, which had to be carried out by the power company. This had to be 
accomplished within one year as the public financing required that the project is carried 
out in one year. There was no public tender but Flens Kommun applied for public financing 
(for further details see Annex 11.4). 
Access and technology: Access to the charging stations, which contain both standard and 
fast charging points, is organized in an open access 24/7 (e.g. public car park). The 
charging station in Flens is located at a public parking spot and charging station in 
Malmköping is located next to a bus stop. Flens Kommun stated that users are not charged 
for using the infrastructure. Flens Kommun has not made a decision yet about the model 
for charging fees at this stage.  
(7) T1 Mall of Tallinn 
The project was established in Tallinn, the most populated city in Estonia, in a city mall. 
The main driver of this project was the operator of the Mall of Tallinn, who wanted to get 
for the construction of the mall the highest energy efficiency standards possible in form of 
an energy efficiency certificate. For this purpose it was necessary to install electric charging 
stations in the mall. 
Companies involved and construction: Elektritransport installed 15 standard charging 
stations in 2018 and the duration of the construction was less than 1 year.  
Financing and costs: Elektritransport did not receive any public funds for the installation of 
the stations. There are no charging costs for users of the stations, who are able to drive 
into the Mall of Tallinn and charge their cars for free (for further details see Annex 11.4). 
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Access and technology: Elektitransport installed standard chargers with up to 22 KW/hour. 
The charging stations are in principle accessible for everybody, the opening hours of the 
mall have to be respected though. 
(8) SmartEnCity 
The project was implemented, among others, in the Estonian city of Tartu and aims to 
transform European cities into sustainable, smart and resource-efficient cities. The project 
is funded under the EU’s Horizon 2020 research and innovation program and is planned 
and implemented in three cities: Vitoria-Gasteiz (Spain), Tartu (Estonia) and Sonderborg 
(Denmark); Lecce (Italy), and Asenovgrad (Bulgaria) should follow. SmartEnCity also 
comprises the installation of electric charging stations for electric vehicles. The information 
below only refers to the project in Tartu. 
Companies involved and construction: Elektritransport installed five electric charging 
stations. The owner of the charging stations is the city of Tartu, Elektritransport is the 
operator. The city of Tartu carried out two tenders for the project, one for the installation 
and one for the operation of the charging stations. Elektritransport won both tenders. The 
main criteria for the tender was the price. The construction of the charging stations took 
less than 1 year, but it should be noted that the connection to the electric grid was already 
pre-installed by city of Tartu. 
Financing and costs: Elektritransport stated that the project was fully funded by the city of 
Tartu, which itself received the respective funds under the EU’s Horizon 2020 research and 
innovation program. The received funds covered the purchase of the charging stations, the 
transportation costs (from Portugal to Estonia), and the installation of those (for further 
details see Annex 11.4). 
Access and technology: Elektritransport installed quick chargers with 50 KW/hour. The 
users of those chargers have to pay a fee of EUR 0.15/KWh. 
(9) Corri-Door  
This project has the objective to foster electric vehicle deployment in France with the aim 
to enable the viability of an interoperable fast charging network. The project comprises 
200 fast charging points distributed every 80 km all over France.  
Companies involved and construction: There are seven companies involved in the project: 
(i) IZIVIA (previous name: Sodetrel) as the owner of the charging stations, (ii) EDF, (iii) 
Renault, (iv) BMW, (v) Nissan, (vi) Volkswagen, (vii) ParisTech. The project was 
constructed on public domain (motorway) and the construction of the charging stations 
lasted ca. three years (from 2014 to 2016). As regards the construction on the public 
domain, the negotiations mainly took place with the concessionaires and sub-
concessionaires of the motorway. 
Financing and costs: The overall costs of the project amounted to ca. EUR 12 million. The 
project belongs to the TEN-T programme and was supported by the Commission, which 
covered ca. 50% of the eligible investment costs.158 The public financing was arranged by 
an open and competitive call for applications. The best proposals were selected according 
to criteria defined by the Commission in its call. A condition to receive public financing was 
to be compliant with the Grant Agreement that was concluded with the Commission. 
                                                            
158 Commission, TEN-T Annual Programme, CORRI-DOOR, 2013-EU-92055-S. 
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Access and technology: The “Corri-Door Project” comprises 200 fast charging stations 
(50KW) which are accessible 24/7 on the French motorways. Users have to pay for 
charging with the option to pay a subscription-fee (EUR 3 or EUR 30 per month) which 
results in lowers charging tariffs. The charging fees range from EUR 1 per 5min to EUR 
0.50 per 5 min. 
(10) GREAT  
The “GREAT Project” (Green Region for Electrification and Alternative fuels for Transport) 
is a cross-national project which was implemented in Sweden, Denmark and Germany. The 
project comprises 69 electric fast charging stations and three LNG/CNG stations, over more 
than 900 km of the Scandinavian-Mediterranean Corridor. 50 charging stations have been 
deployed in Sweden, 17 in Denmark and 2 in Germany; the three LNG/CNG stations for 
heavy trucks were installed in Sweden. The project belongs to the CEF Transport 
programme and was financially supported by the EU.159 
Companies involved and construction: The companies involved in the project were: (i) 
E.ON Danmark A/S, (ii) E.ON Sverige AB, and (iii) E.ON Energilösningar AB. The charging 
stations are established on public domain and the implementation of the project lasted ca. 
5 years. One of the conditions to get the concession for the construction of the public 
domain was the need to lease the land. 
Financing and costs: The project was 50% co-financed by the EU. The remaining 50% of 
the costs regarding the electric charging infrastructure was covered by E.ON (for further 
details see Annex 11.4).   
Access and technology: Users have open access to the charging stations without 
limitations. The users are charged for the use of the infrastructure and the tariffs differ 
among the countries involved. 
7.2.4 Financing of projects 
Question 11.d: Based on the projects identified under Question 11.a. and c. that 
have been selected based on a tender, what are the funding gaps (or bids) of the 
different selected alternative fuel infrastructure projects and what is the 
geographical coverage of the project concerned? 
The percentage figures regarding the financing in Table 17 and Table 18  below refer to 
the amount of aid received by the beneficiaries in comparison to the total costs of the 
project. In addition to the “direct public contribution”, Table 17 and Table 18 also indicate 
the shareholdings or contributions in projects by cities or municipalities as well as the share 
of private contributions.  
As shown in Annex 11.1, the direct public contribution of the beneficiaries of the different 
State aid decisions regarding alternative fuel infrastructure is to a certain extent 
homogeneous. For the decision on charging infrastructure for e-mobility in Germany 
(SA.46574), the average ratio between the support requested by beneficiaries under the 
approved scheme and the total costs of the project is 34%, whereas most beneficiaries 
received a similar share, i.e. between 30 and 40% of aid with regard to the total costs of 
the project.  
                                                            
159 Commission, CEF Transport Programm, GREAT (Green Region for Electrification and Alternatives fuels for 
Transport), 2014-EU-TM-0477-S. 
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Out of 56 beneficiaries, eight received below 30% and three received above 40%. 
Expressed in EUR/KW charging capacity, the direct public contribution for the beneficiaries 
with regard to this scheme (SA.46574) for the first call for applications ranged from EUR 
113/KW to EUR 1,461/KW, as demonstrated in Figure 49 below. 
Figure 49: Granted aid in EUR/MW in first call for applications 
 
Source: Bundesanstalt für Verwaltungsdienstleistungen 
For the second call for applications, the direct public contribution for the beneficiaries with 
regard to this scheme ranged from EUR 6/KW to EUR 300/KW, as demonstrated in Figure 
50 below. 
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Figure 50: Granted aid in EUR/MW in second call for applications 
 
Source: Bundesanstalt für Verwaltungsdienstleistungen 
For the third call for applications, the direct public contribution for the beneficiaries with 
regard to this scheme ranged from EUR 44/KW to EUR 1,639/KW, whereas the vast 
majority of beneficiaries received aid below EUR 200/KW, as demonstrated in Figure 51 
below. 
Figure 51: Granted aid in EUR/MW in third call for applications 
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Source: Bundesanstalt für Verwaltungsdienstleistungen 
By contrast, for the support scheme for the acquisition of electric buses and the respective 
infrastructure for urban public transport in Germany (SA.48190), the direct financing 
amounted to an average 69% in comparison to the total costs, whereas the granting 
authority indicated that the main part of the funding was used for the acquisition of buses. 
There was no information provided on the allocation of the funds between vehicles and 
infrastructure. For this scheme, nine out of twelve beneficiaries received between 69% and 
80% of funds in comparison to the total costs, only three out of twelve received 40% and 
below. The geographical scope covers urban areas (cities in Germany). For the alternative 
power supply for cruise ships in the Hamburg City Port/Altona-HafenCity (SA.37322), there 
was only one beneficiary obtaining investment aid under the approved scheme that 
represent 26% of total infrastructure costs. The beneficiary received additional 25% of the 
total costs from the EU as the project was considered to be a TEN-T project. The 
geographical scope is urban, as the beneficiary is an harbor operator.  
The beneficiaries under the State aid scheme regarding PO SEUR Programme for Clean 
Buses in urban areas in Portugal (SA.45694) received in average a direct public 
contribution of ca. 32% in comparison to the total costs. Four out of eight beneficiaries 
received a fund ratio of 48% and higher, the others received 38% and below. The aid 
requested under the scheme concerned both the acquisition of clean vehicles as well as 
the charging infrastructure and there was no information provided on the allocation of the 
funds between vehicles and infrastructure. The geographical scope covers urban areas 
(Portuguese cities). 
The funding requested by beneficiaries for decision on the Green Deal for Publicly 
Accessible Charging Infrastructure Scheme in the Netherlands (SA.38769) was in average 
34% of total costs. The amount of the granted aid by the central government corresponds 
with the amount of the requested aid by the beneficiaries. Moreover, the private 
contribution, which was required by the tender specifications, was EUR 500 per pole, which 
leads to an average share of 23% private contribution. The remaining share per pole was 
covered by the local governments. The geographical scope covers both urban areas as well 
as broader areas. 
Table 17: Overview of beneficiaries’ financing regarding Commission decisions 
Commission 
decision 
Direct public 
contribution 
(avg.) 
Other financing source Geographical 
scope 
Public involvement of 
different nature (avg.) 
Private contribution 
(avg.) 
SA.46574  34% 66%  Country wide 
of which ca. 40% of 
beneficiaries are 
municipalities and publicly 
owned undertakings 
of which ca. 60% of 
beneficiaries are 
privately owned 
undertakings 
SA.48190  69% 31% (beneficiaries are 
publicly owned 
undertakings) 
 Urban 
SA.37322 51% 49% (beneficiary is a 
public agency) 
 Urban/harbor 
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SA.45694 32% 68%  Urban 
of which ca. 80% of 
beneficiaries are publicly 
owned undertakings 
of which ca. 20% of 
beneficiaries are 
privately owned 
undertakings 
SA.38769 34% 43% (beneficiaries are 
municipalities/provinces) 
 
23% Urban and 
country wide 
Source: Sheppard Mullin 
As regards the electric charging projects selected under Question 11.c., the share of direct 
investment support allocated by public authorities appears to be very diverse and ranges 
from a 0% (T1 Mall of Tallinn) to 100% (SmartEnCity and ELMO Project) share of public 
funds. It also appears that especially the very large cross-border projects such as BENEFIC, 
Corri-Door and GREAT are supported by EU funds. Smaller projects such as Ladestationen 
Wien or Flens Kommun are supported by GBER schemes or owned by local authorities or 
publicly owned undertakings. An overview of the financial contributions is provided in Table 
18 below. 
Table 18: Overview of financing of electric charging stations projects 
Project Direct public 
contribution 
Public involvement of 
different nature 
Private 
contribution 
Geographical 
scope 
SIRVE Project was not 
implemented  
   
CIRVE 50%  50% Country wide 
ELMO 100%   Country wide 
Ladestationen 
Wien 
5% 95% (beneficiary is publicly 
owned company) 
 Urban 
BENEFIC 20%  80%  Cross-national 
Flens Kommun 50% 50% (beneficiary is municipality)  Urban 
T1 Mall of Tallinn   100% Urban 
SmartEnCity 100%   Urban 
Corri-Door 50%  50% Country wide 
GREAT 50%  50% Cross-national 
Source: Sheppard Mullin 
7.2.5 Conclusions 
With regard to the assessment of the schemes for the support of publicly accessible or 
dedicated alternative fuel infrastructure, which were approved by the Commission, all 
schemes analysed, except one, were carried out based on a tender or a call for applications. 
One scheme was addressed to only one beneficiary (a public authority in charge of general 
safety and water pollution control), and no tender procedure was needed. The beneficiaries 
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of three schemes are municipalities or publicly owned undertakings. Two of the schemes 
include also private operators, thus no distinction is made between the private or public 
nature of the organization. The projects concern the purchase of electric and/or natural 
gas buses and/or related charging/re-fuelling infrastructure. The technology referred to in 
these projects is related to standard or fast charging installations, alternative energy 
supply for cruise ships, as well as liquefied or compressed natural gas and hydrogen filling 
stations. The geographical coverage depends on the project. Usually, infrastructure of 
electric buses only covers urban areas, whereas publicly accessible infrastructure projects 
have a wider scope. No related charges are applicable for the projects relating to buses. 
On the contrary, if the projects concern the electric vehicle charging infrastructure, the 
fees for the use of the funded charging facilities vary and depend on the respective 
provider, on the duration of the charging session as well as the charging power. The electric 
charging stations for cars (Germany, SA.46574; Netherlands, SA.38769) and cruise ships 
(Germany, SA.48190) are generally publicly accessible, whereas the electric infrastructure 
projects for buses are dedicated (Germany, SA.48190) or semi-dedicated to public 
transport operators (Portugal, SA.45694). 
The average direct public funding under the approved schemes regarding the acquisition 
of electric buses and the related infrastructure amounts to 32% on average for the scheme 
regarding PO SEUR Programme for Clean Buses in Portugal (SA.45694) and 69% on 
average for the support scheme for the acquisition of electric buses and the respective 
infrastructure for urban public transport in Germany (SA.48190). The average direct public 
contribution for the charging infrastructure for electric vehicles amounts both in Germany 
(SA.46574) and in the Netherlands (SA.38769) to 34% funding in comparison to the total 
costs.  
As regards the ten reviewed electric charging station projects, nine of them were supported 
by public financing, either by the EU, via the CEF/Horizon 2020 program, or by the Member 
States. One project was financed entirely from private funds. It related to one electric 
charging station established in a shopping mall in Tallinn by the operator of the Mall, which 
was willing to achieve the highest energy performance standard for the Mall. The 
implementation period lasted from less than one to four years. With respect to technology, 
eight of the selected projects are fully or partially based on fast charging technology, while 
two are exclusively providing standard charging technology. Two projects are also 
providing CNG, LNG and hydrogen refueling infrastructure and one of them also provides 
onshore electricity supply facilities for inland navigation. Nine of the projects are accessible 
24/7. Users have to pay for the usage of eight of the electric charging station projects. The 
fees vary and depend on the charging time, charging location, and charging technology. 
Some operators offer packages with a monthly basic fee, which reduces the price charged 
per KWh. With regard to the financing for the selected electric charging station projects, 
one project did not receive direct public financing at all whereas other projects received 
public contribution of 100% in comparison to the total project costs. 
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8 Abstract 
The objective of this study is to support the Commission with independent evidence-based 
facts and data on the implementation of the EU Guidelines on State aid for environmental 
protection and energy (EEAG), applicable since July 2014, and of the provisions applicable 
to aid for environmental protection and energy of Commission Regulation (EU) 651/2014 
(GBER). The aim is to provide input for the Commission’s assessment of whether the EEAG 
and the relevant GBER provisions are fit for purpose. The topics covered in this study relate 
to the effectiveness, efficiency and relevance of the rules. With regard to effectiveness, the 
study provides, among others, information on Renewable Energy Sources (RES) schemes 
in order to understand their particular features and the evolution of prices. It also focuses 
on the question whether the absence of a tender for certain categories of RES has been a 
barrier to achieving cost reductions, and whether the existence or size of exemptions to 
market integration has been a barrier to achieving market integration. Moreover, data has 
been gathered on the question to which extent the EEAG ensured that support for high 
energy efficient cogeneration and district heating was effective. The study also contains 
information on whether Member States have introduced a renewable energy policy in the 
period 2014-2020 beyond their binding 2020 RES targets. Moreover, the performance of 
capacity mechanisms has been assessed by comparing various auctions outcomes and 
scheme designs. With regard to efficiency, the study provides information on the impact 
of reductions of RES levies and other comparable levies for energy intensive users (EIU), 
as well as on levies paid by different consumer groups and on the relevance of the 
grandfathering rule. It also focuses on data collection into schemes communicated to the 
Commission by Member States for containing provisions on State aid for energy efficiency 
measures in buildings. With regard to relevance, the study provides input regarding 
subsidy-free renewable energy projects in the EEA as well as on alternative infrastructure 
projects, with a particular focus on the financing of the projects. The study contains the 
outcome of in-depth desk-research and stakeholder consultations, to highlight relevant 
details about the impact of the EU rules in practice. 
Résumé  
L'objectif de cette étude est de fournir à la Commission des données et des faits 
indépendants, fondés sur des preuves, concernant la mise en œuvre des lignes directrices 
sur les aides d'État à la protection de l'environnement et l'énergie (EEAG), applicable 
depuis juillet 2014, et des dispositions applicables aux aides pour la protection de 
l'environnement et l'énergie du règlement (UE) n° 651/2014 de la Commission (RGEC). 
L'objectif est de contribuer à l'évaluation, par la Commission, de l'adéquation entre les 
dispositions de l'EEAG et celles du RGEC. Les thèmes abordés dans cette étude portent sur 
l'efficacité, l'efficience et la pertinence des règles. En ce qui concerne l'efficacité, l'étude 
fournit, entre autres, des informations sur les régimes d'aide aux sources d'énergie 
renouvelables (SER), afin de comprendre leurs caractéristiques particulières et l'évolution 
des prix. Elle traite également la question de savoir si l'absence d'appel d'offres, pour 
certaines catégories de SER, a constitué un obstacle à la réalisation de réductions de coûts, 
et si l'existence ou l'importance des exemptions à l'intégration du marché a constitué un 
obstacle à la réalisation de l'intégration du marché. En outre, des données ont été 
recueillies sur la question de savoir dans quelle mesure les EEAG ont veillé à ce que le 
soutien à la cogénération et au chauffage urbain à haute efficacité énergétique soit efficace. 
L'étude contient également des informations sur l’introduction par les États membres d’une 
politique en matière d'énergies renouvelables au cours de la période 2014-2020, au-delà 
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de leurs objectifs contraignants en matière de SER pour 2020. En outre, la performance 
des mécanismes de capacité a été évaluée en comparant les résultats de différentes 
enchères et conceptions de régimes. En ce qui concerne l’efficience, l'étude fournit des 
informations sur l'impact des réductions des prélèvements sur les SER et d'autres 
prélèvements comparables pour les utilisateurs intensifs d'énergie (UIE), ainsi que sur les 
prélèvements payés par différents groupes de consommateurs et sur la pertinence de la 
règle des droits acquis. Elle se concentre également sur la collecte de données dans les 
régimes communiqués à la Commission par les États membres pour contenir les 
dispositions relatives aux aides d'État en faveur des mesures d'efficacité énergétique dans 
les bâtiments. En ce qui concerne la pertinence, l'étude fournit des informations sur les 
projets d'énergie renouvelable non subventionnés dans l'EEE ainsi que sur les projets 
d'infrastructure alternatifs, en mettant l'accent sur le financement des projets. L'étude 
contient les résultats d'une recherche documentaire approfondie et de consultations des 
parties concernées, afin de mettre en évidence les détails pertinents concernant l'impact 
des règles de l'UE dans la pratique des Etats membres. 
Abstrakt 
Ziel der Studie ist es, die Kommission mit unabhängig erhobenen, belegbaren Fakten und 
Daten über die Umsetzung der seit Juli 2014 geltenden EU-Leitlinien für staatliche 
Umweltschutz- und Energiebeihilfen (EEAG) und der für Umweltschutz- und 
Energiebeihilfen geltenden Bestimmungen der Verordnung (EU) 651/2014 der Kommission 
(AGVO) zu unterstützen. Sie soll einen Beitrag für die Beurteilung der Kommission leisten, 
ob die EEAG und die relevanten Bestimmungen der AGVO praxistauglich sind. Die in der 
Studie behandelten Themen beziehen sich auf die Wirksamkeit, Effizienz und Relevanz der 
Regeln. Im Hinblick auf die Wirksamkeit liefert die Studie u.a. Informationen über 
Regelungen für erneuerbare Energiequellen (EE), um deren besondere Merkmale und die 
Preisentwicklung zu verstehen. Sie befasst sich auch mit der Frage, ob das Fehlen einer 
Ausschreibung für bestimmte Kategorien erneuerbarer Energiequellen ein Hindernis für 
Kostensenkungen war, und ob die Existenz oder der Umfang von Ausnahmen für die 
Marktintegration ein Hindernis für die Erzielung der Marktintegration darstellte. Darüber 
hinaus wurden Daten zu der Frage gesammelt, inwieweit die EEAG sichergestellt haben, 
dass die Förderung der hochenergieeffizienten Kraft-Wärme-Kopplung und der Fernwärme 
wirksam war. Die Studie enthält auch Informationen darüber, ob die Mitgliedstaaten im 
Zeitraum 2014-2020 Politikziele für erneuerbare Energien eingeführt haben, die über ihre 
verbindlichen Ziele für 2020 hinausgeht. Darüber hinaus wurde die Leistung der 
Kapazitätsmechanismen durch den Vergleich verschiedener Auktionsergebnisse und 
Ausgestaltungen der Beihilferegelungen bewertet. Im Hinblick auf die Effizienz liefert die 
Studie Informationen über die Auswirkungen von Senkungen der EEG-Umlagen und 
anderer vergleichbarer Umlagen für energieintensive Nutzer, über Umlagen, die von 
verschiedenen Verbrauchergruppen gezahlt werden, und über die Relevanz der 
Besitzstands-Regel. Ein weiterer Schwerpunkt ist die Datenerfassung im Hinblick auf 
nationale Beihilferegelungen, die der Kommission von den Mitgliedstaaten mitgeteilt 
wurden, da sie staatliche Beihilfen für Energieeffizienzmaßnahmen in Gebäuden enthielten. 
Hinsichtlich der Relevanz liefert die Studie Aussagen über subventionsfreie EE-Projekte im 
EWR sowie zu alternativen Infrastrukturprojekten mit besonderem Schwerpunkt auf deren 
Finanzierung. Die Studie beruht auf intensiven Recherchen und Konsultationen von 
Interessengruppen und enthält relevante Details über die Auswirkungen der EU-
Vorschriften in der Praxis. 
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Annexes 
 
Annex 0 – Evaluation questions 
Effectiveness 
1. To what extent have the EEAG and the GBER corresponding provisions been effective 
in allowing aid for Renewable Energy Sources ("RES") deployment at lower costs or 
with less aid? 
In order to provide input to the Commission to reply to this question, the contractor 
shall identify, for a sample of a minimum of 10 Member States covering at least 85% 
of the total installed renewable generation capacity in the EU, using publicly available 
data: 
a. How has each approved RES scheme (list to be provided by the Commission) 
fared in terms of volume awarded and built or repowered (in total, per 
technology, new/repowered and split by administratively set support and 
tenders)? Under each approved RES scheme, how many and which tenders 
(technology(ies), sources or RES) were carried out? What was the volume 
participating in the auction, the awarded volume and the price? 
b. Under each approved RES scheme, how many and which tenders (technologies, 
design features) open to several technologies and energy sources were carried 
out? What was the volume participating in the auction, the awarded volume and 
the price? 
c. Under each approved RES scheme, how many and which tenders open to 
repowering were carried out? What was the volume of new capacity / repowered 
capacity participating in the auction, the awarded volume of new / repowered 
capacity and the price? Which schemes were successful in encouraging cost-
effective repowering and why? How has competition been ensured when there 
are a limited number of possible repowering projects and/or sites are all 
controlled by a limited number of undertakings? 
2. Has the absence of requiring a tender for certain categories of RES been a barrier to 
achieving cost reduction? Have the existence or size of exemptions to market 
integration been a barrier to achieving market integration? 
In order to provide input to the Commission to reply to this question, the contractor 
shall identify, using publicly available data: 
a. RES volume and aid level (per scheme and technology) covered by exemptions 
in GBER and the EEAG (i) for small installations, (ii) from tendering requirement. 
3. To what extent have the EEAG ensured that support for high energy efficient 
cogeneration and district heating was effective? 
The contractor shall, for maximum 10 measures (list to be provided by the Commission) 
using publicly available data, identify: 
a. How has each support measure for high energy-efficient cogeneration fared in 
terms of the amount of capacity built and the level of aid paid per unit of installed 
capacity (e.g. per MW installed high efficient CHP)? 
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b. Under each scheme, how many and which tenders/allocation processes were 
carried out? For each allocation process, what were the eligible technologies and 
what were the levels of aid awarded? 
4. To what extent have the EEAG ensured that capacity mechanisms were cost-effective 
in providing security of supply and least-distortive to competition? 
In order to provide input to the Commission to reply to this question, the contractor 
shall identify, using publicly available data: 
a. For each auction/ allocation process (both T-4/5 and T-1 where applicable) 
under each of the 10 approved and launched capacity mechanisms, including 
strategic reserves and interruptibility schemes160: 
• Actually calculated derating factors (where applicable) 
• Capacity price 
• The applicable obligations for beneficiaries, and the potential penalties 
• Price cap(s) 
• Awarded amount (MW) of capacity per fuel-type/technology (including 
demand response, interconnection, etc.) and as existing, refurbished and 
new capacity 
• Amount (MW) of capacity contracted per contract length 
5. To what extent have the EEAG and the corresponding GBER provisions and their 
application facilitated the integration of RES into the electricity market? 
In order to provide input to the Commission to reply to this question, the contractor 
shall identify, using publicly available data: 
a. Rules regarding support at negative prices under operational support schemes 
and occurrence of negative prices (number of hours of negative prices, RES 
production during those hours supported under each applicable aid scheme) in 
the following Member States: UK, Germany, France, Netherlands and 
Denmark161. Any available input from other Member States would be also 
welcome. 
6. The contractor shall prepare the following tables: (i) the first table should indicate, for 
each Member State, whether they have introduced a renewable energy policy in the 
period 2014-2020 going beyond their binding 2020 RES targets; (ii) the second table 
should list the level of RES charges over the total electricity bill – where possible, per 
category of electricity consumers (i.e. EIUs vs. other companies) – for a sample of a 
minimum of 15 Member States in the period 2014-2020. For those Member States 
having implemented an approved scheme under section 3.7.2. of the EEAG, the second 
table should also indicate the level of the reductions on RES levies and the level of the 
reductions to other charges approved by the Commission by analogy (e.g. reductions 
                                                            
160 Schemes in UK (SA.35980 and SA.44475), France (SA.39621), Germany (SA.43735), Ireland (SA.44464), 
Belgium (SA.48648), France (SA.48490), France (SA.40454), Greece (SA.48780), Greece (SA.50152), Poland 
(SA.46100). The decisions can all be accessed here: 
http://ec.europa.eu/competition/sectors/energy/state_aid_to_secure_electricity_supply_en.html. 
161 This sample of Member States has been selected as they have regulated the occurrence of negative prices by 
different modalities. 
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to CHP levies), if applicable. For this purpose, the Commission will provide a list of 
cases where reductions to other charges were approved by analogy (maximum 5). 
7. Waste management is an important element for achieving resource efficiency. To what 
extent has Article 47 GBER, which sets out the compatibility criteria for aid for waste 
recycling and re-utilisation, been effective in allowing aid to foster sustainable and 
smart growth in re-use and recycling of waste while avoiding disproportionate 
distortions of competition? 
In order to provide input to the Commission to reply to this question, the contractor 
shall, for the list of schemes communicated to the Commission as falling under Article 
47 GBER (list to be provided by the Commission; the Member States concerned are 
listed in section 7 of the technical specifications): 
a. using the content of the legal basis, identify the schemes that actually contain 
provisions on the granting of aid for waste management (with the exclusion of 
support schemes dedicated to wastewater treatment) and indicate i) whether 
the eligible waste management activities are limited to recycling of waste and 
preparation for re-use, ii) whether they target specific types of waste (and which 
ones) and iii) whether they can also relate to waste-to- energy projects under 
the national legal basis. 
b. for the schemes actually containing provisions on the granting of aid for waste 
management, indicate how many recycling of waste and preparation for re-use 
projects have obtained aid under these schemes, in which Member States, and 
what budget has been allocated to those schemes. If the number of Member 
States concerned is higher than eight, limit your examination to a representative 
and balanced sample of 8 Member States (large/small, North/South, 
East/West/Central, low/high recycling rates162). 
c. If for some Member States examined under data request 6b above, no aid was 
granted under the scheme based on Article 47 GBER, the contractor shall 
identify the reasons (absence of recycling or re-use projects, difficulty to apply 
the “state of the art” criterion, difficulty to satisfy the “treatment of waste from 
others” criterion, too low aid intensities, etc.). 
Efficiency 
8. As regards the Member States which have granted reductions to energy intensive users 
the contractor shall identify and assess: 
a. What impact have those reductions had - in cumulation with reductions to other 
charges approved by the Commission by analogy (e.g. reductions to CHP levies) 
- on the RES levy and other relevant levies paid by non-energy intensive 
industrial consumers and households in terms of EUR/year? 
b. To what extent has the grandfathering rule foreseen in point 197 of the EEAG 
been relevant in the different sectors in terms of proportion of grandfathered 
undertakings? 
9. Based on Member States' implementation of the requirements of Article 39 GBER in 
energy-efficiency schemes and on financial intermediary and energy service companies' 
                                                            
162 Recycling rates of Member States are reproduced in a table under section 7 of the technical specifications. 
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("ESCOs") market behaviour, to what extent has the administrative burden linked to 
Article 39 GBER been proportionate to the potential distortions on the financial 
intermediary markets and on the energy efficiency service market? 
In order to provide input to the Commission to reply to this question, the contractor 
shall, based on the list of schemes communicated to the Commission as falling under 
Article 39 GBER (list to be provided by the Commission; the Member States concerned 
are listed in section 7 of the technical specifications): 
a. using the content of the legal basis, identify the schemes that actually contain 
provisions on the granting of aid for energy efficiency measures in buildings 
based on financial instruments. For the Member States having provided for aid 
measures for energy efficiency measures in building based on financial 
instruments, indicate: 
• How in the national legal basis the selection of funds/financial 
intermediaries is organised. 
• How the national legal basis proposes to verify that the investment by 
independent private investor was reaching 30% and that the private 
investors were obtaining a fair rate of return. 
• How the national legal basis proposes to verify that the financial 
intermediaries were passing on the full advantage to the building owners 
or tenants and were managed on a commercial basis. 
• Whether the national legal basis allows that the subsidized loans be 
concluded between the financial intermediary (or fund) and an ESCO. 
• What types of expenditures and projects are eligible under the national 
legal basis and in particular whether under the legal basis it is possible 
for building owners or tenants to obtain a subsisied loan or guarantee for 
projects relating to i) the building insulation, ii) renovation of the heating 
and iii) installation of renewable energy production and whether the 
eligible costs under the legal basis also allow for a combination of those 
investments (for instance building insulation together with renewable 
energy production). 
• Whether the national legal basis limits the subsidised loans or guarantees 
to households or also allows that the subsidised loans be concluded 
between the financial intermediary and SMEs or large undertakings. 
b. for the schemes actually containing provisions on the granting of aid for energy 
efficiency measures in buildings based on financial instruments, indicate: 
• Whether the Member State actually provided loans or guarantees under 
that scheme to funds or financial intermediaries and what budget has 
been allocated to the scheme concerned. 
• If the concerned Member State has organized a tender or a call for 
application to select the financial intermediary (or the fund) and which 
types of financial institution have been selected to provide subsidized 
energy-efficiency loans (established financial institutions, specialized 
financial institutions, funds, ESCOs, etc.). 
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• Whether there is publicly available evidence (for instance, have there 
been competition enquiries by national competition authorities) of ESCOs 
or energy suppliers tying energy supply contracts to energy-efficiency 
services or tying energy-efficiency contracts to energy supply. 
If the number of Member States concerned is higher than eight, the contractor 
can limit the data request to a representative and balanced  sample of 8 Member 
States (large/small, North/South, East/West/Central, close/far from reaching 
energy-efficiency target163). 
Relevance 
10. Do the EEAG and GBER still adequately address recent market developments such as 
zero subsidy bids? 
In order to provide input to the Commission to reply to this question, the contractor 
shall identify, using publicly available data: 
a. List of zero subsidy bids awarded under RES support schemes, detailing the 
technology, auction date, volume, bid, as well as other advantages (such as 
guaranteed and/or free connection to the grid), and any obligations (e.g. 
requirement to post collateral to help ensure winning projects are built) linked 
to the award. These advantages could be quantified where possible. 
b. Where contracts were awarded to projects that bid at zero, what were the award 
criteria on the basis of which the winning project (or projects) were selected? 
11. To what extent are the process (assessment under the Treaty) and the compatibility 
rules developed by the Commission in its decision practice for alternative fuel164 
infrastructure (publicly accessible or dedicated infrastructure) adapted to subsequent 
market developments and technological advances? 
In order to provide input to the Commission to reply to this question, the contractor 
shall: 
a. For the schemes approved by the Commission (list of 8 decisions to be provided 
by the Commission), indicate how the projects have been implemented: 
companies involved in the projects, tender criteria used for the selection of 
companies (where applicable), costs of project, selected technology (when the 
scheme was open to several technologies), how access of the users to the 
infrastructure was organized (entirely open or not) and how much the user is 
charged for the access to and/or the use of the infrastructure. 
b. For Austria, Belgium, Estonia, France, Spain and Sweden165 identify the list  of 
existing projects of publicly accessible infrastructure (electric charging stations 
and hydrogen refueling stations for road vehicles only, excluding bicycles, 
motorcycles and similar vehicles)166. 
                                                            
163 The progress made by each Member States towards reaching energy efficiency targets is described in Section 
7 of the technical specifications. 
164 Within the meaning of Article 2(1) of The Alternative Fuels Infrastructure Directive (2014/94/EU). 
165 These Member States were selected based on information from the European Alternative Fuels Observatory 
and in order to have a selection of large and small Member States, North/South/Center and with high number of 
charging stations/low number or middle range number of charging stations. 
166 Information on projects can be found on the European Alternative Fuels Observatory website and on the 
Connecting Europe Facility (https://ec.europa.eu/inea/en/connecting-europe-facility) website. 
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c. Select among the projects identified under letter b) twenty projects (electric 
charging stations only), subject to the following criteria: 
• The selection shall at the minimum include for each of the Member States 
listed under b) the project with the broadest geographical coverage in 
the Member State. 
• If the existing projects in a Member States all only relate to local projects 
(no national or regional coverage), the selection must include at least 
the project for the most populated city. 
• The selection must at minimum contain for each Member State listed 
under b) a project in an area with low population density. 
• At minimum the selection shall include three projects for France and 
Spain as they represent two biggest member States in the sample. 
For each selected project, the contractor shall indicate i) which actors are 
involved and the geographical coverage of the project (entire region or country, 
urban area, motorway, countryside, etc.), ii) whether public financing was 
provided and the sources of the public financing as well as the share of the 
public financing in the total costs, iii) the total costs of the project, iv) how 
access to the infrastructure is organised, in particular whether the user is 
charged for the access to and/or the use of the infrastructure, v) the technology 
concerned by the project, vi) if the project was constructed on public domain, 
the conditions under which the concession for the construction of the 
infrastructure was awarded, and in particular assess whether the concession 
was awarded in a competitive manner. In addition, if public financing was 
provided, the contractor shall indicate: vii) whether the public funding was 
granted in a tender, the budget of the tender and the tender criteria used for 
the selection of companies (if any), viii) the selected technology, ix) conditions 
imposed on the beneficiary of public financing, x), which legal basis was used 
by the Member State for the State aid compliance. 
d. Based on the projects identified under a) and c) that have been selected based 
on a tender, make a comparison of the funding gap (or bids) of the different 
selected alternative fuel infrastructure projects and indicate the geographical 
coverage of the project concerned. 
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Annex 1.1 – Aures II and additional data on RES auctions  
(see accompanying Excel file) 
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Annex 1.2 – Additional analysis of RES auctions 
Figure A1.2.1: Volume awarded (MW) through bidding processes in sample 
schemes over time split by number of technologies that could enter each 
bidding process, 2014-2019167 
 
Source: Material collated by Centre for Competition Policy, University of East Anglia from national authority 
websites, national authority documents and preliminary data from the AURES II project.  
Figure A1.2.2: Volume awarded (MW) through bidding processes in 
sampled schemes across Member States split by number of technologies that 
could enter each bidding process, 2014-2019168 
 
                                                            
167 Excludes volumes awarded in MWh or MWp. 
168 Excludes volumes awarded in MWh or MWp. 
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Source: Material collated by Centre for Competition Policy, University of East Anglia from national authority 
websites, national authority documents and preliminary data from the AURES II project.  
Figure A1.2.3 Scatterplot of average awarded price against volume 
participating over volume awarded for each bidding process in sampled 
processes involving a single technology award, 2014-2019169  
 
Source: Material collated by Centre for Competition Policy, University of East Anglia from national authority 
websites, national authority documents and preliminary data from the AURES II project.  
Figure A1.2.4 Scatterplot of average awarded price against the logarithm 
of volume awarded (MW) for sampled bidding processes, 2014-2019170 
 
Source: Material collated by Centre for Competition Policy, University of East Anglia  from national authority 
websites, national authority documents and preliminary data from the AURES II project.  
                                                            
169 Only includes bidding processes with required data. 
170 Only includes bidding processes with required data. 
 168 
 
Figure A1.2.5 Mean of the volume participating over volume awarded ratio 
in sampled bidding processes split by number of eligible technologies, 2014-
2019  
 
Source: Material collated by Centre for Competition Policy, University of East Anglia from national authority 
websites, national authority documents and preliminary data from the AURES II project.  
Figure A1.2.6 Number of cancelled bidding processes within sampled 
schemes by number of technologies eligible to enter the bidding process, 2014-
2019 
 
Source: Material collated by Centre for Competition Policy, University of East Anglia from national authority 
websites, national authority documents and preliminary data from the AURES II project.  
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Figure A1.2.7 Number of bidding processes in sampled schemes where the 
volume requested exceeded the volume participating split by number of 
technologies eligible to enter the bidding process, 2014-2019171 
 
Source: Material collated by Centre for Competition Policy, University of East Anglia from national authority 
websites, national authority documents and preliminary data from the AURES II project.  
                                                            
171 Based on bidding processes with required data only. 
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Figure A1.2.8 Scatterplot of average awarded price against volume 
participating over volume awarded for each bidding process in sampled 
schemes, 2014-2019172  
 
Source: Material collated by Centre for Competition Policy, University of East Anglia  from national authority 
websites, national authority documents and preliminary data from the AURES II project. 
Figure A1.2.9 Volume weighted mean price for solar per KWh in sampled 
schemes by Member State, 2014-2019 
 
Source: Material collated by Centre for Competition Policy, University of East Anglia  from national authority 
websites, national authority documents and preliminary data from the AURES II project. 
                                                            
172 Based on bidding processes with required data only. 
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Figure A1.2.10 Volume weighted mean price for wind per KWh in sampled 
schemes by Member State, 2014-2019 
 
Source: Material collated by Centre for Competition Policy, University of East Anglia  from national authority 
websites, national authority documents and preliminary data from the AURES II project. 
Figure A1.2.11 Volume weighted mean price for biomass/biogas per KWh in 
sampled schemes by Member State, 2014-2019 
 
Source: Material collated by Centre for Competition Policy, University of East Anglia  from national authority 
websites, national authority documents and preliminary data from the AURES II project. 
 172 
 
Figure A1.2.12 Volume weighted mean price for solar per KWh in sampled 
schemes by number of technologies that can enter the bidding process, 2014-
2019173 
 
Source: Material collated by Centre for Competition Policy, University of East Anglia  from national authority 
websites, national authority documents and preliminary data from the AURES II project. 
Figure A1.2.13 Volume weighted mean price for wind per KWh in sampled 
schemes by number of technologies that can enter the bidding process, 2014-
2019174 
 
Source: Material collated by Centre for Competition Policy, University of East Anglia  from national authority 
websites, national authority documents and preliminary data from the AURES II project. 
                                                            
173 This chart pools all available pricing data for bidding processes where volumes awarded were expressed in 
MW. No pricing data was available for Spain in 2016 or Italy or Luxembourg. 
174 This chart pools all available pricing data for bidding processes where volumes awarded were expressed in 
MW. No pricing data was available for Spain in 2016 or Italy or Luxembourg. 
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Figure A1.2.14 Volume weighted mean price for biomass/biogas per KWh in 
sampled schemes by number of technologies that can enter the bidding process, 
2014-2019175 
 
Source: Material collated by Centre for Competition Policy, University of East Anglia  from national authority 
websites, national authority documents and preliminary data from the AURES II project. 
Figure A1.2.15 Variance of awarded prices, cents (EUR) per KWh, in 
sampled bidding processes open to differing numbers of eligible technologies by 
Member State, 2014-2019176 
 
                                                            
175 This chart pools all available pricing data for bidding processes where volumes awarded were expressed in 
MW. No pricing data was available for Spain in 2016 or Italy or Luxembourg. 
176 Data is only included where there were at least two price observations within a Member State for a type of 
process open to a given number of technologies. In bidding processes involving more than one technology price 
observations relate to each sub-category of technology stated in the source documentation, as a result the sub-
categories can vary between bidding processes. In bidding processes involving more than 1 technology where a 
price breakdown by technology subcategory is not provided, the overall price for the bidding process as a whole 
is used.  
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Source: Material collated by Centre for Competition Policy, University of East Anglia  from national authority 
websites, national authority documents and preliminary data from the AURES II project. 
Table A1.2.1  Case study comparisons of prices between bidding processes 
and administratively set support 
Case Study 1: Denmark 2016 (large vs small plants) 
Technology: Solar 
Bidding process price(s), cents (EUR) 
per KWh: 
Administratively set price(s), cents 
(EUR) per KWh: 
4.53 
(i) 8.06 (First 10 Years), then 5.37 
(Following 10 Years) 
(ii) 11.82  
(iii) 12.63 
(iv) 9.67 
Details: 
State Aid Decision(s): SA.44626 
Overview: 2016 pilot tender (open to 
Danish and German producers, only Danish 
producers applied). Aid granted for 20 
years. 
Price type(s): Fixed premium (pay as clear 
auction). Clearing price: 1.73 cents (EUR) 
per KWh, to which project team added 
average 2016 electricity price of 2.80 cents 
(EUR) per KWh (ensto-e data). 
Bidding process volumes: volume 
requested: 20.0MW, volume participating: 
79.5MW, volume awarded: 21.6MW 
 
Details: 
State Aid Decision(s): SA.36204, SA.47440 
Overview: Awarded under VE-loven § 47. 
Requests had to be made before May 2016. 
(i) is open to installations of any size, (ii) is 
for solar panels for own consumption ≤ 6 
kW per household, (iii) is for shared solar 
panels integrated into a building (under 
500KW or for community facilities), and 
(iv) is for solar installations under 500KW. 
Price type(s): (i) variable premium 
(guaranteed minimum price) with one 
minimum price for the first 10 years and 
another for the second 10 years; (ii)-(iv) 
variable premium (guaranteed minimum 
price) within a pool of 20MW with support 
lasting 10 years 
State aid exemption(s): 
Case Study 2: Denmark 2018 (large vs small plants) 
Technology: Onshore wind 
Bidding process price(s), cents (EUR) 
per KWh: 
Administratively set price(s), cents 
(EUR) per KWh: 
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4.70 
(i) 18.25 
(ii) 12.88 
(iii) 6.15 
(iv) 4.81 
Details: 
State aid Decision(s): SA.49918 
Overview: 2018 Multi-Technology Tender. 
Aid is granted for 20 years. 
Price type(s): Fixed premium (pay as bid 
auction). Weighted average price of 
successful onshore wind bids: 0.29 cents 
(EUR) per KWh, to which project team 
added average 2018 electricity price of 
4.41 cents (EUR) per KWh (ensto-e data) 
Bidding process volumes: volume 
requested: unavailable, volume 
participating: 540MW, volume awarded: 
267MW 
 
Details: 
State Aid Decision(s): (i) SA.37122, (ii)-
(iv) SA.50715 
Overview: (i)-(ii) Awarded through VE-
loven § 41 stk. 4 og BEK 82/2017. Aid 
granted to household wind turbines for 12 
years within a pool of 1MW. (iii)-(iv) 
Awarded through Act No. 504 of 23 May 
2018 om ændring af lov om fremme af 
vedvarende energi, lov om elforsyning og 
lov om Energinet. (iii)-(iv) cover projects 
which able to claim under previous 
provisions but delayed due to appeals. (iii) 
was set at the price cap of the 2018 Multi-
Technology Tender. Once the results of this 
tender were known rate was set at the 
highest accepted price of the tender which 
is (iv). 
Price type(s): (i) and (ii) are variable 
premium (guaranteed minimum price). (i) 
awarded to household wind turbines under 
10KW, (ii) awarded to household wind 
turbines over 10KW and up to 25KW 
(iii) fixed premium of 1.74 cents (EUR) per 
KWh to which the project team added 
average 2018 electricity price of 4.41 cents 
(EUR) per KWh (ensto-e data) 
(iv) fixed premium of 0.40 cents (EUR) per 
KW to which the project team added 
average 2018 electricity price of 4.41 cents 
(EUR) per KWh 
State aid exemption(s): (i) point 125 EEAG 
(See SA.37122), also point EEAG 127 
applies due to size of installations. 
ii-iv) point 127 EEAG (See SA.50715) 
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Case Study 3: Finland 2018 (large vs small plants) 
Technology: Onshore wind 
Bidding process price(s), cents (EUR) 
per KWh: 
Administratively set price(s), cents 
(EUR) per KWh: 
3.26 8.35 
Details: 
State aid Decision(s): SA.51525 
Overview: 2018 Technology Neutral 
Tender. Aid granted for 20 years. 
Price type(s): Sliding premium, a fixed 
premium that tapers to zero (pay as bid 
auction). Weighted average price of 
successful onshore wind bids: 0.26 cents 
(EUR) per KWh, to which project team 
added an electricity price of 3.00 cents 
(EUR) per KWh as the variable premium is 
paid in addition to the lower of: (i) the 
market price of electricity or (ii) 3.00 cents 
(EUR) per KWh. (average 2018 electricity 
market price on ensto-e was under 3.00 
cents (EUR) per KWh) 
Bidding process volumes: volume 
requested: 1,400,000 MWh, volume 
participating: 4,130,000 MWh, volume 
awarded: 1,360,000 MWh 
 
Details: 
State aid Decision(s): SA.51525 
Overview: Awarded through § 23 Act No. 
1396/2010. Aid is awarded for 12 Years. 
Wind farms must be under 2.5 MW in 
capacity. 
Price type(s): Sliding premium 
State aid exemption(s): GBER article 42 
Case Study 4: France 2014 (large vs small plants) 
Technology: Solar 
Bidding process price(s), cents (EUR) 
per KWh: 
Administratively set price(s), cents 
(EUR) per KWh: 
(i) 15.90   
(ii) 23.01 
(iii) 19.90 
(iv) 12.88 
  (i) 27.97 
 (ii) 13.74   
(iii) 13.05 
(iv) 6.80 
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(v) 14.96 
(vi) 16.52 
(vii) 15.18 
Details: 
State aid Decision(s): SA.41528 
Overview: (i) PV installations on buildings 
(100-250KW) Both types of aid are granted 
for 20 years, (ii) 100% Concentrated Solar 
< 12MWp, (iii) 50% Concentrated Solar < 
12 MWp, (iv) Solar Tracker < 12 MWp, (v) 
Solar - Car Parking Shades < 4.5 MWp, (vi) 
Solar on Buildings < 3MWp and (vii) Solar 
on Buildings between 3MWp and 12MWp 
Price type(s): (i) Variable premium (pay as 
bid auction), price is weighted average 
from auctions under ‘Appel d’offers portant 
sur des installations photovoltaïques sur 
bâtiment de puissance crête comprise 
entre 100 et 250 kW’, (ii) – (vii) Variable 
premium (pay as bid auction), price is 
weighted average 
Bidding process volumes: (i) volume 
requested: 80MW, volume participating: 
333MW, volume awarded: 82MW; (ii) 
volume requested: unavailable, volume 
participating: 41.7MW, volume awarded: 
22.1MW; (iii) volume requested: 
unavailable, volume participating: 187.9 
MW, volume awarded: 80.8MW; (iv) 
volume requested: unavailable, volume 
participating: 1240.3MW, volume 
awarded: 102.7MW; (v) volume 
requested: unavailable, volume 
participating: 68.4MW, volume awarded: 
60.2MW; (vi) volume requested: 
unavailable, volume participating: 
167.6MW, volume awarded: 102MW; and 
(v) volume requested: unavailable, volume 
participating: 20.5MW, volume awarded: 
12.2MW 
 
Details: 
State aid Decision(s): SA.40349 
Overview: Set quarterly by CRE, rates 
given as of December 2014. Aid is granted 
for a period of 20 years. (i) Less than 9KW 
- Built into the frame of Buildings, (ii) Less 
than 36KW - Integrated but not built into 
buildings, (iii) Between 36KW and 100KW - 
integrated but not built into buildings, (iv) 
less than 12 MW (Ground installations or 
Buildings). 
Price type(s): Feed-in tariff 
State aid exemption(s): From 2016 this 
would have been covered by points 125 
and 127 EEAG (see SA.40349). Additional 
exemptions for larger installations may 
apply, but this scheme fell outside the 
sample for Q2. 
Case Study 5: Germany 2017 (large vs small plants) 
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Technology: Offshore wind 
Bidding process price(s), cents (EUR) 
per KWh: 
Administratively set price(s), cents 
(EUR) per KWh: 
0.44 
(i) 3.9 
(ii) 3.12 
Details: 
State aid Decision(s): SA.45461 
Overview: First call for existing projects 
according to § 26 WindSeeG. Auction 
included Zero subsidy bids. Aid can be 
granted under the EEG for a maximum of 
20 years. 
Price type(s): Variable premium (pay as 
bid auction), price is weighted average of 
successful bids.  
Bidding process volumes: (i) volume 
requested: 1,550MW, volume 
participating: unavailable, volume 
awarded: 1,610MW 
 
Details: 
State aid Decision(s): SA.45461 
Overview: Set under § 47 of EEG 2017. Aid 
can be granted under the EEG for a 
maximum of 20 years. 
Price type(s): Feed in Tariff. (i) Producers 
under 100KW (unclear whether offshore 
wind farms this small exist), (ii) producers 
over 100KW receive 80% of (i) for up to 6 
months a year in exceptional 
circumstances (tariff is designed as a fall 
back if producers cannot sell their 
electricity directly to the market) 
State aid exemption(s): (i) point 125 
EEAG, (ii) justified as rarely used measure 
of last resort (see SA.45461, paragraphs 
188-190) 
Case Study 6: Germany 2017 (large vs small plants) 
Technology: Onshore wind 
Bidding process price(s), cents (EUR) 
per KWh: 
Administratively set price(s), cents 
(EUR) per KWh: 
4.53 
(i) 8.38 
(ii) 4.66 
(iii) 7.98 
(iv) 4.26 
 (v) 6.70   
(vi) 3.73  
Details: 
State aid Decision(s): SA.45461 
Details: 
State aid Decision(s): SA.45461 
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Overview: May, August and November 
2017 Auctions. Aid can be granted under 
the EEG for a maximum of 20 years. 
Price type(s): Variable premium (Pay as bid 
auction, with the exception of energy 
communities where the auction is pay as 
clear). Price is weighted average of 
successful bids. 
Bidding process volumes: (i) volume 
requested: 2,800MW, volume 
participating: 7654.5MW, volume 
awarded: 2819.9MW 
f 
Overview: Set under § 47 EEG 2017. For 
installations under 750KW. Aid can be 
granted under the EEG for a maximum of 
20 years. 
Price type(s): (i) and (ii) are a variable 
premium. (i) is for the first 5 years after 
commissioning (this can be extended if the 
investment yield is low) and after this it is 
(ii). (iii) and (iv) are a feed-in tariff option 
for installations under 100KW where the 
feed-in tariff is (i) and (ii) but reduced by 
0.4 cents (EUR) per KWh (§ 53 no. 2 EEG 
2017). (v) and (vi) are a feed in tariff for 
installations over 100KW available for 6 
months of a year in exceptional 
circumstances set at 80% of (i) and (ii) 
(this is a fall back tariff if producers cannot 
sell their electricity directly into the 
market) 
State aid exemption(s): (i)-(ii) unknown, 
scheme fell outside the sample for Q2; (iii)-
(iv) point 125 EEAG; (v)-(vi) justified as 
rarely used measure of last resort (see 
SA.45461, paragraphs 188-190) 
Case Study 7: Germany 2017 (large vs small plants) 
Technology: Biomass 
Bidding process price(s), cents (EUR) 
per KWh: 
Administratively set price(s), cents 
(EUR) per KWh: 
i)  14.30177 
  ii)  14.81 
 iii)  16.90 
 iv)  14.13 
  i) 13.12 
 ii) 13.32 
iii) 11.49 
iv) 10.66 
 v) 9.19 
vi) 8.23 
vii) 4.57 
                                                            
177 This is the price quoted in Annex 1.1. The prices (ii) to (iv) are not quoted in Annex 1.1 as they did not result 
from separate bidding processes; they are simply added detail on subcategories of bids in the bidding process for 
(i) to assist the comparison with the administratively set support rates. 
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Details: 
State aid Decision(s): SA.45461 
Overview: September 2017 Auction. New 
providers of 150KW to 20MW must the 
enter auction; auction also open to existing 
providers and installations under 150KW. 
Aid is limited to 10 years for existing 
producers and 20 years for new 
installations.   
Price type(s): Variable premium (Pay as bid 
for installations over 150KW, pay as clear 
for installations equal to or under 150KW). 
Prices are weighted average of successful 
bids. (i) is the overall weighted average 
price for the auction, (ii) weighted average 
price for new plants, (iii) weighted average 
price for existing plants (equal to or less 
than 150KW), (iv) weighted average price 
for existing plants (>150KW) 
Bidding process volumes: volume 
requested: 122.45MW, volume 
participating: 40.91MW, volume awarded: 
27.55MW (volume participating is 
below volume requested)  
 
Details: 
State aid Decision(s): SA.45461 
Overview: Set under § 42 EEG 2017. Aid 
can be granted under the EEG for a 
maximum of 20 years. Price type(s): (i) 
feed-in tariff, installations under 100KW; 
(ii) variable premium, installations under 
100KW; (iii) variable premium, 
installations of 100KW-150KW; 
installations over 100KW can receive a 
reduced (80%) feed-in tariff for 6 months 
of a year in exceptional circumstances (a 
fall back tariff if producers cannot sell their 
electricity directly into the market), (iv) is 
for installations 100-150KW, (v) is for 
installations 150-500KW, (vi) is for 
installations 500KW-5MW and (vii) is for 
installations 5-20MW. 
State aid exemption(s): (i) point 125 
EEAG; (ii) unknown, scheme fell outside 
the sample for Q2; (iii)-(iv) justified as 
rarely used measure of last resort (see 
SA.45461, paragraphs 188-190) 
Case Study 8: Greece 2018 (large vs small plants) 
Technology: Onshore wind 
Bidding process price(s), cents (EUR) 
per KWh: 
Administratively set price(s), cents 
(EUR) per KWh: 
6.42 9.8 
Details: 
State aid Decision(s): SA.48143 
Overview: July and December 2018 
tenders. Only onshore wind installations 
between 3MW and 50MW are eligible. Aid 
granted for 20 years 
Price type(s): Variable premium (pay as 
bid), price is weighted average of July and 
December tenders 
Details: 
State aid Decision(s): SA.44666 
Overview: Aid awarded under art.4 para.1b 
Law No.4414/2016. Aid awarded for 20 
years. Plants less than or equal to 3MW are 
eligible. 
Price type(s): feed-in tariff 
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Bidding process volumes: volume 
requested: unavailable, volume 
participating: unavailable, volume 
awarded: 330.58MW 
 
State aid exemption(s): points 125 and 
127 EEAG 
Case Study 9: Malta 2018 vs 2019 (between year comparison) 
Technology: Solar 
Bidding process price(s), cents (EUR) 
per KWh: 
Administratively set price(s), cents 
(EUR) per KWh: 
13.42 
i) 15.5 
ii) 14 
Details: 
State aid Decision(s): SA.43995 
Overview: Two 2018 auctions for solar PV 
installations with capacity of > 1000KWp. 
Aid granted for 20 years.  
Price type(s): Variable Premium (pay as 
bid), price is weighted average of the two 
auctions. 
Bidding process volumes: volume 
requested: 50MW, volume participating: 
33.68MW, volume awarded: 25.88MW 
 
Details: 
State Aid Decision Number: SA.51961 
Overview: Awarded under Second 
Schedule of LN2, 2019. Aid granted for a 
period of 20 years. (i) Installations of 1KWp 
but less than 40KWp; (ii) Installations of 
40KWp but less than 1MWp. 
Price type(s): Feed-in tariff 
State aid exemption(s): GBER article 42 
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Annex 2 – Data on RES aid covered by EEAG and GBER exemptions  
(see accompanying Excel file) 
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Annex 3.1 – Aid levels per unit of installed CHP capacity  
(see accompanying Excel file) 
Annex 3.2 – Additional analysis of aid for high efficiency CHP 
Figure A3.2.1 Average lifetime aid for case study fuel cell plants (EUR per 
KW of electrical capacity) by sampled Member State, 2014-2019  
 
Source: Calculations by Centre for Competition Policy, University of East Anglia  utilizing information from national 
authority websites, national authority documents and European Commission decision documents. 
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Figure A3.2.2  Average lifetime aid for case study plants over 1MW and up 
to 15MW (EUR per KW of electrical capacity) by sampled Member State, 2014-
2019178  
 
Source: Calculations by Centre for Competition Policy, University of East Anglia  utilizing information from national 
authority websites, national authority documents and European Commission decision documents. 
                                                            
178 France is not featured on this graph as its sampled scheme is for plants not exceeding 1MW. 
 185 
 
Figure A3.2.3  Average lifetime aid for case study plants under 100KW of 
electrical capacity (EUR per KW of heat capacity) by sampled Member State, 
2014-2019  
 
Source: Calculations by Centre for Competition Policy, University of East Anglia  utilizing information from national 
authority websites, national authority documents and European Commission decision documents. 
Figure A3.2.4  Average lifetime aid for case study plants 100KW to 1MW of 
electrical capacity (EUR per kW of heat capacity) by sampled Member State, 
2014-2019 
 
 186 
 
Source: Calculations by Centre for Competition Policy, University of East Anglia  utilizing information from national 
authority websites, national authority documents and European Commission decision documents. 
Figure A3.2.5  Average lifetime aid for case study plants over 1MW and up 
to 15MW of electrical capacity (EUR per KW of heat capacity) by sampled 
Member State, 2014-2019 
 
Source: Calculations by Centre for Competition Policy, University of East Anglia  utilizing information from national 
authority websites, national authority documents and European Commission decision documents. 
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Figure A3.2.6  Average lifetime aid for case study internal combustion 
engine plants (EUR per KW of heat capacity) by sampled Member State, 2014-
2019 
 
Source: Calculations by Centre for Competition Policy, University of East Anglia  utilizing information from national 
authority websites, national authority documents and European Commission decision documents. 
Figure A3.2.7  Average lifetime aid for case study fuel cell plants (EUR per 
KW of heat capacity) by sampled Member State, 2014-2019  
 
Source: Calculations by Centre for Competition Policy, University of East Anglia  utilizing information from national 
authority websites, national authority documents and European Commission decision documents. 
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Figure A3.2.8  Percentage change in the total electrical capacity of high-
efficiency cogeneration plants for sampled Member States between 2016 and 
2017 
 
 
Source: Calculations by Centre for Competition Policy, University of East Anglia using Eurostat data 
Figure A3.2.9 Total CHP electrical capacity (KW per capita) for sampled 
Member States, 2011-2017 
 
Source: Calculations by Centre for Competition Policy, University of East Anglia using Eurostat data 
Table A3.2.1: Case study comparisons of prices between CHP aid awarded 
through bidding processes and administratively set support 
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Case Study 1: Poland 2021 vs 2019 (between year comparison)   
Bidding process premium, cents 
(EUR) per KWh: 
Administratively set premium(s), 
cents (EUR) per KWh: 
1.97 
i) 3.29 
                          ii) 0.25 
 
Details: 
State Aid Decision Number: SA.51192 
Overview: Awarded at ‘aukcji na premię 
kogeneracyjną Nr ACHP/1/2019’  auction 
for new cogeneration units ≥1MW and 
<50MW (Or significantly modernized 
cogeneration units, investment has to be 
25-50% of the cost of a comparable new 
build site)  
Premium type(s): Stated price is paid on 
100% of electricity supplied to grid, 
however, if an installation supplies a heat 
network with less than 70% of it generated 
heat the price decreases in proportion to 
the share of heat supplied.  
Bidding process volumes: volume 
requested: 100MW, volume participating: 
Unavailable, volume awarded: 3,633,079 
MWh 
 
Details: 
State Aid Decision Number: SA.51192 
Overview: Aid granted under Article. 56 
section 1 and art. 104 of the Act of 
December 14, 2018 on the promotion of 
electricity from high-efficiency 
cogeneration (Journal of Laws of 2019, 
items 42 and 412). Aid for all categories of 
CHP is awarded administratively in 2019. 
Premiums are for new installations of under 
50MW.  
Premium type(s): (i) Rates for new 
installations  fired with gaseous fuels. (ii) is 
paid to installations not fired by gas, solid 
fuels or biomass. (Installations fired by 
solid fuels and Biomass receive no 
premium).  
Administratively set support volumes: 
50MW (Total estimated figure for 
construction/significant refurbishment) 
Case Study 2: Germany 2017 vs 2016 (between year comparison) 
Bidding process premium(s), cents 
(EUR) per KWh: 
Administratively set premium(s), 
cents (EUR) per KWh: 
4.05 
i)4.4 
ii) 3.1 
iii)2.4 
iv)1.8 
v) 1.5 
vi) 1.0 
 
vii) 4.7 
viii) 3.4 
ix) 2.7 
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x) 2.1 
xi) 1.8 
xii) 1.3 
 
                          xiii) 5.0 
                          xiv) 3.7 
                          xv) 3.0 
                          xvi) 2.4 
                          xvii) 2.1 
                          xviii) 1.6 
Details: 
State Aid Decision Number: SA.42393 
Overview: December 2017 tender for 
CHP, new or modernized plants with 1-
50MW of capacity. Aid awarded under 
KWKG 2016. Also see KWK Tendering 
Ordinance - KWKAusV 
Premium type(s): Fixed Premium. The 
weighted average premium is quoted. 
Bidding process volumes: volume 
requested: 100MW, volume participating: 
Unavailable, volume awarded: 81.98MW 
(volume awarded is below volume 
requested) 
Details: 
State Aid Decision Number: SA.42393 
Overview: Aid is paid as a fixed premium 
under KWKG (Heat and Power Generation 
Act) 2016. Aid is payable for up to 30,000 
or 60,000 hours depending on the size and 
sector of the plant. Support level does not 
vary by fuel type; biogas, biomass, natural 
gas, oil, waste and waste heat are eligible. 
Premium type(s): Fixed premium 
(i) > 250KW, ≤2MW; (ii) >2MW. (iii) and 
(iv) are  lower rates for Energy Intensive 
Users, (iii) > 250KW, ≤2MW; (iv) >2MW. 
(v) and (vi) are the levels for those 
supplying third parties using a private 
network (industrial parks), (v) > 250KW, 
≤2MW; (vi) >2MW.  
(vii)-(xii) Include an additional premium of 
0.3 cents (EUR) per KWh for installations 
subject to the Greenhouse gas emission 
trading law.  
(xiii)-(xviii) Include an additional premium 
of 0.6 cents (EUR) for installations 
replacing coal-fired or lignite plants with 
gas-fired installations.   
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Annex 4.1 – Auction/allocation data for capacity mechanisms  
(see accompanying Excel file) 
Annex 4.2 – Derating factor tables for the Republic of Ireland 
In the Republic of Ireland derating factors vary both by technology and the size of plant. 
Here we provide copies of the tables providing the derating factors for all possible 
combinations. 
2018-2019: The following table is taken from ‘Final Auction Information Pack 2018/2019 
T-1’, available at: https://www.sem-o.com/documents/general-publications/18_19-T-1-
Final-Auction-Information-Pack.pdf 
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2019-2020: The following tables are taken from ‘Final Auction Information Pack 2019/2020 
T-1’, available at: https://www.sem-o.com/documents/general-publications/Final-
Auction-Information-Pack_FAIP1920T-1.pdf 
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2022-2023: The following tables are taken from ‘Final Auction Information Pack 2018/2019 
T-1’, available at: https://www.sem-o.com/documents/general-publications/Final-
Auction-Information-Pack_FAIP2223T-4.pdf 
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Annex 4.3 – Obligations and penalties for those providing capacity 
Following guidance from the Commission we focus on obligations and penalties related to 
the delivery of capacity, as opposed those relating to reporting requirements. 
4.3.1 Belgium SA.48648 Strategic Reserve  
4.3.1.1 Applicable Obligations of Beneficiaries 
Obligation to deliver capacity: The Strategic Reserve is split into a generating capacity 
element, the Strategic Generation Reserve (SGR) and a demand side element, the 
Strategic Demand Reserve (SDR). The SGR can be operational for any number of hours 
during the winter period and the SDR can only be operational for 100 hours per winter 
period, with two possible availability durations, 4 hours and 12 hours.179 
SGR units have a ‘warm up’ phase of 5 hours, when they are turning the asset on. After 
this they have a maximum ‘ramp up’ phase of 1.5 hours. The TSO can cancel the capacity 
obligation during warm up or ramp up.180  
Obligations to make power plant/demand response projects operational by a 
certain date: The strategic reserve only operates over winter (1st November to 31st March 
each year).181 SGR providers have to register by the 31st of July the year before the winter 
in question.182  
Testing Requirements: At least one activation test per asset per winter, each test has 
both a ‘start and control’ and an ‘energy criterion’ to check that the provider promptly 
makes the promised amount of energy available for the required amount of time. 
Additionally, each asset must be tested at the start of the winter.183 
4.3.1.2 Penalties  
Penalties are split into two categories:  
Availability Penalties: These are MW-based penalties for not having capacity available. 
They consist of reimbursement plus 30% for both the SDR and SGR.184 
Activation Penalties: These are MWh-based penalties for when beneficiaries fail to 
activate when called on to do so: 
There are different levels for the SDR and SGR: 
SDR: 
1) If volume reduced is smaller than it should be, the difference is paid as a penalty (with 
a tolerance of 1%) 
                                                            
179 See https://ec.europa.eu/competition/state_aid/cases/272020/272020_1964726_118_2.pdf p11. 
180 See https://ec.europa.eu/competition/state_aid/cases/272020/272020_1964726_118_2.pdf p15. 
181 See https://ec.europa.eu/competition/state_aid/cases/272020/272020_1964726_118_2.pdf p2. 
182 See https://ec.europa.eu/competition/state_aid/cases/272020/272020_1964726_118_2.pdf p13. 
183 See https://ec.europa.eu/competition/state_aid/cases/272020/272020_1964726_118_2.pdf p12. 
184 See Functioning Rules 2019-2020, https://www.elia.be/en/electricity-market-and-system/adequacy/strategic-
reserves  p17. 
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2) If volume is not ‘shut down’ within the disaster down period, a 3 day lump-sum penalty 
is applied.185 (1 and 2 are cumulative)  
3) After 3 incidents which trigger 1 or 2, or if they turn off under 10% of the required 
demand in any activation situation, or if they turn off less than 30% of the required 
demand across all their activations over one winter period, an SDR is forbidden from 
participating in the following auction.186 
SGR: 
1) If the volume injected is less than it should be, any penalty is double the activation fee. 
(Tolerance of 1%) 
2) If the volume is not provided during ramp up, a 3 day lump-sum penalty is applied.187 
4.3.2 France SA.39621 Capacity Mechanism 
4.3.2.1 Applicable Obligations of Beneficiaries 
Obligation to deliver capacity: Note that the Capacity Mechanism is a certificate scheme 
and therefore there is an obligation for producers to deliver capacity and to register for 
capacity certificates, see excerpt from SA.39621 below188:   
“Law No 2010-1488 of 7 December 2010 on the new organisation of the electricity market 
(‘the NOME Act’) made it obligatory for electricity suppliers, network operators (for losses), 
and consumers (for consumption outside a supply contract) – ‘the suppliers’ – to contribute 
to the security of electricity supply in France in line with their own and their customers’ 
power and energy consumption. In order to fulfil this obligation, every year each of them 
must prove that they have a certain volume of capacity guarantees in relation to their own 
and their customers’ peak-period consumption. 
Capacity guarantees are obtained by suppliers either directly for resources they own 
(generation plants or demand-side response capacities), or must be purchased on a 
decentralised market from other holders (capacity operators, other suppliers, traders, 
consumers who are their own suppliers, etc.). 
Operators of generation or demand-side response capacity (‘capacity operators’ or 
‘operators’), on the other hand, are obliged to have their capacity certified by the operator 
of the public electricity transmission grid (RTE). Operators will be allocated capacity 
guarantees by RTE according to the projected contribution of their plant to reducing the 
risk of shortfall at times of peak demand. 
Capacity guarantees are tradable and transferable. The purchase by suppliers of capacity 
guarantees from capacity operators to meet their legal obligation will be organised on the 
basis of a decentralised market for capacity guarantees.’’ 
For the case of this document, beneficiaries are taken to mean capacity operators. See the 
further excerpt from SA.39621 below189: 
                                                            
185 This is 3 x 24 hours x the ‘booking price’ for capacity. 
186 See Functioning Rules 2019-2020 https://www.elia.be/en/electricity-market-and-system/adequacy/strategic-
reserves p17. 
187 See Functioning Rules 2019-2020 https://www.elia.be/en/electricity-market-and-system/adequacy/strategic-
reserves, p36. 
188 See https://ec.europa.eu/competition/state_aid/cases/261326/261326_1873332_314_5.pdf. 
189 See https://ec.europa.eu/competition/state_aid/cases/261326/261326_1873332_314_5.pdf, p5-6. 
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“Obligations of capacity operators and certification principles 
A request for certification must be made to RTE by the operator of every generation plant 
(a technologically neutral mechanism) connected to the public transmission grid or to the 
public distribution network. A request for certification may be made to RTE for every 
demand-side response facility, whichever network it is connected to. It is therefore the 
capacity operator who makes an initial estimate of the capacity volume that it could have 
available during peak consumption periods (PP2) in a given delivery year.  
There are between 10 and 25 PP2 days in a delivery year. In addition, PP1 days190 are 
necessarily PP2 days. PP2 days that are not PP1 days are selected one day in advance by 
RTE on the basis of stress on the electricity system. The time-slots during the PP2 days 
are the same as those for PP1 days. There are therefore between 100 and 250 PP2 peak 
hours per year. 
The certified level is then calculated by RTE on the basis of the data submitted using the 
calculation methods laid down in the legal basis for the mechanism. Corrections are 
applied, for example, to take into account of the potential number of successive days of 
activation of the certified capacities, or the actual contribution to reducing the shortfall risk 
when a capacity’s primary energy source is subject to the vagaries of the weather. 
The operator may then change its availability forecasts throughout the duration of the 
mechanism, including during the delivery year, using a rebalancing mechanism. 
Rebalancing corresponds to ‘re-certification’ of the capacity and enables the operator to 
adjust its forecasts as and when new information on its capacity becomes available. 
Rebalancing may be upwards or downwards. 
This declaration system is supplemented by a capacity control system: the principle is that 
all certified capacities must be activated at least once per year. Random tests are made 
for each capacity without notifying the operator in advance. A capacity may not be tested 
more than three times per delivery period.’’ 
Obligations to make power plant/demand response projects operational by a 
certain date: Existing production capacity can begin to be certified 4 years before the 
delivery period and must be certified 3 years before the delivery period. Projected 
production capacities can request to be certified up to two months before the start of a 
delivery period.191 
Testing Requirements: Activation tests involving random tests for each capacity unit 
with no notice given to the operator. Certified capacity must be tested at least once a year, 
but a capacity unit cannot be tested more than three times per delivery period.192 
4.3.2.2 Penalties  
The capacity mechanism includes a balancing mechanism whereby RPCs (certificate 
portfolio managers: operators or legal bodies responsible for their obligations under the 
balancing mechanism) have to pay the difference between the forecast and actual capacity 
                                                            
190 Note that PP1 days are days for which suppliers have to hold certificates. 
191 See https://ec.europa.eu/competition/state_aid/cases/261326/261326_1711140_20_2.pdf p7. 
192 See https://ec.europa.eu/competition/state_aid/cases/261326/261326_1711140_20_2.pdf  p12. 
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availability.193 If significant rebalancing takes place, then RPCs can be subject to a 
penalty.194  
4.3.3 Germany SA.43735 ABLAV Interruptibility Schemes 
4.3.3.1 Applicable Obligations of Beneficiaries  
Obligations to deliver capacity when required: The scheme is a demand side response 
(DSR) scheme; it allows the German Transmission System Operator (TSO) to enter into 
contracts with electricity consumers who receive payments in exchange for committing to 
reducing their consumption.  
TSOs are allowed to contract up to 1500 MW of demand response:  
• 750MW of Immediately Interruptible Load: 350 milliseconds notice195 
• 750MW of Quickly Interruptible Load: 15 minutes notice196   
In order to be eligible for participation in the ABLAV scheme, there is a minimum capacity 
threshold of 10 MW. The aggregation of loads is allowed. Finally, the DSR providers need 
to be connected to a grid that is not more than two voltage levels lower than the 
transmission grid.197 
The requirements are such that the demand side response does not have to be available 
100% of the time. The maximum non-availability during the weekly contract is 120 x 15-
minute blocks. The DSR providers must have demonstrated that they can deliver load 
reduction for a consecutive period of one hour. A load reduction cannot last longer than 
eight hours, i.e. 32 x 15-minute blocks.198 
Obligations to make power plant/demand response projects operational by a 
certain date: No further relevant information available. 
Testing Requirements: 
The TSOs carry out Remote Controlled Release tests to ensure that the DSR provider is 
able to switch off capacity. These are designed to not interrupt power. In addition, 
providers have to prove they can hit certain criteria when connected to the network. These 
are detailed in 3.2.6.1 and 3.2.6.2 of the switchable loads prequalification requirements199 
and are detailed below: 
3.2.6.1 SOL - immediately switchable load: proof of the amount and duration of 
switching power (§ 5 and § 2 No. 10 AbLaV) 
The ability to deliver the SOL in terms of level and duration of the load reduction is 
demonstrated by the following evidence: 
                                                            
193 See https://ec.europa.eu/competition/state_aid/cases/261326/261326_1873332_314_5.pdf p5. 
194 See https://ec.europa.eu/competition/state_aid/cases/261326/261326_1873332_314_5.pdf p42. 
195 See https://www.next-kraftwerke.de/wissen/abschaltverordnung. 
196 See https://ec.europa.eu/competition/state_aid/cases/264060/264060_1841480_86_2.pdf, p2. 
197 See Switchable Loads: Prequalification Requirements)  Präqualifikationsanforderungen für abschaltbare 
Lasten der deutschen Übertragungsnetzbetreiber 3.2.6.1 available through 
https://www.regelleistung.net/ext/static/abla. 
198 See https://ec.europa.eu/competition/state_aid/cases/264060/264060_1841480_86_2.pdf p3. 
199 See ‘Präqualifikationsanforderungen für abschaltbare Lasten der deutschen Übertragungsnetzbetreiber’, 
downloadable at https://www.regelleistung.net/ext/static/abla. 
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• Gradient detection: The provider must demonstrate that shutdown is triggered within 
350 milliseconds. Documentary proof of the switch-off process must be provided by a 
power/time diagram with a suitable minimum temporal resolution. The performance 
measurements at the transfer points, e.g. to the upstream network operator should also 
be provided. 
• Evidence to evaluate the quality of service: When a disconnectable load is switched 
off, the reference value used to determine the disconnection performance is the minimum 
power consumption. When switching off, in every minute the shutdown power must fall 
within 100% and 120% of the requested amount.  
The provider indicates compliance with the requirements described above in the form of a 
gapless operation log. The operating log includes the period from 15 minutes before the 
beginning of the reduction of power consumption to 15 minutes after the return to full 
power consumption. 
The operation log of the shutdown process contains the following data in tabular form and 
graphical form according to the specifications of the connecting TSO: 
1) Time (in hh: mm) 
2) Power consumption (1-minute average, MW with three decimal places) 
3) Planned minimum power consumption of the quarter-hour concerned (constant over the 
quarter of an hour; 1-minute average value; MW with three decimal places) 
4) Target value of the reduction capacity (1-minute mean value, MW with three decimal 
places) 
5) Power reduction provided as a difference between (3) and (2) 
The measurement accuracy must be commensurate with the amount of prequalified 
shutdown power. The provider will provide written information on how they measured the 
minimum and maximum call duration and, where appropriate, information on intermediate 
call periods and outside call periods.  
The prequalification requirements have to be demonstrated for at least 15 minutes.   
3.2.6.2 SNL - Fast switchable load: proof of the amount and duration of the load 
switching power (§ 5 (1) no. 2 b and no. 3 AbLaV) 
The DSR provider checks that the shutdown takes place within 15 minutes after the start 
of the shutdown time notified by the TSO. This check also includes the performance at the 
transfer points, e.g. to the upstream network operator. 
Providers of Fast Switchable Loads must demonstrate the following: 
Assessment of the quality of service: When a disconnectable load is switched off, the 
reference value used to determine the disconnection performance is the minimum power 
consumption. The in every minute the average power reduction must fall within 100% and 
120% of the requested amount. 
The provider indicates compliance with the requirements described above in the form of a 
gapless operation log. The operation log includes the period from 15 minutes before the 
beginning of the reduction of power consumption up to 15 minutes after the return to full 
power consumption. 
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The operation log of the shutdown process should contain the following data in tabular and 
graphical form according to the specifications of the connecting TSO: 
1) Time (in hh: mm) 
2) Power consumption (1-minute average, MW with three decimal places) 
3) Planned minimum power consumption of the quarter-hour concerned (constant 
over the quarter of an hour; 1-minute average value; MW with three decimal places) 
4) Target value of the reduction capacity (1-minute mean value, MW with three decimal 
places) 
5) Power reduction provided as a difference between (3) and (2) 
The measurement accuracy must be commensurate with the amount of prequalified 
shutdown power. The provider will provide written information on how they measured the 
minimum and maximum call duration and, where appropriate information on intermediate 
call periods and outside call periods.  
The prequalification requirements have to be demonstrated for at least 15 minutes.   
4.3.3.2 Penalties  
If the availability falls below the minimum availability bid, then the provider does not 
receive payment for the entire tender period. 
If a provider is grossly negligent/intentionally reports that their DSR is available when it is 
not then they lose their right to participate in tenders for two years. They also lose the 
right to payment for the tender period when the negligence occurred.200 
4.3.4 France S.A.48490 Erasure Scheme 
4.3.4.1 Applicable Obligations of Beneficiaries 
Obligations to deliver capacity when required: The scheme is for companies to deliver 
erasure (Demand Side Response).  
Sites under 1MW can enter into contracts of up to 4 years. Sites over 1MW can enter into 
contracts of up to 6 years. The contracts can last for up to 20 days per year. (Unless the 
user is also participating in the separate fast and complementary reserves scheme)201 
Obligations to make power plant/demand response projects operational by a 
certain date: Operators that wish to enter the scheme must register and have their 
capacity certified at least 2 months before the delivery year commences.202 
Testing Requirements: A maximum of three tests can occur. A test is considered 
successful when the realized power reduction is greater or equal, on each half-hourly step 
of the test, to the power for which the provider of the demand response has committed.203 
                                                            
200 See https://www.gesetze-im-internet.de/ablav_2016/BJNR198400016.html recital 14. 
201 See https://ec.europa.eu/competition/state_aid/cases/272157/272157_1966994_95_2.pdf p11. 
202 See https://ec.europa.eu/competition/state_aid/cases/261326/261326_1711140_20_2.pdf p7. 
203 See https://ec.europa.eu/competition/state_aid/cases/272157/272157_1966994_95_2.pdf p18. 
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4.3.4.2 Penalties  
Failure to meet testing requirements or to provide erasure can lead to a reduction in 
remuneration, or for repeat offences no remuneration and additional penalties.204 
4.3.5 France SA.40454 Additional Capacity (Brittany) 
4.3.5.1 Applicable Obligations of Beneficiaries  
Obligations to deliver capacity when required: This scheme relates to a tender for the 
installation and operation of a combined cycle gas plant in Brittany.205 The winner had to 
offer guaranteed capacity of 450MW (+15/ -10%)206. The chosen plant needs to be able 
to supply power to the activation service in 15 hours (when machine stopped) or two hours 
(when machine in operation) and be able to supply output to the adjustment mechanism 
(tertiary reserve) within 3 hours (when in operation) or 8 hours (when off).207 
Obligations to make power plant/demand response projects operational by a 
certain date: The commissioning date of the plants was given a 25% weighting in deciding 
which plant to select.208 
Testing Requirements: No details have been found. The relevant French authority has 
been contacted, but we are yet to receive a response.  
4.3.5.2 Penalties  
No details have been found. The relevant French authority has been contacted, but we are 
yet to receive a response. 
4.3.6 Greece SA.48780 Interruptibility Scheme 
4.3.6.1 Applicable Obligations of Beneficiaries 
Obligation to deliver capacity: The scheme is a demand side response scheme, and it 
is split into two auctions (types): 
Type 1: An auction to procure up to 1000MW of capacity. Providers of this capacity have 
to be able to reduce their consumption within 5 minutes and remain available for 48 hours, 
with a maximum of 288 hours per year. Maximum of 3 power reduction orders can occur 
per month, with a period of 1 day between orders. 
Type 2: An auction to procure up to 600MW of capacity. Providers of this capacity have to 
be able to reduce their consumption within 5 minutes and remain available for 1 hour, for 
a maximum of 24 hours a year. A maximum of 4 power reduction orders per month can 
occur with a period of 5 days between orders.209 
Obligations to make power plant/demand response projects operational by a 
certain date: Auctions are held quarterly, approximately a week in advance of when 
                                                            
204 See https://ec.europa.eu/competition/state_aid/cases/272157/272157_1966994_95_2.pdf p12. 
205 See https://ec.europa.eu/competition/state_aid/cases/261325/261325_1711139_35_3.pdf p2. 
206 See https://ec.europa.eu/competition/state_aid/cases/261325/261325_1711139_35_3.pdf p8. 
207 See https://ec.europa.eu/competition/state_aid/cases/261325/261325_1711139_35_3.pdf p20. 
208 See https://ec.europa.eu/competition/state_aid/cases/261325/261325_1711139_35_3.pdf p4. 
209 See https://ec.europa.eu/competition/state_aid/cases/272092/272092_1984402_93_2.pdf p2. 
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beneficiaries need to make their power available. Applicants need to register on the 
interruptibility register in order to apply for auctions.210   
Testing Requirements: ADMIE (independent Power Transmission Operator) randomly 
issues tests to check that the capacity and availability of beneficiaries. If they fail these 
tests they are subject to penalties.211 
4.3.6.2 Penalties  
For each Power Reduction Order issued by the Administrator, a value called the NCC is 
calculated. 
 
 
 
 
MCLi : The Maximum Agreed Power in MW for the TSI Type for which a Power Reduction 
Order was issued. 
MILi : The Maximum Intermittent Load in MW for the TSI Type for which a Power Reduction 
Order was issued. 
Lt : The average load of the Intermittent Consumer in MW as determined by the 
measurement of the energy consumed during the period t. 
NNC : The number of periods during which the Power Limitation Order was not observed. 
Nt : The total number of periods when the Reduction Order was valid. 
t: A measurement period equal to 15 minutes. 
i: Indicator specifying the Interrupted Load Service Type, i.e. Type 1 or Type 2. 
Failure to comply with a Power Reduction Order is defined as a case where the NCC is 
greater than 0.25. Failure to comply with a Power Reduction Order will result in the 
imposition of a penalty on the consumer providing demand response.  
The penalty for the first non-compliance with a Power Reduction Order (as defined by the 
NCC formula) is calculated as the total fee of the consumer providing demand side response 
during the contract.  
If the demand side response consumer fails to comply for a second time, the contract shall 
be terminated and the consumer shall be obliged to pay back all the remuneration received 
under this contract and in addition to pay the System Operator a penalty equal to 20% of 
the total remuneration during the contract. From the date of termination of the contract 
the consumer shall be deleted from the Interruptibility Register.  
The above penalties shall be calculated by the System Operator on a monthly basis and a 
be sent monthly to the demand side response consumer no later than thirty days after the 
month concerned. The relevant invoice shall be payable within ninety days of its 
                                                            
210 See Ministerial Decision ΑΠΕΗΛ/Γ/Φ1/οικ 184898. 
211 See Ministerial Decision ΑΠΕΗΛ/Γ/Φ1/οικ 184898 Article 4, Section 2. 
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issue. Revenue received by the Transmission System Operator from penalties is credited 
to the Special Supply Security Reserve Account. 
In addition, if a consumer fails to comply with a power reduction order twice they cannot 
re-apply for one year.212 
4.3.7 Greece SA.50152 Flexibility Mechanism 
4.3.7.1 Applicable Obligations of Beneficiaries  
Obligations to deliver capacity when required: Plants have to be able to hit a ramping 
rate of 8MW per minute for at least three hours in order to participate.213 In the first period 
(until March 2019) only closed cycle gas turbines, open cycle gas turbines, CHP and hydro-
electric plants were eligible for the mechanism. In the second period DSR and storage are 
also eligible.214 
Fossil fuel technologies have to confirm that they can provide the required service on a 
day-to-day basis.215 Hydro plants are de-rated to take into account seasonal variations.   
Obligations to make power plant/demand response projects operational by a 
certain date: Providers must register with the register of flexible providers in order to 
participate in the auctions.216 The first auction covers the period 1st January 2019 to 31st 
March 2019, while the second auction covers April 2019 to December 2019.217  
Testing Requirements: No details have been found. The relevant French authority has 
been contacted, but we are yet to receive a response. 
4.3.7.2 Penalties  
If providers are unavailable, the following penalties are applied: 
 a. The measured historical available capacity is reduced which reduces potential revenues 
in future periods.  
b. Through the ex-post Imbalance Settlement mechanism, the power plant is obliged to 
pay the non-produced energy at the imbalance price, which is higher (by 10%-20%) than 
the received ex-ante spot price. 
c. Additional administratively defined Non-Compliance Charges apply for failing to follow 
the instructions set by the TSO for energy production and ancillary service provision, or for 
deviations from declared availability and techno-economic data related to articles 18, 22, 
61, 117, 168 of the Greek Grid Code.218 
                                                            
212 Entre Section taken directly from Ministerial Decision ΑΠΕΗΛ/Γ/Φ1/οικ 18489. 
213 See https://ec.europa.eu/competition/state_aid/cases/275343/275343_2009943_90_2.pdf p16. 
214 See https://ec.europa.eu/competition/state_aid/cases/275343/275343_2009943_90_2.pdf p32. 
215 See https://ec.europa.eu/competition/state_aid/cases/275343/275343_2009943_90_2.pdf p17. 
216 See ΦΕΚ ΡΑΕ ΜΜΑΕ 3974 / 2018. 
217 See https://ec.europa.eu/competition/state_aid/cases/275343/275343_2009943_90_2.pdf p16. 
218 See https://ec.europa.eu/competition/state_aid/cases/275343/275343_2009943_90_2.pdf p18. 
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4.3.8 Ireland SA.44464 Capacity Mechanism 
4.3.8.1 Applicable Obligations of Beneficiaries 
Obligations to deliver capacity when required: The Irish Capacity Mechanism is a 
reliability options (RO) scheme and therefore RO holders are subject to difference 
payments at times when prices are high. The capacity providers have a financial incentive 
to be available at times of scarcity, because the payment has to be made irrespective of 
whether they were selling electricity during the relevant settlement period.219 
This is augmented by the load following obligation. This obligation requires that the 
quantity that a capacity provider is contracted for under its RO varies with the actual overall 
system need for capacity. The authorities explain that when scarcity happens outside a 
period of peak demand or because of low plant availability during the summer, it is not 
necessary for the capacity requirement in that period to be equal to the total volume of 
ROs sold in the auction. This allows each individual RO obligation to be scaled down pro-
rata to reflect the actual demand for capacity. This load-following rule thus leaves the 
hedge of both providers and suppliers intact and balances the difference between payments 
paid and received. Moreover, the difference payments reflect the actual value of scarcity.220  
Obligations to make power plant/demand response projects operational by a 
certain date: New capacity is allowed to compete, however, new capacity can only acquire 
contracts of up to one year. Existing capacity can acquire contracts of up to 10 years. New 
capacity has a 18 month ‘lead time’ in t-4 auctions meaning that they can commence 
operation 18 months after the specified delivery date. Existing capacity does not have this 
lead time flexibility and therefore must have operational capacity available on the delivery 
date.  
Testing Requirements: New capacity has to complete an implementation plan before it 
is allowed into the reliability options scheme. The implementation plans involve having to 
meet certain milestones which include testing. There are two types of test: performance 
testing and acceptance testing.221  
4.3.8.2 Penalties  
New capacity has to provide a performance bond shortly after the auction, and enter into 
milestones to ensure that capacity is built. If the capacity is not built or, if milestones are 
not hit, then any payments related to the capacity are forfeited.222 In 2019223 the value of 
these performance security bonds were EUR 10,000 per MW when it is more than 13 
months prior to the beginning of the capacity year, EUR 30,000 per MW from 13 months 
prior to the beginning of the capacity year, and EUR 40,000 per MW from the beginning of 
the capacity year. These values are also the termination charges for ending a capacity 
contract.224 
                                                            
219 See https://ec.europa.eu/competition/state_aid/cases/267880/267880_1948214_166_2.pdf p16. 
220 See https://ec.europa.eu/competition/state_aid/cases/267880/267880_1948214_166_2.pdf p17. 
221 See I-SEM Capacity Market Code p142. 
222 See https://ec.europa.eu/competition/state_aid/cases/267880/267880_1948214_166_2.pdf p16. 
223 For the 2020/21 T-1 and 2021/22 T-2 capacity auctions. 
224 Capacity Remuneration Mechanism 2020/21 T-1 Capacity Auction and 2021/22 T-2 Capacity Auction 
Parameters, Decision Paper, SEM-19-018, 1 May 2019, see p6, 
https://www.semcommittee.com/sites/semc/files/media-files/SEM-19-018%20CRM%202020-21%20T-
1%20and%202021-22%20T-2%20Parameters%20Decision.pdf  
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4.3.9 Poland SA46100 Capacity Mechanism 
4.3.9.1 Applicable Obligations of Beneficiaries 
Obligations to deliver capacity when required: Below is an excerpt from Decision 
SA.46100: 
As a general principle, the capacity market will follow a "delivered energy" model: capacity 
providers will be obliged to deliver energy whenever needed to ensure security of supply, 
i.e. in so-called system stress events. 
A system stress event is defined as an hour in which the planned dispatchable capacity 
reserve available to PSE (the TSO) (in excess of demand) is lower than the level of reserve 
margin required to safely operate the grid. A system stress event may occur in any hour 
of peak demand between 7:00 and 22:00 hours on working days. No limitation is 
introduced as to the number and duration of breaks between sequentially occurring system 
stress events. A system stress event must be preceded by a warning issued by PSE at least 
8 hours in advance. 
Obligations under the capacity agreements are "load following". That means that capacity 
providers will only be required to be generating electricity or reducing demand up to the 
total level of their obligation if all capacity, for which capacity agreements have been 
concluded in the market, is necessary to meet demand. In a stress event where only 70 
% of such total capacity is necessary to meet demand, each provider will only be required 
to generate electricity or reduce demand up to 70 % of their full capacity obligation. 
PSE will verify that a given domestic capacity market units (CMU) has delivered its 
obligation according to the following criteria: (a) for a CMU active in the Polish central 
balancing mechanism (be it a generating or a demand side response CMU), the verification 
will be based on the dispatchable capacity available to PSE in the balancing market 
processes; (b) for other generating CMUs, the verification will be based on the CMU's 
physical net electricity generation; (c) for other demand side response CMUs, the 
verification will be based on the difference between the CMU's baseline electricity 
consumption and the amount of electricity actually consumed. 225 
Obligations to make power plant/demand response projects operational by a 
certain date:  Each delivery year has a T5 auction and then an additional set of four 
auctions (one per quarter) that occur during the delivery year. If suppliers want to enter 
into agreements longer than one year they need to hit CAPEX requirements.  
Testing Requirements: In order to enter the auction, generating CMUs must provide the 
TSO with evidence showing that the CMU is able to continuously deliver their net capacity 
for at least 4 hours without interruption and without any specific technical harm. Non-
Generating CMUs must pass a demand side response (DSR) test. The DSR test seeks to 
verify the ability of prospective DSR CMUs to respond to a stress event. For Aggregated 
DSR CMUs, the test is performed at the pool level. The DSR test takes one hour and 
                                                            
225 See https://ec.europa.eu/competition/state_aid/cases/272253/272253_1977790_162_2.pdf p23. This also 
provides additional rules for ‘foreign’ CMUs.  
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replicates the conditions of a stress event (including the time of call for capacity delivery, 
the methods for baseline calculations, etc.)226 
Also, there is a system of performance demonstrations to ensure that capacity providers 
are able to deliver energy when needed and only receive capacity payments if reliable. This 
is especially important for those delivery years with no stress events in which testing 
providers’ performance ensures that providers are physically capable of delivering as per 
their capacity obligations.227 
4.3.9.2 Penalties  
The penalty regime aims to provide capacity providers with incentives to deliver energy 
when needed. CMUs which perform below the expected level of performance will be 
penalised, while those that exceed the expected level will receive ‘over delivery’ payments, 
so that at the end of the year each unit’s capacity payments will broadly reflect their 
performance. The penalty regime consists of three main elements: (a) an overall annual 
liability cap of 200 % of a CMU’s annual capacity revenues; (b) a monthly cap of 20% of 
the annual cap; (c) an hourly penalty rate expected to be set at 750 euros per MW. The 
penalties are the same for Polish and foreign CMUs.228 
4.3.10 UK SA.35980 Capacity Mechanism 
4.3.10.1 Applicable Obligations of Beneficiaries 
Obligations to deliver capacity when required: The following are excerpts from the 
Commission’s SA.35980 decision document. 
“The Capacity Market follows a ‘delivered energy’ model: capacity providers are obliged to 
deliver energy whenever needed to ensure security of supply, i.e. in real system stress 
situations.’’ 229 
“Under the capacity agreement obligation, system stress events are defined as any half 
hour settlement periods in which either voltage control or controlled load shedding are 
experienced at any point on the system for 15 minutes or longer. Providers are required 
to determine their own response at such times, and avoid breaching any existing code or 
licence conditions. To date, there have been no Capacity Market Notices issued by the 
system operator. The winter (2018/19) was the first year of the measure’s operation in 
full.  
To ensure participants are able to adequately manage the risk of exposure to penalties, 
e.g. the risk that a number of plants simultaneously trip, the System Operator publishes a 
notice of system stress via a ‘Capacity Market warning’, based on the methodology set out 
in the Capacity Market Rules (8.4.6)18. Unless this warning has been issued, a scarcity 
event will not trigger Capacity Market penalties or ‘over-delivery’ payments.  
Capacity agreements oblige participants to deliver a specified quantity of electricity. A 
provider’s obligation at the time of stress events is calculated from the obligations they 
entered into through the four-year and year-ahead auctions, plus any secondary traded 
                                                            
226 https://ec.europa.eu/competition/state_aid/cases/272253/272253_1977790_162_2.pdf see p13. 
227 See https://ec.europa.eu/competition/state_aid/cases/272253/272253_1977790_162_2.pdf p25. 
228 See https://ec.europa.eu/competition/state_aid/cases/272253/272253_1977790_162_2.pdf p24. 
229 See https://ec.europa.eu/competition/state_aid/cases/277359/277359_2054365_76_2.pdf p19. 
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obligations they entered into for the specific settlement periods in which a stress event 
occurs.’’ 230 
Obligations to make power plant/demand response projects operational by a 
certain date: See the following excerpt from the Commission’s SA.35980 decision 
document: 
“In stress periods preceded by a Capacity Market warning of at least four hours notice, 
providers’ obligations are ‘load following’. This means they are only required to be 
generating electricity or reducing demand up to the total level of their obligation if all 
capacity, for which capacity agreements have been concluded in the market, is necessary 
to meet demand. In a stress event where only 70% of such total capacity is necessary to 
meet demand, each provider is only required to generate electricity or reduce demand up 
to 70% of their full capacity obligation.’’ 231 
Testing Requirements: See the following excerpt from the Commission’s SA.35980 
decision document: 
“Capacity providers are required to undertake a rigorous system of performance 
demonstrations to ensure capacity providers are able to deliver energy when needed if 
reliable. This is especially important for those delivery years with no stress events in which 
testing providers’ performance ensures that providers are physically capable of delivering 
as per their capacity obligations.”232 
Penalty Requirements: See the following excerpt from the Commission’s SA.35980 
decision document: 
 “The penalty regime aims to provide capacity providers with incentives to deliver energy 
when needed. Units which perform below the expected level of performance are penalised, 
while those that exceed the expected level receive ‘over delivery’ payments, so that at the 
end of the year each unit’s capacity payments broadly reflects their performance. The 
penalty regime consists of three main elements:  
 a monthly liability cap of 200% of a provider’s monthly capacity revenues, which, given 
the weighting of monthly payments according to system demand, may expose 
providers to a penalty liability of up to 20% of their annual revenue in any one month.  
 an overarching annual cap of 100% of annual revenues.  
 a penalty rate set at 1/24th of a provider’s annual capacity payments.” 233 
4.3.11 UK SA.44475 Additional Capacity Mechanism 
This scheme operates under the same conditions as that covered by SA.35980 above 
except that: 
 The lead time for auctions is not T1 or T4, it is 8 months.  
 Agreements of longer than one year are not permissible in this auction.  
  
                                                            
230 See https://ec.europa.eu/competition/state_aid/cases/277359/277359_2054365_76_2.pdf p19. 
231 See https://ec.europa.eu/competition/state_aid/cases/277359/277359_2054365_76_2.pdf p20. 
232 See https://ec.europa.eu/competition/state_aid/cases/277359/277359_2054365_76_2.pdf p20. 
233 See https://ec.europa.eu/competition/state_aid/cases/277359/277359_2054365_76_2.pdf p20. 
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Annex 4.4 – Additional Analysis on Capacity Mechanisms 
Figure A4.4.1: Scatterplot of the price of capacity against maximum 
contract length awarded for sampled capacity mechanisms234 
 
Source: Material collated by Centre for Competition Policy, University of East Anglia from national authority 
websites, national authority documents and European Commission decision documents. 
                                                            
234 The data points on the far left relate to a contract length of three months. Data is unavailable for Belgium and 
Ireland. Data for France and Germany is not included due to the nature of their schemes. 
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Figure A4.4.2: Scatterplot of the price of capacity against the percentage of 
volume awarded that is Demand Side Response for sampled capacity 
mechanisms 235 
 
Source: Material collated by Centre for Competition Policy, University of East Anglia from national authority 
websites, national authority documents and European Commission decision documents. 
Figure A4.4.3: Scatterplot of the price of capacity against the percentage of 
volume awarded that is new generation capacity for sampled capacity 
mechanisms 236 
 
Source: Material collated by Centre for Competition Policy, University of East Anglia from national authority 
websites, national authority documents and European Commission decision documents. 
                                                            
235 Data unavailable for Belgium. Data for France and Germany is not included due to the nature of their schemes. 
236 Data unavailable for Belgium. Data for France, Germany and Greece not included due to the nature of their 
schemes. 
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Figure A4.4.4: Scatterplot of the price of capacity split by lead time to 
delivery of capacity for sampled capacity mechanisms237 
 
Source: Material collated by Centre for Competition Policy, University of East Anglia  from national authority 
websites, national authority documents and European Commission decision documents. 
Figure A4.4.5 attempts to investigate whether a relationship exists between the maximum 
penalties that firms are exposed to in capacity mechanisms and the capacity price achieved 
by the mechanisms. In Figure A4.4.5 schemes are ordered according to the maximum total 
penalty payment as a proportion of a firm’s annual revenue from the capacity 
mechanism.238 When interpreting Figure A4.4.5 it is important to note that penalty terms 
in the capacity mechanisms can be complex and multi-faceted. It is possible that the true 
expected value of the penalty clauses may be noticeably different to the project team’s 
interpretation of the maximum penalty and so Figure A4.4.5 should be treated with caution. 
Also, Figure A4.4.5 only covers those schemes where usable data in a broadly equivalent 
form is available. 
Figure A4.4.5: Scatterplot of capacity prices against the maximum liability of 
firms (as a percentage of their annual capacity mechanism revenues) for sampled 
capacity mechanisms239 
                                                            
237 Data unavailable for Belgium. Data for France, Germany and Greece not included due to the nature of their 
schemes. 
238 A value of 100% represents a firm forgoing or returning all of the revenue from the capacity mechanism that 
it was due during a given year. 
239 Data included is from the following schemes (maximum penalty in brackets): UK SA.35980 and SA.44475 
(100%), Greece SA.50152 (110-120%, marked on chart as 115%), Greece SA.48780 (120%) and Poland 
SA.46100 (200%). Data is not included for: Germany SA.43735 (100%) as the mechanism involves two prices; 
France SA.48490 (over 100%) as a precise maximum penalty is not provided; Belgium SA.48648 (130%) as no 
pricing data is available; and Ireland SA.44464 plus France SA.40454 and SA.39621 as their penalties were non-
equivalent or not specified. 
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Source: Material collated by Centre for Competition Policy, University of East Anglia  from national authority 
websites, national authority documents and European Commission decision documents. 
Figure A4.4.6: Scatterplot of clearing prices versus volume participating over 
volume awarded for the Greek LT and ST interruptibility schemes, Q4 2016-Q4 
2019240 
 
Source: Material collated by Centre for Competition Policy, University of East Anglia from the Greek Independent 
Power Transmission Operator (IPTO) 
 
  
                                                            
240 Q3 and Q4 2017 are not included as pricing data is not available for these auctions. 
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Annex 5.1 – Denmark (Market 1) electricity pricing data  
(see accompanying Excel file) 
 
Annex 5.2 – Denmark (Market 2) electricity pricing data  
(see accompanying Excel file) 
 
Annex 5.3 – France electricity pricing data  
(see accompanying Excel file) 
 
Annex 5.4 – Germany electricity pricing data  
(see accompanying Excel file) 
 
Annex 5.5 – Netherlands electricity pricing data  
(see accompanying Excel file) 
 
Annex 5.6 – UK (Great Britain) electricity pricing data  
(see accompanying Excel file) 
 
Annex 5.7 – UK (Northern Ireland) electricity pricing data  
(see accompanying Excel file) 
 
Annex 5.8 – Aggregated generation data for RES during hours of 
negative prices  
(see accompanying Excel file) 
 
Annex 5.9 – Generation data for case study RES plants  
(see accompanying Excel file) 
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Annex 5.10 – Rules on aid when negative electricity prices occur  
(see accompanying Excel file)  
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Annex 5.11 - Detail on French rules on aid when negative electricity 
prices occur 
This annex contains translations of the rules covering the receipt of aid when the day ahead 
wholesale electricity price is negative provided in European Commission decision 
documents for relevant French cases where the rules are particularly complex. 
5.11.1 SA.47753, Support through tenders for the development of solar power 
generation facilities located on buildings 
Treatment of negative market prices 
Only energy produced during positive or zero price hours may give entitlement to the 
payment of the additional remuneration. Conversely, no aid is paid during periods of 
negative prices to an installation that produces electricity during this period. However, a 
compensatory measure has been in place for the facilities that do not produce during the 
hours of negative prices beyond a certain number of hours of negative prices recorded per 
year. This measure takes into account the production profile of the sector and the rate of 
annual load of the sector so as not to compensate projects beyond what they would have 
received in the absence of negative prices. The ceiling of hours beyond which compensation 
would be paid is 15 hours (in full power equivalents), corresponding to 1% of operating 
hours for the solar industry. 
In application of Article R. 314-39 of the Energy Code, over a calendar year, beyond the 
first 15 hours of negative spot prices for overnight delivery recorded on the EPEX Spot SE 
electricity exchange for the France zone between 8:00 am and 8:00 pm, called "spot peak 
price", the additional remuneration is increased by the following premium: 
Premiumnegative price = 0.5 x P x T x nnegative prices 
Formula in which: 
- P is the installed power; 
- nnegative prices is the number of hours during which the "spot peak prices" has been strictly 
negative beyond the first 15 hours of negative "spot peak price" for the calendar year, and 
during which the installation did not produce. This number of hours is bounded annually 
by the following condition: 
𝑛𝑛𝑛𝑛𝑛𝑛𝑛𝑛𝑛𝑛𝑛𝑛𝑛𝑛𝑛𝑛𝑛𝑛 𝑝𝑝𝑝𝑝𝑛𝑛𝑝𝑝𝑛𝑛𝑝𝑝 < 1600 − ∑ 𝐸𝐸𝑛𝑛12𝑛𝑛=1𝑃𝑃  
In the formula, the coefficient of 0.5 represents the rate of load of during the hours of 
negative prices concerned. In addition, an installation would not be compensated in the 
case of a negative price at night (between 8pm and 8am), so there will be no payment for 
an installation that would not be able to produce. 
[𝐸𝐸𝑛𝑛 is the sum of the hours at positive spot price or zero on the EPEX Spot SE electricity 
exchange for the France zone, electricity volumes allocated by the network operator, where 
appropriate via a calculation of losses or a settlement agreement, at the balance perimeter 
designated by the producer for the production of his installation in the month i. These 
volumes are net of auxiliary consumption necessary for the operation of the installation 
during the production period.] 
In order to ensure that this premium cannot lead to the overpayment of projects, the 
number of negative price hours giving rise to the premium shall be set so that the 
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installation cannot receive a remuneration corresponding to more than 1,600 hours of 
annual operation. 
The calculation of the reference market price used for the calculation of the premium does 
not take into account the hours during which prices were negative, giving a global incentive 
for the industry not to produce at times of negative prices since in these cases the premium 
obtained will be less than the difference between the reference tariff (which reflects the 
production costs of the sector) and the market price. In addition, it is explicitly provided 
that the additional remuneration is only paid for the electricity affected by the network 
manager for hours at spot prices positive or zero on the EPEX Spot SE electricity exchange 
for the France zone. 
Since the payment is known in advance and accessible to all candidates, the latter will 
integrate the compensation mechanism in case of a significant number of negative prices 
in the price proposed at the end of the tender procedure. Moreover, the ceiling to the 
number of hours of payment of the sector ensures that there is no situation of 
overcompensation in case of prolonged negative price periods. 
Source: pg12-13, pg35 and pg40-41, European Commission Decision Document, Subject: 
State aid SA.46552 (2017 / NN) – France Support through tenders for the development of 
electricity production from solar energy;  State aid SA.47753 (2017 / NN) – France Support 
through tenders for the development of electricity production from solar energy, installed 
on buildings;  State aid SA.48066 (2017 / NN) – France Triennial call for tenders for 
onshore wind; State aid SA.48238 (2017 / N) – France Support through tenders for the 
development of electricity production from photovoltaic solar energy or wind turbine, C 
(2017) 6685 final, 
https://ec.europa.eu/competition/state_aid/cases/271172/271172_1942309_15_2.pdf 
5.11.2 SA.46552, Tendering support for the development of electricity 
generation facilities from solar energy 
Treatment of negative market prices 
Only energy produced during hours of positive or zero spot prices may give entitlement to 
the payment of the additional remuneration. However, a compensatory measure is in place 
for the facilities that do not produce during the hours of negative prices beyond a certain 
number of hours of negative prices recorded per year. In application of Article R. 314-39 
of the Energy Code, over a calendar year, beyond the first 15 hours of negative spot prices 
for overnight delivery recorded on the EPEX Spot SE electricity exchange for the France 
zone between 8:00 am and 8:00 pm, called "spot peak price", the additional remuneration 
is increased by the following premium: 
Premiumnegative price = 0.5 x P x T x nnegative prices 
Formula in which: 
- P is the installed power; 
- nnegative prices is the number of hours during which the "spot peak prices" have been strictly 
negative beyond the first 15 hours of negative "spot peak price" for the calendar year, and 
during which the installation did not produce. This number of hours is bounded annually 
by the following condition: 
𝑛𝑛𝑛𝑛𝑛𝑛𝑛𝑛𝑛𝑛𝑛𝑛𝑛𝑛𝑛𝑛𝑛𝑛 𝑝𝑝𝑝𝑝𝑛𝑛𝑝𝑝𝑛𝑛𝑝𝑝 < 1600 − ∑ 𝐸𝐸𝑛𝑛12𝑛𝑛=1𝑃𝑃  
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The tender specifications provide for the payment of installations which will not have 
produced at negative price hours to compensate for some of the loss of earnings related 
to this lower production beyond a certain number of hours of negative prices. In any case, 
the facilities that will produce at times of negative prices will not receive any compensation 
corresponding to this production. 
[𝐸𝐸𝑛𝑛 is the sum of the hours at a positive spot price or zero on the EPEX Spot SE electricity 
exchange for the France zone, electricity volumes allocated by the network operator, where 
appropriate via a calculation of losses or a settlement agreement, at the balance perimeter 
designated by the producer for the production of his installation during the month i. These 
volumes are net of the auxiliary consumption necessary for operation of the installation 
during the production period.] 
The ceiling of hours beyond which compensation is paid is 15 hours (in equivalent full 
power hours), corresponding to 1% of hours of operation for the solar industry. 
This premium paid in case of non-production during negative price hours will be weighted 
by a coefficient of 0.5, representative of the load ratio of the hours of negative prices 
concerned. In addition, an installation will not be compensated in case of negative prices 
at night (between 8pm and 8am), in order not to pay for an installation that would not be 
able to produce. 
In order to ensure that this premium cannot lead to the overpayment of projects, the 
number of negative price hours giving rise to the premium shall be set so that the 
installation cannot receive remuneration corresponding to more than 1,600 hours of annual 
operation. 
The calculation of the reference market price used for the calculation of the premium does 
not take into account the hours during which prices were negative, giving a global incentive 
for the industry not to produce at times of negative prices since in these cases the premium 
obtained will be less than the difference between the reference tariff (which reflects the 
production costs of the sector) and the market price. In addition, it is explicitly provided 
that the additional remuneration is only paid for the electricity affected by the network 
manager for hours at spot prices positive or zero on the EPEX Spot SE electricity exchange 
for the France zone. 
Since the payment is known in advance and accessible to all candidates, the latter will 
integrate the compensation mechanism in case of a significant number of negative prices 
in the price proposed at the end of the tender procedure. Moreover, the ceiling to the 
number of hours of payment of the sector ensures that there is no situation of 
overcompensation in case of prolonged negative price periods. 
Source: pg14-15, pg35 and pg40-41, European Commission Decision Document, Subject: 
State aid SA.46552 (2017 / NN) – France Support through tenders for the development of 
electricity production from solar energy;  State aid SA.47753 (2017 / NN) – France Support 
through tenders for the development of electricity production from solar energy, installed 
on buildings;  State aid SA.48066 (2017 / NN) – France Triennial call for tenders for 
onshore wind; State aid SA.48238 (2017 / N) – France Support through tenders for the 
development of electricity production from photovoltaic solar energy or wind turbine, C 
(2017) 6685 final, 
https://ec.europa.eu/competition/state_aid/cases/271172/271172_1942309_15_2.pdf 
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5.11.3 SA.48238, Tendering support for the development of electricity generation 
facilities from solar photovoltaic or wind energy 
Treatment of negative market prices 
Only energy produced during positive or zero price hours may give entitlement to the 
payment of the additional remuneration. Conversely, no aid is paid during periods of 
negative prices to an installation that produces electricity during this period. However, a 
compensatory measure has been put in place for the facilities that do not produce during 
the hours of negative prices beyond a certain number of hours of negative prices recorded 
per the year (15h for the solar sector and 20h for the wind industry). This measure takes 
into account the annual production profile of the sector so as not to compensate for projects 
beyond what they would have received in the absence of negative prices. 
Photovoltaic installations not producing during negative price hours will receive 
compensation beyond the first 15 hours of strictly negative spot prices (over a calendar 
year) for overnight delivery observed on the EPEX Spot SE electricity exchange for the 
France zone between 08:00 and 20:00. The compensation (Premiumnegative price) is 
calculated as follows: 
Premiumnegative price = 0.5 x P x T x nnegative prices 
Formula in which: 
- P is the installed power; 
nnegative prices is the number of hours during which the "spot peak prices" were strictly 
negative beyond the first 15 hours of negative spot peak prices of the calendar year, and 
during which the installation did not produce. This number of hours is limited annually by 
the following condition: 
𝑛𝑛𝑛𝑛𝑛𝑛𝑛𝑛𝑛𝑛𝑛𝑛𝑛𝑛𝑛𝑛𝑛𝑛 𝑝𝑝𝑝𝑝𝑛𝑛𝑝𝑝𝑛𝑛𝑝𝑝 < 1600 − ∑ 𝐸𝐸𝑛𝑛12𝑛𝑛=1𝑃𝑃  
The 50% coefficient applied to photovoltaic installations in case of a negative price is the 
average load factor of the sector during the day (from 8h to 20h). 
[𝐸𝐸𝑛𝑛 is the sum of positive spot hours ("spot price") and for overnight delivery on the French 
organized electricity supply market platform, electricity volumes affected by the network 
manager, where appropriate by a loss calculation formula or a settlement agreement, at 
the balance perimeter designated by the Producer for the production of his installation on 
the month i. These volumes are net of the auxiliary consumption required for operation of 
the installation during the production period.] 
Wind farms not producing during negative price hours will receive compensation beyond 
the first 20 hours, consecutive or not, of strictly negative spot prices for overnight delivery 
noted on the EPEX Spot SE electricity exchange for France. The compensation 
(Premiumnegative price) is calculated as follows: 
Premiumnegative prices = 0.35 x Pmax x T x nnegative prices 
formula in which: 
- T is the electricity reference rate in € / MWh determined by the Candidate when 
submitting his offer; 
- nnegative prices is the number of hours during which the spot prices for next day delivery on 
the French organized electricity market platform were strictly negative beyond the first 20 
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hours of negative prices of the calendar year and during which the installation has not 
produced energy. This number of hours is limited annually by the following condition: 
𝑛𝑛𝑛𝑛𝑛𝑛𝑛𝑛𝑛𝑛𝑛𝑛𝑛𝑛𝑛𝑛𝑛𝑛 𝑝𝑝𝑝𝑝𝑛𝑛𝑝𝑝𝑛𝑛𝑝𝑝 < 2300 − ∑ 𝐸𝐸𝑛𝑛12𝑛𝑛=1𝑃𝑃  
The 35% coefficient applied to wind installations in case of negative prices corresponds to 
the average load factor observed during negative price periods. This calculation was made 
thanks to the history of negative prices observed in France since 2012 (EpexSpot data). 
The load factor considered is that observed for the wind energy sector, for installations 
installed on 1st January, during each negative price period (TEN data, transmission and 
electricity network). The load factor observed during these periods is highly variable and 
represents on average 35%. 
The calculation of the reference market price used for the calculation of the premium does 
not take into account the hours during which prices were negative, giving a global incentive 
for the industry not to produce at times of negative prices since in these cases the premium 
obtained will be less than the difference between the reference tariff (which reflects the 
production costs of the sector) and the market price. In addition, it is explicitly provided 
that the additional remuneration is only paid for the electricity affected by the network 
manager for hours at spot prices positive or zero on the EPEX Spot SE electricity exchange 
for the France zone. 
Since the payment is known in advance and accessible to all candidates, the latter will 
integrate the compensation mechanism in case of a significant number of negative prices 
in the price proposed at the end of the tender procedure. Moreover, the ceiling to the 
number of hours of payment of the sector ensures that there is no situation of 
overcompensation in case of prolonged negative price periods. 
Source: pg18-19, pg35 and pg40-41, European Commission Decision Document, Subject: 
State aid SA.46552 (2017 / NN) – France Support through tenders for the development of 
electricity production from solar energy;  State aid SA.47753 (2017 / NN) – France Support 
through tenders for the development of electricity production from solar energy, installed 
on buildings;  State aid SA.48066 (2017 / NN) – France Triennial call for tenders for 
onshore wind; State aid SA.48238 (2017 / N) – France Support through tenders for the 
development of electricity production from photovoltaic solar energy or wind turbine, C 
(2017) 6685 final, 
https://ec.europa.eu/competition/state_aid/cases/271172/271172_1942309_15_2.pdf 
5.11.4 SA.48066, Triennial call for tenders for onshore wind 
Treatment of negative market prices 
Only energy produced during hours of positive or zero spot prices may give entitlement to 
the payment of the additional remuneration. However a compensatory measure has been 
put in place for the installations that do not produce during negative price hours beyond a 
certain number of hours of negative prices recorded over the year. 
Over a calendar year, beyond the first 20 hours, consecutive or not, of strictly negative 
spot prices for overnight delivery on the EPEX Spot SE electricity exchange for the France 
zone, an installation that does not produce during the hours of negative prices receives a 
bonus equal to Premiumnegative prices , defined below: 
Premiumnegative prices = 0.35 x Pmax x T x nnegative prices 
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formula in which: 
- T is the electricity reference rate in € / MWh determined by the Candidate when 
submitting his offer, 
- nnegative prices is the number of hours during which the spot prices for next day delivery on 
the French organized electricity market platform were strictly negative beyond the first 20 
hours of negative prices of the calendar year and during which the installation has not 
provided energy, 
- the coefficient of 35% applied in the case of a negative price corresponds to the average 
load factor of wind turbines observed during negative price periods. This calculation was 
made thanks to the negative price history observed in France since 2012 (EpexSpot data). 
The load factor considered is that observed for the wind energy sector, installed on the 1st 
January, during each negative price period (TEN data, Network transport and electricity). 
The load factor observed during these periods is very variable and represents an average 
35%. 
The calculation of the reference market price used for the calculation of the premium does 
not take into account the hours during which prices were negative, giving a global incentive 
for the industry not to produce at times of negative prices since in these cases the premium 
obtained will be less than the difference between the reference tariff (which reflects the 
production costs of the sector) and the market price. In addition, it is explicitly provided 
that the additional remuneration is only paid for the electricity affected by the network 
manager for hours at spot prices positive or zero on the EPEX Spot SE electricity exchange 
for the France zone. 
Since the payment is known in advance and accessible to all candidates, the latter will 
integrate the compensation mechanism in case of a significant number of negative prices 
in the price proposed at the end of the tender procedure. Moreover, the ceiling to the 
number of hours of payment of the sector ensures that there is no situation of 
overcompensation in case of prolonged negative price periods. 
Source: pg16-17, pg35 and pg40-41, European Commission Decision Document, Subject: 
State aid SA.46552 (2017 / NN) – France Support through tenders for the development of 
electricity production from solar energy;  State aid SA.47753 (2017 / NN) – France Support 
through tenders for the development of electricity production from solar energy, installed 
on buildings;  State aid SA.48066 (2017 / NN) – France Triennial call for tenders for 
onshore wind; State aid SA.48238 (2017 / N) – France Support through tenders for the 
development of electricity production from photovoltaic solar energy or wind turbine, C 
(2017) 6685 final, 
https://ec.europa.eu/competition/state_aid/cases/271172/271172_1942309_15_2.pdf 
5.11.5 SA.46698, Tenders for biomass plants 
Compensation supplement 
Production taken into account for the calculation is capped and is reduced from the 
production eventually indemnified in the event of a period of negative prices 
Pef is a premium linked to the use of livestock manure installations. This coefficient applies 
only to the family "methanisation". Whereas the use of livestock effluents in methanisation 
allows optimization of the nitrogen cycle at the local level, the use of livestock effluents is 
encouraged by a premium for filling the gap of biogas production, and therefore of 
electricity, related to this low methane input category. So, for the winning installations of 
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livestock effluents is encouraged by a premium for filling the gap of biogas production, 
and therefore of electricity, related to this low methane input category. So, for the 
winning installations of the "Methanisation" family, the bonus for the treatment of 
livestock manure has a value applicable to an installation is defined as follows: 
Value of Ef PEF value 
[€ / MWh] 
0% 0 
≥60% 50 
a. Where Ef is the amount of livestock manure (in tonnes of inputs) of the facility's
supply calculated on  an annual basis. Livestock effluents are liquid or solid manure,
manure, rainwater dripping on open areas accessible to animals, silage juice and
wastewater from livestock farming and its annexes.
b. Intermediate values of Pef are determined by linear interpolation
Pparticipatoryinvestment is a bonus that values participation in the capital of the project of a local 
authority or of companies where a large share of the capital is held by twenty individuals, 
or one or several communities. If the candidate is a local authority or, in the case of a 
joint-stock company or a cooperative, if he undertakes that capital is held at least 40% 
by such actors, it benefits from a bonus of € 5 / MWh. This premium becomes negative (- 
€ 5  
/ MWh) if this commitment is not respected later by the candidate. 
Pfumes a coefficient applicable only to the facilities of the family "wood energy" and 
intended to enhance the projects where power generation equipment deals with deadly 
heat fumes. If this is the case, the candidate receives a bonus in his rating. On the other 
hand, if it does not respect this commitment, it is subject to a penalty equal to € 10 / 
MWh for the duration of the contract (Pfumes is 0 if the candidate lives up to his / her 
commitment). 
Pair is a coefficient applicable only to installations of the family "energy-wood" and is 
designed to promote projects that go beyond environmental standards for air emissions 
of dust and nitrogen oxides. If a candidate commits to the objectives fixed by the 
specifications, it benefits from a bonus in its rating. On the other hand, if it does not 
respect this commitment, at any moment of the relevant calendar year, it is subject to 
a penalty equal to 10 € / MWh for the year in question (Pair is equal to 0 if the candidate 
respects his commitment). 
Only energy produced during hours of positive or zero spot prices may give entitlement 
to the payment of the additional remuneration. However, the charges in the tender 
specification provide for the compensation of facilities that have not produced at negative 
price hours for part of the loss of compensation related to this lower production. Thus, 
over a calendar year, beyond the first 70 hours, consecutive or not, of strictly negative 
day ahead spot prices on the EPEX Power Exchange Spot SE for the France zone, if the 
installation does not produce during the hours of negative prices, she receives a bonus 
equal to: 
Premiumnegative prices = Pproject x (T0 + Pef + Pparticipatoryinvestment - Pair - Pfumes) x nnegative prices
Pproject is the Project Power in MWe; 
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nnegative prices is the number of hours the prices for next day delivery on the EPEX Spot SE 
electricity exchange for the France zone were strictly negative beyond the first 70 hours of 
negative prices in the calendar year and during which the installation did not produce 
energy. 
The 70 hour threshold corresponds to 1% of the expected operating hours for the biomass 
sector. 
As mentioned in paragraph (33), measures are also in place to prevent producers from 
being incentivized to produce electricity at negative prices. Indeed, the calculation of the 
reference market price used for the calculating the premium does not take into account 
the hours during which prices were negative, giving a global incentive for the industry not 
to produce during hours of negative prices since in these cases the premium obtained will 
be less than the difference between the reference tariff (which reflects the costs of sector 
production) and the market price. In addition, it is explicitly provided that the additional 
remuneration is only paid for the volumes of electricity received by the network operator 
for hours at a positive or zero spot price on the EPEX Spot SE electricity exchange for the 
France zone. 
As mentioned above (see paragraph (33)), the support scheme provides for compensation 
in the event of a significant recurrence of negative prices. Given that the payment is known 
in advance and accessible to all candidates, the latter will integrate the clearing mechanism 
in the event of a large number of negative price hours proposed following the tendering 
procedures. Otherwise the ceiling on the number of hours of load of the sector that receives 
payment ensures that there is no overcompensation situation in the event of an extended 
period of negative prices. 
Source: pg8-10, pg19 and pg22, European Commission Decision Document, State aid 
SA.46698 (2017 / NN) – France Tenders for biomass plants, C (2018) 1210 final, available 
at: 
https://ec.europa.eu/competition/state_aid/cases/271174/271174_2032504_64_2.pdf 
5.11.6 SA.51190, Support by tender for the development of electricity 
production from solar energy in the Department of Haut-Rhin 
Treatment of negative market prices 
Only energy produced during positive or zero price hours may give entitlement to the 
payment of the additional remuneration. However a compensatory measure has been put 
in place for the installations that do not produce during negative price hours beyond a 
certain number of hours of negative prices recorded over the year. 
Over a calendar year, beyond the first 15 hours of spot prices for next day delivery on the 
EPEX Spot SE electricity exchange for the France zone between 8 am and 8 pm, so-called 
"peak spot price", that are strictly negative, the additional remuneration is increased by 
the following premium: 
Premiumnegative price = 0.5 x P x T x nnegative prices 
Formula in which: 
- P is the installed power 
- T is the reference electricity rate in EUR / MWh determined by the candidate when 
submitting his offer, 
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- nnegative prices is the number of hours during which the "peak spot prices" were strictly 
negative beyond the first 15 hours of negative "peak spot prices” for the calendar year and 
during which the installation did not provide energy. This number of hours is limited 
annually by the following condition: 
𝑛𝑛𝑛𝑛𝑛𝑛𝑛𝑛𝑛𝑛𝑛𝑛𝑛𝑛𝑛𝑛𝑛𝑛 𝑝𝑝𝑝𝑝𝑛𝑛𝑝𝑝𝑛𝑛𝑝𝑝 < 1600 − ∑ 𝐸𝐸𝑛𝑛12𝑛𝑛=1𝑃𝑃  
[𝐸𝐸𝑛𝑛 is the sum over the hours at positive or zero spot prices for next day delivery on the 
French organized electricity supply market platform, electricity volumes allocated by the 
network manager, where appropriate by a loss calculation formula or a settlement 
agreement, at the balance perimeter designated by the producer for the production of his 
installation on the month i off corrections, in calculating the difference in scope under the 
rules referred to in Article L.321-14, linked, where appropriate, to the participation of 
installations to the services necessary for the operation of the network or adjustment 
mechanism. These volumes are net of auxiliary consumption necessary for the operation 
of the installation during production] 
As mentioned in paragraphs (48) and (49), measures are also in place to prevent producers 
from being induced to produce when electricity prices are negative. Indeed, the calculation 
of the reference market price used for the calculation of the premium does not take into 
account the hours during which the prices were negative, giving a global incentive for the 
industry not to produce during hours of negative prices since in these cases the premium 
obtained will be less than the difference between the reference tariff (which reflects the 
costs of sector production) and the market price. In addition, it is explicitly provided that 
the additional remuneration is only paid for the volumes of electricity allocated by the 
network operator for hours at a positive or zero spot price on the EPEX Spot SE electricity 
exchange for the France zone. 
As mentioned above (see paragraphs (48) and (49)), support schemes provide for 
compensation in the event of a significant recurrence of negative prices. Since the payment 
is known in advance and accessible to all candidates, the latter will integrate the 
compensation mechanism for a significant number of negative price hours into the price 
they propose at the end of the tender procedure. Moreover, the ceiling on the number of 
hours of payment to the sector ensures that there is no situation of overcompensation in 
the case of prolonged negative price periods. 
Source: pg11-12, 22 and 25 of European Commission Decision Document, Object: State 
aid SA.51190 (2018 / N) - France- Support by tender for the development of electricity 
production from solar energy in the Department of Haut-Rhin, C (2019) 317 final, 
https://ec.europa.eu/competition/state_aid/cases/274758/274758_2049151_113_2.pdf 
5.11.7 SA.48642, Support by tender for the development of Innovative 
electricity generation from solar energy 
Treatment of negative market prices 
Only energy produced during positive or zero spot price hours may give entitlement to the 
payment of the additional remuneration. However a compensatory measure has been put 
in place for the installations that do not produce during negative price hours beyond a 
certain number of hours of negative prices recorded over the year. In application of Article 
R. 314-39 of the Code of Energy, over a calendar year, beyond the first 15 hours of spot 
prices negative for overnight delivery, recorded on the EPEX electricity exchange Spot SE 
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for the France zone between 8:00 and 20:00, called "spot peak price", the Compensation 
supplement is increased by the following premium: 
Premiumnegative price = 0.5 x P x T x nnegative prices 
Formula in which: 
- P is the installed power 
- T is the reference electricity rate in EUR / MWh determined by the candidate when 
submitting his offer, 
- nnegative prices is the number of hours during which the "peak spot prices" were strictly 
negative beyond the first 15 hours of negative "peak spot prices” for the calendar year and 
during which the installation did not provide energy. This number of hours is limited 
annually by the following condition: 
𝑛𝑛𝑛𝑛𝑛𝑛𝑛𝑛𝑛𝑛𝑛𝑛𝑛𝑛𝑛𝑛𝑛𝑛 𝑝𝑝𝑝𝑝𝑛𝑛𝑝𝑝𝑛𝑛𝑝𝑝 < 1600 − ∑ 𝐸𝐸𝑛𝑛12𝑛𝑛=1𝑃𝑃  
[𝐸𝐸𝑛𝑛 is the sum over the hours at positive or zero spot prices ("spot price") for next day 
delivery on the French organized electricity market platform, electricity volumes allocated 
by the system operator, where appropriate by a loss calculation or accounting formula, at 
the balancing perimeter designated by the producer for the production of his installation in 
the month i . These volumes are net of auxiliary consumption necessary for the operation 
of the installation in the production period.] 
The tender specifications provide for the payment of the installations that did not produce 
during negative price hours to compensate for some of the loss of earnings related to this 
lower production beyond a certain number of hours of negative prices. In any case, the 
facilities that will produce at times of negative prices will not receive any compensation 
corresponding to this production. 
The ceiling of hours, beyond which compensation is paid, is fixed at 15 hours (in equivalent 
full power hours), corresponding to 1% of the hours of operation for the solar industry. 
This premium, paid in the event of non-production during hours of negative prices, will be 
weighted by a coefficient of 0.5, representative of the load ratio of during the hours of 
negative prices concerned. In addition, an installation will not be compensated in case of 
negative prices at night (between 8pm and 8am) in order not to pay for an installation that 
would not be able to produce. 
In order to ensure that this bonus cannot lead to overpayment of projects, the number of 
negative price hours giving rise to the premium shall be limited so that the installation 
cannot receive a remuneration corresponding to more than 1,600 hours of annual 
operation. 
As indicated in section 2.7.3, measures are also put in place to prevent producers from 
being induced to produce electricity at negative prices. Indeed, the calculation of the 
reference market price used for the calculation of the premium does not take into account 
the hours during which the prices were negative, giving a global incentive for the industry 
not to produce during hours of negative prices since in these cases the premium obtained 
will be less than the difference between the reference tariff (which reflects the costs of 
sector production) and the market price. In addition, it is explicitly provided that the 
additional remuneration is only paid for the volumes of electricity allocated by the network 
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operator for hours at a positive or zero spot price on the EPEX Spot SE electricity exchange 
for the France zone. 
As indicated in section 2.7.3, the aid scheme provides for compensation in case of 
significant recurrence of negative prices. Since the payment is known in advance and 
accessible to all candidates, they will integrate the compensation mechanism for a 
significant number of negative prices into the price proposed at the end of the tendering 
procedure. Moreover, capping the number of hours payment ensures there is no 
overcompensation situation in the event of a period prolonged negative prices. 
Source: pg11-12, pg20 and pg23, of Object: State aid SA.48642 (2018 / NN) – France 
Support by tender for the development of innovative electricity generation from solar 
energy, C (2018) 7753 final, 
https://ec.europa.eu/competition/state_aid/cases/275755/275755_2049031_99_2.pdf 
5.11.8 SA.43485, Support Mechanism for Electricity Generation Facilities using 
biogas from wastewater treatment 
No additional remuneration is paid for delivery in the event of strictly negative spot prices 
recorded on the EPEX Spot SE electricity exchange for the France zone. However, beyond 
the first 70 hours, consecutive or not, of strictly negative spot prices recorded on the EPEX 
Spot SE electricity exchange for the France zone an installation that does not produce 
during the negative price hours receives a premium equal to: 
Premiumnegative prices = Pmax x T x nnegative prices 
formula in which: 
• T is the reference tariff defined in paragraph (38) [in euro per MWh] 
• nnegative prices is the number of hours during which the spot prices for delivery recorded on 
the EPEX Spot SE electricity exchange for the France zone were negative beyond the first 
70 hours and during which installation did not provide energy. Thus the installation will 
receive no remuneration for approximately 1% of the time of expected operation. France 
has however provided that this compensation can only be paid within the limit of a certain 
number of reference operating hours over the year for the installation (i.e. 6,000 hours). 
France has implemented a mechanism to prevent producers being encouraged to produce 
electricity at negative prices. In the calculation of the reference market price used for the 
calculation of the premium the hours during which the prices were negative are not taken 
into account, which gives a global incentive for the industry not to produce at times of 
negative prices, since in these cases the premium obtained will be lower than the difference 
between the reference tariff (which reflects the production costs of the sector) and the 
market price. In addition, it is explicitly provided that the additional remuneration is only 
paid for electricity volumes allocated by the network operator during hours at a positive or 
zero spot price on the EPEX Spot SE electricity exchange for the France zone. 
Remuneration is provided for installations which have not produced after 70 hours when 
the quoted price of electricity is negative in order to compensate for a part of the loss of 
pay related to this reduced production. The purpose of this measure is to reduce 
uncertainty about the number of negative price hours in the coming years. To date, the 
number of negative price hours in France has never exceeded 15 hours per year. The 
threshold 70 hours corresponds to approximately 1.17% of the annual operating time 
expected for an installation of the STEP industry, i.e. 6000 hours. Above the threshold of 
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70 hours the production facility will receive a premium whose parameters are presented in 
paragraph (44). 
This provision does not lead to a risk of overcompensation as compensation can only be 
paid within the limit of the reference number of hours of operation for an installation during 
a year. In other words, once an installation has received support (whether as a supplement 
compensation or compensation for non-production beyond 70 hours of negative prices) for 
a number of full power equivalent hours equal to the reference number of operating hours 
(6000 hours) used to determine the level of support, the facility will no longer receive 
compensation. 
Source: pg9-10 and pg19, European Commission Decision Document, Object: State aid 
SA.43485 (2015 / N) – France Support Mechanism for Electricity Generation Facilities using 
biogas from wastewater treatment. 
https://ec.europa.eu/competition/state_aid/cases/261160/ 261160_1900821_256_2.pdf 
5.11.9 SA.46898, Support Mechanism for Electricity Generation Facilities using 
the biogas produced by methanisation and the installations of electricity 
production using energy extracted from deposits geothermal 
It follows from the definition of Eelec that no additional remuneration is paid in the event of 
strictly negative spot prices recorded on the EPEX Spot SE electricity exchange for the 
France zone. However, beyond the first 70 hours, consecutive or not, of spot prices that 
are strictly negative recorded on the EPEX Spot SE electricity exchange for the France zone 
an installation that does not produce during the negative price hours receives a premium 
equal to: 
Premiumnegative prices = Pmax x T x nnegative prices 
Formula in which: 
T is the reference rate defined in subsection (65). 
nnegative prices is the number of hours during which spot prices observed on the EPEX Spot SE 
electricity exchange for the France zone were negative beyond the first 70 hours and during 
which the installation was not delivering energy. Thus the installation will not receive any 
remuneration during a maximum 9% of the expected operating time. France, however, 
has planned that compensation can only be paid within the limit of a number of reference 
hours of operation over the year of the installation (i.e. 8,000 hours in the case of 
geothermal energy). 
[Eelec (in MWh) is the sum over the hours at positive or zero spot prices on the EPEX Spot 
SE electricity exchange for the France zone, volumes allocated by the network operator, 
where appropriate via a loss calculation or settlement agreement, at the balance perimeter 
designated by the producer for the production of his installation. These volumes are net of 
the auxiliary consumption necessary for the functioning of the installation] 
No incentive to produce in the case of negative prices 
France has also implemented a mechanism to prevent producers from being encouraged 
to produce electricity at negative prices. The calculation of the reference market price used 
for the calculation of the premium does not take into account the hours during which the 
prices were negative, which gives a global incentive for the industry not to produce at 
times of negative prices, since in these cases the premium obtained will be lower than the 
difference between the reference tariff (which reflects the production costs of the sector) 
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and the market price. In addition, it is explicitly provided that the additional remuneration 
is only paid for electricity volumes allocated by the network operator for hours at a positive 
or zero spot price on the EPEX Spot SE electricity exchange for the France zone. 
(150) Remuneration is provided for installations which have not produced electricity 
beyond the first 70 hours where the electricity spot price is negative in order to compensate 
for a part of the loss of pay related to this reduced production. The purpose of this measure 
is to reduce uncertainty about the number of negative price hours in the coming years. To 
date, the number of negative price hours in France has never exceeded 15 hours per year. 
The threshold 70 hours corresponds to approximately 9% of the annual operating time for 
a geothermal installation. 
Beyond the 70 hour threshold, the production facility will receive a premium based on the 
parameters in paragraph (71). The remuneration received according to this formula cannot 
exceed the remuneration that an installation would have received in normal circumstances. 
It does not lead to a risk of overcompensation as the compensation can only be paid within 
the limited number of reference operating hours over the year for the installation. Once 
the facility has received support over a number of hours equivalent to full power for the 
number of reference hours of operation (8,000 hours) used to determine the level of 
support, the installation will no longer receive compensation. 
Source: pg 17-18 and pg30-31, European Commission decision document, Object: State 
aid SA.46898 (2016 / N) – France Support Mechanism for Electricity Generation Facilities 
using the biogas produced by methanisation and the installations of electricity production 
using energy extracted from geothermal deposits, 
https://ec.europa.eu/competition/state_aid/cases/267053/267053_1871207_76_2.pdf 
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Annex 5.12 – Additional analysis of RES generation during hours of 
negative day ahead electricity prices 
Figure A5.12.1 Hourly generation output (MW) of the case study Denmark 
Market 1 RES plants on 1 January 2019 
 
Note: Negative day ahead price periods (inclusive of prices of zero) are illustrated by the shaded box. Negative 
price periods (inclusive of prices of zero) on the intraday market are illustrated by the thick green line. 
Source: Day ahead prices and generation data from the entso-e transparency platform, intraday prices from 
Nord Pool. 
Figure A5.12.2 Hourly generation output (MW) of the case study Denmark 
Market 1 RES plants on 17 March 2019  
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Note: Negative day ahead price periods (inclusive of prices of zero) are illustrated by the shaded box. Negative 
price periods (inclusive of prices of zero) on the intraday market are illustrated by the thick green line. 
Source: Day ahead prices and generation data from the entso-e transparency platform, intraday prices from 
Nord Pool. 
Figure A5.12.3 Hourly generation output (MW) of the case study Denmark 
Market 1 RES plants on 23 April 2019  
 
Note: Negative day ahead price periods (inclusive of prices of zero) are illustrated by the shaded box. Negative 
price periods (inclusive of prices of zero) on the intraday market are illustrated by the thick green line. 
Source: Day ahead prices and generation data from the entso-e transparency platform, intraday prices from 
Nord Pool. 
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Figure A5.12.4 Hourly generation output (MW) of the Horns Rev C offshore 
windfarm on 30 June 2019  
 
Note: Negative day ahead price periods (inclusive of prices of zero) are illustrated by the shaded box. Negative 
price periods (inclusive of prices of zero) on the intraday market are illustrated by the thick green line. 
Source: Day ahead prices and generation data from the entso-e transparency platform, intraday prices from Nord 
Pool. 
Figure A5.12.5 Hourly generation output (MW) of the Horns Rev C offshore 
windfarm on 11 August 2019  
 
Note: Negative day ahead price periods (inclusive of prices of zero) are illustrated by the shaded box. Negative 
price periods (inclusive of prices of zero) on the intraday market241 are illustrated by the thick green line. 
                                                            
241 Intraday price data was missing for 17:00-18:00. 
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Source: Day ahead prices and generation data from the entso-e transparency platform, intraday prices from Nord 
Pool. 
Figure A5.12.6 Hourly generation output (MW) of the case study Denmark 
Market 2 RES plants on 1 January 2019  
 
Note: Negative day ahead price periods (inclusive of prices of zero) are illustrated by the shaded box. Negative 
price periods (inclusive of prices of zero) on the intraday market are illustrated by the thick green line. 
Source: Day ahead prices and generation data from the entso-e transparency platform, intraday prices from Nord 
Pool. 
Figure A5.12.7 Hourly generation output (MW) of the case study Denmark 
Market 2 RES plants on 2 January 2019  
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Note: Negative day ahead price periods (inclusive of prices of zero) are illustrated by the shaded box. Negative 
price periods (inclusive of prices of zero) on the intraday market242 are illustrated by the thick green line. 
Source: Day ahead prices and generation data from the entso-e transparency platform, intraday prices from Nord 
Pool. 
Figure A5.12.8 Hourly generation output (MW) of the case study Denmark 
Market 2 RES plants on 4 March 2019  
 
Note: Negative day ahead price periods (inclusive of prices of zero) are illustrated by the shaded box. Negative 
price periods (inclusive of prices of zero) on the intraday market243 are illustrated by the thick green line. 
Source: Day ahead prices and generation data from the entso-e transparency platform, intraday prices from 
Nord Pool.  
                                                            
242 Intraday price data was missing for 14:00-15:00. 
243 Intraday price data was missing for 04:00-05:00. 
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Figure A5.12.9 Hourly generation output (MW) of the case study Denmark 
Market 2 RES plants on 17 March 2019  
 
Note: Negative day ahead price periods (inclusive of prices of zero) are illustrated by the shaded box. Negative 
price periods (inclusive of prices of zero) on the intraday market are illustrated by the thick green line. 
Source: Day ahead prices and generation data from the entso-e transparency platform, intraday prices from 
Nord Pool.  
Figure A5.12.10 Hourly generation output (MW) of the case study Denmark 
Market 2 RES plants on 23 April 2019  
 
Note: Negative day ahead price periods (inclusive of prices of zero) are illustrated by the shaded box. Negative 
price periods (inclusive of prices of zero) on the intraday market are illustrated by the thick green line. 
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Source: Day ahead prices and generation data from the entso-e transparency platform, intraday prices from 
Nord Pool.  
Figure A5.12.11 Number of negative day ahead price events of different 
durations for sampled Member States, 2014-2019 
 
Source: Underlying data from the entso-e transparency platform, plus additional data from the Elspot market 
(Denmark), the EPEX spot market (France and Germany). 
Figure A5.12.12 Total number of negative day ahead price hours across 
sampled Member States, 2014-2019 
 
Source: Underlying data from the entso-e transparency platform, plus additional data from the Elspot market 
(Denmark), the epexspot market (France and Germany). 
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Annex 6.1 – 2020 RES targets and policies exceeding them  
(see accompanying Excel file) 
 
Annex 6.2 – Details on the rules covering reductions to RES and other 
charges  
(see accompanying Excel file) 
 
Annex 6.3 – Estimated proportion of electricity bills devoted to RES 
charges  
(see accompanying Excel file) 
 
Annex 6.4 – Estimated proportion of electricity bills devoted to ‘other 
charges’  
(see accompanying Excel file) 
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Annex 6.5 – Tables for Section 3.1 to 3.5 
Table A6.5.1:  RES schemes covered by EEAG and GBER decisions which 
involve competitively awarded operating aid 
Member 
State 
RES Schemes covered by EEAG 
decisions and involving 
competitively awarded operating 
aid (state aid case number) 
RES Schemes covered by 
GBER decisions and 
involving competitively 
awarded operating aid (state 
aid case number) 
Denmark SA.36204, SA.44626, SA.49918 No relevant case 
Estonia SA.36023, SA.47354 No relevant case 
Finland No relevant case SA.51525 
France SA.46259, SA.41528, SA.47753, 
SA.46552, SA.48238, SA.48066, 
SA.49181, SA.47752, SA.46698, 
SA.49180, SA.51190, SA.48642 
No relevant case 
Germany SA.38632, SA.45461 No relevant case 
Greece SA.44666, SA.48143 No relevant case 
Hungary SA.44076 SA.47331 
Italy SA.43756, SA.53347 No relevant case 
Lithuania SA.45765 No relevant case 
Luxembourg SA.37232, SA.43128 No relevant case 
Malta SA.43995 No relevant case 
Netherlands SA.39399, SA.43442, SA.46960 No relevant case 
Poland SA.43697 No relevant case 
Portugal SA.41694 No relevant case 
Slovenia SA.41998 No relevant case 
Spain SA.40348 No relevant case 
UK SA.36196, SA.47267, SA.52960 SA.39216, SA.39316, SA.43144 
Table A6.5.2:  RES schemes covered by EEAG and GBER exemptions which 
involve operating aid 
Member 
State 
RES Schemes covered by EEAG 
exemptions and involving 
RES Schemes covered by 
GBER exemptions and 
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operating aid (state aid case 
number) 
involving operating aid 
(state aid case number) 
Denmark SA.36204, SA.37122, SA.42498, 
SA.50715 
SA.47403, SA.47404, 
SA.47408, SA.47440, 
SA.47441, SA.50264, 
SA.50266, SA.50279, 
SA.51529 
Estonia SA.47354 SA.49198 
Finland No relevant case SA.46069, SA.51525 
France SA.40349, SA.41528, SA.43485, 
SA.43780, SA.46259, SA.46552, 
SA.46655, SA.46898, SA.47205, 
SA.47623, SA.47752, SA.47753, 
SA.47957,  SA.48066, SA.48238, 
SA.48642, SA.51190 
SA.43057 
Germany SA.38632, SA.45461, SA.48327 No relevant case 
Greece SA.44666, SA.48143 No relevant case 
Hungary SA.44076 No relevant case 
Italy SA.43756, SA.53347 SA.40279, SA.53666 
Lithuania244 No relevant case No relevant case 
Luxembourg SA.37232, SA.43128, SA.48601 No relevant case 
Malta SA.43995 SA.42970, SA.51961 
Netherlands SA.46960 SA.48966 
Poland SA.43697 SA.51852 
Portugal SA.41694 No relevant case 
Slovenia SA.41998 No relevant case 
Spain SA.40348 SA.42837, SA.51070 
UK No relevant case SA.39216, SA.39316, 
SA.40460, SA.43144, 
SA.43600, SA.49638, 
SA.52852 
                                                            
244 Lithuania is included in this table as it was part of the Q1 sample, however, it does not have scheme with a 
relevant exemption. 
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Table A6.5.3:  Combined heat and power schemes selected for data 
collection 
Member State CHP Schemes (state aid case 
number) 
Belgium SA.46013 
Czech Republic SA.38701, SA.45768 
Denmark SA.44922 
France SA.43719 
Germany SA.42393 
Lithuania SA.41539 
Netherlands SA.39399 
Poland SA.36518, SA.51192 
Table A6.5.4:  Electrical and thermal outputs of example CHP plants used in 
modelling of aid per unit of installed capacity 
Plant Title Net 
Electricial 
Output 
(kW) 
Thermal 
Output 
(kW) 
Primary 
Energy Saving 
(natural gas, 
post-2016)245 
High 
efficiency co-
generation? 
Internal Combustion 
Engine A 
100 196 10.68% Yes 
Internal Combustion 
Engine B 
633 815 13.91% Yes 
Internal Combustion 
Engine C 
1,121 1,266 14.73% Yes 
Internal Combustion 
Engine D 
3,326 3,126 16.55% Yes 
Internal Combustion 
Engine E 
9,941 7,857 15.75% Yes 
Gas Turbine A 3,304 5,760 -7.35% No 
Gas Turbine B 7,038 10,092 2.11% No 
Gas Turbine C 9,950 15,340 0.03% No 
                                                            
245 The primary energy savings utilize the standard reference efficiency values for separate heat and electricity 
plants when fueled by natural gas and constructed after 2016, respectively 87.0% and 53.0%. 
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Gas Turbine D 20,336 22,801 5.27% No 
Gas Turbine E 44,488 40,645 5.32% No 
Backpressure Steam 
Turbine A 
500 5,844 -4.06% No 
Backpressure Steam 
Turbine B 
3,000 45,624 -5.06% No 
Backpressure Steam 
Turbine C 
15,000 148,484 -3.12% No 
Microturbine A 28.0 61.0 1.15% Yes 
Microturbine B 61.0 119.8 3.16% Yes 
Microturbine C 190.0 258.9 -2.64% No 
Microturbine D 240.0 375.6 1.44% Yes 
Microturbine E 320.0 450.2 3.87% Yes 
Plant Title Net 
Electricial 
Output 
(kW) 
Thermal 
Output 
(kW) 
Primary 
Energy Saving 
(natural gas, 
post-2016) 
High 
efficiency co-
generation? 
Microturbine F 950.0 1,299.0 -2.49% No 
Fuel Cell A 0.7 1.0 19.54% Yes 
Fuel Cell B 1.5 0.5 20.10% Yes 
Fuel Cell C 300.0 223.9 22.23% Yes 
Fuel Cell D 400.0 548.0 15.57% Yes 
Fuel Cell E 1,400.0 1,296.3 20.37% Yes 
Table A6.5.5:  Capacity mechanisms selected for data collection 
Member State Capacity Mechanism (state aid case 
number) 
Belgium SA.48648 
France SA.39621, SA.48490 and SA.40454 
Germany SA.43735 
Greece SA.48780 and SA.50152 
Republic of Ireland SA.44464 
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Poland SA.46100 
UK SA.35980 and SA.44475 
Table A6.5.6:  Total number of hours of negative electricity prices observed 
on selected markets 1/1/14 to 4/9/19 
Annex Number Member State (Market) Number of Hours of 
Negative Electricity 
Prices 
5.1 Denmark (Market 1) 414 
5.2 Denmark (Market 2) 264 
5.3 France 51 
5.4 Germany 720 
5.5 Netherlands 2 
5.6 UK (Great Britain) 0 
5.7 UK (Northern Ireland) 59 
Table A6.5.7:  RES plants and days sampled to understand generation 
outputs around negative price events 
Member State 
(Market) 
Sampled Plants Sampled Days 
Denmark 
(Market 1) 
Anholt – Wind Offshore 
Horns Rev B – Wind Offshore 
Horns Rev C246 – Wind Offshore 
Skaerbaekvaerket 3 - Biomass 
Studstrupvaerket 3 – Biomass 
1 January 2019 
2 January 2019 
17 March 2019 
23 April 2019 
30 June 2019247 
10 August 2019 
11 August 201817 
                                                            
246 This is the Horns Rev 3 wind farm (SA.40305) that the Commission requested be considered for inclusion in 
the sample. The two other possible wind farms proposed for sampling by the Commission (in SA.45974 and 
SA.43751) are still to be under development/construction at the time of writing. 
247 These two dates were added for the Horns Rev C plant due to no other dates with negative prices (apart from 
10 August 2019) having the data for Horns Rev C on entso-e. These two dates were not chosen for the sampling 
of other plants due to the relatively small number of negative price hours on these days. 
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Member State 
(Market) 
Sampled Plants Sampled Days 
Denmark 
(Market 2)248 
Avedoerevaerket 1 - Biomass 
Avedoerevaerket 2 - Biomass 
Roedsand 1 – Wind Offshore 
Roedsand 2 – Wind Offshore 
1 January 2019 
2 January 2019 
4 March 2019 
17 March 2019 
23 April 2019 
France Aigle 6 – Hydro Water Reservoir 
Chastang 3 – Hydro Run of River and 
Poundage 
Combe D’Aurieux 1 – Hydro Water Reservoir 
Montezic 2 – Hydro Pumped Storage 
Provence 4 Biomasse249 - Biomass 
Revin 4 – Hydro Pumped Storage 
1 January 2018 
17 March 2019 
12 May 2019 
8 June 2019 
23 June 2019 
Germany Koepchenwerk – Hydro Pumped Storage 
PSW Goldisthal PSS A – Hydro Pumped 
Storage 
Rheinkraftwerk Iffezheim – Hydro Run of 
River and Poundage 
Waldeck II M6 - Hydro Pumped Storage 
Wehr – Hydro Pumped Storage 
Wikinger_Prod – Wind Offshore 
18 March 2018 
21 May 2018 
1 January 2019 
17 March 2019 
23 April 2019 
Netherlands Westereems 2 Tennet – Wind Onshore 2 June 2019 
UK (Great 
Britain) 
N/A N/A 
UK (Northern 
Ireland) 
Lisahally - Biomass 9 February 2019 
17 February 2019 
13 March 2019 
                                                            
248 Only four RES plants were identified on entso-e for Denmark Market 2. 
249 Reflecting the Commission’s request for sampling across technologies we initially selected this biomass plant 
for sampling, but its generating output was zero on all sampled days. 
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Member State 
(Market) 
Sampled Plants Sampled Days 
14 March 2019 
15 March 2019 
Table A6.5.8:  Degree to which RES charges involved manipulation or 
estimation 
RES charges taken 
directly from legislation 
RES charges involving 
manipulation of values 
in legislation 
RES charges where an 
estimation methodology 
was required 
Austria – Flat Rate Croatia Denmark 
Austria – Green Subsidy France Greece (2018) 
Estonia Lithuania Italy – Green Certificates 
Germany UK - CfD Poland – CO scheme 
Greece (2011-2017) - UK – RO 
Italy - Levy - UK – FiT 
Latvia - - 
Slovakia - - 
Slovenia - - 
Poland - Surcharge - - 
Romania - - 
Table A6.5.9: Other charges approved by analogy selected for data 
collection 
Member 
State 
State Aid 
Case 
Number 
Name of Charge Name of Charge (English) 
France SA.36511 Contribution au service 
public de l'électricité (CSPE) 
Contribution to the electricity 
utility 
Germany SA.42393 KWKG Umlage KWKG Surcharge 
Greece SA.52413 Ειδικό Τέλος Μείωσης 
Εκπομπών Αερίων Ρύπων 
ETMEAR Levy 
Italy SA.38635 Oneri generali di Sistema 
(A3) 
General system Charges (A3) 
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Poland SA.52530 Opłata kogeneracyjna Cogeneration Charge 
 
Slovakia SA.50877 Jadrového fondu The Nuclear Levy 
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Annex 6.6 – Additional figures on RES targets and the proportion of 
electricity bills accounted for by RES and other charges 
Figure A6.6.1:  Percentage of the electricity bill accounted for by RES 
charges for example EIUs in Germany, rates per consumption band 
 
Source: E.CA Economics based on data collected for Question 6. RES levy rates calculated by the University of 
East Anglia. 
Figure 6.6.2:  Percentage of the electricity bill accounted for by RES 
charges for example households in Germany, rates per consumption band 
 
Source: E.CA Economics based on data collected for Question 6. RES levy rates calculated by the University of 
East Anglia. 
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Figure A6.6.3:  Percentage of the electricity bill accounted for by RES 
charges for example non-EIU commercial users in Germany, rates per 
consumption band 
 
Source: E.CA Economics based on data collected for Question 6. RES levy rates calculated by the University of 
East Anglia. 
Figure A6.6.4:  Percentage of the electricity bill accounted for by RES 
charges for example EIUs in Italy, rates per consumption band 
 
Source: E.CA Economics based on data collected for Question 6. RES levy rates calculated by the University of 
East Anglia. 
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Figure A6.6.5:  Percentage of the electricity bill accounted for by RES 
charges for example households in Italy, rates per consumption band 
 
Source: E.CA Economics based on data collected for Question 6. RES levy rates calculated by the University of 
East Anglia. 
Figure A6.6.6:  Percentage of the electricity bill accounted for by RES 
charges for example non-EIU commercial users in Italy, rates per consumption 
band 
 
Source: E.CA Economics based on data collected for Question 6. RES levy rates calculated by the University of 
East Anglia. 
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Figure A6.6.7:  Other charges approved by analogy over electricity bill by 
sampled Member States over time (percentage, averaged across all example 
household consumers) 
 
Source: Calculations by Centre for Competition Policy, University of East Anglia  utilizing information from national 
authority websites, national authority documents and European Commission decision documents. 
Figure A6.6.8:  Other charges approved by analogy over electricity bill by 
sampled Member States over time (percentage, averaged across example non-
energy intensive commercial consumers, consumption bands IC to IF) 
 
Source: Calculations by Centre for Competition Policy, University of East Anglia  utilizing information from 
national authority websites, national authority documents and European Commission decision documents. 
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Figure A6.6.9:  Other charges approved by analogy over electricity bill by 
sampled Member States over time (percentage, averaged across all example 
energy intensive commercial consumers) 
 
Source: Calculations by Centre for Competition Policy, University of East Anglia  utilizing information from national 
authority websites, national authority documents and European Commission decision documents. 
Figure A6.6.10:  Electricity prices inclusive of all taxes and charges by 
sampled Member States over time (averaged across all example household 
consumers), Austria to Italy 
 
Source: Eurostat 
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Figure A6.6.11:  Electricity prices inclusive of all taxes and charges by 
sampled Member States over time (averaged across all example household 
consumers), Latvia to the UK 
 
Source: Eurostat 
Figure A6.6.12:  Electricity prices inclusive of all taxes and charges by 
sampled Member States over time (averaged across all example commercial 
users), Austria to Italy 
 
Source: Eurostat 
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Figure A6.6.13:  Electricity prices inclusive of all taxes and charges by 
sampled Member States over time (averaged across all example commercial 
users), Austria to Italy 
 
Source: Eurostat 
Figure A6.6.14:  RES Levy rates by sampled Member States over time 
(averaged across all example household consumers)250 
 
                                                            
250 Excludes the fixed fee elements of charging systems. 
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Source: Calculations by Centre for Competition Policy, University of East Anglia  utilizing information from national 
authority websites, national authority documents and European Commission decision documents. 
Figure A6.6.15:  RES Levy rates by sampled Member States over time 
(averaged across all example non-energy intensive consumers)251 
 
Source: Calculations by Centre for Competition Policy, University of East Anglia  utilizing information from national 
authority websites, national authority documents and European Commission decision documents. 
Figure A6.6.16 Difference to EU 2020 RES target for primary energy 
consumption by Member State (first 14), 2010-2018 
 
                                                            
251 Excludes the fixed fee elements of charging systems. 
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Source: Calculations by Centre for Competition Policy, University of East Anglia using Eurostat data 
Figure A6.6.17 Difference to EU 2020 RES target for primary energy 
consumption by Member State (second 14), 2010-2018 
 
Source: Calculations by Centre for Competition Policy, University of East Anglia using Eurostat data 
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Annex 7.1 – Review of Article 47 GBER schemes  
(see accompanying Excel file) 
 
Annex 7.2 – Review of Article 47 GBER schemes containing provisions on 
waste management  
(Confidential Annex) 
 
Annex 7.3 – Waste management projects under scheme SA.49422 and 
SA.40266  
(see accompanying Excel file) 
 
Annex 7.4 – Responses to questionnaires 
(Confidential Annex) 
 
Annex 7.5 – Confidential details on German projects having received 
State aid from KfW 
(Confidential Annex) 
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Annex 8.1 - RES and related levies 
The review presented in this appendix covers all countries that introduced a reduction on 
RES levies over the period of observation individually. These countries are: Denmark, 
France, Germany, Greece, Italy, Latvia, Poland, Romania, Slovenia and the UK.252  
Electricity prices, RES levies and reductions to the latter generally depend on the 
consumption intensity. The following table provides an overview of consumption bands and 
the consumption range. When calculating total levy rates based on consumption, the 
midpoint of each consumption range interval is assumed to provide the best estimate for 
consumption. Only for the lowest consumption band, the upper bound of the interval (1,000 
kWh) is assumed as proxy for yearly consumption. 
Table 1: Electricity consumption bands and related ranges of consumption 
Consumption 
band 
Consumption 
Range (kWh) 
Consumption 
band 
Consumption Range 
(kWh) 
DA < 1,000 IA < 20 
DB 1,000–2,500 IB 20–500 
DC 2,500–5,000 IC 500–2,000 
DD 5,000–15,000 ID 2,000–20,000 
DE > 15,000 IE 20,000–70,000 
  IF 70,000–150,000 
Source: Eurostat. 
The assessment of potential impacts of reductions is based on a discussion of two 
elements: 
• A graphical depiction of the development of levy rates in Eurocent253 per 
kWh over time for different user groups. 
• A graphical depiction of the development of levy rates indexed to the last 
year before the introduction of a rebate. 
• A tabular comparison of the level of levies before to after the introduction 
of rebates for different user groups. This comparison is based on periods of equal 
length before and after the introduction of a rebate.254 The level of levies is 
quantified in two alternative ways: (i) as total levies in Euro per year paid by user 
group. (ii) RES or CHP levies as share of the overall electricity bill. 
                                                            
252 For some countries, data on RES levies or reductions to RES levies have been collected and presented in the 
answer to Question 6 but these data are cannot be used here. Austria was disregarded for it introduced an 
exemption for households in 2012 because data are only available from 2012 onwards. Estonia, Lithuania and 
Slovakia were also disregarded for there were no reductions applied to EIUs. 
253 All monetary values have been converted to Euros. 
254 These periods are as long as possible given the availability of the data. For example, if there are three years 
observed before the introduction of a rebate and five years after it, the last three years before the introduction 
of rebates are compared to the first three years after this introduction. 
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The following analyses focus on the development of different levy rates and observed 
correlations (or co-developments). Where appropriate, it is noted that the observed pattern 
is consistent with a redistribution effect. However, this should not be misinterpreted as 
evidence or causality because the development of levies is influenced by multiple factors, 
including unobserved political decisions. In particular, insofar as levy rates are linked to 
the price of electricity, then they also depend on unobserved market factors. As a result, 
even if one rate (e.g. for EIUs) decreases and another rate (e.g. for households) increases, 
this does not prove that one caused the other. The analyses, based on the data at hand, 
allows depicting developments and identifying patterns but it does not allow making 
conclusions on causality. 
8.1.1 Denmark 
Denmark introduced a subsidy for EIUs in September 2015 that is estimated to amount to 
roughly 0.07 DKK per kWh. The subsidy may not exceed 85% of the total levy amount and 
will not be paid on an amount less than 20,000 DKK but companies can group together to 
exceed threshold and benefit from the subsidy (see Question 6ii). 
The following figure shows the development of RES levy rates in Eurocent/ kWh255 in 
Denmark separately for energy-intensive users (EIUs) and non-EIUs. All customers pay 
the same RES levy per kWh but the subsidy introduced for energy intensive users (EIS) in 
2016 leads to a reduction for the latter. The lower panel shows the levy rates indexed to 
year 2015, the year directly before the introduction of rebates. The horizontal red line 
marks the 100%-level of this index. 
                                                            
255 Figure 1 in 11.1 shows the development indexed to 2015, illustrating the percentage changes in the levy 
relative to the last year before the introduction of the subsidy. 
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Figure 1: RES levy rate per consumption band in Denmark. Lower panel 
indexed to 2015 
 
Source: E.CA Economics based on data collected as answer to Question 6. RES levy rates calculated by the 
University of East Anglia. Note: Reductions are available for EIU as of Sep 2015. 
RES levies in Denmark show a hump-shaped development for all user groups. Rates for 
EIUs declined significantly after 2015. For all user groups, RES levy rates increased from 
2011 to 2014 from about 0.5 to 2 Cent. For households and non-EIUs, they increased from 
2015 to 2016 and then decreased so about 1.4 Cent. In relative terms, they more than 
doubled between 2011 and 2015 and then decreased to about 70% of the level of 2015. 
For EIUs, they decreased sharply from 2015 to 2017 and then levelled off at slightly less 
than 0.5 Cent, or between 20 and 40% of the level of 2015. Only for consumption band IF 
of non-EIUs, levy rates increased to the level of all other non-EIUs and households when 
rebates for EIUs were introduced. However, this adaptation appears small relative to the 
massive discount introduced for EIUs. 
The following table describes the difference in levels of levies before to after the 
introduction of the subsidy. The first two columns show the user type (households, non-
EIUs and EIUs) and the consumption bands. The second part shows the average RES levies 
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in Euro per year and the third part the average RES levies in percent of the electricity bill. 
Within each part, the table shows the level for 2013-2015 (three years before the 
introduction of rebates), the level for 2016-2018 (three years after the introduction of 
rebates), the simple difference (in Euro per year or percentage points, depending on the 
measure) and the difference in percent. 
Table 2: RES levies per user type and consumption band before and after 
introduction of rebate (Denmark) 
Cons. 
band 
Average RES levy in Euro per year 
Average RES levy as % of electricity 
bill 
2013-2015 2016-2018 Difference Difference  
2013-
2015 
2016-
2018 
Difference Difference  
(€) (€) (€) (%) (%) (%) (p.p.) (%) 
Households 
DA 16.7 15.6 -1.1 -6.6 4.8 4.1 -0.7 -15.1 
DB 29.2 27.3 -1.9 -6.6 5.0 4.7 -0.4 -7.3 
DC 62.5 58.4 -4.1 -6.6 5.5 5.1 -0.5 -8.3 
DD 166.7 155.8 -11.0 -6.6 7.3 6.4 -0.9 -12.4 
DE 250.1 233.7 -16.4 -6.6 7.4 7.0 -0.3 -4.7 
Non-EIUs 
IA 333.5 311.5 -21.9 -6.6 5.9 5.3 -0.7 -11.1 
IB 4,335.1 4,050.1 -285.0 -6.6 6.3 5.6 -0.7 -10.6 
IC 20,842.0 19,471.6 -1,370.4 -6.6 6.5 6.0 -0.5 -8.1 
ID 183,409.6 171,350.3 -12,059.3 -6.6 6.5 6.0 -0.5 -7.6 
IE 750,311.9 700,978.4 -49,333.6 -6.6 6.9 6.4 -0.5 -7.5 
IF 1,733,301.4 1,713,502.6 -19,798.7 -1.1 6.6 6.4 -0.2 -2.8 
EIUs 
IC 20,842.0 10,405.9 -10,436.1 -50.1 6.5 3.3 -3.2 -49.6 
ID 183,409.6 70,620.5 -112,789.1 -61.5 6.5 2.6 -4.0 -60.8 
IE 750,311.9 280,599.3 -469,712.6 -62.6 6.9 2.6 -4.3 -61.8 
IF 1,733,301.4 682,029.5 -1,051,271.8 -60.7 6.6 2.6 -4.0 -60.0 
Source: E.CA Economics based on data collected as to Question 6. 
Between the three years before and after the introduction of the subsidy, the average RES 
levy paid by households of band DA decreased from 16.7 Euro to 15.6 Euro, which is a 
reduction by 1.1 Euro or 6.6%. Since all non-EIUs (but band IF) pay the same RES levy 
rate, their percentage increase was the same. However, the total increase depends on total 
 262 
 
consumption. For band IE, the decrease by 6.6% meant 49 thousand Euro less expenses 
for RES levies. For band IF, the decrease was only 19 thousand Euro. 
For EIUs benefiting from the subsidy, the reduction meant a decrease of expenses up to 
61.8%. For band IF consuming the largest amounts of electricity, total RES levies were on 
average 1.7 million Euro in 2013-2015 and 682 thousand in 2016-2018, a decrease by 
1.05 million Euro, or 60.7%. 
The share of RES levies in the electricity bill (shown in the last part of the table) did not 
change much. For households and non-EIUs, it was between 4% and 8% in 2013-2015 
and about half a percentage point lower in 2016-2018. For EIUs, the share decreased by 
50 to 60% from 6% to 7% of the electricity bill to 3.3% for band IC and to 2.6% for bands 
ID, IE and IF. 
Overall, RES levies declined for all user groups, but for EIUs, they declined much more that 
for others because of the reduction.  
8.1.2 France 
In France, RES and CHP levies were collected through the same channel, i.e. the CSPE.256 
This is capped at 0.5% of the EIUs value added but also in terms of the total CSPE 
contribution per consumption site. The total cap was introduced in 2011 when it was set 
to 550,000 € per year and then increased on an annual basis.257 This cap therefore reduced 
total charges for consumption band IF from 2011 onwards. From 2013 onwards, total 
CSPE-charges for the average site of band IE exceeded the cap. Since data is available 
only from 2011 onwards, the following discussion focuses on the reduction relevant for 
band IE from 2013 onwards (see Question 6). The levies have been in use until 2015. From 
2016 onwards, the system of financing renewable energy sources through levies was 
replaced by financing via general taxation. 
The average share of RES levies in the CSPE for 2003 through 2015 was 39% and the 
average share of CHP levies was 61%. The following discussion first addresses the 
development of RES levies and then the development of CHP levies. It then shows the 
overall effect of both levies on expenses by different consumer groups and on the electricity 
bill of these. 
RES levies 
The following figure shows the development of RES levy rates in Eurocent/ kWh258 in France 
by consumption band. Since 2013, firms belonging to band IE benefit from a reduction due 
to the cap in total contributions. Households and consumption bands IA, IB, IC and ID pay 
the same RES levy rate, so there is only one line for all these groups. The lower panel 
shows the levy rates indexed to year 2012, the year directly before the introduction of 
rebates. The horizontal red line marks the 100%-level of this index. 
                                                            
256 Contribution au service public de l’électricité, or tax contribution to the public service charges for electricity. 
257 Annual values are: 550,000 € (2011), 559,350 € (2012), 569,418 € (2013), 597,889 € (2014), and 627,783 
€ (2015). Source: Question 6. 
258 Figure 3 in Annex 11.1 shows the development indexed to 2012, illustrating the percentage changes in the 
levy relative to the last year before the introduction of the reduction. 
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Figure 2: RES levy rate per consumption band in France. Lower panel 
indexed to 2012 
 
Source: E.CA Economics based on data collected as answer to Question 6. Levy rates adjusted by the University 
of East Anglia. Note: Reductions are available for EIU (IE) as of Jan 2013. Additional reductions are available 
for EIU (IF) as of Jan 2011. 
RES levies in France follow an almost linear upwards trend for most consumption bands. 
Only for IF, they have been almost unchanged between 2011 and 2015. For households 
and consumption IA through ID, RES levies increased from about 0.3 Cent in 2011 to less 
than 0.8 Cent in 2015. In percentage (lower panel), this means that RES levies more than 
doubled in this period. For consumption band IE, the increase was more moderate. Levy 
rates increased by almost 40% between 2012 and 2013. Then, the increase slowed down 
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(as can be seen in the kink) and rates increased to slightly more than 50% above the 
2012-level in 2015.  
The development for consumption band IF was very moderate. These increased from 
slightly less than 0.2 Cent in 2011 to slightly more than this in 2015, or from 98% of their 
2012-level in 2011 to 112% in 2015. 
CHP levies 
Since CHP levies and RES levies are derived from the same source (the CSPE) and the data 
only allow a separation by average share, the overall development is the same but the 
levels differ. The following figure shows the development of CHP levy rates in Eurocent/ 
kWh259 in France by consumption band. As discussed above, households and consumption 
bands IA, IB, IC and ID pay the same rate, so there is only one line for all these groups. 
As for RES levies, the lower panel shows the values indexed to 2012.  
                                                            
259 Figure 4 in Annex 11.1 shows the development indexed to 2012, illustrating the percentage changes in the 
levy relative to the last year before the introduction of the reduction. 
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Figure 3: CHP + Other levy rate per consumption band in France. Lower 
panel indexed to 2012 
 
Source: E.CA Economics based on data collected as answer to Question 6. Levy rates adjusted by the University 
of East Anglia. Note: Reductions are available for EIU (IE) as of Jan 2013. Additional reductions are available 
for EIU (IF) as of Jan 2011. 
Aggregate effect of reductions 
The following table shows the aggregate effect of the reduction introduced in 2013 on the 
sum of both levies (RES + CHP), i.e. the CSPE charge. The first two columns show the user 
type (households, non-EIUs and EIUs) and the consumption bands. Since reductions 
depend on the level of consumption only, EIUs and non-EIUs are grouped together. The 
second part shows the average levies (RES + CHP) in Euro per year and the third part the 
average levies in percent of the electricity bill. Within each part, the table shows the level 
for 2011-2012 (two years before the introduction of rebates), the level for 2013-2014 (two 
years after the introduction of rebates), the simple difference (in Euro per year or 
percentage points, depending on the measure) and the difference in percent. 
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Table 3: RES + CHP + Other levy per user type and consumption band 
before and after introduction of rebate (France) 
Cons. 
band 
Average RES levy in Euro per year Average RES levy as % of electricity bill 
2011-
2012  
2013-
2014  
Difference  Difference  
2011-
2012  
2013-
2014  
Difference  Difference  
(€) (€) (€) (%) (%) (%) (p.p.) (%) 
Households 
DA 8.3 15.0 6.8 81.8 3.3 5.4 2.1 62.1 
DB 14.4 26.3 11.8 81.8 5.1 8.3 3.2 62.0 
DC 30.9 56.3 25.3 81.8 5.8 9.3 3.6 61.6 
DD 82.5 150.0 67.5 81.8 6.3 10.2 3.9 61.0 
DE 123.8 225.0 101.3 81.8 6.4 11.0 4.5 70.5 
Non-EIUs / EIUs 
IA 165.0 300.0 135.0 81.8 5.5 9.3 3.8 68.9 
IB 2,145.0 3,900.0 1,755.0 81.8 6.9 11.1 4.1 60.0 
IC 10,312.5 18,750.0 8,437.5 81.8 8.2 13.3 5.2 63.2 
ID 90,750.0 165,000.0 74,250.0 81.8 9.4 15.5 6.1 64.5 
IE 371,250.0 583,653.5 212,403.5 57.2 10.1 16.0 5.9 58.0 
IF 554,675.0 583,653.5 28,978.5 5.2 7.4 8.4 1.0 13.8 
Source: E.CA Economics based on data collected as answer to Question 6. 
Between the two years before and after the introduction of rebates, the average total levy 
paid by households and consumption bands IA through ID increased by 81.8%. The total 
amount depends on the level of consumption. For band DA, expenses increased from 8.3 
Euro to 15.0 Euro, an increase by 6.8 Euro. For band DE, the increase meant additional 
expenses of 101 Euro. For band ID, this translates into additional costs of 74,250 Euro, a 
change from 90,750 Euro to 165,000 Euro. For band IE, the increase was 57.2%, or 212 
thousand Euro. For band IF (the band that benefitted from a reduction taking effect in 
2011), the difference is very small; expenses for band IF increased by only 5.2%.  
The share of RES levies in the electricity bill increased by more than 50% for households 
and slightly more than that for bands IA through IE. Only for band IF, the relative increase 
was moderate for the share of its electricity bill that consists of RES levy contributions only 
increased by 13.8%. 
Overall, contributions to RES and CHP levies in France increased for all customer groups 
but the increase was stronger for non-rebated groups, which are all but those with the 
highest consumption levels. For band IF, the development after 2011 is very flat compared 
to other bands. 
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8.1.3 Germany 
In Germany, both RES and CHP levies have been collected. RES levies were much higher 
- they amounted to about 3.5 Cent in 2011, while CHP levies make up only between 0.1 
and 0.5 Cent per kWh. In 2012, there was a reduction of RES levies for EIUs and in 2017 
there was a harmonisation of CHP levies (see Question 6). The before-after comparison of 
rebates is therefore presented separately for RES and CHP levies.  
RES levies 
The following figure shows the development of RES levy rates in Eurocent/ kWh260 in 
Germany by consumption band and separately for energy-intensive users (EIUs) and non-
EIUs. All non-EIUs pay the same RES levy, so there is only one line for all these groups. 
The lower panel shows the levy rates indexed to year 2011, the year directly before the 
introduction of rebates. The horizontal red line marks the 100%-level of this index.  
                                                            
260 Figure 5 in Annex 11.1 shows the development indexed to 2011, illustrating the percentage changes in the 
levy relative to the last year before the introduction of the reduction for EIUs. 
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Figure 4: RES levy rate per consumption band in Germany. Lower panel 
indexed to 2011 
 
Source: E.CA Economics based on data collected as answer to Question 6. RES levy rates based on information 
from legislation. Notes: Reductions are available for EIU as of January 2012. 
RES levies in Germany generally follow an upward trend. In 2008, they were at less than 
2 Cent per kWh, grew to 3.5 Cent in 2011, and to almost 7 Cent in 2017. In percentage 
(lower panel), this means that RES levies more than doubled in the four years leading up 
to 2011. For households and non-EIUs, they grew by 80% in the three years following the 
introduction of the rebates. For EIUs, they shifted to a very low level and then increased 
slowly over time. 
The development of RES levies for EIUs that benefitted from the reduction depends on the 
consumption bands. Since the full levy amount is payable for the first GWh consumed but 
all consumption above this threshold is reduced, the average reduction is relatively small 
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for the band IC261 while for most of the electricity consumed by members of band IF, there 
is a significant reduction to the RES levy.262 For consumption band IC, RES levies still grow 
by more than 50 percent to almost 6 Cent per kWh until 2018. For bands ID to IF, they 
dropped to less than 1 Cent in 2012, or by 2 to 20% of their 2011-level. Over time, they 
grew to 1 to 2 Cent, or to about 20 to 45% of their 2011-level. The following table describes 
the difference in levels of levies before to after the introduction of rebates.  
                                                            
261 For the mid-point of the consumption interval (1.25 GWh), only one 20% of total consumption are reduced 
while for 80%, the consumer needs to pay the full RES levy. 
262 This band refers to customers consuming between 70 GWh and 150 GWh. For 70 GWh, the unrebated first 
GWh amounts to only 1.4%, for 150 GWh it makes up only 0.7%. Since the reduction means that EIUs pay only 
10 to 15% (depending on the year) of the levy for consumption beyond 1 GWh, levy rates for EIUs with high 
consumption are reduced substantially. 
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Table 4: RES levies per user type and consumption band before and after 
introduction of rebate (Germany) 
Cons. 
band 
Average RES levy in Euro per year 
Average RES levy as % of electricity 
bill 
2008-2011  2012-2015  Difference  Difference  
2008-
2011  
2012-
2015  
Difference  Difference  
(€) (€) (€) (%) (%) (%) (p.p.) (%) 
Households 
DA 20.2 53.2 33.1 163.8 5.5 12.5 7.0 129.0 
DB 35.3 93.1 57.8 163.8 7.6 16.9 9.3 121.9 
DC 75.7 199.6 123.9 163.8 8.4 18.4 10.0 118.9 
DD 201.8 532.3 330.5 163.8 8.9 19.4 10.4 117.0 
DE 302.6 798.4 495.8 163.8 9.2 20.2 10.9 118.2 
Non-EIUs 
IA 403.5 1,064.5 661.0 163.8 8.0 18.5 10.5 130.7 
IB 5,245.5 13,838.5 8,593.0 163.8 11.2 24.2 13.0 116.6 
IC 25,218.8 66,531.3 41,312.5 163.8 12.9 27.7 14.9 115.3 
ID 221,925.0 585,475.0 363,550.0 163.8 14.2 31.1 16.9 118.7 
IE 907,875.0 2,395,125.0 1,487,250.0 163.8 15.4 35.4 19.9 129.3 
IF 2,219,250.0 5,854,750.0 3,635,500.0 163.8 16.1 38.9 22.9 142.0 
EIUs 
IC 25,218.8 54,748.4 29,529.7 117.1 12.9 23.7 10.8 84.1 
ID 221,925.0 110,760.5 -111,164.5 -50.1 14.2 7.5 -6.7 -47.4 
IE 907,875.0 204,593.8 -703,281.3 -77.5 15.4 4.3 -11.1 -71.9 
IF 2,219,250.0 377,213.8 
-
1,842,036.3 
-83.0 16.1 4.0 -12.1 -75.4 
Source: E.CA Economics based on data collected as answer to Question 6. 
The first two columns show the user type (households, non-EIUs and EIUs) and the 
consumption bands. The second part shows the average RES levies in Euro per year and 
the third part the average RES levies in percent of the electricity bill. Within each part, the 
table shows the level for 2008-2011 (four years before the introduction of rebates), the 
level for 2012-2015 (four years after the introduction of rebates), the simple difference (in 
Euro per year or percentage points, depending on the measure) and the difference in 
percent. 
Between the four years before and after the introduction of rebates, the average RES levy 
paid by households of band DA increased from 20.2 Euro to 53.2 Euro, i.e. by 33.1 Euro 
or 163.8%. Since all non-EIUs pay the same RES levy rate, the percentage increase was 
 271 
 
the same for all of these. However, the total increase depends on total consumption. For 
band IF of non-EIUs, the annual RES levies paid went from 2.2 million Euro to 5.9 million 
Euro, which is an increase by 3.6 Mio Euro. 
For EIUs that benefit from the reduction, the development depends on the level of 
consumption and hence the share of this consumption that is reduced (see above). The 
lowest band of EIUs (band IC) faced an increase in RES levies paid. These went up from 
25 to 55 thousand Euro, which means an increase by 29.5 thousand Euro, or 117.1%. For 
the bands of higher consumption, RES levies decreased significantly. For consumption band 
IE, they decreased by about 111 thousand Euro (50.1%), for band IE by 703 thousand 
Euro (77.5%), and for band IF by 1.8 million Euro (83.0%). 
The share of RES levies in the electricity bill (shown in the last part of the table) grows 
with the consumption level. This is because higher consumption leads to lower prices per 
kWh while the RES levy per kWh is constant, hence the share of the RES levy in the total 
price increases. For households in band DS, the share went up from 5.5% of the electricity 
bill to 12.5%, which is an increase by 7 percentage points or 129%. The difference in 
percentage points between both periods also generally increases with consumption. The 
percentage difference is more heterogeneous: It ranges from 115.3% for group IC to 
142.0% for group IF, meaning that also the share of RES levies in the electricity bill more 
than doubled between the two periods.  
Regarding EIUs, the share of the electricity bill paid for RES levies increased with 
consumption before the introduction of rebates but decreased after the introduction of 
rebates (see discussion above). For consumption band IC, RES levies made up 23.7% in 
the years 2012-2015 while for band IF, they only accounted for 4.0%. In terms of 
differences, this means that they increased by 10.8 percentage points or 84.1% for band 
IC but a decrease by 12.1 percentage points or 75.4% for band IF. 
The development is consistent with substantial redistribution between consumer groups. 
RES levies paid – both in Euro per year of as share of the electricity bill – increased 
significantly for all user groups not benefitting from a rebate and even for those EIUs for 
which the reduction affected only a small part of their consumption. On the other hand, 
EIUs with higher electricity consumption (bands ID, IE and IF), saw a significant reduction 
in the total Euro paid for RES levies or in the share of their electricity bill made up by RES 
levies. 
CHP levies 
Germany also charges CHP levies. For years 2011 through 2016, there were three different 
CHP levy rates depending on total consumption. For 2017 and 2018, this system was 
harmonised. Since then, there is only one CHP levy rate and EIUs benefit from reductions 
that are applied to consumption above 1 GWh.  
The following figure shows the development of CHP levy rates in Eurocent/ kWh263 in 
Germany by consumption band and separately for energy-intensive users (EIUs) and non-
EIUs. All households and consumption band IA and IB pay the same CHP levy rate. The 
lower panel shows the levy rates indexed to year 2016, the year directly before the 
introduction of rebates. The horizontal red line marks the 100%-level of this index.  
                                                            
263 Figure 6 in Annex 11.1 shows the development indexed to 2016, illustrating the percentage changes in the 
levy relative to the last year before the harmonization of rates. 
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Figure 5: CHP levy rate per consumption band in Germany. Lower panel 
indexed to 2016 
 
 
Source: E.CA Economics based on data collected as answer to Question 6. CHP Levy rates are taken from 
legislation. Note: Reductions are available for EIU as of January 2017. 
The development of CHP levies differs across consumption bands. For households and 
consumption bands IA and IB, rates increased from less than 0.1 Cent to about 0.45 Cent 
between 2011 and 2016 and then started to decline. Up to 2016, the rate for bands IC for 
EIUs and non-EIUs were almost identical. From 2017 onwards, rates for non-EIUs were 
the same as rates for households, which led to an increase of the rates for non-EIUs. As 
shown in the lower panel, this increase was massive relative to the level of 2016 for bands 
ID, IE and IF because rates for these had been on a relatively low level up to then. 
Rates for EIUs were lower and remained in a corridor between 0 and about 0.1 Cent per 
kWh throughout the period of observation (2011 to 2018). 
The following table describes the difference in levels of levies before to after the 
introduction of rebates and the harmonisation in 2017. The first two columns show the 
user type (households, non-EIUs and EIUs) and the consumption bands. The second part 
shows the average CHP levies in Euro per year and the third part the average CHP levies 
in percent of the electricity bill. Within each part, the table shows the level for 2015-2016 
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(two years before the introduction of rebates), the level for 2017-2018 (two years after 
the introduction of rebates), the simple difference (in Euro per year or percentage points, 
depending on the measure) and the difference in percent. 
Table 5: CHP levies per user type and consumption band before and after 
introduction of rebate (Germany) 
Cons. 
band 
Average RES levy in Euro per year 
Average RES levy as % of electricity 
bill 
2015-
2016  
2017-
2018  
Difference  Difference  
2015-
2016  
2017-
2018  
Difference  Difference  
(€) (€) (€) (%) (%) (%) (p.p) (%) 
Households 
DA 3.5 3.9 0.4 12.0 0.8 0.8 0.0 5.7 
DB 6.1 6.9 0.7 12.0 1.1 1.2 0.1 8.9 
DC 13.1 14.7 1.6 12.0 1.2 1.3 0.1 9.8 
DD 35.0 39.2 4.2 12.0 1.2 1.4 0.1 10.8 
DE 52.4 58.7 6.3 12.0 1.3 1.5 0.2 12.1 
Non-EIUs 
IA 69.9 78.3 8.4 12.0 1.3 1.4 0.1 10.1 
IB 908.7 1,017.9 109.2 12.0 1.6 1.7 0.2 10.9 
IC 3,608.8 4,893.8 1,285.0 35.6 1.5 2.0 0.5 34.5 
ID 8,045.0 43,065.0 35,020.0 435.3 0.4 2.3 1.9 449.5 
IE 23,515.0 176,175.0 152,660.0 649.2 0.4 3.1 2.8 758.2 
IF 53,090.0 430,650.0 377,560.0 711.2 0.4 3.0 2.6 680.6 
EIUs 
IC 3,563.8 4,061.8 498.1 14.0 1.4 1.6 0.2 13.5 
ID 6,245.0 9,787.5 3,542.5 56.7 0.3 0.5 0.2 63.6 
IE 15,595.0 29,754.0 14,159.0 90.8 0.2 0.5 0.3 122.2 
IF 33,470.0 67,925.3 34,455.3 102.9 0.2 0.5 0.2 97.7 
 Source: E.CA Economics based on data collected as answer to Question 6. 
Since levy rates were quite high in 2015-2016 already, the relative increase in expenses 
was only 12% for households and non-EIUs of band IA and IB. For consumption band DA, 
this means an increase from 3.5 Euro to 3.9 Euro, or by 40 Cent. For band IC (which was 
close to the rate of households but then the levy rate was adjusted upwards), expenses 
for CHP levies increased from on average 3,609 to 4,894 Euro per year, by 1,285 Euro or 
35.6%. For bands ID through IF, the increase was massive and amounts to between 435 
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and 711% relative to the level of 2015-2016. In monetary terms, CHP expenses for band 
IF went from 53 thousand Euro up to 431 thousand Euro (by 378 thousand Euro).  
Expenses also increased for EIUs. For band IC, expenses increased by 498 Euro (14.0%), 
for band ID by 3,543 Euro (56.7%), for band IE by 14,159 Euro (90.8%). Band IF saw its 
expenses more than doubled as they went from 33,470 Euro to 67,925 Euro, which is an 
increase of 34,455 Euro or by 102.9%. 
Overall, there is no clear pattern of redistribution regarding CHP levies in Germany. 
However, the harmonisation in 2017 led to significant increases in rates for non-EIUs with 
high consumption. At the same time, CHP expenses for EIUs also increased significantly, 
while expenses for households remained rather stable. 
8.1.4 Greece 
Greece finances renewable energy through the ETMEAR264 Levy introduced in 1999. The 
levy is used to fund both renewable energy and HECHP265. It is a flat rate fee that varies 
by voltage (Low, Medium and High) and consumer type (residential, agricultural, and 
other). In 2014, Medium Voltage (bands IC, ID and IE) was split by consumption level to 
reduce the ETMEAR rate for medium voltage users, which consumed more than 13 GWh of 
electricity. This split is comparable to a reduction of levy for bands IC, ID and IE and will 
therefore be discussed as such (see Question 6). The major part of ETMEAR are RES levies. 
Only 2 to 4% of ETMAR levy are used to finance HECHP.  
RES levies 
The following figure shows the development of RES levy rates in Eurocent/ kWh266 in 
Greece by consumption band and separately for energy-intensive users (EIUs) and non-
EIUs.  
                                                            
264 Ειδικό Τέλος Μείωσης Εκπομπών Αερίων Ρύπων. 
265 High Efficiency Combined Heat and Power production 
266 Figure 7 in Annex 11.1 shows the development indexed to 2013, illustrating the percentage changes in the 
levy relative to the last year before the split of medium voltage consumption bands. 
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Figure 6: RES levy rate per consumption band in Greece. Lower panel 
indexed to 2013 
 
Source: E.CA Economics based on data collected as answer to Question 6. Levy rates are taken from legislation. 
Note: Reductions are applied as of 2014. There is no data for consumption band IF for 2017 and 2018. 
Households pay the same RES levy irrespective of their consumption level, so there is only 
one line for all these groups. The lower panel shows the levy rates indexed to year 2013, 
the year directly before the introduction of rebates. The horizontal red line marks the 
100%-level of this index. RES levies in Greece generally follow an upwards trend up to 
2013 and then diverge. Rates for households and consumption bands IA and IB increase 
heavily between 2013 and 2014 before they level off and slowly decrease up to 2018. For 
consumption bands IC and ID, there was also an increase but more moderate while rates 
for bands IE and IF decreased and, from 2014 onwards, remained relatively stable.  
For households, rates increased from about 0.2 Cent in 2011 to around 1 Cent in 2013 and 
then more than doubled, reaching about 2.5 Cent 2014, an increase by about 150%. 
Between 2014 and 2018, rates remained relatively stable but slightly declined. The 
development was similar for bands IA and IB, but the level was slightly higher. 
For bands IC and ID, rates in 2013 were about 0.7 Cent per kWh and grew by about 70% 
between 2013 and 2014. They remained stable for a year, decreased to about 1 Cent in 
2016 and remained relatively stable at around this value up 2018, slightly declining over 
time.  
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Band IE saw the biggest change. Before the redefinition of groups, rates were at about 0.7 
Cent (as for band ID) in 2013 but then declined to about 0.2 Cent in 2014 where it 
remained up to 2018.  
The band with the highest electricity consumption (IF) saw the most moderate change in 
RES levies. These increased from 0.1 Cent in 2011 to 0.3 Cent in 2013, declined to 0.2 
Cent in 2014 and remained relatively stable up to 2016.267 
Overall, the redefinition of consumption bands in 2014 has the effect similar to a levy 
reduction for EIUs. There was a strong upwards shift in levy for consumption bands that 
do not qualify for the lower levy and a downwards shift for bands IE and IF that qualified 
for a lower levy due to the change.  
HECHP levies 
Since HECHP levies are defined as a share of ETMEA rates and this share is relatively stable 
over time, the overall development is comparable to the development of RES levies 
discussed above. The level, however, is very difference because only 2 to 4% of the ETMEA 
rates are used for HSCHP purposes. The following figure shows the RES HECHP levy rate 
in Eurocent/ kWh268 in Greece by consumption band and separately for energy-intensive 
users (EIUs) and non-EIUs. Households pay the same RES levy irrespective of their 
consumption level, so there is only one line for all these groups. The lower panel shows 
the levy rates indexed to year 2013, the year directly before the introduction of rebates. 
The horizontal red line marks the 100%-level of this index. 
                                                            
267 For 2017 and 2018, Eurostat does not provide price information.  
268 Figure 8 in Annex 11.1 shows the development indexed to 2013, illustrating the percentage changes in the 
levy relative to the last year before the split of medium voltage consumption bands. 
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Figure 7: HECHP levy rate per consumption band in Greece. Lower panel 
indexed to 2013 
 
Source: E.CA Economics based on data collected as answer to Question 6. HECHP Levy rates are taken from 
legislation. Values in 2018 are calculated by the University of East Anglia. Note: Reductions are applied as of 
2014. There is no data for consumption band IF for 2017 and 2018. 
Aggregate effect of reductions 
The following table describes the difference in levels of levies before to after the split of 
the medium voltage band. The first two columns show the user type (households, non-
EIUs and EIUs) and the consumption bands. The second part shows the average RES levies 
in Euro per year and the third part the average total ETMEA levies in percent of the 
electricity bill. Within each part, the table shows the level for 2011-2013 (three years 
before the split), the level for 2014-2016 (three years after the split), the simple difference 
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(in Euro per year or percentage points, depending on the measure) and the difference in 
percent. 
Table 6: RES + CHP levies per user type and consumption band before and 
after introduction of rebate (Greece) 
Cons. 
band 
Average RES levy in Euro per year Average RES levy as % of electricity bill 
2011-
2013  
2014-
2016  
Difference  Difference  
2011-
2013  
2014-
2016  
Difference  Difference  
(€) (€) (€) (%) (%) (%) (p.p) (%) 
Households 
DA 5.8 25.8 20.0 343.4 3.2 11.1 7.9 248.5 
DB 10.2 45.2 35.0 343.4 4.3 14.8 10.5 246.9 
DC 21.8 96.8 75.0 343.4 3.9 14.7 10.8 277.9 
DD 58.2 258.2 200.0 343.4 3.5 13.9 10.4 294.8 
DE 87.4 387.4 300.0 343.4 3.6 13.4 9.8 269.1 
Non-EIUs 
IA 165.2 599.9 434.7 263.2 4.0 12.6 8.6 216.0 
IB 2,147.6 7,799.1 5,651.5 263.2 4.8 16.3 11.5 238.0 
EIUs 
IC 6,166.7 14,858.3 8,691.7 140.9 3.6 8.6 4.9 136.6 
ID 54,266.7 130,753.3 76,486.7 140.9 4.2 10.8 6.6 156.5 
IE 222,000.0 106,500.0 -115,500.0 -52.0 4.8 2.8 -2.0 -42.1 
IF 276,833.3 251,900.0 -24,933.3 -9.0 3.4 3.7 0.2 6.8 
Source: E.CA Economics based on data collected as answer to Question 6. 
Between the three years before and after the splitting of consumption levels in 2014, the 
average ETMEA levy paid changed a lot depending on the consumption band. 
The combined levies increased by 343.3% for all households, from 5.8 Euro to 25.8 Euro 
for band DA alone.269 For band DE, this means an increase of 300 Euro in RES + CHP 
contributions.  
For non-EIUs of bands IA and IB, the increase was smaller than for households but still 
263.2 % compared to the average level before the introduction. For bands IC and ID (EIUs 
or non-EIUs), expensed increased by 140.9%, meaning that total costs went from 54 
thousand Euro to 130 thousand Euro (plus 76 thousand Euro) for band ID. 
                                                            
269 This increase might overstate the general development because as the comparison is based on three years 
before to after the introduction of rebates, the time after the introduction covers the top of the hump as can be 
seen from the figures above. 
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Band IE saw its total expenses for levies decline. From an average of 222 thousand Euro 
in 2011-2013, these went down to 106.5 thousand Euro, a decline by 115.5 thousand Euro 
or 52.0%. For band IF, there was a decline by 25 thousand Euro, or 9.0% relative to the 
average level of 2011-2013. 
Relative to the electricity bill, the increase for households and non-EIUs was large as well. 
This share was from 3% to 5% before 2014 and subsequently grew to a range from 11% 
to 17% in the period 2016-2016, an increase by more than 200%. For bands IC and ID, 
the share more than doubled and for IE it declined by some 42%. For band IF, the share 
remained largely unchanged. 
Overall, RES and CHP levies in Greece increased a lot between 2011 and 2014, which is 
when they reached the maximum for non-rebated customer groups, and then declined 
again. At the same time, they declined for customer groups that benefitted from the 
reduction, which is consistent with a redistributional effect of the reduction.  
8.1.5 Italy 
Italy applies two schemes to fund renewable energy sources: RES levies and contributions 
to green certificates. The contribution to RES levies depends on consumption and on the 
peak demand of the end user. In 2014, contributions to green certificates faded out and 
Italy introduced reductions to EIUs. In 2018, these reductions were increased (see 
Question 6). The following figure shows the development of levies combined, i.e. the RES 
levies that include contributions to cogeneration (CHP) as well as contributions to green 
certificates.  
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Figure 8: RES and other levies per consumption band in Italy. Lower panel 
indexed to 2013 
 
 
Source: E.CA Economics based on data collected as answer to Question 6. Levy rates are taken from legislation. 
Note: Total rate include costs for green certificates. Green certificate rate is calculated by the University of East 
Anglia. Reductions are available for EIU as of Jul 2013/ Jan 2018. Values for EIU IC are only available for 2018. 
Rates are shown in Eurocent/ kWh270 for groups of different levy costs: domestic bands DA 
and DB, domestic bands DE, DE and DF, non-EIUs are of bands IA, IB and IC or ID and IE 
and, finally, IF. EIUs are grouped similarly (ID and IE as well as IF). The lower panel shows 
the levy rates indexed to year 2013, the year directly before the introduction of rebates. 
The horizontal red line marks the 100%-level of this index.RES and related levies in Italy 
increase between 2009 and 2013 and then develop differently for different consumption 
bands. In general, they continue to increase or remain stable for EIUs and households. For 
the latter, they decrease after 2016 again. For EIUs, they shift to a lower level in 2014 
where they remain rather stable up to 2017 before decreasing again in 2018.  
For households of bands DA and DB, levies increased from about half a cent in 2009 to 
below 3 Cent in 2013 and then remained relatively stable through to 2016 before they 
                                                            
270 Figure 9 in Annex 11.1 shows the development indexed to 2013, illustrating the percentage changes in the 
levy relative to the last year before the introduction of reductions for EIUs and the fading out of green certificates. 
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dropped to about 2 Cent in 2017 and 2018. For households of bands DC through DF, levies 
were higher throughout. They started at the same level but increased to more than 5 Cent 
in 2013. They then remained stable and increased further between 2014 and 2016 to 
almost 7 Cent per kWh. After that, they dropped sharply to about 4 Cent and rebound to 
more than 6 Cent in 2018. Relative to 2013, they developed similar to bands DA and DB.  
Non-EIUs saw a relatively modest but steady increase in levies. Starting at about 0.5 Cent 
in 2009, levies increased to 3.5 Cent (band IF), 4 Cent (bands IA, IB and IC) and 4.5 Cent 
(bands ID and IE) in 2013. These rates remained stable between 2013 and 2017 and then 
increased in 2018 when reductions of EIUs were introduced.  
The following table describes the difference in levels of levies before to after the 
introduction of rebates to EIUs in 2014. The first two columns show the user type 
(households, non-EIUs and EIUs) and the consumption bands.271 The second part shows 
the average total levies in Euro per year and the third part the average total levies in 
percent of the electricity bill. Within each part, the table shows the level for 2009-2013 
(five years before the introduction of rebates), the level for 2014-2018 (five years after 
the introduction of rebates), the simple difference (in Euro per year or percentage points, 
depending on the measure) and the difference in percent. 
                                                            
271 Consumption band IC exists for EIUs only since 2018.  
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Table 7: RES and other levies per user type and consumption band before 
and after introduction of rebate (Italy) 
Cons. 
band 
Average RES levy in Euro per year 
Average RES levy as % of electricity 
bill 
2009-2013  2014-2018  Difference  Difference  
2009-
2013  
2014-
2018  
Difference  Difference  
(€) (€) (€) (%) (%) (%) (p.p) (%) 
Households 
DA 16.6 26.3 9.7 58.1 6.2 8.6 2.4 38.8 
DB 29.1 46.1 16.9 58.1 9.0 12.3 3.2 35.8 
DC 112.6 219.6 106.9 94.9 13.8 25.8 12.0 86.9 
DD 300.4 585.5 285.2 94.9 11.1 22.8 11.7 105.8 
DE 450.6 878.3 427.7 94.9 10.0 22.4 12.4 124.3 
Non-EIUs 
IA 443.1 908.3 465.3 105.0 7.4 15.5 8.1 108.6 
IB 5,759.8 11,766.2 6,006.4 104.3 10.0 21.1 11.1 110.9 
IC 30,282.6 59,816.4 29,533.8 97.5 12.7 26.8 14.0 110.2 
ID 265,989.5 524,926.6 258,937.2 97.3 14.4 30.8 16.4 114.5 
IE 1,087,941.6 2,146,849.6 1,058,907.9 97.3 17.2 37.0 19.9 115.6 
IF 2,086,129.5 4,118,632.8 2,032,503.4 97.4 15.8 38.3 22.5 142.2 
EIUs 
ID 265,989.5 178,970.7 -87,018.7 -32.7 14.4 12.5 -1.9 -13.2 
IE 1,087,941.6 732,007.0 -355,934.7 -32.7 17.2 15.5 -1.7 -10.0 
IF 2,086,129.5 1,382,234.1 -703,895.4 -33.7 15.8 16.0 0.2 1.1 
Source: E.CA Economics based on data collected as answer to Question 6. 
Between the five years before and after the introduction of rebates, the average RES and 
related levies paid by households of band DS increased from 16.6 Euro to 26.3 Euro, which 
means by 9.7 Euro or 58.1%. For households of band DC through DE, expenses related to 
RES and related levies increased by 94.9% and hence almost doubled. For Non-EIUs from 
bands IA and IB, they more than doubled, leading to additional costs of 6 thousand Euro 
for band IB. For bands IC through IF, the increase was also massive (by 97.3 to 97.5%). 
Since the total amount depends on consumption, expenses for levies of non-EIUs from 
band IF increased from 2.09 million Euro to 4.12 million Euro, which means these paid 
more than 2 million Euro more than before.  
For EIUs, the total bill decreased by about a third (32.7% or 33.7%), translating into 
savings of 87 thousand Euro for band ID, 356 thousand Euro for band IE and almost 704 
thousand Euro for band IF. The share of RES and other levies in the electricity bill increased 
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for all households, but most so for bands DD and DE where it grew by more than 100%. 
For all non-EIUs, it more than doubled. The effect for EIUs was more diverse. For band ID, 
the share in the electricity bill declined by 1.9 percentage points or 13.2%. For band IE, it 
declined by 1.7 percentage points or 10.0%, and for IF it increased by 0.2 percentage 
points or 1.1%. 
Overall, levies increased for households and non-EIUs but declined for EIUs after the 
introduction of levy reductions in 2013. Some levelling-off happened between 2014 and 
2018 for all customer groups. Additional reductions for EIUs introduced in 2018 again 
pushed the levies for households and non-EIUs up and the levies for EIUs down, thus 
consistent with the redistribution between different consumer groups. 
8.1.6 Latvia 
Latvia has one levy, which is used to fund Renewable Energy Sources only. In order to be 
classified as EIUs, undertakings must exceed 0.5 GWh of annual electricity consumption. 
In 2016, Latvia introduced an EIU exemption, which takes the form of a compensation for 
85% of the charge for RES over 0.5 GWh in the previous year (see Question 6).272 
The following figure shows the development of RES levy rates in Eurocent/ kWh273 in Latvia 
by consumption band and separately for energy-intensive users (EIUs) and non-EIUs. All 
households and non-EIUs pay the same RES levy, so there is only one line for all these 
groups. The lower panel shows the levy rates indexed to year 2015, the year directly before 
the introduction of rebates. The horizontal red line marks the 100%-level of this index. 
                                                            
272 Due to this calculation, and because the levy rate decreased in 2018, some levy amounts of EIUs in this annual 
period were negative. Where a negative levy amount was calculated, the levy/electricity bill was assumed equal 
to zero. 
273 Figure 10 in Annex 11.1 shows the development indexed to 2015, illustrating the percentage changes in the 
levy relative the last year before the EIU exemption. 
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Figure 9: RES levy rate per consumption band in Latvia. Lower panel indexed 
to 2015 
 
 
Source: E.CA Economics based on data collected as answer to Question 6. Levy rates are taken from legislation. 
Note: Reductions are available for EIU as of Jul 2015. As the compensation is based on the levy amount of the 
previous year, negative values exist for EIU in 2018. 
RES levies in Latvia generally follow a slight upwards trend. For EIUs, they shifted 
downwards with the introduction of rebates in 2016. The RES levy was below half a Cent 
in 2012 and increased to about 1 Cent in 2015. For non-rebated bands, it increased slightly 
in 2016, went up to about 1.5 Cent in 2017 and back to about 1 Cent in 2018. This up-
and-down movement amounts to slightly more than 40% of the level of 2015.  
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For EIUs, the costs per kWh declined to about a quarter of a Cent in 2016 (20% of the 
level before), then rebound to between half a Cent and a Cent, depending on the band, 
and then declined again.  
The following table describes the difference in levels of levies before to after the 
introduction of rebates to EIUs in 2016. The first two columns show the user type 
(households, non-EIUs and EIUs) and the consumption bands. The second part shows the 
average RES levies in Euro per year and the third part the average RES levies in percent 
of the electricity bill. Within each part, the table shows the level for 2013-2015 (three years 
before the introduction of rebates), the level for 2015-2018 (three years after the 
introduction of rebates), the simple difference (in Euro per year or percentage points, 
depending on the measure) and the difference in percent. 
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Table 8: RES and other levies per user type and consumption band before 
and after introduction of rebate (Latvia) 
Cons. 
band 
Average RES levy in Euro per year Average RES levy as % of electricity bill 
2013-2015 2016-2018 Difference Difference  
2013-
2015 
2016-
2018 
Difference  Difference  
(€) (€) (€) (%) (%) (%) (p.p) (%) 
Households 
DA 9.2 11.9 2.8 30.2 7.2 6.3 -0.9 -12.6 
DB 16.0 20.9 4.8 30.2 6.7 7.3 0.6 9.0 
DC 34.4 44.7 10.4 30.2 6.3 7.6 1.2 19.1 
DD 91.6 119.2 27.6 30.2 6.2 7.8 1.6 26.5 
DE 137.4 178.9 41.4 30.2 6.2 7.7 1.6 25.4 
Non-EIUs 
IA 183.2 238.5 55.2 30.2 4.9 5.5 0.5 10.4 
IB 2,381.8 3,100.1 718.2 30.2 5.9 7.5 1.5 25.6 
IC 11,451.2 14,904.2 3,453.0 30.2 6.5 8.7 2.2 33.1 
ID 100,770.3 131,156.7 30,386.4 30.2 7.1 9.9 2.8 38.7 
IE 412,242.0 536,550.0 124,308.0 30.2 7.4 10.9 3.5 47.0 
IF 1,007,702.7 1,311,566.7 303,864.0 30.2 8.4 12.9 4.5 53.8 
EIUs 
IC 11,451.2 7,347.7 -4,103.5 -35.8 6.5 4.4 -2.1 -32.7 
ID 100,770.3 25,365.7 -75,404.6 -74.8 7.1 2.5 -4.7 -65.3 
IE 412,242.0 88,197.7 -324,044.3 -78.6 7.4 2.5 -5.0 -66.7 
IF 1,007,702.7 208,317.7 -799,385.0 -79.3 8.4 3.0 -5.4 -64.1 
Source: E.CA Economics based on data collected as answer to Question 6. 
Comparing the period before to after the introduction, the table shows that total expenses 
increased by 30.2% for all bands who did not benefit from the rebates (households and 
non-EIUs). For households of band DA, it increased from 9.2 Euro to 11.9 Euro, or by 2.8 
Euro. For band IF, expenses for RES levies increased from 1 million Euro to 1.3 million 
Euro by about 303 thousand Euro. 
For EIUs that benefit from the reduction, total expenses declined. For band IC, the bill went 
down by 4 thousand Euro from 11.4 to 7.3 thousand Euro, a relative reduction of 35.8%. 
For bands ID through IF, the relative reduction was close to 80%, and band IF saw its 
expenses reduced by 0.8 million Euro. 
The share of RES levies in the electricity bill (shown in the last part of the table) amounts 
to some 5 to 10% before the introduction of rebates. After the introduction, non-rebated 
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but high-volume consumers (bands IE and IF) paid more than 10% of their electricity bill 
for RES levies while for those benefitting from the rebates, RES levies made up only 2.5 to 
3% of the electricity bill.  
Overall, the figures and table show that RES levies paid – both in Euro per year of as share 
of the electricity bill – increased significantly for all user groups not benefitting from a 
rebate and even for those EIUs for which the reduction affected only a small part of their 
consumption. On the other hand, EIUs with higher electricity consumption (bands ID, IE 
and IF), saw a significant reduction in the total Euro paid for RES levies or in the share of 
their electricity bill made up by RES levies.  
8.1.7 Poland 
Poland has two schemes, the RES Surcharge (opłata OZE) and Certificate of Origin System. 
The RES surcharge was set to 0 in 2018 and 2019 due to overfunding in 2017, but the 
Certificate of Origin System collected positive contributions (see Question 6).274 The 
following sections first discuss the reduction for RES levies and then the reduction for CHP 
levies. Furthermore, Poland has three different reduction rates that depend on the EIUs 
electro-intensity. Firms only pay 80% of the RES surcharges if their electro-intensity is 
between 3% and 20%; they pay 60% if their electro-intensity is between 20% and 40%; 
and they pay 15% of the RES surcharge if their electro-intensity is above 40%.275 
RES levies 
The following figure shows the development of the RES levy rate in Eurocent/ kWh276 in 
Poland for EIUs and non-EIUs. The RES levy is understood as a combination of the RES 
surcharge and the cost of the origin certificates. The lower panel shows the levy rates 
indexed to year 2013, the year directly before the introduction of rebates. The horizontal 
red line marks the 100%-level of this index. 
                                                            
274 Since there are two levies, total rates as presented below are not zero in 2018. 
275 Source: SA.43697, para. 85. 
276 Figure 11 in Annex 11.1 shows the development indexed to 2013, illustrating the percentage changes in the 
levy relative to the last year before the introduction of the rebate for EIUs. 
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Figure 10: RES levy rate per consumption band in Poland. Lower panel 
indexed to 2013 
 
 
Source: E.CA Economics based on data collected as answer to Question 6. Levy rates are taken from legislation. 
Green certificate rate is calculated by the University of East Anglia. Note: Reductions are available for EIU as of 
Jan 2014. 
For households and non-EIUs, the RES levy rate decreased between 2011 and 2013 from 
about 0.7 Cent to 0.5 Cent and then re-increased to the same level over the years 2014 
and 2015. After 2015, it sharply dropped to almost the same level of EIUs (about 0.25 
Cent) for 2016 and 2017 and then increased to about 0.4 Cent in 2018 again. Relative to 
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the level of 2013, this meant an increase by more than 50% over two years and then a 
decrease to about 50% of the 2013-level.  
Rates for EIUs continued to decline after 2013 to about 0.1 Cent in 2014 (about 25% of 
the level of 2013) and then slightly increased again to about 0.2 Cent in 2016 and 2017 
and above 0.3 Cent in 2018.  
The following table describes the difference in levels of levies before to after the 
introduction of rebates. The first two columns show the user type (households, non-EIUs 
and EIUs) and the consumption bands. The second part shows the average RES levies in 
Euro per year and the third part the average RES levies in percent of the electricity bill. 
Within each part, the table shows the level for 2008-2011 (four years before the 
introduction of rebates), the level for 2012-2015 (four years after the introduction of 
rebates), the simple difference (in Euro per year or percentage points, depending on the 
measure) and the difference in percent. 
 290 
 
Table 9: RES levies per user type and consumption band before and after 
introduction of rebate (Poland) 
Cons. 
band 
Average RES levy in Euro per year Average RES levy as % of electricity bill 
2011-
2013  
2014-
2016  
Difference  Difference  
2011-
2013  
2014-
2016  
Difference  Difference  
(€) (€) (€) (%) (%) (%) (p.p) (%) 
Households 
DA 6.1 5.3 -0.8 -13.4 3.3 3.0 -0.4 -10.7 
DB 10.7 9.3 -1.4 -13.4 4.0 3.6 -0.5 -11.2 
DC 23.0 19.9 -3.1 -13.4 4.2 3.8 -0.5 -11.3 
DD 61.2 53.0 -8.2 -13.4 4.4 3.9 -0.5 -11.6 
DE 91.8 79.5 -12.3 -13.4 4.5 3.9 -0.6 -12.5 
Non-EIUs 
IA 122.4 106.0 -16.4 -13.4 3.2 2.9 -0.3 -8.6 
IB 1,591.3 1,378.2 -213.2 -13.4 4.2 3.9 -0.4 -9.1 
IC 7,650.7 6,625.8 -1,024.9 -13.4 5.3 5.1 -0.2 -3.5 
ID 67,326.0 58,307.0 -9,019.0 -13.4 6.1 5.9 -0.2 -4.0 
IE 275,424.7 238,528.6 -36,896.0 -13.4 6.5 6.4 -0.1 -1.2 
IF 673,260.3 583,070.0 -90,190.3 -13.4 6.8 6.9 0.1 1.6 
EIUs 
IC 7,650.7 1,970.4 -5,680.3 -74.2 5.3 1.6 -3.7 -70.6 
ID 67,326.0 17,339.8 -49,986.2 -74.2 6.1 1.8 -4.3 -70.9 
IE 275,424.7 70,935.6 -204,489.1 -74.2 6.5 2.0 -4.6 -69.9 
IF 673,260.3 173,398.0 -499,862.3 -74.2 6.8 2.1 -4.7 -68.9 
Source: E.CA Economics based on data collected as answer to Question 6. 
Comparing the period before to after the introduction of rebates, all customer groups saw 
a decline in their expensed for RES levies. This decline was 13.4% for non-rebated groups 
(households and non-EIUs) and 74.2% for EIUs. In monetary terms, annual expenses for 
households of band DA decreased by 80 Cent from 6.1 Euro to 5.3 Euro. For band IF of 
non-EIUs, it was 673 thousand Euro before and 583 thousand Euro after the reduction, a 
decline by 90 thousand Euro. For EIUs, the savings range from 5,680 for band IC to almost 
half a million for band IF, where expenses declined from 673 to 173 thousand Euro per 
year. 
The share of RES levies in the electricity bill ranged from about 3% to 7% before the 
introduction of rebates and slightly declined afterwards for households and non-EIUs. The 
change in percentage points was between -0.6 and 0.1. For households, the share in the 
electricity bill declined by slightly more than 10%, for non-EIUs by less.  
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For EIUs, RES levies made up 2% or less of the electricity bill in 2014-2015. Relative to 
this, the share of RES levies in the electricity bill declined by about 70%. 
Overall, there reduction has led to stronger rebates for EIUs than for non-rebated customer 
groups. However, this difference did not last. The rates were very similar from 2017 
onwards.  
CHP levies 
Beyond RES levies, Poland also charges CHP levies. These are shown in Eurocent/ kWh277 
below and separately for non-rebated and rebated consumption bands. Since the reduction 
is very small and has very little effect on the difference between both rates, there is no 
figure that shows the indexed values.  
Figure 11: CHP levy rate per consumption band in Poland 
  
 
Source: E.CA Economics based on data collected as answer to Question 6. 
These rebates take effect as of 2019 and have hardly any effect on total or relative levies. 
However, they lead to a strong decline in 2019 relative to 2018. The rebate affected all 
consumption bands in the same or almost the same way.278 
8.1.8 Romania 
Financing of RES in Romania is supported by a green certificates scheme. Electricity 
suppliers are legally obligated to hold a certain level of green certificates and pass on the 
costs for these certificates to customers. The passing on is determined based on the 
number of certificates per unit of electricity produced, the quantity of electricity invoiced, 
                                                            
277 Figure 12 in Annex 11.1 shows the development indexed to 2018, illustrating the percentage changes in the 
levy relative to the last year before the introduction of rebates for EIUs. 
278 There is no data on consumption for 2019, so it is not possible to compare total expenses. 
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and the average weighted price for traded certificates (see Question 6). In the following 
discussion refers to the rates resulting from this pass-on as RES levy rates. Romania 
introduced a reduction for EIUs, which was binding from the 1st August 2014 and applied 
in the data from 2015 onwards.  
The following figure shows the development of RES levy rates in Eurocent/ kWh279 in 
Romania by separately for households and non-EIUs on the one hand and energy-intensive 
users (EIUs) on the other hand. The lower panel shows the levy rates indexed to year 
2014, the year directly before the introduction of rebates. The horizontal red line marks 
the 100%-level of this index. 
                                                            
279 Figure 13 in Annex 11.1 shows the development indexed to 2014, illustrating the percentage changes in the 
levy relative to the last year before the introduction of reductions for EIUs. 
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Figure 12: RES levy rate per consumption band in Romania. Lower panel 
indexed to 2014 
 
Source: E.CA Economics based on data collected as answer to Question 6. Levy rates are taken from legislation. 
Note: Reductions are available for EIU as of Aug 2014. 
RES levy rates in Romania started at about a quarter of a Cent in 2011, increased to about 
five times this value in 2013 and then dropped to slightly below 1 Cent in 2014. After that, 
EIUs benefitted from a reduction while households and non-EIUs did not.  
For non-rebated customer groups, levies remained at about one Cent between 2014 and 
2018. For EIUs, they dropped to about 0.2 Cent in 2015 and remained at this level. In 
relative terms, they dropped to less than 20% of their 2014-level.  
The following table describes the difference in levels of levies before to after the 
introduction of rebates. The first two columns show the user type (households, non-EIUs 
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and EIUs) and the consumption bands. The second part shows the average RES levies in 
Euro per year and the third part the average RES levies in percent of the electricity bill. 
Within each part, the table shows the level for 2013-2015 (three years before the 
introduction of rebates), the level for 2016-2018 (three years after the introduction of 
rebates), the simple difference (in Euro per year or percentage points, depending on the 
measure) and the difference in percent. 
Table 10: RES levies per user type and consumption band before and after 
introduction of rebate (Romania) 
Cons. 
band 
Average RES levy in Euro per year Average RES levy as % of electricity bill 
2013-2015  2016-2018 Difference  Difference  
2013-
2015 
2016-
2018 
Difference  Difference  
(€) (€) (€) (%) (%) (%) (p.p) (%) 
Households 
DA 10.1 9.7 -0.4 -3.9 7.5 7.6 0.0 0.0 
DB 17.7 17.0 -0.7 -3.9 7.6 7.5 -0.1 -1.4 
DC 37.9 36.4 -1.5 -3.9 7.8 7.6 -0.2 -2.2 
DD 101.0 97.0 -4.0 -3.9 7.9 7.8 -0.1 -1.6 
DE 151.4 145.5 -6.0 -3.9 8.1 8.1 -0.1 -0.8 
Non-EIUs 
IA 201.9 194.0 -7.9 -3.9 6.9 8.1 1.2 16.8 
IB 2,624.7 2,521.5 -103.2 -3.9 7.7 8.8 1.2 15.1 
IC 12,618.9 12,122.7 -496.3 -3.9 9.1 10.2 1.1 12.4 
ID 111,046.7 106,679.5 -4,367.1 -3.9 10.2 11.0 0.8 7.9 
IE 454,281.8 436,416.2 -17,865.5 -3.9 11.4 12.3 0.9 7.7 
IF 1,110,466.6 1,066,795.3 -43,671.3 -3.9 11.8 12.5 0.8 6.5 
EIUs 
IC 9,724.4 1,818.4 -7,906.0 -81.3 6.8 1.6 -5.2 -76.6 
ID 85,574.4 16,001.9 -69,572.5 -81.3 7.7 1.7 -6.0 -77.5 
IE 350,077.3 65,462.4 -284,614.8 -81.3 8.5 1.9 -6.6 -77.4 
IF 855,744.4 160,019.3 -695,725.1 -81.3 8.8 2.0 -6.8 -77.5 
Source: E.CA Economics based on data collected as answer to Question 6. 
The table shows that total expenses for RES levies did not change much for non-rebated 
customer groups. Comparing the three years before to after the introduction of the 
reduction, expenses declined by 3.9%. For households of band DA, this means that it went 
from 10.1 Euro to 9.7 Euro, a decline by 40 Cent. For band IF, this means that expenses 
for RES went from 1.11 million Euro to 1.07 million Euro, a decline by 44 thousand Euro. 
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The reduction for EIUs led to a decline by 81.3%. For band IF, this translates into expenses 
declining from 855 to 160 thousand Euro, a decline by 696 thousand Euro. 
Relative to the electricity bill, the share of RES levies increases with consumption. While it 
makes up about 7.5% for band DA, it amounts to 11.8% for band IF in the years 2013-
2015 and to 12.5% in 2016-2018. The difference both in percentage points and relative to 
the average share 2013-2014 was moderate for households with changes of far less than 
1 percentage point and less than 3% in relative terms. For non-EIUs, the relative increase 
was highest for bands IA, IB and IC. These saw the share of their electricity bill grew by 
1.1 to 1.2 percentage points, which means an increase of 12.4 to 16.8%. For EIUs, the 
relative changes were more pronounced as the share of RES levies in the electricity were 
from 6.8% to 8.8% in 2013-2015 and declined to less than 2% in the period 2016-2018. 
This implies a decline by more than 75%. 
Overall, the reduction in Romania heavily affected EIUs’ rates, while expenses and shares 
in expenses remained stable for non-rebated customer groups.  
8.1.9 Slovenia 
Slovenia has a levy that is used to fund both RES and CHP. The levy depends on consumers 
voltage levels, operating hours, and whether they are on a distribution or transmission 
connection (see Question 6). The following figure shows the development of RES levy rates 
in Eurocent/ kWh280 in Slovenia by consumption band and separately for energy-intensive 
users (EIUs) and non-EIUs.  
                                                            
280 Figure 14 in Annex 11.1 shows the development indexed to 2014, illustrating the percentage changes in the 
levy relative to the last year before the introduction of rebates to EIUs. 
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Figure 13: RES + CHP levy rate per consumption band in Slovenia. Lower 
panel indexed to 2014 
 
Source: E.CA Economics based on data collected as answer to Question 6. Levy rates are taken from legislation. 
Note: Reductions are available for EIU as of 2015. 
Consumption bands are grouped if they pay the same levy rates. The lower panel shows 
the levy rates indexed to year 2014, the year directly before the introduction of rebates. 
The horizontal red line marks the 100%-level of this index.RES levies in Slovenia are 
heterogeneous. While all households pay the same levy, there are four different rates 
applicable to non-EIUs and two different rates for EIUs. There was a peak in 2013 but 
levels then declined for most consumption bands over the following years. As of 2015, 
bands IC, ID and IE of EIUs paid the lowest and band non-EIUs from band IF the highest 
levies. For households, levies were below 0.2 Cent in 2011 and increased to below 0.4 Cent 
in 2013 where they remained relatively stable. In 2016, they increased by 20% but 
remained below 0.5 Cent. For non-EIUs of all bands but IF, rates were similar up to 2013 
and then slightly diverged. Overall, they remained in a corridor between 0.3 and 0.7 Cent, 
around the same level as for households. Rates for EIUs vary substantially by electricity 
consumption bands. For bands IC, ID and IE, they were similar to those of households but 
declined more after 2013, dropping to the lowest levy of all bands at about 0.2 Cent for 
the period 2015-2018. Band IF is the most special. Here, rates were high in the early years 
of observation (0.4 to 0.5 Cent in 2011 and 2012), increased strongly in 2013 and then 
decreased to below 0.4 Cent for EIUs but remained rather high (at 0.6 to 07 Cent) for non-
EIUs. For the latter, levy rates increased to around 1.4 Cent for the period 2016-2018. 
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The following table describes the difference in levels of levies before to after the 
introduction of rebates. The first two columns show the user type (households, non-EIUs 
and EIUs) and the consumption bands. The second part shows the average RES levies in 
Euro per year and the third part the average RES levies in percent of the electricity bill. 
Within each part, the table shows the level for 2011-2014 (four years before the 
introduction of rebates), the level for 2015-2018 (four years after the introduction of 
rebates), the simple difference (in Euro per year or percentage points, depending on the 
measure) and the difference in percent. 
Table 11: RES levies per user type and consumption band before and after 
introduction of rebate (Slovenia) 
Cons. 
band 
Average RES levy in Euro per year 
Average RES levy as % of electricity 
bill 
2011-
2014 
2015-2018 Difference  Difference  
2011-
2014 
2015-
2018 
Difference  Difference  
(€) (€) (€) (%) (%) (%) (p.p) (%) 
Households 
DA 2.3 4.2 1.9 80.4 1.0 1.8 0.8 78.8 
DB 4.1 7.4 3.3 80.4 1.2 2.1 0.9 71.5 
DC 8.8 15.9 7.1 80.4 1.5 2.6 1.1 78.2 
DD 23.5 42.4 18.9 80.4 1.6 3.0 1.4 83.7 
DE 35.2 63.5 28.3 80.4 1.8 3.4 1.5 84.6 
Non-EIUs 
IA 57.6 129.6 72.0 124.9 1.6 3.9 2.3 143.8 
IB 749.2 1,685.0 935.8 124.9 2.1 5.2 3.1 144.7 
IC 3,289.6 5,087.2 1,797.7 54.6 2.3 4.0 1.7 71.3 
ID 28,948.1 44,767.7 15,819.6 54.6 2.6 4.7 2.1 78.3 
IE 118,424.0 183,140.4 64,716.5 54.6 2.9 5.4 2.5 83.6 
IF 794,757.4 1,358,299.3 563,541.9 70.9 8.4 17.4 8.9 106.3 
EIUs 
IC 2,802.5 1,300.2 -1,502.3 -53.6 2.0 1.1 -0.9 -47.3 
ID 24,662.0 11,441.8 -13,220.2 -53.6 2.2 1.2 -1.0 -44.9 
IE 100,890.2 46,807.4 -54,082.7 -53.6 2.5 1.4 -1.1 -43.0 
IF 794,757.4 407,489.8 -387,267.6 -48.7 8.4 6.0 -2.4 -28.8 
Source: E.CA Economics based on data collected as answer to Question 6. 
Between the period before and after the introduction of rebates (in 2015), expenses for 
RES levies changed differently according to their consumption bands.  
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For households, average expenses increased by 80.4%, which means an increase from 2.3 
Euro to 4.2 Euro (by 1.9 Euro) for band DA and an increase from 35.2 Euro to 63.5 Euro 
(by 28.3 Euro) for band DE.  
For non-EIUs, expenses more than doubled for bands IA and IB (increase by 124.9%) and 
increased by 54.6% for bands IC, ID, and IE. For band IE, this translates into an increase 
by 65 thousand Euro, from about 118 thousand Euro to 183 thousand Euro. For band IF, 
they went from 795 thousand to 1.36 million Euro, which is an increase by 564 thousand 
Euro or 70.9%. 
EIUs saw their expenses roughly cut in half. They declined by 53.6% for bands IC, ID and 
IE and by 48.7% for band IF. In monetary terms, this means that expensed for band IF 
wend from 795 thousand Euro to 408 thousand Euro, a decline by 387 thousand Euro.  
The share of levies in the electricity bill is lowest for households where it made up between 
1 and 2% before 2015, which almost doubled after that. For non-EIUs, the share was 
slightly higher before the introduction of rebates (in particular for band IF) and the increase 
was larger. For bands IC, ID and IE, the increase was comparable to that of households 
but for bands IA and IB, the share increased by almost 150%. For IF, it roughly doubled.  
For EIUs, the share was slightly above 2% for bands IC, ID and IE and this roughly halved 
after the introduction of rebates. For band IF, the reduction in terms of share of the bill 
was more moderate as it declined from 8.4% to 6.0%, a decrease by 2.4 percentage points, 
or by 28.8%.  
Overall, the development is consistent with redistribution effects. While EIUs saw their 
expenses decline, these increased for households and non-EIUs. The effect was strongest 
for consumption band IF of non-EIUs which saw its rates increase strongly. However, rates 
for all non-rebated consumption bands increased within two years after the introduction of 
rebates and remained at a higher level.  
8.1.10 UK 
The United Kingdom raises funds for RES via three different schemes: renewable 
obligations (RO) charged indirectly by a green certificate scheme and passed through to 
customers, a feed-in tariff scheme (FIT) and a contract for differences (CfD) scheme (see 
Question 6). In the following discussion refers to the totality of these schemes as RES 
levies. 
The following figure shows the development of RES levy rates in Eurocent/ kWh281 in the 
UK separately for energy-intensive users (EIUs) and non-EIUs (including households). The 
lower panel shows the levy rates indexed to year 2015, the year directly before the 
introduction of rebates. The horizontal red line marks the 100%-level of this index. 
                                                            
281 Figure 15 in Annex 11.1 shows the development indexed to 2015, illustrating the percentage changes in the 
levy relative to the last year before the introduction of rebates for EIUs. 
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Figure 14: RES levy rate per consumption band in the United Kingdom. Lower 
panel indexed to 2015 
 
Source: E.CA Economics based on data collected as answer to Question 6. CfD Levy rates are adjusted, green 
certificate and FiT rates are calculated by the University of East Anglia. Note: Reductions are available for EIU 
as of Jan 2016. 
In general, RES levy rates increased almost linearly between 2011 and 2017 for non-
rebated customer groups. Between 2011 and 2015, it grew from slightly above half a Cent 
to more than 2 Cent and then continued to grow up to slightly below 3 Cent in 2017. This 
is comparable to a 20% increase relative to 2015. 
For EIUs who benefited from rebates since 2016, rates went down to less than half a Cent 
in 2016, or to about 20% of the level of 2015 and remained at this level for 2017. 
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The following table shows the difference in levels of levies before to after the introduction 
of rebates. The first two columns show the user type (households, non-EIUs and EIUs) and 
the consumption bands. The second part shows the average RES levies in Euro per year 
and the third part the average RES levies in percent of the electricity bill. Within each part, 
the table shows the level for 2014-2015 (two years before the introduction of rebates), the 
level for 2016-2017 (two years after the introduction of rebates), the simple difference (in 
Euro per year or percentage points, depending on the measure) and the difference in 
percent. 
Table 12: RES levies per user type and consumption band before and after 
introduction of rebate (UK) 
Cons. 
band 
Average RES levy in Euro per year Average RES levy as % of electricity bill 
2014-2015 2016-2017 Difference  Difference  
2014-
2015 
2016-
2017 
Difference  Difference  
(€) (€) (€) (%) (%) (%) (p.p) (%) 
Households 
DA 20.5 26.7 6.2 30.3 8.0 10.1 2.1 26.1 
DB 35.9 46.7 10.9 30.3 8.9 12.7 3.8 42.6 
DC 76.8 100.1 23.3 30.3 9.9 14.4 4.6 46.0 
DD 204.9 266.9 62.0 30.3 10.9 15.8 4.9 45.1 
DE 307.3 400.4 93.0 30.3 11.9 16.9 5.1 42.8 
Non-EIUs 
IA 409.8 533.8 124.0 30.3 9.6 14.4 4.8 50.5 
IB 5,327.0 6,939.5 1,612.6 30.3 10.8 15.3 4.6 42.5 
IC 25,610.4 33,363.2 7,752.8 30.3 12.0 17.3 5.3 43.9 
ID 225,371.4 293,595.8 68,224.4 30.3 13.2 18.5 5.3 40.3 
IE 921,973.7 1,201,073.6 279,099.8 30.3 13.4 18.8 5.4 40.0 
IF 2,253,713.6 2,935,957.6 682,244.0 30.3 13.8 19.1 5.3 38.8 
EIUs 
IC 25,610.4 5,004.5 -20,605.9 -80.5 12.0 3.1 -9.0 -74.6 
ID 225,371.4 44,039.4 -181,332.0 -80.5 13.2 3.3 -9.9 -75.0 
IE 921,973.7 180,161.0 -741,812.7 -80.5 13.4 3.4 -10.1 -75.0 
IF 2,253,713.6 440,393.6 -1,813,319.9 -80.5 13.8 3.4 -10.3 -75.1 
Source: E.CA Economics based on data collected as answer to Question 6. 
Between two years before and after the introduction of rebates, the contributions 
households and non-EIUs increased by 30.3%. In monetary terms, this means that 
expenses for band DA increased by 6.2 Euro, from 20.5 Euro in 2014-2015 to 26.7 Euro in 
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2016-2017. For band IF, this means that expenses went up from 2.25 million Euro to 2.94 
million Euro, or by 682 thousand Euro. For EIUs, the rebate led to a substantial reduction. 
The average contribution in 2016-2017 was 80.5% lower than in 2014-2015. For band IF 
of EIUs, expenses went from 2.25 million Euro to 0.44 million Euro, a decline by 1.81 
million Euro. The share of the electricity bill grows with consumption inside the three user 
type groups (households, non-EIUs and EIUs). For households and non-EIUs, this share 
increased by about 40 to 50%. Only the share of group DA increased by only 26.1%. For 
EIUs, it declined from some 12 to 14% of the electricity bill to slightly above 3%, a decline 
by about 75%.Overall, the development shows an ongoing increase in levies, expenses 
and share of the electricity bill for non-rebated customers. At the same time, there was a 
substantial downward shift of the burden on EIUs.  
Annex 8.2 - Grandfathering rule 
Table 13: Relevance of grandfathered undertakings in NACE sectors in Poland 
(RES and CHP 2017) 
NACE 2017 sales in EUR 
million 
Number of 
undertakings 
Proportion of 
grandfathered 
undertakings 
Comments 
Grand-
fathered 
under-
takings 
NACE 
sector 
Grand-
fathere
d 
under-
takings 
NACE 
sector 
% of 
sales 
% of 
no. of 
under- 
takings 
0111 281.29 N/A 1 N/A N/A N/A (One) sales data 
from 2018; Data 
for NACE A is not 
available 
0210 265.74 N/A 2 N/A N/A N/A Data for NACE A is 
not available 
2561 54.94 2,388.3 1 4,193 2.3 0.024  
3511 6.12 8,188.4 1 2,989 0.075 0.033  
3811 N/A 2,560.3 1 2,256 N/A 0.044 No sales data 
available for 
grandfathered 
firms 
4120 4.12 19,261.4 1 54,438 0.021 0.0018  
4671 *2,500.69 30,287.5 1 4,447 *8.26 0.025 *One firm is 
producing coal, 
yet is exempted 
through its 
wholesale entity 
in NACE 4671 
4673 79.44 12,494.9 2 11,757 0.636 0.017  
4675 2,315.55 10,987.0 1 3,068 21.1 0.0326 One firm is also 
grandfathered for 
CHP 
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NACE 2017 sales in EUR 
million 
Number of 
undertakings 
Proportion of 
grandfathered 
undertakings 
Comments 
Grand-
fathered 
under-
takings 
NACE 
sector 
Grand-
fathere
d 
under-
takings 
NACE 
sector 
% of 
sales 
% of 
no. of 
under- 
takings 
4677 2.61 4,481.3 1 3,744 0.058 0.0267  
4690 291.23 42,641.1 2 23,510 0.683 0.0085 One firm is also 
grandfathered for 
CHP 
6810 *986.79 3,004.6 1 9,102 *32.8 0.011 One firm is also 
grandfathered for 
CHP; *One firm is 
producing coal, 
yet is exempted 
through its 
holding entity in 
NACE 6810 
7022 119.54 5,265.1 1 39,770 2.27 0.0025  
Source: Bureau van Dijk, Eurostat. . Note: *If the holding entities of the coal producers are assessed against 
NACE 0510 (Mining of coal and lignite), the proportion of grandfathered undertakings in respect to sales is 
56.22% and 3.51% in respect to the number of undertakings. 
Table 14: Relevance of grandfathered undertakings in NACE sectors in 
Germany 
NACE
282 
2017 sales in EUR 
million 
Number of 
undertakings 
Proportion of 
grandfathered 
undertakings 
Comments 
Grand-
fathered 
under-
takings 
NACE 
sector 
Grand-
fathered 
under-
takings 
NACE 
sector 
% of 
sales 
% of no. 
of 
under- 
takings 
1052 132.91 1,437.0 2 223 9.249 0.897  
                                                            
282 NACE Codes – 1052 Manufacture of ice cream; 1060 Manufacture of grain mill products, starches and starch 
products; 1072 Manufacture of rusks and biscuits; manufacture of preserved pastry goods and cakes; 1089 
Manufacture of other food products n.e.c.; 1330 Finishing of textiles; 1610 Sawmilling and planing of wood; 1729 
Manufacture of other articles of paper and paperboard; 1810 Printing and service activities related to printing; 
1812 Other printing; 1813 Pre-press and pre-media services; 1820 Reproduction of recorded media; 2229 
Manufacture of other plastic products; 2361 Manufacture of concrete products for construction purposes; 2451 
Casting of iron; 2561 Treatment and coating of metals; 2562 Machining; 2810 Manufacture of general-purpose 
machinery; 2932 Manufacture of other parts and accessories for motor vehicles; 3317 Repair and maintenance 
of other transport equipment; 3511 Production of electricity; 3811 Collection of non-hazardous waste; 4120 
Construction of residential and non-residential buildings; 4312 Site preparation; 4671 Wholesale of solid, liquid 
and gaseous fuels and related products; 4673 Wholesale of wood, construction materials and sanitary equipment; 
4675 Wholesale of chemical products; 4677 Wholesale of waste and scrap; 4690 Non-specialised wholesale trade; 
4900 Land transport and transport via pipelines; 4920 Freight rail transport; 4931 Urban and suburban passenger 
land transport; 4940 Freight transport by road and removal services; 5221 Service activities incidental to land 
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NACE
282 
2017 sales in EUR 
million 
Number of 
undertakings 
Proportion of 
grandfathered 
undertakings 
Comments 
Grand-
fathered 
under-
takings 
NACE 
sector 
Grand-
fathered 
under-
takings 
NACE 
sector 
% of 
sales 
% of no. 
of 
under- 
takings 
1071 N/A 20,680.9 1 9,383 N/A 0.011  
1330 2.65 1,220.5 3 1,291 0.217 0.232 
Sales data 
available for 
1/3 firms 
1810 19.61 19,045.0 3 9,585 0.103 0.03 
Sales data 
available for 
2/3 firms; 
Sales data 
from 2016 for 
one firm; 3/3 
NACE codes 
are reassigned 
by Orbis 
1812 1,364.93 14,649.7 20 6,444 9.317 0.31 
Sales data 
available for 
15/20 firms 
1820 148.99 12,237.1 1 1,615 1.22 0.124 
Sales data 
from 2015 for 
one firm; 
Sales data 
available for 
1/2 firms 
2361 9.60 8,534.6 1 1,163 0.112 0.086  
2562 7.10 21,115.0 1 16,155 0.034 0.006  
2810 N/A 
103,786.
8 
1 2,171 N/A 0.046 
Sales data 
available for 
0/1 firms; 1/1 
NACE code is 
reassigned by 
Orbis  
3317 12.54 2,712.9 1 975 0.462 0.103 
1/1 NACE code 
is reassigned 
by Orbis 
                                                            
transportation; 5222 Service activities incidental to water transportation; 5229 Other transportation support 
activities; 6420 Activities of holding companies; 6810 Buying and selling of own real estate; 7022 Business and 
other management consultancy activities; 7490 Other professional, scientific and technical activities n.e.c.; 8292 
Packaging activities; 8299 Other business support service activities n.e.c.; 9609 Other personal service activities 
n.e.c.. 
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NACE
282 
2017 sales in EUR 
million 
Number of 
undertakings 
Proportion of 
grandfathered 
undertakings 
Comments 
Grand-
fathered 
under-
takings 
NACE 
sector 
Grand-
fathered 
under-
takings 
NACE 
sector 
% of 
sales 
% of no. 
of 
under- 
takings 
4212 N/A 2,044.5 1 260 N/A 0.385 
Sales data 
available for 
0/1 firms; 1/1 
NACE codes is 
reassigned by 
Orbis  
4312 336.38 2,334.9 1 3,142 14.407 0.032 
1/1 NACE 
codes is 
reassigned by 
Orbis 
4690 N/A 77,043.5 1 4,693 N/A 0.021 
1/1 NACE 
codes is 
reassigned by 
Orbis 
4900 88.78 95,219.6 3 70,215 0.093 0.003 
3/3 NACE 
codes are 
reassigned by 
Orbis; Sales 
data available 
for 1/3 firms 
4920 6,457.05 N/A 25 N/A N/A N/A 
NACE code 
data on 
Eurostat is 
confidential 
4931 195.40 25,140.0 4 3,887 0.777 0.077 
3/4 NACE 
codes are 
reassigned by 
Orbis 
4940 3.1 44,824.0 1 38,455 0.007 0.003 
1/1 NACE 
codes is 
reassigned by 
Orbis 
5221 37.52 10,660.1 2 2,534 0.352 0.079 
2/2 NACE 
codes are 
reassigned by 
Orbis 
5222 171.57 3,396.7 1 688 5.051 0.145 
1/1 NACE 
codes is 
reassigned by 
Orbis 
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NACE
282 
2017 sales in EUR 
million 
Number of 
undertakings 
Proportion of 
grandfathered 
undertakings 
Comments 
Grand-
fathered 
under-
takings 
NACE 
sector 
Grand-
fathered 
under-
takings 
NACE 
sector 
% of 
sales 
% of no. 
of 
under- 
takings 
5229 1,294.63 87,489.5 5 15,515 1.480 0.032 
5/5 NACE 
codes are 
reassigned by 
Orbis; Sales 
data available 
for 3/5 firms 
6420 264.86 N/A 2 N/A N/A N/A 
2/2 NACE 
codes are 
reassigned by 
Orbis; NACE 
code does not 
appear on 
Eurostat 
7490 78.19 15,120.9 1 34,600 0.517 0.003 
1/1 NACE 
codes is 
reassigned by 
Orbis 
8292 N/A 3,651.6 1 1,276 N/A 0.078 
1/1 NACE 
codes is 
reassigned by 
Orbis; One 
firm does not 
have sales 
data available 
8299 86.62 31,606.7 1 34,768 0.274 0.003 
1/1 NACE 
codes is 
reassigned by 
Orbis 
9609 6.0 N/A 1 N/A N/A N/A 
1/1 NACE 
codes is 
reassigned by 
Orbis; NACE 
code is not 
available on 
Eurostat 
Source: Bureau van Dijk, Eurostat. Note: There are additional grandfathered undertakings, based on the NACE 
code provided by BAFA, in the NACE codes 1060,1071 (3x), 1600, 1820, 2200, 2450, and 2562. Due to the 
conflicting information between BAFA and Orbis in respect to the NACE codes, they are neglected in the table. 
Additionally, there are three undertakings, which BAFA tags with NACE 4920, while Orbis tags them with NACE 
4910. These undertakings are not included in the map of undertakings active in NACE 4910 
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Table 15: Relevance of grandfathered undertakings in NACE sectors in Italy 
NACE
283 
2017 sales in EUR 
million 
Number of 
undertakings 
Proportion of 
grandfathered 
undertakings 
Comments 
Grand-
fathered 
under-
takings 
NACE 
sector 
Grand-
fathered 
under-
takings 
NACE 
sector 
% of 
sales 
% of no. 
of under- 
takings 
0100 14.7  1    NACE code is not 
available on 
Eurostat 
0110 48.0  1    NACE code is not 
available on 
Eurostat 
0111 6.4  1    NACE code is not 
available on 
Eurostat 
                                                            
283 NACE Codes – 111 Growing of cereals (except rice), leguminous crops and oil seeds, 0161 Support activities 
for crop production, 0163 Post-harvest crop activities, 0210 Silviculture and other forestry activities, 1052 
Manufacture of ice cream, 1071 Manufacture of bread; manufacture of fresh pastry goods and cakes, 1330 
Finishing of textiles, 1811 Printing of newspapers, 1812 Other printing, 1814 Binding and related services, 2361 
Manufacture of concrete products for construction purposes, 2363 Manufacture of ready-mixed concrete, 2364 
Manufacture of mortars, 2550 Forging, pressing, stamping and roll-forming of metal; powder metallurgy, 2561 
Treatment and coating of metals, 2562 Machining, 3312 Repair of machinery, 3521 Manufacture of gas, 3821 
Treatment and disposal of non-hazardous waste, 4120 Construction of residential and non-residential buildings, 
4321 Electrical installation, 4621 Wholesale of grain, unmanufactured tobacco, seeds and animal feeds, 4631 
Wholesale of fruit and vegetables, 4632 Wholesale of meat and meat products, 4639 Non-specialised wholesale 
of food, beverages and tobacco, 4641 Wholesale of textiles, 4662 Wholesale of machine tools, 4669 Wholesale 
of other machinery and equipment, 4673 Wholesale of wood, construction materials and sanitary equipment, 
4674 Wholesale of hardware, plumbing and heating equipment and supplies, 4675 Wholesale of chemical 
products, 4676 Wholesale of other intermediate products, 4791 Retail sale via mail order houses or via Internet, 
4941 Freight transport by road, 5210 Warehousing and storage, 5814 Publishing of journals and periodicals, 6420 
Activities of holding companies, 6820 Renting and operating of own or leased real estate, 7010 Activities of head 
offices, 7219 Other research and experimental development on natural sciences and engineering, 9609 Other 
personal service activities n.e.c., 0100 Crop and animal production, hunting and related service activities, 0110 
Growing of non-perennial crops, 0700 Mining of metal ores, 0810 Quarrying of stone, sand and clay, 0890 Mining 
and quarrying n.e.c., 1000 Manufacture of food products, 1010 Processing and preserving of meat and production 
of meat products, 1030 Processing and preserving of fruit and vegetables, 1060 Manufacture of grain mill 
products, starches and starch products, 1070 Manufacture of bakery and farinaceous products, 1090 Manufacture 
of prepared animal feeds, 1300 Manufacture of textiles, 1700 Manufacture of paper and paper products, 1710 
Manufacture of pulp, paper and paperboard, 1720 Manufacture of articles of paper and paperboard, 1810 Printing 
and service activities related to printing, 2000 Manufacture of chemicals and chemical products, 2010 Manufacture 
of basic chemicals, fertilisers and nitrogen compounds, plastics and synthetic rubber in primary forms, 2100 
Manufacture of basic pharmaceutical products and pharmaceutical preparations, 2210 Manufacture of rubber 
products, 2220 Manufacture of plastics products, 2300 Manufacture of other non-metallic mineral products, 2310 
Manufacture of glass and glass products, 2340 Manufacture of other porcelain and ceramic products, 2350 
Manufacture of cement, lime and plaster, 2400 Manufacture of basic metals, 2430 Manufacture of other products 
of first processing of steel, 2440 Manufacture of basic precious and other non-ferrous metals, 2450 Casting of 
metals, 2500 Manufacture of fabricated metal products, except machinery and equipment, 2510 Manufacture of 
structural metal products, 2560 Treatment and coating of metals; machining, 2590 Manufacture of other 
fabricated metal products, 2610 Manufacture of electronic components and boards, 2810 Manufacture of general-
purpose machinery, 2820 Manufacture of other general-purpose machinery, 2840 Manufacture of metal forming 
machinery and machine tools, 2930 Manufacture of parts and accessories for motor vehicles, 3100 Manufacture 
of furniture, 4600 Wholesale trade, except of motor vehicles and motorcycles, 5810 Publishing of books, 
periodicals and other publishing activities, 7110 Architectural and engineering activities and related technical 
consultancy 
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NACE
283 
2017 sales in EUR 
million 
Number of 
undertakings 
Proportion of 
grandfathered 
undertakings 
Comments 
Grand-
fathered 
under-
takings 
NACE 
sector 
Grand-
fathered 
under-
takings 
NACE 
sector 
% of 
sales 
% of no. 
of under- 
takings 
0161 54.8  2    NACE code is not 
available on 
Eurostat 
0163 275.2  1    NACE code is not 
available on 
Eurostat 
0210 69.9  2    NACE code is not 
available on 
Eurostat 
0700 150.3  1    Eurostat data is 
partially 
confidential, thus 
not 
representative/ne
glected 
0810 35.3 2007.0 3 1736 1.758 0.173 N/A 
0890 83.9 611.4 1 140 13.725 0.714 N/A 
1000 192.7 117954.9 5 52542 0.163 0.010 N/A 
1010 139.7 24177.7 6 3182 0.578 0.189 N/A 
1030 102.0 11565.3 5 1768 0.882 0.283 One sales number 
is from before 
2017 
1052 404.5 1063.4 2 354 38.037 0.565 One undertaking 
is a leading player 
in the market 
1060 40.6 7131.0 2 1146 0.570 0.175 N/A 
1070 17.4 19269.8 1 34285 0.090 0.003 N/A 
1071 156.7 7736.7 7 29061 2.026 0.024 N/A 
1090 175.7 5537.6 5 492 3.172 1.016 N/A 
1300 112.9 20796.7 5 13471 0.543 0.037 One sales number 
is from after 2017 
1330 591.1 2082.3 52 2190 28.385 2.374 One sales number 
is from before 
2017; Four 
undertakings 
together generate 
more than 20% of 
the aggregated 
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NACE
283 
2017 sales in EUR 
million 
Number of 
undertakings 
Proportion of 
grandfathered 
undertakings 
Comments 
Grand-
fathered 
under-
takings 
NACE 
sector 
Grand-
fathered 
under-
takings 
NACE 
sector 
% of 
sales 
% of no. 
of under- 
takings 
sales of all 
grandfathered 
undertakings 
1700 735.4 23176.1 2 3637 3.173 0.055 N/A 
1710 354.8 5987.9 6 180 5.925 3.333 N/A 
1720 351.4 17188.2 8 3457 2.044 0.231 One sales number 
is not available 
1810 44.5 10281.6 3 14901 0.433 0.020 N/A 
1811 38.3 339.4 4 35 11.286 11.429 N/A 
1812 1281.9 8509.9 37 11652 15.064 0.318 One sales number 
is not available 
1814 111.7 605.2 2 1112 18.453 0.180 One undertaking 
is a leading player 
in the market 
2000 1153.0 68662.3 7 4250 1.679 0.165 N/A 
2010 5412.3 39870.3 13 989 13.575 1.314 N/A 
2100 275.9 27146.7 6 405 1.016 1.481 N/A 
2210 677.1 12355.2 8 1339 5.480 0.597 One sales number 
is from before 
2017 
2220 5274.4 33614.3 188 8330 15.691 2.257 One sales number 
is from before 
2017 
2300 40.8 28583.8 1 17978 0.143 0.006 N/A 
2310 1032.1 6090.6 14 2933 16.946 0.477 N/A 
2340 55.6 979.6 3 2198 5.680 0.136 One sales number 
is not available 
2350 3.6 2057.3 1 146 0.177 0.685 N/A 
2361 33.5 2117.0 2 1139 1.582 0.176 One sales number 
is from before 
2017 
2363 40.7 2144.4 2 1074 1.898 0.186 N/A 
2364 12.7 238.3 1 71 5.343 1.408 N/A 
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NACE
283 
2017 sales in EUR 
million 
Number of 
undertakings 
Proportion of 
grandfathered 
undertakings 
Comments 
Grand-
fathered 
under-
takings 
NACE 
sector 
Grand-
fathered 
under-
takings 
NACE 
sector 
% of 
sales 
% of no. 
of under- 
takings 
2400 580.9 57899.4 1 3257 1.003 0.031 N/A 
2430 105.3 6227.5 4 667 1.691 0.600 N/A 
2440 611.0 14838.4 3 663 4.118 0.452 N/A 
2450 1511.7 6776.1 36 1036 22.309 3.475 Two undertakings 
together generate 
more than 40% of 
the aggregated 
sales of all 
grandfathered 
undertakings 
2500 354.3 80720.4 7 62759 0.439 0.011 N/A 
2510 235.7 19012.8 6 29506 1.240 0.020 N/A 
2550 3464.2 11170.7 92 1317 31.011 6.986 N/A 
2560 23.7 19029.7 1 15465 0.124 0.006 N/A 
2561 1215.0 5309.6 94 3682 22.883 2.553 One sales number 
is from after 2017 
2562 1144.7 13720.1 46 11783 8.344 0.390 One sales number 
is not available 
2590 293.3 18552.4 8 11158 1.581 0.072 N/A 
2610 1598.0 6090.3 1 1940 26.239 0.052 One undertaking 
is a leading player 
in the market 
2810 15.1 31350.9 1 2712 0.048 0.037 N/A 
2820 134.2 40630.4 4 7314 0.330 0.055 One sales number 
is not available 
2840 356.0 9137.1 2 1699 3.896 0.118 N/A 
2930 179.7 24504.4 1 1425 0.733 0.070 N/A 
3100 633.8 22300.6 8 18200 2.842 0.044 N/A 
3312 20.7 6719.9 2 18563 0.308 0.011 N/A 
3521 67.9 94.4 2 45 71.911 4.444 One undertaking 
is a leading player 
in the market and 
generates more 
than 65% of all 
sales in the NACE 
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NACE
283 
2017 sales in EUR 
million 
Number of 
undertakings 
Proportion of 
grandfathered 
undertakings 
Comments 
Grand-
fathered 
under-
takings 
NACE 
sector 
Grand-
fathered 
under-
takings 
NACE 
sector 
% of 
sales 
% of no. 
of under- 
takings 
sector; sector only 
includes other 
manufacturer of 
gas, yet 
undertaking is 
also active in 
related sectors 
3821 5.4 4468.3 1 771 0.121 0.130 N/A 
4120 21.8 51694.5 2 109670 0.042 0.002 N/A 
4321 29.9 20204.4 1 66412 0.148 0.002 N/A 
4600 29.4 517968.3 2 379784 0.006 0.001 N/A 
4621 84.0 13649.2 3 3436 0.615 0.087 N/A 
4631 37.3 24656.6 2 7874 0.151 0.025 N/A 
4632 22.7 11553.6 2 3018 0.196 0.066 N/A 
4639 146.2 21024.9 2 2349 0.695 0.085 N/A 
4641 2.7 4117.5 1 3248 0.065 0.031 N/A 
4662 52.7 6242.7 1 3538 0.845 0.028 N/A 
4669 35.4 17937.3 1 9149 0.197 0.011 N/A 
4673 97.8 18184.3 3 15667 0.538 0.019 N/A 
4674 39.5 17142.3 3 6951 0.231 0.043 N/A 
4675 466.9 16162.7 3 3981 2.889 0.075 N/A 
4676 222.6 7841.2 4 3315 2.839 0.121 One sales number 
is not available 
4791 14.0 9834.4 1 12170 0.143 0.008 N/A 
4941 23.1 47308.5 1 62752 0.049 0.002 N/A 
5210 15.9 3630.9 1 1660 0.439 0.060 N/A 
5810 88.3 7421.9 2 4648 1.190 0.043 N/A 
5814 49.2 2287.0 1 1791 2.153 0.056 N/A 
6420 79.1  2    One sales number 
is from after 2017 
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NACE
283 
2017 sales in EUR 
million 
Number of 
undertakings 
Proportion of 
grandfathered 
undertakings 
Comments 
Grand-
fathered 
under-
takings 
NACE 
sector 
Grand-
fathered 
under-
takings 
NACE 
sector 
% of 
sales 
% of no. 
of under- 
takings 
6820 151.8 23729.2 4 144539 0.640 0.003 N/A 
7010 277.5 6478.6 5 1241 4.283 0.403 N/A 
7110 17.7 15887.5 1 196199 0.111 0.001 N/A 
7219 16.6 2575.8 1 4489 0.645 0.022 N/A 
9609 17.6  1    NACE code is not 
available on 
Eurostat 
Source: Bureau van Dijk, Eurostat. Note: There are 19 undertakings, which were identified by Orbis, yet do not 
show a NACE code. Therefore, these undertakings could also potentially be grandfathered undertakings. These 
undertakings are neglected in the table and therefore their respective share is potentially underestimated. 
Additionally, there are 54 undertakings on the list of beneficiaries provided by the Italian regulator, which Orbis 
did not identify based on the tax ID code (Partita IVA). If possible, these were identified on Orbis through their 
company name. If the manual search did not yield the appropriate undertaking listing on Orbis, the concerned 
undertaking is being neglected.  
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Annex 8.3 - Literature review 
Impacts of environmental regulations on the affected firms have been extensively debated 
and analysed in the economic literature. There are two different views in the environmental 
economics literature on the effects of asymmetric policies on the firms’ performance: the 
pollution haven (or carbon leakage) hypothesis and the Porter hypothesis.  
The pollution haven hypothesis predicts that more stringent environmental policies will 
increase compliance costs and drive pollution-intensive production to regions with weak 
environmental policy (e.g., Levinson and Taylor, 2008). Subsequently, there will be a 
carbon leakage from the regions with more stringent environmental policies to regions with 
weak environmental policy. Imposing RES levies should have thus caused carbon leakage 
from EU to other regions of the world, insofar as the tightening of environmental policy 
has been unilateral. 
In contrast, the Porter hypothesis (Porter and van der Linde 1995) argues that stringent 
environmental policies promote cost-cutting efficiency improvements, which reduce or 
completely offset regulatory costs, and foster innovation in new technologies. This, 
subsequently, helps firms to achieve international technological leadership and expand 
market share. 
This section, reviews the recent economic literature that has analysed the impacts of 
asymmetric environmental regulations on competitiveness. Although most of the papers 
do not discuss RES levies per se, any environmental policy that increases the cost of using 
non-renewable energy - such as carbon emission price –expectedly has similar effects as 
RES levies. 
The section begins by reviewing the predictions from recent papers that have applied 
computational general equilibrium (CGE) models. In the second subsection, it moves on to 
review the recent empirical literature. First, it discusses at papers where the point of 
departure is more based on the pollution haven hypothesis and which analyse, for example, 
whether it is observable that more stringent environmental policies would have caused 
changes in trade flows or firms’ location choices. Second, it discusses papers that build 
more on the Porter hypothesis and focus on the impacts of environmental regulations on 
various measures of competitiveness, such as productivity, innovation, sales, export share, 
and investment. Third, it focuses on papers that have assessed the impacts of 
environmental regulations on employment. The final subsection concludes.  
Carbone and Rivers (2017) have recently reviewed the CGE models on this topic, whilst 
Dechezleprêtre and Sato (2017) have gone through the empirical literature. The section 
below will build upon these reviews and, for simplicity, refer to the former by CR and to 
the latter by DS. It summarises the main findings from these reviews, discussing explicitly 
each paper that has employed data from EU. Alongside it complements the text with the 
most recent studies published after 2017. Unfortunately, the studies that employ data from 
EU do not yet cover the period beyond 2013. 
8.3.1 CGE models 
This section focuses on studies that employ CGE models to predict the impacts of 
environmental regulation on international trade, productivity, economic performance and 
employment. CGE models are based on the same foundation as theoretical models, but 
they are solved numerically rather than algebraically. In addition, CGE models calibrate 
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the system of equations to observed economic data, thus providing a numerical estimate 
of the magnitude of the effect to be estimated. 
According to the pollution haven hypothesis, stringent environmental policies drive 
pollution-intensive production to regions with weak environmental policy. Subsequently, 
within a given country, and insofar as the environmental policies are effective, a reduction 
in greenhouse gas emissions should be associated with a decrease in net exports in energy 
intensive sectors. When energy intensive sectors move their production abroad, exports of 
those goods decrease and some of the domestic consumption is replaced by imports. 
Meanwhile, greenhouse gas emissions in the country decrease. 
This hypothesis is also partly supported by the models studied by CR: The average model 
arrives to a reduction of approximately 7 percent in exports for a country that unilaterally 
reduces its greenhouse gas emissions by 20 percent. However, CR is not able to find 
discernible relationship across the studies between import volumes and levels of unilateral 
greenhouse gas reductions. 
8.3.1.1 Productivity, innovation and economic performance 
The models reviewed by CR also seem to agree that the output in emission intensive 
sectors decreases when a country unilaterally cuts down greenhouse gas emissions. 
Moreover, there appears to be some agreement among the studies concerning the 
magnitude of this effect: for a 20 percent reduction in emission levels from the pre-policy 
baseline, the models predict a reduction of approximately 5 percent in output. This is 
slightly lower than the reduction of 8.3% obtained by Pezzey (1992) for EC.  
In a fairly recent paper Baccianti and Löschel (2014) develop a dynamic multi-sector CGE 
model that distinguishes between R&D-based process innovation for all firms, endogenous 
product innovation in the capital good sector and adoption decisions with respect to the 
installation of new capital vintages in the rest of the economy. The results of the authors 
support the previous literature in finding that aggregate innovation declines following an 
energy tax but whereas process innovation is reduced, product innovation actually rises. 
The authors further find that demand pull policies are less effective than product-related 
R&D subsidies to reduce aggregate energy intensity. 
8.3.1.2 Employment 
According to CR, only a few studies examine the response of employment levels to 
unilateral reductions in greenhouse gas levels. However, the ones that do suggest a 
response that is very similar to output: roughly a 5 percent reduction in emission intensive 
sector employment when there is a 20 percent unilateral reduction in the greenhouse gas 
emissions.  
In a recent paper by Castellanos and Heutel (2019) develop a CGE model of US economy 
to study the unemployment effects of climate policy and the importance of cross-sectoral 
labour mobility. The authors consider two alternate extreme assumptions about labour 
mobility: either perfect mobility, as is assumed in much previous work, or perfect 
immobility. The effect of a $35 per ton carbon tax on aggregate unemployment is small 
and similar across the two labour mobility assumptions (0.2–0.3 percentage points). The 
effect on unemployment in fossil fuel sectors is much larger under the immobility 
assumption – a 30 percentage-point increase in the coal sector – suggesting that models 
omitting labour mobility frictions may greatly under-predict sectoral unemployment 
effects. Returning carbon tax revenue through labour tax cuts can dampen or even reverse 
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negative impacts on unemployment, while command-and-control policies yield larger 
unemployment effects. 
8.3.2 Ex-post studies 
8.3.2.1 International trade and location choice 
At the most straightforward level, pollution haven hypothesis has been tested simply by 
examining the overall effect of international trade on the quality of the environment. Based 
on the reviewed literature, DS find little evidence that would support the hypothesis that 
international trade would worsen the quality of the environment. In fact, the authors even 
refer to a study by Antweiler et al. (2001), where international trade is found to decrease 
the level of sulfur dioxide concentration, because the increase in economic activity (scale 
effect) is offset by changes in both technology and the composition of output in the 
economy. 
Based on literature that more directly assess whether environmental regulation causes 
changes in trade flows, DS conclude that environmental regulation does have an impact 
on trade flows, at least in geographically mobile sectors. Studies that focus on the impacts 
of carbon pricing policies on trade report modest effects, particularly in more energy-
intensive sectors. This is also the conclusion drawn by Branger et al. (2016), who examine 
the impact of the EU ETS using a time-series analysis for the period 2004–2012. They test 
whether carbon prices increased net EU imports of cement and steel, but they find limited 
evidence. 
The conclusions by DS are in line with the results of a recent paper by Ederington et al. 
(2019), in which the authors use industry-level bilateral trade data to study the impacts of 
the ratification of an international environmental agreement (IEA) on country’s exports. 
The authors find that ratifying an IEA has significant, but small, negative effects on the 
exports of a country’s median (in terms of emission intensity) manufacturing industry in 
the short run. In addition, ratifying an IEA induces a compositional shift towards exporting 
cleaner goods and this effect becomes stronger in the long-run as a ratifying country sees 
a further decline in exports of polluting industries which is more than compensated for by 
an increase in exports of cleaner industries, with an overall positive but negligible effect 
on employment. In contrast to the results above, Naegele and Zaklan (2019), who also 
use industry-level bilateral data, find no evidence that the EU ETS emission costs caused 
carbon leakage in European manufacturing. 
Yet using trade flows as a starting point, Barrows and Ollivier (2018) how production and 
emissions of manufacturing firms in one country respond to foreign demand shocks in 
trading partner markets. Using a panel of large Indian manufacturers the authors estimate 
that foreign demand growth leads to higher exports, domestic sales, production, and 
CO2emissions, and slightly lower emission intensity. Interpreting their results literally 
would indicate that environmental regulation that doubles energy prices world-wide 
(except in India) would only increase CO2 emissions from India by1.5%. Thus, while 
leakage fears are legitimate, the magnitude appears fairly small. 
Besides trade flows, the impacts of environmental regulation also on location choices have 
been examined. Several researchers have used the variation in environmental standards 
across U.S. to examine its effect on manufacturing plant location. The papers reviewed by 
DS suggest that studies with a smaller geographic scope tend to find stronger effects, 
possibly because smaller areas tend to have less variation in the other determinants of 
production location. This conclusion is also supported by the findings of Millimet and List 
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(2004), who say that the effects of environmental standards vary systematically with other 
location-specific factors.  
Within-country variation in environmental standards has also been used to examine its 
impacts on both inwards and outwards FDI location. Based on analysis conducted using UK 
firm-level data, Manderson and Kneller (2012) are not able to find evidence that firms with 
high environmental compliance costs are more likely to establish foreign subsidiaries than 
those with low environmental compliance costs. Taking into account also the studies from 
US, DS conclude that the overall evidence from the literature on this topic is inconclusive. 
8.3.2.2 Productivity, innovation and economic performance 
Environmental regulation may affect firms’ decisions concerning the volume, type, or 
timing of their investments, including their investments on research and development. 
Subsequently environmental regulation may have an impact on firms’ productivity and 
long-term competitiveness.  
Considered in isolation, because investment in pollution control diverts resources away 
from production, economic theory seems to suggest that environmental regulation will 
hamper productivity growth. However, the literature reviewed by DS suggests that 
environmental regulation has both negative, short-term impacts on productivity in some 
sectors and for some pollutants and positive productivity impacts in others. 
DS quote several studies that support the so-called “induced innovation hypothesis”, which 
suggests that when regulated firms face a higher price on polluting emissions relative to 
other costs of production, these firms have an incentive to develop new emissions-reducing 
technologies. Among the quoted papers is the one by Calel and Dechezleprêtre (2016) who 
employ firm-level data to estimate the impacts of EU ETS on innovation. According to the 
results, EU ETS has increased innovation activity in low-carbon technologies among 
regulated companies by 30 percent relative to a control group. 
In a recent paper Fusillo et al. (2019) use a dataset of European firms over the period 
2005-2012 and find that rather than having a direct effect on the development of green 
technologies, environmental regulation stimulates firms to search for new qualified 
collaboration. Then the nature and the structure of these collaborations is the factor that 
potentially encourages firms to generate new green technological knowledge. 
Empirical literature supports the view that regulation promotes environmental innovation. 
Subsequently, from a policy perspective, the next logical step is to assess which regulatory 
instruments provide the strongest incentives for innovation. DS quote an array of 
theoretical literature suggesting that market-based instruments provide stronger 
incentives for innovation than technology mandates and performance standards. However, 
the few empirical papers reviewed by DS appear to at least partly contradict this 
hypothesis. 
Moving to competitiveness, in a recent paper Gerster and Lamp (2019) investigate the 
causal impact of an exemption from the renewable energy sources levy in Germany on 
plant-level electricity consumption, fuel input choices, and competitiveness indicators 
(sales, export share, and investment). The data ranges from 2010 to 2013. The authors 
find that exempt plants increase electricity consumption by 5-7.5% in response to the 
exemption, substitute electricity for gas and reduce own electricity generation capacities. 
Electricity-intensive plants adjust energy inputs more strongly in response to an 
exemption, whilst export-oriented firms do it less. The authors do not find evidence that 
the exemption had an impact on competitiveness indicators. 
 316 
 
Employing the same estimation methodology as Gerster and Lamp (2019), Laukkanen et 
al. (2019) study the causal impact of energy tax exemption on the economic and 
environmental performance of the manufacturing firms in Finland. The researchers employ 
a dataset that contains information on establishment level economic outcomes, 
expenditure and energy use and firm level information on tax refunds for years 2007-2016. 
To this end, the last two years of the dataset overlap with the EEAG. However, the focus 
of the analysis is Finland’s 2011 energy tax reform and the subsequent expansion of a pre-
existing tax exemption for large energy-intensive firms. Laukkanen et al. (2019) find that 
the exemption has had no statistically significant impact on turnover, value added, wages, 
number of people employed or electricity consumption and negative impact on gross output 
and energy efficiency.  
Third very recent study by Dechezleprêtre et al. (2018), which also relies on the same 
methodology as the two aforementioned papers, investigates the joint impact of the 
European Union Emissions Trading System (EU ETS) on carbon emissions and economic 
performance of regulated companies. The impact on emissions is analysed using 
installation-level carbon emissions from national Polluting Emissions Registries from 
France, Netherlands, Norway and the United Kingdom complemented with data from the 
European Pollutant Release and Transfer Register (E-PRTR). The impact on firm 
performance is analysed using firm-level data for all countries covered by the EU ETS. The 
analysis focuses on the first and the second trading period of the EU ETS and therefore the 
datasets extent only up until 2013. The authors find that the EU ETS has induced carbon 
emission reductions in the order of -10% between 2005 and 2012, but it has not have any 
negative impact on the economic performance of regulated firms. Moreover, 
Dechezleprêtre et al. (2018) even find that the EU ETS has led to an increase in regulated 
firms’ revenues and fixed assets.  
8.3.2.3 Employment 
The political acceptability of climate policies is undermined by job-killing arguments, 
especially for the least-skilled workers. Using a general-equilibrium two-sector search 
model, Hafstead and Williams (2016) show that in the long run environmental regulations 
might simply induce a substitution between polluting and non-polluting activities. This 
implies that the long run impacts of environmental regulations on net employment is 
impossible to determine a priori.  
To this end, DS turn to empirical studies that have been conducted at the microeconomic 
level and focus on short run effects of environmental regulations on employment. Out of 
these studies, the only one that uses data from EU is the one by Cole and Elliot (2007): 
using an industry-level data from in UK the authors carry out an analysis that provides no 
evidence that environmental regulations reduced employment in the 27 examined 
industries. Taking into account also the other studies on this topic, DS conclude that the 
effects of environmental regulations on employment in energy intensive sectors seem to 
be small but statistically significant. However, the authors point out that all the studies 
they reviewed were based only on within-country analyses and since relocation barriers 
are likely higher between countries, then the results from the literature present upper 
bounds on the likely effects of cross-border difference in environmental stringency.  
In a recent paper Marin and Vona (2019) use sectoral-level data to examine the 
associations between climate policies, proxied by energy prices, and workforce skills for 14 
European countries and 15 industrial sectors over the period 1995–2011. The authors find 
that climate policies have been skill biased against manual workers and have favoured 
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technicians. The long-term change in energy prices accounted for between 9.2% and 
17.5% (resp. 4.2% and 8.0%) of the increase (resp. decrease) in the share of technicians 
(resp. manual workers). Finally, as mentioned above, Ederington et al. (2019), find that 
ratifying an IEA has an overall positive but negligible effect on employment. 
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Annex 9.1 – Review of Article 39 GBER schemes  
(see accompanying Excel file) 
 
Annex 9.2 – Review of Article 39 GBER schemes containing provisions on 
the granting of aid  
(Confidential Annex) 
 
Annex 9.3 – Responses to questionnaires 
(Confidential Annex)
  
 
Annex 10 – Subsidy-free projects approved outside and auction system 
Country Technology Project name and/or 
location 
Capacity 
(MW) 
Reference 
Spain Solar Torre de Cotillas 1, Murcia 3.9 https://www.foresightgroup.eu/news/foresight-starts-construction-of-torre-de-cotillas-1-a-39-
mw-solar-farm-in-murcia-spain/ 
Don Rodrigo, Seville 148.8 https://www.baywa-re.com/en/cases/emea/subsidy-free-solar-power/ 
El Salobral, Andalucia 45.6 https://www.pv-tech.org/news/hive-energy-bags-approval-for-45.6mw-subsidy-free-solar-farm-
in-spain 
Germany Solar Bavaria 1.5 https://www.pv-tech.org/news/axpo-boosts-german-subsidy-free-scene-with-ppa-debut 
Rostock 85 https://renews.biz/51497/enbw-backs-subsidy-free-solar-in-germany/ 
Barth V, Stralsund-Barth 7.5 https://www.baywa-re.de/en/solar/solar-park-barth-v/ 
North Western part of 
Germany 
4 https://www.centrica.com/media-centre/news/2019/subsidy-free-solar-ppa-in-germany/ 
Norway Onshore wind Horavind, Nordhordland 1,500 https://renewablesnow.com/news/norways-norsk-vind-plans-building-15-gw-zero-subsidy-wind-
farm-646808/ 
Italy Solar Montalto di Castro, Lazio 
region 
63 https://www.pv-magazine.com/2018/12/17/octopus-signs-second-italian-private-ppa-in-a-week/ 
Not known 70.5 https://renews.biz/50465/shell-and-octopus-shake-on-italian-deal/ 
Assemini, Sardinia 40 https://renewableenergytimes.com/2018/04/09/octopus-secures-5-year-ppa-for-another-40-mw-
of-solar-in-italy/ 
Naro, Sicily 15 1https://www.pv-magazine.com/2018/12/17/octopus-signs-second-italian-private-ppa-in-a-
week/ 
Multiple locations 425 https://www.protheagroup.com › 2018_01_31 Limes RE - PR - Limes Italia 
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Country Technology Project name and/or 
location 
Capacity 
(MW) 
Reference 
Basilicata 20 https://renewablesnow.com/news/audax-renovables-bas-fv-italia-shake-hands-on-10-year-solar-
ppa-639694/ 
Lazio, Molise, Basilicata, 
Sicily, Sardinia 
400 http://www.solareb2b.it/horus-capital-400-mw-italia/ 
Multiple locations 250 https://bebeez.it/files/2019/05/RENERGETICA-EOS_accordo-27052019.pdf 
Piemonte, Lazio e Basilicata 100 https://www.milanofinanza.it/news/renergetica-accordo-pluriennale-con-building-energy-ltd-
201905161022252722 
Onshore wind Mazara del Vallo, Sicily 
Region 
18 https://analysis.newenergyupdate.com/wind-energy-update/vestas-tailors-turbine-site-win-first-
italy-merchant-deal 
Northern Italy 23 http://www.energysaving.it/eolico-arriva-il-primo-contratto-ppa-in-italia/ 
Finland Onshore wind Viinamäki, Ii 21 https://www.tuulivoimayhdistys.fi/hankelista 
Lakiakangas, Isojoki 50.4 https://www.tuulivoimayhdistys.fi/hankelista 
Kuuronkallio, Kannus 60 https://www.tuulivoimayhdistys.fi/hankelista 
Hedet, Närpiö 81 https://www.tuulivoimayhdistys.fi/hankelista 
Långmossan, Maalahti 30.1 https://www.tuulivoimayhdistys.fi/hankelista 
Ribäcken, Maalahti 23 https://www.tuulivoimayhdistys.fi/hankelista 
Ponsiovuori, Kurikka 31.1 https://www.tuulivoimayhdistys.fi/hankelista 
Verhonkulma, Marttila 27 https://www.tuulivoimayhdistys.fi/hankelista 
Paltusmäki, Pyhäjoki 21.8 https://www.tuulivoimayhdistys.fi/hankelista 
Välikangas, Haapäjärvi 100 https://www.tuulivoimayhdistys.fi/hankelista 
Somero 18 https://www.tuulivoimayhdistys.fi/hankelista 
 321 
 
Country Technology Project name and/or 
location 
Capacity 
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Saunamaa, Teuva, Kurikka 33.6 https://www.tuulivoimayhdistys.fi/hankelista 
Suolakangas, Kauhajoki 37.8 https://www.tuulivoimayhdistys.fi/hankelista 
Kajaani, Pyhäntä, 
Piiparinmäki 
211 https://www.tuulivoimayhdistys.fi/hankelista 
Oltava, Pyhäjoki 91 https://www.tuulivoimayhdistys.fi/hankelista 
Kröpuln, Uusikaarlepyy 30.1 https://www.tuulivoimayhdistys.fi/hankelista 
Storbacken, Vöyri 30.1 https://www.tuulivoimayhdistys.fi/hankelista 
Polusjärvi, Pyhäjoki 56 https://www.tuulivoimayhdistys.fi/hankelista 
Kokkola, Kalajoki, Kannus, 
Mutkalampi 
250 https://www.tuulivoimayhdistys.fi/hankelista 
 Not known 52.6 https://www.tuulivoimayhdistys.fi/hankelista 
Sweden Onshore wind Markbygden ETT, 
Markbygden 
650 https://svevind.se/Project/Markbygden%20ETT 
Aldermyrberget, Skellefteå 72 https://www.wpd.de/en/wpd-builds-72-megawatts-project-in-sweden/ 
Målarberget, Norberg, 
Avesta 
113 https://www.pne-ag.com/en/newsroom/news/article/pne-ag-another-large-wind-farm-sold-in-
sweden/ 
Laxå, Örebro 25 http://www.vksvind.se/project/laxaskogen/pressrealease/ 
UK Solar Clayhill, Milton Keynes 10 https://anesco.co.uk/subsidy-free-solar-pv/ 
Westhampnett, Sussex 7.4 https://www.solarpowerportal.co.uk/news/uks_second_subsidy_free_solar_farm_completed_by_
west_sussex_council_using_b 
York 29.5 https://www.gridserve.com/post/breaking-news 
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Hull 21.8 https://www.gridserve.com/post/breaking-news 
Outwood Solar Park, Essex 6 https://wirsol.co.uk/wirsol-energy-ltd-announces-the-acquisition-of-two-subsidiary-free-solar-
parks-in-the-uk-2/ 
Trowse-Newton Solar Park, 
Norfolk 
7.7 https://wirsol.co.uk/wirsol-energy-ltd-announces-the-acquisition-of-two-subsidiary-free-solar-
parks-in-the-uk-2/ 
Low Farm Solar Park, 
Lincolnshire 
17 https://wirsol.co.uk/wirsol-energy-ltd-adds-an-additional-47mwp-to-their-uk-portfolio-of-non-
subsidised-solar/ 
Sweeting Thorns Solar Park, 
Lincolnshire 
23 https://wirsol.co.uk/wirsol-energy-ltd-adds-an-additional-47mwp-to-their-uk-portfolio-of-non-
subsidised-solar/ 
Westcott Venture Park, 
Wescott 
15 https://www.westcottvp.com/news-and-insights/news/uks-first-unsubsidised-on-site-solar-park-
at-westcott 
Woodington Farm, Romsey 40 http://www.hiveenergy.co.uk/hive-energy-granted-planning-permission-develop-40mw-subsidy-
free-hampshire-solar-park/ 
Onshore Wind Withernwick Wind Farm, 
Yorkshire 
8.2 https://www.naturalpower.com/natural-power-delivers-on-uks-first-subsidy-free-wind-farm/ 
Craiggore Wind Farm, 
Northern Ireland 
25 http://res-group.mediaroom.com/press-releases?item=122591 
Douglas West, Scotland 45 https://realassets.ipe.com/news/greencoat-uk-wind-buys-45mw-douglas-west-wind-farm-in-
45m-deal/realassets.ipe.com/news/greencoat-uk-wind-buys-45mw-douglas-west-wind-farm-in-
45m-deal/10028755.fullarticle 
Crossdykes, Dumfries and 
Galloway 
46 https://www.energylivenews.com/2019/09/02/scottish-developer-breaks-ground-on-subsidy-free-
onshore-wind-farm/ 
Glen Kyllachy, Highlands 48.5 https://www.morningstar.co.uk/uk/news/AN_1570714561310880300/greencoat-uk-wins-
acquires-glen-kyllachy-in-scotland-for-gbp58-million.aspx 
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Portugal Solar Ourika, Ourique 39.1 https://welink.eu/welink-energy-poised-to-grow-its-collaboration-with-allianz-capital-partners-
following-its-sale-to-them-of-europes-largest-unsubsidised-pv-project/ 
Vale Matancas, Alcácer do 
Sol 
7 https://www.foresightgroup.it/user_uploads/foresight-group-intro-brochure-spring-2019.pdf 
Iberian Peninsula 28 https://www.photon.info/en/news/dynavolt-build-28-mw-pv-plant-portugal 
Solara4, Alcoutim 220 https://welink.eu/better-planet-now-solara4/ 
Planta Solar da Gloria, 
Salvaterra de Magos 
24 https://elperiodicodelaenergia.com/axpo-firma-un-ppa-con-blackrock-para-una-planta-solar-de-
24-mw-en-portugal/ 
Ireland Onshore wind Donegal 91.2 https://www.aboutamazon.eu/press-release/amazon-announces-new-renewable-energy-project-
in-ireland-to-support-aws-global-infrastructure 
Denmark Onshore wind Hirtshals Havn, North 
Denmark 
17 https://www.aa.com.tr/en/energy/general/vestas-to-supply-denmarks-first-subsidy-free-wind-
park-/24975 
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